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The duality construct of a ‘Muslim’ identity has become a challenge for the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community as they attempt to profess their Sri Lankan identity 
(and sense of belonging). By identifying themselves ethnically as ‘Muslims’, the 
Muslim community through political elites have played on blurring the 
distinctions between faith as a theological marker (i.e. a religious motivator) and 
faith as an identity marker (i.e. communal galvanizer). 
 
What the literature and the research shows is that the concept of Sri Lankan 
‘Muslim’ identity was and is politically ‘constructed’ as a response to colonial 
influence as well as nationalistic aspirations of other ethnic communities within 
the country.  In one sense it mirrored the development of the identity of the 
other communities in response to colonial pressures but in another sense the 
development of a Muslim identity opened the community up to influences from 
global transnational Islamic reformations.  As a result of this, ethnic 
institutionalisation leading to religious consciousness transformed into a political 
identity for survival leaving the community with a hybrid identity.  However, this 
reduced several ethnic and cultural communities that subscribe to Islam, to one 
representative model, which was subsequently challenged by hegemonic actors 
in the ethno-nationalist struggle of a country coming out of a 30-year-old ethnic 
conflict.  The challenge became more acute after the conflict as transnational 
questions of solidarity also informed the hegemonic Sinhala Buddhist actors in 
their relationship with the Muslims 
 
The study thus shows that the political elite from the community were intent on 
pushing for a political identity but did not understand the changing dynamics of 
the context. It shows that a transformation of a minority constituency due to 
changing demographic contexts at the grassroots amidst static political contexts 
could mean that the legitimacy of political elites from minority communities is 
undermined unless they can transform to meet those challenges.  It shows a 
need to reimagine how identity is formed and its narrative to manage relations 
with the ‘Other’.  In the wake of the Easter Sunday Attacks of April 2019, it 
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“The Muslim community in Sri Lanka desperately needs a 
change of strategy if they are to live as citizens, equal in status 
to all their compatriots.  This needs an enlightened political 
leadership, pragmatic religious scholarship and engaged 
community leadership that really addresses the questions 
whether we are ‘Muslims of Sri Lanka’ or ‘Muslims in Sri Lanka’.  
We can’t afford any more mistakes in how we respond and 
define ourselves as we are at crossroads ”.1 
1.1 			A	Unique	Challenge	
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka is not a new phenomenon, and can be traced 
back to Arab traders coming to Sri Lanka before and after the advent of Islam as 
well as through a history of migration as a result of colonisation, becoming the 
country’s second largest minority. The ethnic categorisations of ‘Muslims’ were 
primarily constructed in response to emerging nationalism from other 
communities in Sri Lanka in the 19th century but, the community have struggled 
to carve out their ethnic space, frequently compressed between two dominant 
ethno-nationalism projects.  
 
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent events, marked an important turning point 
for Muslim identity globally (and ultimately in Sri Lanka). Almost overnight, being 
a Muslim became an accusation on top of a religious affiliation.  In the West, 
many organisations had to respond in the public sphere to address the 
demonization of a whole religion because of the actions of a few, a sad effect of 
the natural outcome of social movement theory, which sees formal organisation 
as an “effective instrument for empowering politically excluded collectivities 
because it coordinates and focuses activities, thereby collectivising what would 
otherwise remain individualised grievances and concerns.” (Wiktorowicz 2001, 
7).    
 
For the Muslims of Sri Lanka, this accusation was and remains a double edged 
sword impacting on their religious and ethnic representation, their relationship 
with the other communities, as well as their transnational relationship to Muslims 
from outside the country. In the light of growing Buddhist ethno nationalism 
especially after the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009, they have been 
burdened with defending a religious identity and an ethnic representation that has 
become institutionalised2 over a 130 year period since the time of the British rule 
in the country. 
                                                
1		Skype	interview	with	Prof	Ameer	Ali,	March	2016	
2	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 consider	 the	 development	 and	 transformation	 of	 institutions	 (of	 all	 forms	 and	




The sentiments by Prof Ameer Ali made above, echo similar sentiments that are 
expressed in private and public by people from within the Muslim community as 
well as outside the community in Sri Lanka.  There is a sense of frustration (and 
despair) at being unable to fully understand the identity of the Sri Lankan Muslim 
and also where the ‘Muslim’ fits into the Sri Lankan national consciousness.   
 
Speaking as someone with Sri Lankan Muslim heritage, I can testify to this 
frustration (and despair).  In the first instance, people do not know that there are 
Muslims in Sri Lanka and they ask you, ‘are you Sinhalese or Tamil?’  When you 
respond ‘Muslim’, then there is a whole process of trying to explain who and how 
Muslims are considered an ethnicity in Sri Lanka and not just a faith.  There then 
follows a whole conversation around whether Muslims are a religious grouping or 
an ethnic / political expression.  Sometimes, the question is asked “aren’t there 
Sinhalese or Tamil Muslims?”.  To many Sri Lankans it is unthinkable to even ask 
this question, because they can not imagine such a case since “Muslims are a 
different ethnicity, background and so on”3.  So the question arises: ‘How does 
one explain the Sri Lankan Muslim community?” 
 
Initially I relied on my local and personal knowledge to respond to these queries 
but as I grew up I started to investigate more about what could be said in this 
space.  It is then that I became acutely aware that there is very little work that has 
been done in this regard to really get into the deep understanding of what 
constitutes the identity of the Muslim community especially from an academic 
perspective.   I realised that this confusion was as much within the Muslim 
community as with those outside.  This is why I wanted to do this PhD in order to 
contribute to the thinking in this area that unpacks and understands the lived 
experiences of Muslims.  
 
This absence of the understanding of the reality of the Muslim lived experience 
in Sri Lanka is not made any easier by global dynamics and geopolitics around 
Islam and Muslims.  Thus an ignorance of the history and lived experience of 
Muslim community in Sri Lanka coupled with global misperceptions around 
Muslims creates a scenario whereby Muslims in Sri Lanka are now viewed with 
suspicion.  Recent violent incidents in Sri Lanka signify such a rising 
Islamophobic tension and the worrying incitement to violence (Bengali 2018),  
echoing narratives that have been present in mainstream Western media for a 
long time where Islam is seen simply as a religion of unintelligible crazy, violence 
and mass-murdering fanatics.  This type of sentiment, common in the West, is 
now also becoming common in Sri Lanka and is reflected in the media coverage  
as well as mainstream narratives in Sri Lanka showing no sign of dissipating 
(Mazumdaru 2018). 





This research analyses the transformation and politicisation of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim identity over approximately 130 years following critical junctures in the 
country, primarily between 1889 and 2014.  It is essentially a study about the 
politics of identity examining structural influences and effects in particular the 
agency of Islamic political / social / cultural activism in the Sri Lankan context 
examining how Muslim identity was ‘imagined’ and ‘created’ during the time of 
British colonial rule in response to the ‘other’ formations of identity in the country.  
Thus this research explores the historical context of its roots to understand how 
Islamic identity has been transformed and politicised and the challenges being 
faced moving forward. 
 
Why choose a 130-year period?  My hypothesis is that we need a wider picture 
of the history of the Muslim community, to understand the context, the influences 
and the effects of its transformation and politicisation. Such a comprehensive 
study has not been done before that explores the holistic element of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim identity which looks at a long enough period for analysis. Hence 
in so doing, I have broken the thesis into different historical time periods largely 
based on how I see the Muslim community reacting to certain critical junctures4 
in Sri Lankan history that affected representation and formation.   
 
In doing this research, I am not exploring external influences on Islamic cultural 
practice nor really approaching it from a security lens.  Thus, this thesis is not big 
in scope as to cover the political agenda of the West in producing and 
perpetuating anti-Islam discursive practices nor does it seek to interrogate the 
global Islamophobia discourse that has queried the global Muslim experience in 
the aftermath of attacks such as  9/11 on US soil and 7/7 in London and others.    
 
In addition, though there is a case to be made of relating the development of the 
Sri Lankan Muslim identity, to wider Muslim – Buddhist interactions such as in 
Myanmar and Thailand or other nationalist cases of ethno-religious identity such 
as in Thailand and Malaysia, this is not the scope of the thesis and could be 
explored as a follow up to the thesis as next stages of research. 
1.3.1			What	is	the	Idea?	
The research tests the hypothesis that Muslim identity developed, transformed, 
was institutionalised and politicised in Sri Lanka over a 130-year period, being 
influenced by a global Islamic reformation but also responding to contextual 
influences within Sri Lanka pressurised by a colonial history.  This premise is 
evidenced by primary and secondary research data that explores the existential 
crisis faced by the Muslim community as they navigate their religious, cultural, 
ethnic and political representation in the country against the ‘other’ (other ethnic 
communities) whilst battling influences from global Islamic movements, 
globalised Islamophobia and other national and global externalities.  The analysis 




suggests that the identity of Muslims became more religiously inclined and more 
visible in the early 1980s and 1990s mirroring global moves of Islamic reformation 
and then with the onset of the ethnic conflict in the country, became embedded 
and institutionalised within a political framework.  Indeed, much of that increase 
in religious inclinations and development of institutions was premised on early 
support from the government of the time, who were anxious to ensure that the 
Muslim community were not involved in the conflict and thus encouraged the 
development of an identity and institutions. It is this encouragement that has 
contributed to the dynamic nature of the lived experience of Muslim identity in a 
minority context swinging like a pendulum from ethnic representation to religious 
expression.  In particular, the latter manifesting as increasing religiosity of 
Muslims, linked to visibility in public space has caused tensions with the other 
communities, creating an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust towards the 
Muslims. These external tensions mask the internal challenges within the 
community where the lived experience has difficulty disassociating between 
theological and cultural expressions5. 
 
The thesis will also demonstrate how the argument cannot be reduced to just 
dispelling the myth around Islam which has pervaded the relationship between 
extreme Sinhala Buddhists and the Muslims and the plethora of binary 
oppositions, linguistic associations, oppositional differences and terms that 
abound in the discursive practices of identity discussions in Sri Lanka.  I am going 
to argue that the only ‘stable’ linguistic sign in all discursive strategies is around 
‘Islam’.  In other words, what Islam is pitted against is a shifting category of 
identity representation. Islam, as a signifier, no longer draws its significance from 
being the religious affiliation of 1.6 billion people round the globe. The signified 
has become invested with an infinite set of ‘oppositions’ related to an ethnic 
identity in Sri Lanka and the particularity of the ethnic identity expression vis-à-
vis politics and religious expression.  
 
My approach here is to look at the conflation of Islam with ethnic / political identity 
to the exclusion of other aspects of identity construction. With religious 
expression, the ethnic Sri Lankan Muslim identity became identified as being 
either ‘Muslim or non-Muslim’ (in terms of practice of religion6), and thus religion 
emerged as both a unifying force among Muslims and an alienating force from 
non-Muslims.   
 










In the course of this study, the research and specifically the interviewing 
consistently nodded to the issue of representation transformation and 
institutionalisation of identity; in terms of how individuals and small groups who 
were generally labelled as part of the ‘Muslim community’, actually identified 
themselves as such especially in terms of religious representations and 
institutionalisation and what challenges that these developed in terms of political 
expression.  This is especially when such religious representations aligned with 
specific ideologies and schools of jurisprudence, but clashed with political 
representation, cultural agency and ethnic identity, whilst being placed under the 
wide umbrella of ‘Muslim Community’.   
1.3.2	Identity	Politics	
Identity politics thus is the main catalyst for this thesis, which presupposes that 
identity is not a static but rather a fluid construct that responds to social and 
political contingencies. Whilst there is a detailed discussion in Chapter 2 around 
identity, it is important to conceptualise ‘identity politics’, which has come to 
signify any political participation that is based around the self-interest, or the 
specific perspective, of a particular group within society (Heyes 2012) . Usually, 
this group will be a minority, or one that has suffered (or continues to suffer) 
particular injustice or inequality. This has given rise to a practice of identity politics 
where it is sought to remedy perceived injustices or disadvantages, often through 
challenging the dominant culture’s account about the inferiority of the identity in 
question, and redefining it on its own terms, and also often through raising 
consciousness within the various communities associated with the identity. 
 
Identity discourse has been characterized by at least five problem areas (Gaudelli 
2001): essentialising social groups; categorizing individuals automatically and 
superficially; failing to recognize the power knowledge dynamic; marginalizing 
disparate voices; and totalizing the individual.  The problems these five areas 
unpack demonstrate how the Muslim community in Sri Lanka was essentialised 
(possessive of core properties) first on an ethnic basis, and due to global 
pressures, on a religious basis/allegiance irrespective of other social, cultural and 
economic factors.  In addition, such essentialist strategies have imbued their 
identities with presupposed negative stereotypical representations, which have 
led such communities to respond by resorting to what the post-colonial critic 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak refers to as ‘strategic essentialism’ (G. C. Spivak 
1988).    
 
As a  concept, ‘strategic essentialism’  is interesting as it refers to a political tactic 
that minority groups, nationalities, ethnic groups essentially mobilize on the basis 
of shared gendered, cultural, or political identity to represent themselves.  Whilst 
strong differences may exist internally between members of these groups, and 
amongst themselves they engage in continuous debates, it is seen as sometimes 
advantageous for them to temporarily ‘essentialise’ themselves and to bring 
forward their group identity in a simplified way to achieve certain goals often for 
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equal rights, or to oppose the levelling impact of global culture. Thus political 
claims are put forward to the state, proposing remedial measures to secure 
equality and tackle disadvantage.   This enables the rise of identity politics, in the 
sense that it provides individuals with the opportunity to freely group with those 
who share their identities and collectively put forward their claims (Ibid).  Yet there 
is a danger of this type of identity politics as Sen (2006a) writes, that this could 
actually promote the side-by-side existence of a diversity of discrete communities, 
with very few meaningful interactions between them, a concept called ’plural 
mono-culturalism’ (Sen 2006b). 
 
Another charge that has been made against such form of identity politics is that 
rather than providing an authentic space for minority or disadvantaged groups to 
be heard in the public sphere, the types of community groups and forums that 
governments are likely to engage with, have had a tendency to be hijacked by 
individuals resembling the archetypal ‘community leader’ (Heyes 2012).  In such 
a scenario, there is a danger that minority voices within minority communities are 
overlooked and organisations become preoccupied with furthering the political 
agendas or pet projects of those at their helm. Moreover, the continued exercise 
of identity politics could be blamed for encouraging governments to address 
communities, and for communities to view themselves, in a compartmentalised 
fashion, through the lens of their identity, as opposed to simply as citizens (Ibid).  
 
So rather than appreciating the diversity of perspectives and aspirations within 
communities, identity politics can generate and entrench reification. This, in turn, 
promotes an inaccurate and unfair picture of the lived realities of citizens, as well 
as acting as a general barrier to integration and social cohesion (A. Phillips 2007).   
This in effect outlines how the Sri Lankan Muslim community have been 
mobilised.  Although Spivak  would later disavow the term, dissatisfied with the 
problematic ways in which the term has been deployed in nationalist enterprises 
that promotes essentialism itself (G. C. Spivak 2008), the fact remains that the 
term is still useful to consider in the Sri Lankan context, as it  attempts to 
transcend differences that might exist among members of the same group and 
focuses on ‘essentialism’ as a means for presenting a unified front. In other 
words, Sri Lankan Muslims felt and feel the need to find a voice for themselves 
as ethnic Muslims (linked with religious expression) regardless of the other 
elements that make up the multiplicity of their backgrounds.  Yet in promoting this 
voice, an unfair reality has emerged with a disconnect emerging between the 
political elites of the Muslim community and the lived realities of citizens as it 
speaks to a fundamental aspect around identity politics in that no representative 




This brings us to the second concept in the thesis to explore and that is the 
institutionalisation of Islam in Sri Lanka, namely, the social, religious and 
political organisations that have emerged to give agency to represent and provide 
stability to the Muslim community in Sri Lanka.  As a term of reference, 
institutionalisation can occupy a hazardous position within socio-political 
discourse. Often thrown about without definition, interlocutors generally assume 
it simply means creating institutions to represent the interests, goals, or 
aspirations of a certain group (Hannan & Freeman 1989, Powell 1991, Zucker 
1983). However, there is a school of thought that has put forward the thinking that 
institutionalisation is more or less when “all participants in a political process 
understand and accept the rules of that process, and the struggles over the 
framework within which politics takes place have been settled.” (Gorges 2001, 
155). The deployment of the term in this sense, points to its positive and 
homogenising attributes without much reference to its exclusionary and 
productive powers.   
 
Whilst this is true to some extent within the Sri Lankan context as per the Muslim 
community, it is worth viewing the concept of institutionalisation from a 
Foucaultian lens, which looks at a process engendering normative practices, 
assigning subject positions, enabling insidious mechanisms of power-relations 
and establishing certain forms of knowledge and schemata through discursive 
practices and marginalisation of others (Foucault 1977).  Thus far from being only 
a process in which the Sri Lankan Muslims, seeking political effectiveness and 
social agency through collective action formally organises itself, 
institutionalisation can be seen as an ‘incitement in discourse’, a demand for 
specific forms of knowledge; a whole dispositif surrounding Islam. Foucault 
(1977:194-195) defines this term dispositif as “a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions”.   
 
I refer at the end to what Asad (1986) argues about Islam being understood as a 
'discursive tradition' producing doctrine and practice that are historically situated. 
While Asad's definition helps to challenge and overcome problems of the 
conceptualisation of change in Muslim society, by historically situating the 
production of doctrine and practice, it mainly captures the element of time and 
not space, the vertical element and not the horizontal. In Sri Lanka, Islam is 
produced by interactions and relationships (dialogical), horizontally, in 
demographic and other spaces as much as it is affected vertically by the context 
and situation at the time.  The horizontal aspect of this is where the recognition 
of ‘institutional’ tradition comes in and where we explore its evolution in this 
thesis.  Ultimately it is this discursive and institutional positions that accounts for 
Islam in Sri Lanka, because you can not have the discursive without the 
institutional association. 
 16 
Hence, the thesis explores a horizontal and vertical relationship of the nature of 
the Sri Lankan Muslim identity, which considers the nature of the connection that 
can exist between these heterogeneous elements where the formation has at its 
major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need.  
Thus as evident from Foucault’s definition, what he terms dispositif is the whole 
set of practices, measures, discursive and non-discursive features, even 
architectural norms which regulate the institutions that arise in response to an 
urgent need.  Consequently, what we see in the history of the evolution of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim identity and its institutionalisation, is that the collective action and 
political effectiveness of the community engendered a complex system of 
regulation and production far exceeding the simple act of transforming an informal 
network of people into a formal organisation and also in response to critical 
junctures in history (the urgent need).   It is  through such activity,  the link is 
made with the Foucaultian7 take on institutionalisation which points to the 
importance of seeing all these heterogeneous elements as part of a wider 
network of practices. In this sense the horizontal and vertical element break 
through the tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome 
mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial or cultural blocs (Brubaker 2002). 
 
My thesis is thus concerned with examining how these two levels of 
institutionalisation interact, on the one hand, marginalised non-religious aspects 
of identity (ethnic expression); and on the other, alternative structures of Islamic 
expression (in terms of religious and theological thought). By adopting an 
essentialist strategy and as a result of the influence from global transnational 
Islamic reformation, the institutionalised representation for Muslims have evolved 
to mostly inadvertently, reduce several ethnic and cultural communities that 
subscribe to Islam to one representative ‘model’ while at the same time tailoring 
a formal structure for Islam that represents the community but also addresses 
rising Islamophobia.  
 
An issue which wasn’t really anticipated at the outset, was the level of 
engendering of the global discourse of Islamophobia in Sri Lanka.  In particular, 
the rhetoric post 2009 after the end of the conflict in the country, often mirrored 
rhetoric and narratives from Europe and North America.  This proved quite 
challenging for the Muslim community in many forms, but also in terms of how it 
navigated relationships with the other communities as well as with itself as it 
sought to address political and ethnic divisions whilst addressing issues to do 
with Islamophobia and ideological aspirations.  For example, the visibility of the 
Muslim community in terms of identity markers such as dress code and mosques, 
were seized upon as an Islamic threat, perpetuating a growing Anti Muslim 
narrative reinforced with a growing anti-Western and extremist literature 
produced by it. 
                                                
7	 The	 Foucaultian	 concept	 of	 institutionalisation	 looks	 at	 a	 process	 which	 engenders	 normative	
practices	and	assigns	subject	positions.	(Raffnsoe,	Gudmand-Hoyer	and	Thaning	2016)	
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Whilst the thesis will not examine how these reductionist strategies were 
deployed or operated, it will explore the fact that these strategies lead to 
contradictory representations and knowledge constructs about both Muslims and 
Islam and, consequently, a failure to achieve maximum political effectiveness and 
grass roots agency. 
 
This thesis will examine and reflect on the schemata, discourses and strategies 
adopted by the Sri Lankan Muslims in response to the realities engendered by 
colonial and other political challenges in the country. It will explore the 
transformation of the identity of the Sri Lankan Muslims over 130 years, as a 
spectrum of representation from colonial influences to present times and how the 
emergence of organisations to represent Muslims and their political concerns 
ended up advancing a specific interpretation(s) or discourse(s) about what Islam 
“is” or “is not.” It will examine the political motives behind ‘institutionalising’ 
political representation and specific discourses about Islam to the exclusion of 
others and the role these played in promoting a mobilisation agenda that has 
emphasized the religious aspect of identity to the exclusion of ethnic, racial, 
cultural, social and economic variables of such identities.  In some way this 
mobilisation agenda complements the notion of the ‘triadic nexus’ identified by 
Brubaker (1996) for similar cases of religious/nationalist conflict and will be 
discussed in the light of broader theoretical claims in the thesis.  Finally, it will 
explore how despite this transformation, the representation of the Muslims 
became disconnected from the realities at the grass roots and became static.  
This therefore raises a larger question that the concept of minority bloc 
representation has a finite shelf life and thus it needs to be revisited and rethought 
to ensure relevance to the time and context to ensure adequate representation 
to its constituents.  This was of course raised through my field research in Sri 
Lanka which uncovered the existential crisis that the Muslim community went and 
is going through as it tries to navigate a political identity with a religious 
expression. 
1.3.4	Understanding	Terminology	
My thesis explores that in Sri Lanka the state, government, community and 
religion are all inter-connected with ethnic identity and representation. In this 
context these are all loaded concepts that have been subject to various different 
political and academic analyses in a situation of violence and conflict, and 
therefore require a level of unpacking and clarification for the purposes of this 
study. The nation-state in the Sri Lankan context is highly contested in terms of 
representation and agency.  It is not a united concept and really symbolises a 
fractured, post-colonial construct than a strong representation of sovereignty, 
independence, peace and development (Bartholomeusz and De Silva 1998).  
What this means is that in reality as discussed in the thesis, every community has 
different and similar approaches to how they understand representation and 
identity in Sri Lanka and none has it more complicated than the Muslim 
community who navigate a religious and ethnic expression, constructed and 
reconstructed in a process of 'othering' or in response to the Other (Ismail and 
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Jeganathan 1995).  
My starting point in this thesis is to reassert that categories of identity, such as by 
ethnicity and religion, were colonial impositions that at the time had no real 
meaning to the people of Sri Lanka, but were used as political opportunism by 
the elites of that period (and then followed up post independence to the present 
age) to become decisive and competitive entities in opposition to each ‘other’. 
What I show is that by virtue of these unilateral expression of identities, these 
categories somehow disregarded the lived experiences those so categorised, 
something that Wickramasinghe (2006) discusses in more detail. The discussion 
around the Muslim community identity in particular gave fixed boundaries and 
new meanings which ignored the reality of the lived experience of the community 
and in particular the political elite neglected this trait of the community as they 
tried to argue the representation of the community whilst not understanding the 
dynamics of the community.  This is ultimately what I have been convinced off 
during the course of this thesis. 
In undertaking this thesis, one has to have been mindful of the use of terminology 
and language that often confuses matters in Sri Lanka.  The references to 
Muslims and the Muslim community in this thesis are to Sri Lankans with an ethnic 
representation of community, group or population that varies in a number of 
factors including gender, class, demography and social status, and to a group 
who believe in and practise the religion of Islam. This complicates matters as 
Islam is a religion but in Sri Lanka it is also about ethnic representation.  Thus 
this thesis refers to Islam here not only as a system of beliefs, ideologies, world 
views, practices, rituals, symbols that are founded on monotheism and 
recognises Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) as a prophet and founder, but also 
recognises the ethnic nature of the representation. Hence for Muslims in Sri 
Lanka, Islam is not just only about ethnic representation but an all encompassing 
system of truth, divinely constructed, eternal and universal. In practice what this 
means is that there are people who are from the ‘ethnic’ group considered as 
Muslims but may not practise the faith of Islam or even want to adhere to the faith 
of Islam but who would still identify themselves as being Muslim.  
However, this thesis is not heavily concerned with the theological aspects of Islam 
(or the practice of the tenets of Islam), nor is it disinterested in it. It is just 
interested in recognising the different manifestations of religious bodies that have 
been developed due to the various manifestations of ethno religious identity 
(social, institutional and political).  These various manifestations are a result of 
the transformation of changes started pre colonial period and that took place at 
critical junctures of history of the country and has lead to an existential crisis for 
the Muslim community that affects internal and external relations.   
Thus as this thesis goes to show, the concept of a 'Muslim' in Sri Lanka 
constitutes an ethnic and religious identity which, although by definition 
dysfunctional, is strictly non-negotiable to them.	
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1.4	Situating	within	Contemporary	Academia	
This research addresses the need to develop a better understanding of the 
identity of Muslims in Sri Lanka and the challenges of ethno religious nationalistic 
expression, especially in how minorities strategically essentialise this expression 
but could also fall victim to being disconnected from the realities on the ground.  
In so doing, it seeks to fill a dearth in literature around contemporary Muslim 
identity that examines political and religious interactions and that explores the 
consequences of Muslim minority politics from a point of view of indigenous 
politics rather than immigrant politics.  Thus, part of the challenge that has been 
experienced when doing this research is that there are two aspects that 
contemporary academia covers on Muslim politics and Islamic religious reform 
and identity.   
The first is that very few academia covers these issues from a purely Muslim 
minority perspective, apart from few exceptions (see Mayaram 1997, Eickelman 
and Pscatori 2004) and as a consequence the present understanding and 
analysis of both subjects remains shaped, almost exclusively, from a Muslim 
majority perspective. For many years Muslim and Islamic politics were not 
considered a factor in Muslim minority populations or in non-Muslim states.    
The second is that where these have been covered they have really looked at it 
from a western-centric perspective or looking at immigrant Muslim communities 
to the west.  In other words, academia that cover Muslim minority politics explore 
the issue where Muslims are not indigenous but are new comers to society like 
in Europe and North America.  Thus, there is a certain bias in which this topic is 
addressed such as Islamic fundamentalism or militancy or a specifically 
constructed definitional framework (Mandaville 2007, Roy 2004).  As a 
consequence, they have examined how political Islam manifests in a Muslim 
minority context as a group engagement, but not necessarily considered how that 
very status of being in the minority affects the politicisation of Islam and a 
representation on an ethnic basis.  Hence, there is no in depth analysis of 
exploring Islam as a religious and community marker and the tensions herewith. 
This is a particularity that the Sri Lankan case, as discussed in this thesis, adds 
to this literature.  
While change, especially within a 130-year period, is arguably to be expected, it 
requires comprehensive study here because the nature and pace with which it 
occurred in Sri Lanka especially in the last 20-30 years was exceptional.  The link 
from colonial to present day is important to get an understanding of how this has 
developed.  The consequences are also wide reaching by which it is meant that 
it was an extreme and unusual form of change, and because it was so widespread 
with huge ramifications. This thesis will discuss that after nearly three centuries 
of colonisation, independence and then a three-decade conflict had significant 
impacts on the Muslim community, thus prompting varied forms of expression of 
their religious and ethnic identity and religiosity. The fact of the matter is that it 
was also mirrored by other communities means that these changes have not 
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occurred in isolation and thus needs to be understood in a wider perspective.  
These changes with regards religious reformation in conjunction with ethnic 
identification reflect a similar phenomena occurring in Muslim societies globally. 
This resonates with what Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) talk about when they 
mention the ‘objectification’ of Islam that preoccupies people with issues such as: 
“What is my religion?”, and “How do my beliefs guide my conduct?”.  Yet the fact 
that there is a political ethnic element to the expression means that these 
changes are also specific to Sri Lankan Muslims and can be seen as a response 
to the ethno-political situation and the socio-economic issues in their own unique 
situation.  This is the horizontal and vertical aspect of Islamic identity in Sri Lanka 
described above that makes it difficult to really explain Islam as understood within 
the confines of the Western epistemology.  
1.5			Structure	of	the	Thesis	
The thesis is divided into three sections –  
Part I is grouped around ‘Understanding Issues of Identity and Conflict Context’ 
and consists of two chapters: 
Chapter 1 is the ‘Introduction’ which will provide a justification for why I 
personally want to do this thesis.  It touches upon some of the theoretical 
concepts that will be elaborated further in the thesis, terminology and 
situating in contemporary academia.  It then provides the structure for the 
thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the ‘Literature Review’ in a few parts.  The first is to 
provide a background into Sri Lanka, its ethnic makeup, challenges facing 
its identity question and specifically to take a look at work already done on 
Muslim identity (which will then be elaborated upon in subsequent 
chapters) followed by a justification of the gaps being investigated for the 
thesis.  The second is to understand the grounding that this work is based 
upon within the whole body of work to do with identity politics, nationalism 
and conflict resolution which form the theoretical justification and 
relationship to the work. The third is to understand the rationale based on 
the first two for questions to be explored in order to understand the nature 
of the thesis which sees itself as analysing the transformation and 
evolution of the institutionalization of Sri Lankan Muslim identity following 
critical junctures in the country, primarily between 1889 and 2009.  This, 
chapter explores certain key questions that underpin the thesis which will 
give direction to the rest of the chapters and the field work to be 
undertaken.   It finally discusses the field work by exploring the 
methodology, discussing the practicalities of qualitative approaches, the 
Ethics and highlighting limitations on the study 
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Part II explores the ‘Institutionalisation of Muslim Identity (Ethnic, Social & 
Political Identity vs Religious Framework)’.  In this sense the following chapters 
explore understanding the evolution of the Muslim community identity based on 
certain two-level critical junctures (exploring inter and intra group dynamics) & the 
current representations of Muslim identity.  What I illustrate is that the identity of 
the Muslim community was a response to the ‘ethnic/religious’ marking of the 
‘Other’.  However, the same state of disillusionment and despair against the Sri 
Lankan state (and Muslim politicians) ‘who neglected to serve and support 
Muslims’, resonated as well with global Islamic reformation ideologies that have 
also experienced disillusionment with secularisation, modernisation, democracy 
or the nation-state.  It is this resonance that allowed a mingling between Islamic 
ideological thinking and ethnic political representation and through its 
institutionalisation creating an existential crisis of two different, though inter-
connected, processes.  
 
Chapter 3 titled ‘Developing an Ethnic Consciousness’ discusses the 
development of a concept of a Muslim ethnic identity in the context of pre-
independence Sri Lanka as a result of colonial engagement and traces the 
history of Muslims in Sri Lanka to Independence (pre 1948). It also 
contextualises the arrival of Islam and the history of the community on the 
island. It examines the reasoning behind the development of the ethnic 
identity and looking at how current understandings of history relate to this.  
 
Chapter 4, ‘Institutionalising Identity’, discusses the crucial years (1948-
1983) for Sri Lanka post independence which not only set the scene for 
the future conflict but also served as a catalyst to entrench the notion of 
ethno-religious identities.  For the Sri Lankan Muslims, it also served as 
the next step in the evolution of their identity by providing an opportunity 
for social and cultural institutions.  This chapter situates this factor of the 
identity within a larger premise as part of the evolution of the community  
 
Chapter 5, ‘Forging a new Political direction’, examines a crucial part of Sri 
Lanka’s history which is the conflict (1983 -  2009).  It examines the conflict 
from the point of view of the Muslim community’s relationship to it 
especially as it served to catalyse the birth of separate Muslim political 
parties and the concept of a standalone Muslim political identity. 
 
Chapter 6, ‘Identities under Pressure’ examines the post conflict scenario 
(2009 - 2014) in Sri Lanka where the Muslim community is being 
challenged with respect its identity and where it fits in.  In the wake of a 
global Islamophobia narrative, nationalist Sinhala Buddhists have revived 
new challenges for existence for the Muslim community. 
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Part III is all about exploring the ‘The Search for A New Identity’ and looking at 
overcoming the challenge for the community arising from Part II and proposing 
ways forward. 
 
Chapter 7, ‘Deconstructing the Narrative’, seeks to tie all of the strands 
together by discussing the comprehensiveness of the Sri Lankan Muslim 
identity underpinned within a religious framework. It explores the evolution 
of the identity through 5 critical junctures leading to the notion of ‘Imagined 
Community’ with ‘Imagined Geography’.  In this sense, it is a religio- ethnic 
identity that by virtue of a series of factors, was institutionalised in Sri 
Lanka which was essential during the conflict, but in a post conflict 
scenario with external influence, leaves communities with a series of 
challenges.  It discusses how the reification of the Sri Lankan Muslim 
identity doesn't recognise the lived experience or the external challenges 
faced, showing that there has been a process of a shift of boundaries of 
representation and thinking. It explores what the potential challenges are 
that arise not only from a concept of a Muslim identity, and from its 
institutionalisation.   
 
Chapter 8, ‘Reimagining Identity’, starts a discussion as to what a new 
component of a Muslim identity could look like in the face of the end of the 
conflict in 2009 ultimately showing that there is no going back to what was 
or what could have been.  The change of narrative proposed by this 
chapter is what the Muslim communities need to ponder moving forward if 
they want to overcome these tensions with others.  Finally the chapter 
looks ahead at future work on this scope and discussing contributions to 





Those who speak thus of the nation, beg the question, who is that ‘nation’ 
and who has the authority and the ‘right’ to speak for that ‘nation’ and 
express its will?  How can we find out what the ‘nation’ actually wanted? 
(Luxemburg 1976) 
2.1			Introduction	
In undertaking this thesis, the literature review is in a few parts.  The first is to 
provide a background into Sri Lanka, its ethnic makeup, challenges facing its 
identity question and specifically to take a look at work already done on Muslim 
identity (which will then be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters) followed by 
a justification of the gaps being investigated for the thesis.   
 
The second is to understand the grounding that this work is based upon within 
the whole body of work to do with identity politics and conflict resolution.  
Therefore, this literature review will also focus on publications on the theoretical 
background of ethnicity and national identity.  In particular, I discuss the need to 
understand terminologies and approaches when discussing these topics. 
 
The third is to understand the rationale based on the first two for questions to be 
explored in order to understand the nature of the thesis which sees itself as 
answering a fundamental question being posed as to what can the Muslims of Sri 
Lanka do in order to help the country move forward in a post conflict era facing 
such complex political transitions?  In answering this question, it seems we have 
to start at the beginning and that is to really understand the nature of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim within the context of Sri Lanka.  
 
Lastly, the chapter will explore certain key questions that underpin the thesis and 
will explore the methodology related to the study, the field work undertaken.  It 




Much of this thesis is based upon understanding and appreciating the historical 
journey of the development of the Muslim identity in Sri Lanka and, thus the 
following chapters will explore the the Muslim community in more detail.  Though 
this section has the danger of finding itself being repeated in other subsequent 
chapters, needless to say that it is also important to elaborate on some of the 
generic history of the country as well as discuss the current identity formations in 
order to place some context.   
 
Subsequent chapters will provide a better overview of the arrival and subsequent 
demographics of Muslim communities whilst this chapter will provide an 
assessment of the contributions of current academic literature in this field. This 
literature review will focus on what has been discussed regarding the concept of 
identity, nationalism and conflict.  It will touch briefly on the identity formations of 
Muslims in Sri Lanka and the prevalent themes. 
2.2.1	General	Remarks	on	Sri	Lanka	
Sri Lanka being one of the oldest democracies in Asia is a country with an old 
culture and history (Bandarage 2009).  Known as Ceylon until 1972, it is a small 
island in the Indian Ocean (approximately 65, 610 sq.km in area) and is situated 
at the foot of the South Asian subcontinent. Sri Lanka is about 400 kilometres/ 
273 miles in length and about 220 kilometres / 137 miles at its widest point. The 
centre of the island is mountainous; its highest point, Mount Pidurutalagala, rises 
to 2,524 meters / 8, 281 feet (Dowers, Joachim and Erica 2007). 
Social	Differences	
Sri Lanka is diverse in social composition with the heterogeneity being reflected 
in the various ethnic groups, religious faiths, and languages spoken on the island. 
Sri Lanka’s religious and ethnic diversity echoes the multi-racial and pluralistic 
character of Sri Lankan society.  Until 2012, no full census had been taken in the 
country since 1981 and thus any previously full demographic figures are bound 
to be out of date.  What is known is that the Sinhalese people who are 
predominantly Buddhist are the major ethnic group in Sri Lanka, constituting 
some 74.8% of the population and were originally migrants who arrived from 
North India as early as around 500BC (Department of Census and Statistics Sri 
Lanka 2012).  
 
The Sri Lankan Tamils, who are mainly Hindus, are the largest ethnic minority in 
the country. They composed 11.2% of the population in 1981 (A. Imtiyaz 2010) 
increasing to 15.4% by 2012 (Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka 
2012).  Again like the Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils have a close link to India, but 
instead of North India, their relationship is with South India. The Tamil population 
in Sri Lanka was reinforced with the arrival of the Indian Tamils or ‘up-country 
Tamils’ mainly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work in the 
British-owned estates as workers: first for coffee and then later for tea and rubber 
estates in the highlands. By 1921, Indian Tamils comprised 13.4% of the total 
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Tamil population, which in turn represented 24.8% of the inhabitants of Sri Lanka 
(A. Imtiyaz 2010). The Indian Tamils, however, as a result of the Ceylon 
Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949, engineered by the government of the day, 
lost their large share in the country’s population charts and by 1981, Indian Tamils 
in Sri Lanka only accounted for 5.5% of the total population (Ibid) and in 2012 
comprised 4.1% of the population (Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka 
2012). Following the 1983 riots in Sri Lanka and the subsequent conflict, many 
Tamils fled the country seeking asylum elsewhere, thereby reducing their 
numbers (A. Imtiyaz 2010).   
 
The Muslims, most of whom speak Tamil, are mainly broken up into two main 
ethnic groups known as Moors (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011) and Malays although 
there are other groups which will be discussed below. They constitute 9.1% of 
the island’s total population in 2012 (Department of Census and Statistics Sri 
Lanka 2012) with many scholars saying that they  are now the second largest  
ethnic minority (Bandarage 2009)8   
 
Finally, there are the Burgers, who are also a small but significant minority group, 
tracing their ancestry to European settlers and often appearing to be western 
European in their physical appearance (and even some aspects of their culture 
and traditions). At the time of independence in 1948, Burgers comprised 0.6% of 
the total population (Bandarage 2009). However, since independence, the Burger 
population in Sri Lanka has declined as a result of migration to Australia, Canada 
and United Kingdom. They now only account for 0.18% of the island’s total 
population in 2012 (Department of Census and Statistics Sri Lanka 2012). 
 
Apart from English, Sri Lanka is home to two other major languages. They are 
the Sinhala language spoken by the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil language 
used both by the Tamils and Muslims9. Although, Sinhala and Tamil are derived 
from different sources, they share some common features and have influenced 
each other's linguistic evolution. 
Identity	Differences 
Language is perhaps one of the most important elements in the creation of an 
ethno-national identity (Gill 2014).  Sri Lanka is no exception and the issue of a 
‘national language’ has been a dominant theme in both religious and political 
spheres since early after independence and it still remains a major bone of 
contention and difference between the Sinhalese and the Tamils (Feith 2010). 
 







Bush (2003) talks about factors that show that the communities themselves are 
also not homogeneous which leads to intra-group differences and also 
contributes to the conflict within the country.  For instance, there is the fact that 
whilst language and religion could distinguish the communities, there are other 
distinguishing factors within communities such as “the nineteenth-century 
construction of the four principal social categories - caste, religion, language and 
ethnicity” (J. D. Rogers 1994, 13).  Thus, within the Sinhalese community, the 
Sinhalese are divided culturally and geographically into the upcountry Kandyan 
Sinhalese and the low country Sinhalese. Differences between these sub groups 
are based on the historical fact that the Kandyan Kingdom (though later ruled by 
Tamils) successfully resisted colonial rule until 1815 when it was conquered by 
the British, and enjoyed special privileges within Buddhist hierarchy10.  This also 
has a bearing on the type of Buddhist caste that one belongs to, with  the  ‘Govi’ 
Buddhist traditionally being the elite of the Buddhist  and an unspoken rule of the 
Presidents (and Prime Ministers) coming from this caste (vijayanni 2013).  The 
low country Sinhalese on the other hand have been exposed to the various 
influences of the colonial powers and are then more likely to be Christian.  
 
The identity of the Sinhalese is largely influenced by two factors: 1) the Sinhala 
language and 2) Buddhism (A. Imtiyaz 2010), with the identity being mobilized 
through myths linking the two factors up through the Buddhist chronicles (The 
Mahawansa), often having dangerous consequences.  “Sinhalas do die and do 
kill because of and for their history and especially when such a history contradicts 
the lived experience of myth” (Batholomeusz and de Silva 1998, 2). This in 
particular has been exploited throughout critical junctures of Sri Lanka’s history 
by political parties  towards their electoral advantage (ICG 2007a).  Thus “the 
political manipulation of Sinhalese myths and symbols has become a common 
means of mobilizing support and legitimating actions of competing groups within 
the Sinhalese community” (Bush 2003, 46).   
 
However for the Tamils, the identity link is not as deep with religion, as there is 
no Tamil equivalent of the Buddhist chronicles that the Sinhala Buddhist identity 
is based on (Bush 2003).  Thus much that can be said of Tamil identity is in fact 
linked to culture, literature, heritage and so on (Cheran 2009).  Understanding 
intra-group divisions of the Tamil community is undertaken through a 
geographical correspondence to major social, political and economic difference 
between Tamil groups within the country. Members within these groups also 
recognize a caste / status hierarchy which conditions their relations: Colombo 
and Jaffna Tamils at the top; east coast Tamils at the middle and up country 
Tamils at the bottom.   
 




70% of the Sinhalese are associated with (the Theravada school of) Buddhism, 
which was introduced to Sri Lanka in the 3rd century BCE by the Venerable 
Mahinda, the son of the Emperor Ashoka (Deegalle 2009). Buddhist Bhikkhus or 
monks play a leading part in the socio-political life in Sri Lanka and argue that 
anyone can live in Sri Lanka as long as Sinhala-Buddhists enjoy cultural, 
religious, economic, political, and linguistic hegemony (Houtart 1974).  Hinduism, 
the second largest religion in Sri Lanka, is predominantly the faith of the Tamils 
in Sri Lanka. Though ideological connections between Buddhism and Hinduism 
are very close, relations between Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka have not 
been cordial since the escalation of the conflict (A. Imtiyaz 2010). 
 
Religion is also key to the self-identity of Sri Lankan Muslims who are mainly from 
the Sunni sect  (Nuhman 2007) that also manifests itself in opposition to the Sri 
Lankan identity as well (de Munck 1998) largely due to this ethnic / religious 
conundrum.  The Christians who comprise 7.5% of the population constitute the 
fourth main religious group in Sri Lanka. The majority is Roman Catholic, with 
Anglican, Calvinist, Methodist and Baptist minorities with both Tamils and 
Sinhalese making up the Christian community. See Figure 1 for a breakdown of 






























Figure 1: Distribution of Religion across Sri Lanka (Wikimedia Commons 2012) 
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In this scenario, the diversity of religious composition of the society should prompt 
a neutrality of the state in religious affairs, however this has been far from the 
case in Sri Lanka (See Bandarage 2009; Bush 2003; Deegalle 2009; ICG 2007a). 
 
The	Conflict	
Sri Lanka was home to one of the world’s most intractable wars involving an 
armed struggle between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE (Liberation of 
Tamil Tigers of Eelam).  This vicious territorial struggle though concentrated in 
the north and east was felt island wide with a spate of suicide bombs.  The war 
came to a bloody conclusion in 2009 with the defeat of the LTTE and the death 
of its leader, sparking international calls for war crimes against the government 
(Havilland 2009). However, the conflict (its causes and effects) is not understood 
completely and “While a large body of writing exists on the Sri Lankan conflict, it 
is conceptually limited.  It portrays the conflict largely as either 1) a terrorist 
problem between an extreme secessionist group and the Sri Lankan state, or 2) 
a primordial and intractable ethnic problem between the Sinhala majority and the 
Tamil minority” (Bandarage 2009, 3).   
 
The reality though is the conflict, its causes and effects, was (and is) not as clear 
cut as this simple analysis of cultural identity and ethnic dualism.  Whilst, it is a 
conflict borne out of a failure to establish a workable democratic mechanism post-
independence (Edirippulige 2004), it is also made up of “irreconcilable religious, 
ethnic, political and nationalistic positions, which have continuously fed into 
further misunderstandings and accusations of injustice resulting in the bloody 
conflict” (Deegalle 2006, 2). Scholars like Bandarage (2009), Deegalle (2006) 
and Bush (2003) dispute the ‘asymmetric’ bi polar conflict model based on binary 
analyses built on the duality of ‘Self vs. other’.  They  have chosen instead to 
develop a broader analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict by “examining multiple 
ethnic and religious groups and focussing on intra-ethnic social class, caste, 
regional and other divisions as they pertain to the separatist conflict” (Bandarage 
2009, 7).  In other words, “inter-ethnic group relations may both condition and be 
conditioned by intra-group dynamics” (Bush 2003, 11).  
 
Thus unpacking the conflict in Sri Lanka, shows a conflation of different types of 
violence and victims, which are not necessarily discussed in the overall narrative 
of the Sri Lankan conflict.  For example very little is mentioned about the violence 
within the Sinhalese community that arose between 1987 -1990 that claimed an 
estimated 40,000 deaths in a little over two years (Ibid)11 in relation to the Sri 
Lankan conflict12. To overlook these dimensions would neglect understanding 
critical elements and scenarios of the conflict.  It is thus a complex conflict 







perpetuated by the confluence of factors in a complex world and requires deeper 
understanding of all stakeholders.    
 
In Sri Lanka, the present dynamics of the conflicts and the ethnic identities upon 
which it is based needs not only to be understood but to there needs to be deeper 
reading ‘between the lines’ in order to appreciate the impact of sub-group 
dimensions of inter and intra group relations.  In other words, no ethnic group is 
homogenous and there are competing axes of identity which have competing 
priorities and influences and thus needs to be better understood.  Hence, the 
developing of an understanding of the conflict in Sri Lanka must start with a 
recognition that the major groups are internally divided into politically salient 
subgroups along a range of differentiating axes such as religion, caste and 
political affiliations (Bush 2003).    In addition to this, since a catalysing element 
of the conflict seems to be 1) the competing representation of the past; 2) 
understandings of the present; and 3) linkages between the two (Ibid.), it is 
important that this is unpacked and examined in the light of representations of 
identity of the ‘self’ vs. the ‘other’.   In this regard, work done by Bartholomeusz 
and De Silva (1998) have identified several threads of identity and nationalism 
within the Sri Lankan narrative not only linked to Sinhala Buddhism but that 
tanscend them to other religious and ethnic minorities as well.   
2.2.2	‘Contested’	Identities	in	Sri	Lanka	
Many scholars examining the conflict in Sri Lanka and its causes, whilst caught 
between the tensions between ‘primordialist’ and ‘modernist’ approaches, look at 
ethnic identity as the main cause (Kapferer 1988; Kemper 1991; Dharmadasa 
1988 and so on).  Those advocating a ‘Primordialism’ approach assume blood 
ties and ethnicity as a fixed biological phenomenon (Bandarage 2009), and have 
traditionally been a source for interpreting cultural and ethnic nationalism in Sri 
Lanka (J. D. Rogers 1994).  For example, from this approach, Sinhala nationalism 
is thought to be old ideologies articulated in new ways.  Those advocating the 
‘modernist’ approach using Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ thesis 
in particular, justify that the primordial identities (nations and traditional 
homelands) espoused by various ethno-nationalist groups in Sri Lanka “formed 
in response to modern circumstances rather than primordial entities based on 
historical facts” (Ibid, 10).  Thus the modernist interpretations trace the roots of 
ethnic and cultural nationalism to the indigenous responses to colonialism, 
namely the social and religious reform movements of the nineteenth century 
(Ibid). This perspective allows Sinhala nationalism to be developed as a modern 
ideology but based on distorted facts from the past (Kapferer 1988), through 
language.   
 
What this points out to then is the need for some clarity in understanding how Sri 
Lanka ethnic identities are developed and relationships with and between 
language and religion. 
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The	Language	Issue	
Language has emerged as the initial primary ethnic marker in the social formation 
of the two major ethnic groups—the Tamils and Sinhalese.  Whilst the Muslims 
share close linguistic and cultural ties with the Tamils, including the Tamil 
language13; they have however, traditionally preferred to be recognised by their 
religious and cultural identity, and claims of a distinct ethnic group identity (Ali 
1981).  This is a position that expresses the key differences between the two 
Tamil-speaking communities (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011).  
 
It is the introduction of the ‘Sinhala only’ act in 1956 by which Sinhala became 
the sole official language in the country,  that is deemed to be one of the primary 
catalysts of the conflict, serving to corroborate Gellner’s analysis of the 
importance of language for economic advantage  (Gombrich 2006). The standoff 
with other ethnicities and thereby the conflict which emerged as a result of this, 
can also be justified by the fact that in the “Sinhala language, the words for nation, 
race and people are practically synonymous and a multiethnic nation or state is 
incomprehensible to the popular mind” (Little 1999, 42).  There are other analysts 
though that blame the conflict entirely on the past with colonial history14 in 
particular transforming inter-ethnic relations (Gunasingam 1999) whilst others 
look at economic compulsions and resources competition (Edirippulige 2004). 
 
Thus there are many different narratives that relate to the cause of the conflict in 
Sri Lanka with ethnic accommodation being a dominant theme in the country’s 
history as “the taproots of discord reach equally deeply into the fearful soil of past 
discord” (Rotberg 1999, 4).  To some extent, a contextualist approach might be 
more suitable for analyzing ethnicity within the Sri Lankan context as “a socially 
constructed phenomenon that is also available for instrumental use” (Bandarage 
2009, 10) or even a modernist approach influenced by the colonial period 
(Wickramasinghe 2006) could be useful.  Rogers (1994) suggests that ‘post-
Orientalists’ scholarship, influenced by Said and Foucault, which “provide a new 
variant on modernist interpretations of ethnic and cultural nationalism” (Ibid, 10), 
could help to bolster understandings of cultural and ethnic nationalism in modern 
Sri Lanka and that it is their approach that is most helpful.  Using either of these 
various approaches lend themselves to the explicit questioning of social 
categories and the tracing of the historical development of these categories 
thereby also bringing fresh meaning to the notions that  cultural markers can be 
frequently manipulated by ideologues and those seeking power (Mamdani 2001). 










It is clear that ethnic and linguistic identity based on comprehensive 
understandings of history are a starting point for any discussions to do with Sri 
Lanka, its conflict and community relations.  Identity and indigeneity have been 
tied together in the public discourse on multiculturalism and rights and in popular 
perceptions of Sinhalaness and Tamilness.  Resentments, remembered slights, 
perceived fears of the other and the dangerous awareness of envy are never far 
from the surface (Rotberg 1999), and there is an entanglement of religious and 
ethnic loyalty. 
 
Wickramasinghe (2006) using the modernist and post-modernist approach 
alludes to contested identities in Sri Lanka.  This is not uncommon when 
interpreting the origins of modern national and communal identity in South Asia.  
One interpretation sees “colonial modernity as a radical epistemological break 
and judges the content of pre-colonial pasts irrelevant for understanding modern 
politics” (J. D. Rogers 2004, 625).  Thus, modern identities become responses to 
colonial constructions of the Asian 'tradition'.  Another interpretation sees 
continuities between the late pre-colonial and early colonial periods.  Hence, the 
origins of modern national and communal identities lie not only in colonial 
interventions, but also in non-colonial eighteenth-century social formations and in 
early colonial interaction between the British and South Asians (Ibid). 
 
It is this dichotomy of interpretation that also leads to this ‘contestation’ of history 
in Sri Lanka, thereby causing it to evolve down two parallel routes of the ‘historical 
path’ and the ‘heritage path’ (Wickramasinghe 2012).  The former has been 
explicit about their craft and methods and attempted to write an objective 
exposition of the past open to inspection and peer review according to accepted 
norms of the profession.  The latter, the ‘heritage’ path, has also made truth 
claims which have not been supported by the type of evidence that professional 
historians would have considered acceptable sources.  As is shown in 
subsequent chapters, it is this reasoning that seems to have gained more popular 
traction in the public discourse.  However whilst the historical path constitutes a 
Sinhala disposition toward the past and the ‘heritage’ path a Tamil representation 
both Sinhala and Tamils are guided by a past that is at once transformed and 
determined by the present (Batholomeusz and de Silva 1998) hence bringing up 
the interest of the modernists.  This could also be attributed to the Muslim 
community as well. 
 
The historical development of the identities and nationalities is easily identified 
from the eighteenth century onwards, as the British established their domination 
in South Asia, causing new forms of identity to emerge following various muddled 
schemes of social differentiation across the subcontinent (J. D. Rogers 2004).  
The overall effect was to marginalize existing forms of social identification at the 
expense of others, and eventually to produce new social formations that were 
'modern', fraternal, and enumerable.  “These identities were the product of the 
 32 
centralization of state power and its accompanying discourses of modernity, 
which in South Asia were shaped by the need to be consistent with British power. 
Across the subcontinent, efforts were then made to categorise the new identities 
within an encompassing sociology based on some singular ‘ethnic’ principle” 
(Ibid, 646).  Within this rigid framework “the twentieth- century centralisation of 
state power and extension of the franchise led to the rise of ethno-nationalism 
and the Sinhalese-Ceylon Tamil polarisation that now dominates Sri Lankan 
politics” (J. D. Rogers 1994, 20).  This polarisation in part was caused by policies, 
employed by Sinhalese politicians in a post independent Sri Lanka that were 
largely ethnocentric and favoured the Sinhalese.  The politicisation of ethnic 
difference not only succeeded in marginalising the Tamil community but also 
succeeded in eroding the trust of all minorities in the state and its institutions (A. 
Imtiyaz 2008).   
 
The emergence of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism (and for militant action leading 
to demands of separation) is consequently linked to policies of colonialism (and 
post colonialism) and the cultural, literacy and religious synchronicity between 
Jaffna and Tamil Nadu.  Thus in the early days, it had little hostility to the 
Sinhalese or to Buddhism or even to the Muslims or Islam because there was no 
scriptural foundation or political cause for such sentiments at that time (Cheran 
2009).  It is not coincidental that Tamil histories have developed in the same 
period that has witnessed the rise of Sinhalese Buddhist fundamentalism – 
namely the 19th century to the present.  Hence the late 19th century Tamils used 
history to prove their right to be in Sri Lanka, constituting a Tamil community 
identity distinct from but closely related (at least linguistically, religiously and 
culturally) to the Tamil community in India.  Consequently, Tamils of Sri Lanka 
used identity and history to form a ‘people’ with a more proximate other (in India) 
and a less proximate other (the Sinhala).  The Sinhala people in turn used history 
to claim to be rightful heirs to the land casting the Tamils as an enemy 
(Batholomeusz and de Silva 1998) and claiming their right (as Buddhists) for 
ownership, security and rule of the land. The Sri Lankan Muslim community also 
developed a unique identity, but ethnic identity and religious identity remain 
inseparable (Nuhuman 1998). 
Challenges	in	Discussing	Muslim	Identity	
The separate Muslim identity narratives involves an analysis of how it has 
undergone a political transformation based on colonial political representation 
and as a result of the actions of successive Sinhala dominated Sri Lankan 
governments post-independence.  However in parallel to this, an identity 
fundamentally based on their Islamic belief and culture also developed (ICG 
2007b).  The validity of the ethnic vs. religious identity and the evolution of the 
nexus between the two is the precise subject for this thesis in terms of addressing 
challenges for the future.  
	
There is a common acceptance that anyone who performs the rituals, such as 
the five daily prayers, fasting and pilgrimage, is a devout Muslim. As a 
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consequence, the default position is that Islamic scholars must answer where 
ritual, theology and dogma which form the most important feature in Islam, fit in 
with moral and social individual and collective responsibilities (Yakun 1990). It is 
also widely accepted that anyone who believes in the main tenets of Islam, albeit 
does not practice the main acts of worship prescribed by Islam, is for the benefit 
of statistics and research at least, considered to be a Muslim. Even when 
researchers have, in fact, taken a broader, more inclusive approach, it has often 
been to study those Muslims who are active participants in Islamic groups or 
organizations. The perspectives and experiences of those Muslims who are 
marginal to these organized forums have received little attention. If only in indirect 
ways, this too has nurtured the image of homogeneity by reducing the visibility of 
an important dimension of the Muslim experience. (Kibria 2011)15. 
 
Another issue that is raised is that ‘Muslim’ is used by Muslims themselves as 
both a religious, political and a cultural signifier, taking it as their identifier under 
which they pressure for action on issues that allow them to take on the concern 
of an ‘ethnic’ community. ‘Muslim’ thus becomes at once a political, ethnic, 
cultural as well as a religious affiliation and this is replicated in academic 
discourse. The term ‘Muslim Community’ to describe all Sri Lankan Muslims 
implies a level of homogeneity across the heterogeneous ideological and 
geographical groups that constitute Muslims in Sri Lanka, in addition to the 
challenges of using religious labels as ethnic markers.  
	
Despite the huge diversity of the Muslim world, however, it is the case that a 
fundamental theme in Islamic discourse is based on the unity of Muslims, as 
differing communities united by faith; expressed through the concept of an 
ummah (community) that transcends internal divisions (al-Ahsan 1992). Because 
of this, narratives presented about Islam by Muslims err towards presenting the 
faith as unified and potentially monolithic, based on a perfected form revealed in 
the time of the Prophet Mohamed (Peace Be Upon Him - PBUH). Hence “... the 
key assumption of orthodox Islamic thought that doctrines have been set out in 
the unchangeable and faultless form of the Qur’an; and that therefore any belief 
of practice can be challenged only so far as it does not have a real basis in the 
original truths that were revealed to Mohamed” (Jacobson 1998, 112) 
	
Consequently, for many Sri Lankan Muslims, this reflects how divisions are 
considered a ‘private’ layer of inter-community relations, and to the ‘outside’ there 
is a consensus to maintaining at least the veneer of unity, in keeping with the 
Islamic tenets of One God, One Faith. The replication of this conception of unified 
faith in discourse outside of the boundaries of Muslim communities can be seen 
in the articulation of a generally understood conception that there is such a thing 






as ‘mainstream’ Islam. This is most clearly seen when looking at views and 
practices of individuals, that might differ from the mainstream, as ‘un-Islamic’, 
against the principle tenets of Islam, and therefore outside of the mainstream of 
the faith and hence not fit to be representative of the community16 
	
Understanding practice and structure of Islam in Sri Lanka, therefore requires 
global reference to the Islamic traditions, cultures and politics.  There have always 
been traditional differences among Muslims in Sri Lanka over issues of faith, most 
of which have not provoked serious conflict and have been accepted by religious 
leaders as part of a broader tolerance in the community. However, since the late 
1980s there has been a strong growth in ultra-orthodox interpretations of Islam 
with a new identity that have provoked conflicts with other interpretations that 
have existed previously (ICG 2007b). 
 
This push for a greater Islamic identity has seen an increased articulation of a 
‘pure’ Muslim identity that is set in the context of religiosity (and religious 
practice) but also has transnational Muslim solidarity which is based on a 
strengthening of reactive identities as a response to the identity-stripping 
experience of the conflict, generational gaps and globalisation.  However much 
of this is anecdotal and empirical and needs further rigorous study.   
 
There are a number of competing discourses and narratives within the Muslim 
communities. While the institutions formed by Muslims have been created by a 
generation looking to consolidate their identity and existence, there has definitely 
been a cross over with regards the religious practice.  Consequently, younger 
Muslims have begun to construct a narrative of religious practice that indicates 
that their “mainstream” practice of faith focuses on a return to the basics of Islam, 
away (and in opposition to) the cultural practices of the previous generations. 
The challenge for the Muslims is to articulate a national and ethnic identity whilst 
remaining true to the religious practices.  
Community	Polarisation	
In Sri Lanka, many kinds of imagined communities are still concurrently sustained 
and what sustains them are not only ideas of representations in an exclusively 
Semitic sense but also definite structures of legal identification and 
representation (Wickramasinghe 2006, xv).  The 30-year-old conflict has fuelled 
competing conceptions of nationalism and further led to the polarization of 
communities.  A survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2011 showed that 
as the country emerged from decades of civil war, new challenges relating to 
ethno-religious dynamics were palpable. The survey shows that although the war 
ended, people were worried about extremist religious views and violence, 






particularly in areas that were multi-ethnic (Sabharwal and Chinn 2012). The 
survey, which included 5,553 interviews across all provinces with the four major 
religious groups – Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Roman Catholics- provided 
a more grounded understanding of people’s perceptions of religious beliefs and 
practices, inter-religious relations, and the role and influence of religious leaders. 
According to the results, Sri Lankans overwhelmingly perceived their society as 
becoming significantly more religious, and adherence to core religious practices 
and rituals was high among people of all faiths, especially Buddhists. Thus the 
problem of increasing segregation has the danger of playing out in communities 
across Sri Lanka especially on religious lines (Ibid.)  
Another study conducted showed that “post war ethnic relations among resettled 
communities are deeply divergent than convergent.  The absence of shared 
values and persistent distrust and suspicion, now marks the composition of the 
multi ethnic in former conflict zones” (Thaheer, Peiris and Pathiraja 2013).   
2.2.3	Rationale	for	the	Study	
In Sri Lanka’s case, particularly when the conflict is discussed, much attention is 
paid more to the two principle communities (and those directly in conflict with 
each other), the Sinhalese and the Tamils, with very little being said about the 
other minorities especially the Muslims.  This is one of the important casing points 
to be made in this study.  The conflict is not binary and has equally suffered from 
intra-ethnic divisions within the communities as it has perpetrated inter-ethnic 
polarization between the communities.  Whilst the conflict is not the scope of this 
work, it is important to recognize the work of Asoka Bandarage in articulating the 
need to develop a multi-polar approach to the Sri Lankan conflict “examining 
multiple ethnic and religious groups and by focusing on intra-ethnic, social class, 
caste, regional and other division” (Bandarage 2009, 7), which Bush (2003) also 
alludes to with regards the multidimensional aspect of the conflict. 
 
Sri Lanka’s history narrative (pre and post-independence) reveals a focus on a 
singular identity at the expense of a multi-polar approach.  In this absence has 
developed a communal and religious dynamic with the emphasis on the 
dominance between the two main ethnicities in the country which “pushes to the 
margins other numerically smaller groups unable to make the same claims to 
historical provenance and territorial occupation” (Rambukwella 2012).   
 
“The history of Muslim identity formation is widely contested” (Lewer and Ismail 
2011, 119), due to its diversity and it is due to this, that its  study in Sri Lanka is 
not as well covered as the other two communities despite the work of scholars 
such as Dennis B McGilvray (1998,2007,2011); Imtiyaz (2007,2008,2009, 2010); 
Nuhman (2007).  However, these pieces of work are largely piecemeal as the 
“Muslims are generally left out of the dominant discourse on the Sri Lankan 
separatist conflict” (Bandarage 2009, 6).  In addition, whatever study that has 
been done has largely concentrated either on the conflict (Imtiyaz 2007, 2008) or 
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general ethnographic and historical studies (McGilvray 2007) with very little 
recent work being done following the end of the conflict on the challenges that 
Muslim communities face from Sinhala nationalist as a result of the 
transformation of their identity.  
 
Developing such a comprehensive study on this topic has not yet been done and 
this is one of the first attempts to do so on the transformation of the Muslim 
identity, its institutionalization and politicisation in the country over this time frame 
in the light of challenges being faced today as an attempt to address the way 
forward.  Understandably over the last 20 years, a lot of emphasis has gone to 
trying to explore the role of the Muslim community in the conflict and to some 
cases trying to justify their involvement in peace processes and so on (Imtiyaz 
2007, 2008).  However, without a comprehensive understanding of the past and 
how the community has transformed, it is difficult to appreciate how it is viewed 
currently and even more difficult to actually understand where it needs to get to. 
2.3	Conception	of	Identity	
The construction of identity plays a significant role in the social formation of any 
political group, picking up from Chapter 1. In discussing Sri Lankan identity, it is 
important to look at the concepts of ethnicity, nation, nationalism, religion and 
conflict.  Whilst the first four are distinct and determinative elements in their own 
right, they cannot be considered in isolation whilst attempting to understand the 
shaping of modern history (Wan and Vanderwef 2009).  In addition, I would also 
add that one cannot afford to isolate conflict which as another distinct element is 
intimately linked to the previous four and thus deserves interrogation.  This is in 
particular because identity based conflicts (which it could be argued that Sri 
Lanka suffers from) also push us to rethink our understanding of collective identity 
(formation, mobilisation and politicisation) and ultimately its relationship with 
violence (Bush 2003).   “There is a need to both build on and go beyond, well-
travelled realists’ paths” (Ibid, 4). 
 
Hence a clear definition of the key-terms is important because authors use them 
in different ways.  
 
2.3.1	Identity	
Identity is one of the most overused but least understood or considered terms in 
contemporary humanities and social sciences.  Consequently, it is dealt with 
paradoxically and subjected to a searching critique.  Its “deconstruction has been 
conducted within a variety of disciplinary areas, all of them, in one way or another, 
critical of the notion of an integral, original and unified identity” (Hall 2000, 15).     
 
Identity can be understood as “a provisional stabilization of a sense of self or 
group that is formed in actual historical time and space, in evolving economies, 
polities, and cultures, as a continuous search for some solidity in a constantly 
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shifting world – but without closure, without forever naturalizing or essentializing 
the provisional identities arrived at.” (Suny 2001, 866).  This concept of identity 
doesn’t signal  a stable core of the self that is unchanged through history and in 
fact accepts  that identities are not only not unified but are increasingly 
fragmented, fractured and multiply constructed across different discourses, 
practices and positions (Hall 2000).  Thus identity needs to be understood as 
produced in “specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive 
formations and practices by specific enunciative strategies” (Ibid, 17).  In other 
words, when people talk about identity they seem to exclude a sense of historical 
construction or provisionality and instead almost always accept the present 
identity as fixed, singular, bounded, internally harmonious, distinct from others at 
its boundaries, and marked by historical longevity, if not rooted in nature (Suny 
2001).  Hence “identities are constructed through, not outside, difference” (Hall 
2000, 17) which entails a relationship to the ‘Other’ (the relation to what it is not, 
to precisely what it lacks, to its ‘constitutive’ outside) consequently meaning that 
identities can acquire a temporary form based on subject positions which 
discursive positions construct for us.  Identities therefore become “the positions 
which the subject is obliged to take up while always ‘knowing’ that they are 
representations from the place of the Other” (Ibid, 19).  The language of identity 
reminds us of the concept of dialogical formation in that it is “in dialogue with other 
people’s understandings of who I am that I develop a conception of my own 
identity” (Appiah 2005, 20). 
Consequently, we can think, of identity as being the story of who we are and 
every memory we have ever had gets stored up, and contributes in some way 
towards how we understand the world with some having more impact than others.   
Thus narrative is central to identity formation, as it is through narrativity that we 
come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through 
narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities (Suny 2001).  If 
this is unpacked even more, it might be possible to identify four dimensions of 
narratives (Somers 1994): ontological, public, conceptual, and meta. “Ontological 
narratives are about who we are and why we do what we do. Public narratives 
are those attached to cultural and institutional formations beyond the single 
individual, to intersubjective networks of institutions. Conceptual narrativity is the 
concepts and explanations that are constructed by social researchers, such as 
“society,” “culture,” “structure,” and “agency.” And, finally, metanarratives or 
master narratives are the grand overriding stories in which we are historically 
embedded, such as stories of the nation, progress, decadence, or the end of 
history” (Ibid, 617-620).  Identities are then formed within these discourses and 
are related to the historic positioning of the subjects involved. Subsequently, the 
strength of identity is the mobilising potential that it has, by bringing people 
together around a particular issue or belief in order to campaign for a particular 
thing and creating forms of solidarity.  The concept of the social movement arises 
from this phenomenon and we look at the concept of ‘identity politics’. 
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The latter probably best signifies any political participation that is based around 
the self-interest, or the specific perspective, of a particular group within society. 
As will be discussed from a primordialist description of ethnicity and race, identity 
politics has often come to be equated to dealing with minorities. Historically, the 
second half of the 20th century has witnessed successive waves of political 
movements seeking to rectify injustices that had been suffered by disadvantaged 
or minority groups (Heyes 2012).  The practice of identity politics then is used to 
remedy perceived injustices or disadvantages, often through challenging the 
dominant culture’s account about the inferiority of the identity in question.  By 
challenging this account, it seeks to redefine it on its own terms, often through 
raising consciousness within the various communities associated with the identity 
and using them to push outwards for recognition.  This process then seeks to put 
forward political claims to the State (and other bodies) proposing remedial 
measures to secure recognition, equality and to tackle disadvantage.  The second 
half of the 20th century which has seen a greater rise of identity politics mirrors 
the development of liberal democracies (in a post-colonial period) which has 
allowed people to share a sense of origin with others and collectively put forward 
their claims.  In this context, modern nations may be defined “as those political 
communities made up of people who believe they share characteristics (perhaps 
origins, values, historical experiences, language, territory, or any of many other 
elements) that give them the right to self-determination – perhaps control of a 
piece of the earth’s real estate (their homeland), even statehood and the benefits 
that follow” (Suny 2001, 6).  Hence in this case, they could become arenas in 
which people dispute who they are, argue about boundaries, who is in or out of 
the group, where the “homeland” begins and ends, what the “true” history of the 
nation is, what is “authentic” about being national and what is to be rejected (Ibid). 
Like individuals, nations become articulated through stories spread through 
mythology and symbols, often talking about origins, sacrifice, glory and heroism.  
 
The counter claim though is that liberal democracies have been incapable of 
catering sufficiently to the concept of identity politics, mainly because of their 
organisation around political parties. Interest groups and lobbies that individuals 
can join or leave at will, rather than identity groups (Brown 1995).  This could also 
lead to the marginalisation of minority groups as we have seen in the case of Sri 
Lanka.   
 
Part of my thesis will be to unpack the validity of politics based around ethno-
religious identity formation for the Muslim community in Sri Lanka.  What we need 
to understand is the reasoning behind the transformation of the institutionalisation 
of the Muslim identity in Sri Lanka which also evaluates the practical meaning 
that Muslim identity politics holds for those who were engaged with it – including 
their key concerns and aspirations.   
 
As a form of political engagement and lobbying, identity politics is nothing new, 
but in Sri Lanka, it has been the subject of much contention over recent years, 
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especially with regards minorities and their politics.  In particular, this accusation 
is being brought forward to challenge Sri Lankan Muslims as well with regards 
their allegiances to the state and a national identity.  The counter argument has 
been that the political system in Sri Lanka especially in a post 1956 era not only 
excessively fostered identity politics, but cultivated an unhealthy, divisive political 
landscape whereby minority groups competed with one another for the largest 
portion of official attention, and representation.  This is a form of ‘plural mono-
culturalism’ (Sen 2006a) where actual meaningful interactions between different 
communities are few and far between.  In other words, the concept of identity 
politics as it is practised in places like Sri Lanka, promotes the idea of parallel 
communities and of the side-by-side existence of a diversity of discrete 
communities, to the extent that they ‘might pass one another like ships in the 
night’ (Sen 2006b). 
 
The concept of the parallel communities fits into the theory of ‘Imagined 
Communities’ (Anderson 1983), where despite not actually knowing all other 
members of the community – or even having face to face contact, the community 
is ‘imagined’ in the sense of horizontal comradeship, despite actual inequalities 
and hierarchies and it is limited because of this ‘boundary’.  Hence Anderson 
argues that the community (or the nation, in the sense that he’s particularly 
focussing on) gives the individual a sense that they are a part of something that 
is bigger than them, and that will still exist long after they themselves have gone. 
In this sense, you could build a case (and this is one that Anderson engages with, 
actually) that community identity takes the place of religion in the sense providing 
the individual with personal meaning.  The complication comes when community 
identity becomes synonymous with religion as we have seen in Sri Lanka. 
 
2.3.2	Ethnicity	
Since ethnicity is one of the root causes for identity disputes in Sri Lanka, we 
need to discuss this.  Yet in my opinion, a discussion of ethnicity is always 
complicated by the variety of related terms used to designate similar phenomena, 
such as race, tribe, nation and minority group.  I tend to consider ethnicity to be 
a chapeau of these different terms.  Yet some scholars use these terms 
interchangeably while others treat them as unrelated concepts.  Given the intra-
relationships between the terms is complex, there is a need to understand these 
relationships.   
 
The concept of understanding ethnicity is that it is constructed both historically 
and symbolically around a particular cultural tradition (Bush 2003).  Hence like 
identity, there is an aspect of ethnicity being relationship oriented and emerging 
from one's relationship to a particular ethnic group (Wan and Vanderwef 2009), 
which is distinct, separate and unique from all other groups. “Ethnicity is an 
aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as 
culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a 
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minimum of regular interaction”  (Eriksen 2002, 12).  So ethnicity becomes an 
aspect and not a cultural ‘entity’ in itself; making cultural differences relevant in 
communications, being contextually influenced and above all requiring social 
‘interaction’ with ‘others’. This is something that Barth (1969) also discusses in 
terms of self identity with social interaction.   In other words, one cannot have an 
ethnic identity in isolation.  It needs to be declared in opposition to another person 
as it provides ‘insider groups’ with a sharper sense of their separate selves when 
confronted by the presence of an outsider group (Bush 2003).    
 
Wan and Vanderwef (2009, 2) argue that this approach could be slightly 
problematic because it “pushes the researcher, often unconsciously, toward a 
primordialist understanding of ethnicity”. It is this that sometimes leads to the 
mistaken conclusion of ‘ethnic’ to be ‘minority’.  In other words, “ethnic groups are 
defined as ‘a distinct collective group’ of the population within the larger 
society whose culture is different from the mainstream culture” (Ibid, 5).   This 
often forms the basis of ethnic conflict in the sense that these ethnic (or minority) 
groups are often subject to prejudicial attitudes and actions by the state or its 
constituents (who comprise the majority).  It is this type of analysis of conflict that 
makes it problematic and not all encompassing.  In the case of Sri Lanka this type 
of binary analyses needs to be avoided as it doesn’t fully grasp the complexities 
of the problems at the ground level. 
 
Ethnicity need not always be the most relevant means by which people organize 
themselves in a society or are categorized by others.  It requires enormous power 
for the mobilization of people around a predominant identity and could mean more 
than just a particular ethnic origin.  In fact “when ethnicity becomes politically 
relevant and determines the life prospects of people belonging to distinct ethnic 
groups, it is possible to mobilize group members to change a situation of 
apparently perpetual discrimination and disadvantage or in defense of a valued 
status quo” (Wolff 2006, 31) 
 
Thus understanding ethnicity can not only be difficult but problematic as various 
different definitions and understandings abound (Cashmore 2003, Gellner 1983, 
Anderson 1983 and so on).  However, in dealing with ethnicity as a relationship 
process, that consists of communities and identities, with some foundational 
affirmation of kinship, this primordialist element could be ‘tempered’ with 
constructionism (Wolff 2006).  It is consequently certain, that any approach to 
deal with a definition, approach and theory needs to clearly identified from the 
beginning and will do well to be complementary as opposed to exclusive. 
 
In addition to this, with transnational migration and colonial expansion, ethnicity 
is also linked to nationality17 especially with the rise of the modern state system 




in the 17th Century.  Thus, in the West, the notion of ethnicity, like race and 
nation, developed in the context of European colonial expansion, when 
mercantilism and capitalism were promoting global movements of populations at 
the same time that state boundaries were being more clearly and rigidly defined.  
Modern states in the 19th Century then generally sought legitimacy through their 
claim to represent "nations." Nation-states, however, included populations that 
were largely excluded from national life because they were ‘different’ from the 
‘majority’.   These excluded groups (minorities or ethnic groups) subsequently 
either demanded inclusion on the basis of equality, or sought autonomy.  
 
Anthropological theories of ethnicity are normally grouped into basic 
categories:  Primordialist theories and Instrumentalist theories whilst Gurr and 
Harff (1994) also place Constructivist theories as a third category to be 
considered, especially when considering ethnic conflict (See  
 
Table 1 below).  These theories broadly reflect changes of approach in 
anthropology over the past two decades, i.e. the shift from cultural evolution 
theories, to structural-functional theories, to conflict theories, and finally to 
postmodern theories (Wan and Vanderwef 2009).  Thus it is imperative that when 
reading on ethnicity in Sri Lanka for example, one needs to be aware of which 
theory of ethnicity is being followed since this could in theory affect an author’s 
perspective and conclusion. 
 
Table 1: Three Basic Approaches to Understanding Ethnicity (Wan and Vanderwef 2009) 
Perspective Description 
Primordialist Theories 
Ethnicity is fixed at birth.  Ethnic identification is based on deep, 
primordial attachments to a group or culture.  
Instrumental Theories 
Ethnicity, based on people's "historical" and "symbolic" memory, is 
something created and used and exploited by leaders and others in the 
pragmatic pursuit of their own interests. 
Constructivist Theories 
Ethnic identity is not something people "possess" but something they 
"construct" in specific social and historical contexts to further their 
own interests. It is therefore fluid and subjective. 
 
Primordialist	Theories	of	Ethnicity	
The ‘primordialist’ way of thinking about ethnic identity is that one’s ethnic group 
is fixed (Chandra 2012) and hence each of us belongs to one and only one ethnic 
group, that group membership remains fixed over a lifetime and it is passed down 
intact across generations. Identity then is something intrinsic and inherent (with 
importance being given to blood and descent, religion and language, custom and 
culture).  Wars begin and end; states grow and die; economies boom and crash; 





but through it all, ethnic groups stay the same.   Hence ethnicity is not only “deeply 
ingrained in human history and experience” (Wolff 2006, 33), but ethnic bonds 
are primordial and unlike other bonds: have an over-powering non-rational, 
emotional quality; are largely inexplicable; are ancient, enduring and recurrent; 
given, natural and immutable.  The power of this theory lies in its immutability 
which gives it a sort of invisible power in the sense that it becomes the default 
position and tangible foundation for ethnic identification and from which 
discussions on issues of ethnicity, nationalism and conflict take place.   
 
Primordialism’s socio-biological strand further claims that ethnicity, tied to 
kinship, promotes a convergence of interests between individuals and their kin 
group’s collective goals (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).  Primordialist theories thus 
view human society as a conglomeration of distinct social groups.  At birth a 
person "becomes" a member of a particular group and identification is based on 
deep, primordial attachments to that group, established by kinship and descent 
and hence  “One’s ethnicity is thus ‘fixed’ and an unchangeable part of one’s 
identity” (Wan and Vanderwef 2009, 9). So for example a primordial analysis of 
the Sri Lankan context says that Sri Lanka has always been dominated by two 
exclusive and conflictual groups: Sinhala-speaking Buddhists and Tamil-
speaking Hindus. 
 
The criticism of primordialism is its intrinsic premise that ethnic identities are 
static, when in fact, they can be influenced by different contexts.  This therefore 
ignores how ethnicity is formed instead choosing to focus on the nature of ethnic 
identification. This challenge arises when it comes to looking at Sri Lanka and the 
relationships between the communities.  As Non-Primordial analyses illustrate, 
groupings within Sri Lanka based on language and religion have been historically 
variable and intersecting social divisions. So whilst there was never a perfect 
congruence of ‘race’, language, religion and political territory, current ethnic 
identities which are inherently political, are a by-product of the colonial era and 
have inherently drawn on history and heritage to generate a conflict within the 
modern state. 
Instrumentalist	Theories	of	Ethnicity	
Proponents of instrumentalist theories on the other hand view ethnicity as 
something that can be socially and politically changed, constructed or 
even manipulated over time to gain specific political and/or economic ends (Wan 
and Vanderwef 2009).  Thus this theory posits the notion of an ‘elitist’ approach 
which says that leaders in a modern state (the elite) use and manipulate 
perceptions of ethnic identity to further their own ends and stay in power.  
Consequently, ethnicity is more of a product of political myths brought about by 
the manipulation of elite competition determined by economic and political 
realties (Ibid).  Thus ethnicity is “foremost a resource in the hands of leaders to 
mobilize followers in the pursuit of other interests” (Wolff 2006, 33). Ethnic bonds 
are related to political and social projects; instrumentally mobilized as a means 
to gain material goals. 
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Instrumentalism however fails to understand the non-rational, emotional depth of 
national identity, which have to do with the passion of belonging or the sacrifices 
made in its name.  It also fails to distinguish the fact that ethnic disputes are not 
all about economic and political interests and could arise as a struggle over ideals 
and values. 
 
What both the primordial and instrumental schools have in common is that they 
agree that ethnicity has a number of tangible aspects such as common history, 
customs, traditions and so on (Wolff 2006).  Whilst this may be important 
components for an individual’s ethnic identity, it is slightly different in making this 
an acceptable characteristic of group membership.  Technically even though 
everyone has an ethnic identity, this should not mean that every aspect of 
people’s lives has to be organised on the basis of ethnic ‘in-groups and out-
groups’.  Unfortunately, this is often the case today in many countries, where 
ethnicity is reduced to this base determinant.  It can be argued by some that Sri 
Lanka is a classic example of this type of reductionist determinant for ethnicity.  
However, this doesn’t fully explain the phenomenon in relation to intense 
emotions such issues bring up.  There is explanatory power for some groups in 
some situations, but not for all and hence the concept of ethnic conflict arises.  
Arguably neither school of thought accurately captures the entirety of processes 
of ethnic identification or fully explains the varied elements of ethnic mobilization 
towards conflict with the ‘other’. 
Constructivist	Theories	of	Ethnicity	
Constructivists view ethnic identities as a product of human actions and choices 
(A. Imtiyaz 2009).  In other words, ethnic identities are not singular, nor are they 
fixed.  Hence identity is a created sentiment, based on social, political and cultural 
resources.  Therefore, it can be flexible (albeit) manipulative but processual, 
leading to ever-changing perceptions of identity. Constructivism can involve not 
only large scale changes but “can be a product of the very political and economic 
phenomena that they are used to explain” (Chandra 2012, 5).  Thus identities are 
constructed and transmitted, not genetically inherited, from the past (Taras and 
Ganguly 2002).  This is used subsequently by constructivists to explain that the 
concept of nationalism and ethnic identity is an eighteenth-century European 
phenomenon and an ideological creation.  
 
What this indicates then is that under certain circumstances / problems, ethnic 
identity could be formed by appropriate political actions but also ‘abused’ by 
political actors anxious to obtain and retain power (A. Imtiyaz 2009).  This type of 
analysis is probably one of the better approaches to looking at the Sri Lankan 
scenario, especially in approaching the transformation of the institutionalisation 
of the Muslim identity, as has been done by Imtiyaz 2009; Imtiyaz and Stavris 
2008 and so on.  However, as Ismail (1997) points out, the Muslim political elites 
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well before independence had succeeded in constructing their identity largely 
based on the Islamic faith to distinguish themselves as a group from the Tamils. 
 
What constructivism provides then is an opportunity to ascertain a relationship 
between  ethnicity, politics and economics looking at the process of the formation 
of ethnic identity,  in particular “how to incorporate the possibility of fluidity and 
endogeneity of ethnic identity” (Chandra 2012, 5).   In other words, ethnicity can 
be a process which continues to unfold as it is negotiated and constructed in 
every day living (Wan and Vanderwef 2009) 
 
The concept of constructivism then develops the notion of multiple identities that 
can change endogenously to political and economic processes.   The key is to 
understand the process, speed, phenomenon (in other words, who what, why, 
where, when and how) that drives these changes.  Constructivism cannot serve 
as the basis for new theories unless these disagreements are made explicit and 
synthesized into a coherent set of propositions” (Chandra 2012, 5). 
 
Constructivism focuses on the role of identity in explaining state actions.  In 
particular, it allows the claim that state identities and interests are an important 
part constructed by these social structures, rather than “given exogenously to the 
system by human nature or domestic politics” (Ibid, 216).  Thus this approach 
claims that states possess identities and interests that are socially constructed.  
 
What this then opens up is a notion of an expanded discussion on the concept of 
ethnicity, identity, ethnic groups and boundaries and a hybridity of these concepts 
that arise based on the different contexts and pressures.  Hence in the quest now 
to understand nationalism, identity and so on, our understanding of  “…ethnic 
identity should perhaps rather be seen as something that has roots in a group’s 
culture, and historical experiences and traditions, but that is also dependent upon 
contemporary opportunities that can be a useful instrument for mobilizing people 
for social, political, or economic purposes that may or may not be related directly 
to their ethnic origins” (Wolff 2006, 36-37). 
	
2.3.3	Nations	&	Nationalism	
The concept of Sinhala identity is premised around the mythology of a nation and 
nationalism and the interactions between the two. There is still no consensus as 
what defines a nation, nor is there any wider societal consensus of the 
relationship between modern nations and entities from which members of modern 
nations claim linear descent (Wolff 2006), hence “the key to our understanding of 
nationalism is appreciating how it operates as an ideology” (Cordell and Wolff 
2011, 5). 
 
Any discussion of ‘nations’, nationalism, ethnicity and even ethno-religious 
nationalism is immediately confronted by the continued controversy that 
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surrounds the main terms of the debate.  This is because “the ‘nation’ is a 
fundamentally contested concept” (Jackson-Preece 2011, 15).  Whilst one of the 
most influential doctrines in modern history is the fact that “all humans are divided 
into groups called nations” (Wan and Vanderwef 2009, 13), it is also a 
fundamentally contested concept as “the precise meaning of the term defies an 
easy explanation” (Jackson-Preece 2011, 15).  For example, the concept of the 
Nation could be “a clearly delimited, compact, and recognized homeland; a mass, 
public culture; a centralized economy with mobility throughout; and common 
rights and duties for all co-nationals, usually to the exclusion of outsiders.” (Smith 
1993, 34). In other words, it is simply a membership in ‘a people’ and could be 
construed to be about political representation and how it conceives (as opposed 
to ethnicity) relationships with the state.   
 
On the other hand, a nation could be “A human group consciousness of forming 
a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated 
territory, having a common past and a common project for the future, and claiming 
the right to rule itself” (Guibernau 1999, 14).  Thus national identity becomes a 
modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature, which consists of fulfilling 
certain attributes related to psychological, cultural, territorial, historical and 
political dimensions (Guibernau 2007). 
 
It is clear, how contested the debate on nations (and nationalism) can become.  
Like the discussion on ethnicity there are several categories for theories related 
to the origins of nations (See Table 2 below) 




Nations have existed as long as man has existed.  It is part of being human to 
seek to form nations. 
Perennialist theories 
Nations have been around for a long time, but have taken different shapes at 
different points in history.  National forms may change and particular nations 
may dissolve, but the identity of a nation is unchanging.  The past (history) is 
of great importance. (Anthony D. Smith) 
Modernist theories 
Nations are entirely modern and are socially constructed.  The past is largely 
irrelevant. The nation is a modern phenomenon and socially constructed, the 
product of nationalist ideologies, which themselves are the expression of 
modern, industrial society.  This is currently the most prevalent scholarly 
position (Ernest Gellner) 
Post-modern 
theories 
While nations are modern and the product of modern cultural conditions, 
modem nationalist leaders (elites) "use" the past for their own ends V i.e. they 
select, invent and mix traditions from the ethnic past and offer them as 





This first basic theory of the Origins of Nations which is called the "Nationalist" 
theory sees modern nation-states as direct descendants of ancient primordial 
ethnic groups.  Hence the theoretical underpinnings of this approach  rest on a 
primordialistic view of ethnicity and that to primordialists, nationalism is a natural 
phenomenon (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).  Primordialists focus on ancient and 
inherited social practices as the source of authentic national community.  
Consequently, nations are considered to be primordial entities that are 
identifiable through history, that have ancient roots and through their distinctive 
way of life, attachment to a particular territorial homeland and their striving for 
political autonomy.  
 
It is this reasoning that perhaps seems to justify its presence in many discussions 
today especially when it comes to justifying ethnic conflict (Sri Lanka is no 
exception to this argument).  The resurgence / persistence of ethnic conflict 
disputes early modernization theory which predicted that modernization would 
break down people’s localised ethnic identities and replace them with loyalties to 
larger communities.  Primordialists would argue that the antiquity of the ethnic 
nation and superiority of culture means that this is never the case, and conflicts 
arise when ethnic consciousness is realised as a result of the ‘group’ being 
threatened (culturally, politically, socially) by external forces thereby giving it a 
fundamental  right to self-determination or autonomy, a form of  ‘Neo-
primordialism’ (Comaroff 1995)18.  In other words, ethno-national conflict is 
inevitable under primordial analysis.  This becomes many of the position of right 
wing (Tamil and Sinhalese) nationalist historians (and professionals) in Sri Lanka.  
 
Perennialist	Theories	
This group of theories sees ethnic groups as stable, even ancient units of social 
cohesion (Wan and Vanderwef 2009).   Largely proposed by Anthony D. Smith, 
this theory accounts for the gap created when an ethnic group evolves into a 
nation (Smith 1998) and in some ways explains the evolution of the first European 
nations from their pre-modern ethnic cores19.  Thus before the rise of nation-
states, citizens owed loyalty to kingdoms or empires and the ruling dynasty with 
the focus of people being mainly local (Wan and Vanderwef 2009).  All of this 
changed with communication and education and the connection of villages and 
towns.  As people began to develop a feeling of a collective cultural identity with 
others who spoke their language and practiced their religion, and dynasties 
expanded for financial and political gain, the nation state began to emerge.  
Hence ethnic unity, which relates to the existence of coherent mythology, and a 








symbolism of history and culture in an ethnic community,  is a necessary condition 
for not only national survival and unity but for the ethnic community to become a 
nation state (Wan and Vanderwef 2009). 
Modernist	Theories	
Modernists (e.g. Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm) view 
nations as specifically modern, owing nothing to ethnic heritage as they are  the 
result of political and economic developments in European history, traced to the 
last quarter of 18th century (Enlightenment) and spreading across the globe 
through colonisation, thereby answering the question ‘where does sovereignty 
lie?’ The first conceptions of nationalism were primarily civic and territorial. 
Civic/territorial conceptions of the nation regard it as a community of shared 
culture, common laws, and territorial citizenship and that residence and political 
participation in a public culture tends to determine citizenship and membership of 
the nation (Smith 1993). 
 
Ethnic nationalism rose in importance in 19th century and it is from this point that 
“the discourse of modernity was infused with a national rhetoric” (Jackson-Preece 
2011, 16).  As discussions on history and culture, take prominence, they also 
centre around ‘national economies’, ‘national interest’ and so on. Therefore, 
ethno-nationalism involves the politicisation of ethnicity and usually consists of 
both territorial as well as political claims. 
 
In his classic work, ‘Nations and Nationalism’, Gellner (1983, 15) defines nations 
as “groups which will themselves to persist as communities.  Crystallisation of 
these groups could be by “will, voluntary identification, loyalty and solidarity, as 
well as fear, coercion, and compulsion”. Thus Gellner argues that both nations 
and nationalism are essentially modern phenomena that emerged after the 
French Revolution as a result of modern conditions such as industrialism, literacy, 
education systems, mass communications, secularism and capitalism. “For 
Gellner, the transition from agrarian to industrial society was the key to explaining 
the emergence of ‘nations’ and its concomitant ideology of nationalism” (Jackson-
Preece 2011, 17).  This is opposed to the theories of Elie Kedourie who connects 
nationalism with a top-down intellectual revolution connected to ideas of the 
Enlightenment (Ibid.) 
 
Hence the ‘nation’ has no existence beyond our subjective meanings and there 
is no need for cultural homogeneity of national identity before the modern era. 
Whilst, a sense of shared national identity can be forged, “Gellner suggests that 
ethnicity is neither a prerequisite nor a required element in the formation of 
nations” (Isiksal 2002, 5).   So according to arguments the nation depends upon 
political and intellectual elite imposing a shared culture on the whole population 
in a territory particularly through the national education system. Thus modernism 
presents national consciousness as a complete construct, which is developed as 
an educational process on the masses. 
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Nations then take the form of (Hutchinson 2005): 
• Secular political units infused with ideas of popular sovereignty seeking an 
independent state with universal citizenship rights 
• Consolidated territories with a bureaucratic state and market economy that 
erodes regional and loyal loyalties 
• Ethnically homogenous by virtue of state policies including the promotion 
of official languages, the inculcation of a patriotic ethos is education and 
the expulsion of minorities 
• High cultural unity based on a standard vernacular language, literacy and 
print capitalisation 
• Industrial urban societies with a high degree of territorial integration and 
new middle class social mobility. 
 
Post-Modern	theories	
“Benedict Anderson is the most well-known proponent of the postmodernist 
perspective on nations” (Wan and Vanderwef 2009, 18).  He perhaps offers a 
compromise between the materialism of Gellner and the idealism of Kedourie 
(Jackson-Preece 2011), where in the concept of the nation, he says   
 
“In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the 
nation: it is an imagined political community — and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.  It is imagined because the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion…In fact all communities larger than primordial villages 
of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. 
Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity or genuineness, 
but by the style in which they are imagined…. The nation is imagined as 
limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion 
living human beings has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lies 
other nations…It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born 
in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the 
legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical, dynastic realm…..it is 
imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a 
deep, horizontal comradeship.  Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it 
possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not 
so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (Anderson 
1983, 7-8) 
 
Whilst Anderson shared Gellner’s conception of nationalism as a modern 
phenomenon, he focused on nationalism as a mode of political imagination.  In 
particular, he credits the rise of mass vernacular print media and its effect of a 
unified ‘national’ identity as key components in developing this new found concept 
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of the nation state.  For Anderson, the role of the vernacular media was crucial to 
the rise of the nation, because it allowed the elites to create a context by which 
individuals imagined themselves as members of a greater community beyond 
their immediate locale (Jackson-Preece 2011).   
Criticism	of	the	Modernist	Theory	
The criticism of modernist theories however is perhaps the fact that it fails to take 
into account historical facts and fails to “acknowledge the many different sources 
of dynamism and unpredictability in the pre-modern era that can act as catalysts 
of ethnic formation” (Hutchinson 2005, 12). In this there is also a criticism for 
stressing the role of the elite in terms of manipulating mass consciousness whilst 
perhaps ‘dismissing’ the hopes and aspirations of the ordinary people.  The 
presence of ‘national consciousness’ in the 14th century within a largely illiterate 
English society suggests that the concept of nationalism is much more than its 
‘manufactured’ nature  that is attributed to favourable conjunctions of 
technological, social and economic conditions,  This perhaps challenges 
Anderson’s theory (1983) of the importance of print capitalism and the growth of 
vernacular usages amongst elites (as envisaged by Anderson) were not the 
necessary conditions (as he has assumed) but the facilitators for national 
consciousness formation. 
 
Nevertheless, what modernist theories highlight is the possibility that national 
consciousness can not only be manipulated but it can be used to polarise elite 
interests in a neglected cultural heritage.  What it is perhaps slightly weak in, is 
explaining how this consciousness can get mass support. Another challenge for 
the modernism theory is that it requires cohesive political communities for 
consent to govern which could be a problem for the ‘internal other’.  It detaches 
rationality and technical efficiency from morality and hence for example, it is 
possible to explain that the holocaust was enabled by processes of modernity 
(Bauman 1989).   It fails to understand the multi-layered concept of ethnic cultures 
which can provide ethnic communities with alternatives at times of crises 
(Hutchinson 2005).   As the configurations of power shift (i.e. in some case, the 
concept of the nation state no longer becomes as important as it did in the 
nineteenth century), we now need to understand how to represent these new 
identities and the new cultural politics that are formed.   
Ethno-symbolism	
This theory is seen as a compromise between the primordial and modernist 
positions, stressing both the ethnic origins of national consciousness but also the 
way this can be developed or manipulated. In particular ethnicity is seen as a 
product of culture, history, and/or foundational myths, symbols and memories (so 
in a sense a ‘soft’ form of primordialism). Whilst myths, memories and symbols, 
reinforce collective consciousness, there is a role for the intelligentsia in 
mobilising ethnicity around a collective threat, thereby galvanising a sense of 
nationhood (hence the link with modernism).  This is one of the key principles of 
Anthony D Smith, who claims that national identities are collective identities and 
 50 
that the defining elements of ethnic identification as psychological and emotional, 
emerging from a person’s historical and cultural background (Smith 1995).  
 
Smith argues that whilst the core of ethnicity resides in the myths, memories, 
values, symbols and the characteristic styles of particular historic configurations, 
there is a myth-symbol complex (Wan and Vanderwef 2009), which embody 
certain recurrent dimensions of cultural community and identity including a sense 
of stability; a sense of difference; a sense of continuity and a sense of destiny 
and mission.  These form the body of beliefs and sentiments of a collective 
identity of an ethnic or ‘ethnie20’ community, which its defenders wish to preserve 
and pass on to future generations. The durability of the ethnie thus resides in the 
forms and content of the myth-symbol complex. Of pivotal importance for the 
survival of the ethnie is the diffusion and transmission of the myth-symbol 
complex to its unit of population and its future generations (Ibid).  Although Smith 
does not systematically focus on the intellectuals, he acknowledges their pivotal 
role as the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas, mainly as 
‘chroniclers’ of the ethnic past, elaborating those memories which can link the 
modern nation back to its ‘golden age’ (Conversi 2006).   This then opens the 
doors for anyone who ‘conveys’ ideas to be part of this pool of people who use 
national symbols to awaken the imagined community and to popularise it as well. 
 
Thus the central focus of ethno-symbolism is the relationship between ethnie and 
nation, with there being both physical and ‘moral’ aspects of the relationship 
(Hutchinson 2005). Consequently, in this framework, the concept of ethnic and 
national identity could also be influenced by religion, empires, interstate 
competition, trade and migration (Ibid). Hence Smith (1995) defines nations not 
only as specific subsets of ethnic communities (based on characteristics of the 
ethnic) showing a definite historical territory; a common economy; shared public 
mass education-based culture and common legal rights and duties for all 
members.  In addition, to this, he proposes a five stage formation for nations 
which consist of (Ibid): 
1) Ethnic origins with the coalescence of clans and tribes into wider cultural 
and political networks, from which foundational myths of ancestry etc. 
emerge 
2) Ethnic consolidation associated with the flowering of the ethnic culture, 
military exploits, saints and heroes 
3) Development and divisions (often seen as a decline) where the old order 
ossifies around the upper class and there is conquest of the community 






4) Nationalism finds fertile soil in the wake of opposing the conquerors.  As 
part of this, old myths of a pre-existence nation are roused and tied to a 
vision of the future. 
5) The period of modern nation with the provision of the national constitutions 
and so on. 
 
Thus nations are built on ethnies according to Smith which has some semblance 
of correlation with what has transpired in Sri Lanka as well.  From a nation building 
perspective, it is implicit of the role of historical myths (Coakley 2004).  The 
function of definition is filled by myths of origin which are used to persuade people 
as to their distinguished ancestry.  This reinforces the need for the nation to 
express itself in ways in which it can feel proud.  Myths also evoke commiseration 
in the wake of alien intervention and oppression and legitimise any national 
struggles to re-create the opportunity to once again express the individuality of 
the nation (Ibid.). “The great value of nationalist historiography to ethno-national 
political elites is, the, clear: it can be used to justify not only past actions but also 
current or planned political programs” (Ibid, 554) 
Criticism	of	the	Ethno-symbolist	Theory	
Although ethno-symbolism remains broadly unchallenged on its own ground, 
some internal weaknesses may be signalled. Firstly the complex set of elements 
that Smith tends to use interchangeably, often without sufficient specification 
does not allow for critical analysis or easy application (Conversi 2006).  It has 
some fragile conceptual foundations. Smith’s definition of the  nation as “a named 
human population occupying an historic territory, and sharing myths, memories, 
a single public culture and common rights and duties for all members” (Smith 
2004, 65) remains slightly unclear.  Whilst the inclusion of ‘common rights and 
duties’ in the definition seems to refer to citizenship rights, it can only be fully 
granted by the existence of a state or autonomous region.  So how does this 
explain, many minority groups trying to distinguish themselves as a nation?  
Hence there is something to be said about Smith’s rather too inclusive definition 
of the nation (Conversi 2006).  This then leads onto another weakness which 
relates to its apparent difficulty in explaining the variability of nationalist 
movements and their different motivations based on its limited engagement with 
the problem of distortion of ethnic myths by political elites. 
Combining modernism and perennialism, ethno-symbolism focuses on the 
centrality of myths of descent in ethnic persistence. It also focuses on the role of 
the intellectuals and the intelligentsia as interpreters, rather than manipulators. 
Failing this task, ethno-symbolism risks remaining a descriptive endeavour and 
thus “In accepting that ethno-symbolism is one of the most sophisticated 
approaches  to the study of nationalism does not bring us nearer to a general 
theory of nationalism….it remains conceptually opaque and politically 
unnuanced” (Conversi 2006, 26). 
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Finally, ethno-symbolism has not addressed the wider context, or the 
precipitates, or the different outcomes of various ways of mobilising ethnic myths 
and symbols. So far, ethno-symbolism has largely disregarded the changes in 
and adaptations of these myths to the goals of elites. Hence, there is the risk of 
drifting towards an agency-less approach. Furthermore, by dismissing outright 
the role of elite manipulation in the enormous emotional appeal of nationalism, 
ethno-symbolism leaves out of consideration the dynamics of power. 
Nationalism	
The road that leads to the full understanding of nationalism in all its complexities 
is still a long one. Lacking a general theory, there is still a need to explore several 
approaches, each of which will, ‘illuminate a corner of the broader canvas only to 
leave the rest of it in untraversed darkness’ (Smith 1998, 220). 
Nationalism is thus an ideology which is ubiquitous. Unlike other ideologies, such 
as socialism and liberalism, it is often taken as given, as part of the natural order 
of things.  It is then contested depending on which theory is used.  For the 
modernists, nationalism is concerned with economical transition and 
democratisation (i.e. shared political and economic experience) but for the 
primordialists, nationalism is fundamentally concerned with a cultural politics of 
authenticity.  Hence for “modernising nationalists, both language and ethnicity is 
a means to an end (the modern nation-state); for primordialists, language and 
ethnicity are needs in themselves because they disclose an intrinsic organic 
national community.” (Jackson-Preece 2011, 20). 
There are consequently many different forms of nationalism: dominant/state; 
settler-state (or settler-colonial); anti-colonial; post-colonial; indigenous; linguistic 
(integrally connected to ethno-nationalism); revolutionary socialist or communist 
nationalisms; etc. Most political scientists distinguish between two ways of 




Table 3: Ethnic vs. Civic Nationalism (Wan and Vanderwef 2009) 
Theory Description 
Civic Nationalism 
• Civic/territorial conceptions of the nation ‘regard it as a community 
of shared culture, common laws, and territorial citizenship’. 
• With civic nationalism ‘residence and political participation in a 
public culture tend[s] to determine citizenship and membership of the 
nation’ (Smith 1993 
• Celebrates the freely chosen and purely political identity of 
participants in modern states 
• Primacy of “individual rights” (the individual) 
• Exemplified by France, Canada, and the United States. 
• Focus on demos 
• “Multi-culturalism” and diversity valued 
• Equal rights for all ethnic groups 
Ethnic Nationalism 
• Ethnic conceptions of the nation ‘focus on the genealogy of its 
members, however fictive; on popular mobilization of “the folk”; on 
native history and customs; and on the vernacular culture’ (Smith 
1993). 
• Therefore, ethno-nationalism involves the politicisation of ethnicity 
and usually territorial as well as political claimsCelebrates inherited 
cultural identity 
• Primacy of “collective rights” (the ethnic nation) 
• Exemplified by Nazi Germany, pre-WW II Japan, and some Eastern 
European countries. 
• Focus on ethnos 
• “Ethnic purity” valued 
• Special rights given to the dominant ethnic group 
 
So there are problems with both ethnic and civic conceptualizations of the nation-
state.  Whilst these theories are useful in most societies there are people who 
aren’t members of the hegemonic nation (in ethnic or civic terms); some members 
of national collectivities live in other states; some nations have never had a state.  
The concept of ethnic-nation states is very rare in the world except for a few 
countries (although there is an aspiration for this by countries such as Myanmar 
and Sri Lanka).Civic nation-states on the other hand  require difficult nation-
building project and can have ethnic undertones that make minorities feel 
excluded. As Gellner (1983, 1) says 
 
“In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that 
ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, 
that ethnic boundaries within a given state . . . should not separate the 




Finally based on what has been discussed in terms of a framework, there is now 
an opportunity to explore how national identity can be conceptualised.  Again 
there are many different models that can be used, as summarised in Table 4. 
 






Theories that are essentially primordial, i.e. that view national identity as 
emerging from kinship, cultural or historical ties that are enshrined in the 




A constructivist approach that views national identity as an elusive socially 
constructed and negotiated reality, something that essentially has a different 
meaning for each individual.   
 
This can then be developed into the following (Bellamy 2003): 
The “big stories” -  The first level is an abstract level of ‘big stories’ that 
distinguish the nation from other nations 
 
 
The instrumental usage of the “big stories” by elites - The second level 
looks at the political and intellectual elites who attempt to make sense of these 
‘big stories’ in order to legitimize particular political programs. 
 
“Banal Nationalism” at the local and individual level - The third level 
examines how narratives of national identity articulated by political and 
intellectual elites are constantly reinterpreted in social 
 
 
Thus national identity is made up of a complex relationship between different 
factors based on intangible cultural traits, the collective memory (like customs, 
myths, religion) and a continually changing expression of national identity which 
ultimately do slowly change the latter.  These factors end up being manifested at 
a local level and impacting individualism multiple social spheres.  ‘National 
identity… becomes embedded in the lived out experiences of people. Hence, 
these dynamics make national identity complex, overlapping and often 
contradictory” (Wan and Vanderwef 2009, 38). 
Based on this notion of the complex relationship, it is worth exploring the work 
done by Brubaker (1996, 2009) which explains this complex relationship 
especially for minorities, and could be useful in a Sri Lankan context to be aware 
of.  Brubaker explores the concept of ‘triadic nexus’ which he terms as the 
relationship between three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms. The 
first is the aspect of the 'nationalizing' nationalisms of newly independent (or 
newly reconfigured) states. This involves claims made in the name of a 'core 
nation' or nationality, defined in ethno-cultural terms, and sharply distinguished 
from the citizenry as a whole. The core nation is then understood as the legitimate 
'owner' of the state, which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation, in 
other words the ‘majority. Despite having 'its own' state, however, the core nation 
is conceived and perceived (largely internally) as being in a ‘weak’ cultural, 
economic, or demographic position within the state. This weak position - seen as 
a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence - is 
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held to justify the 'remedial' or 'compensatory' project of using state power to 
promote the specific (and previously inadequately served) interests of the core 
nation, largely against the ‘other’. 
Directly challenging these 'nationalizing' nationalisms are, transborder 
nationalisms or what Brubaker calls 'external national homelands.' These 
‘homeland nationalisms’ assert the rights of states to monitor the condition, 
promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, assert the rights, and 
protect the interests of 'their ' ethnonational kin in other states. Such claims are 
typically made when the ethnonational kin in question are seen as threatened by 
the nationalizing (and thereby, from the point of view of the ethnonational kin, de-
nationalizing) policies and practices of the state in which they live. Homeland 
nationalisms thus arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with 
nationalizing nationalisms.  This could be akin to the Indian Government 
engaging with its diaspora and overseas citizens both for internal and external 
purposes. 'Homeland,' in how Brubaker approaches it, is a political, not an 
ethnographic category. A state becomes an external national 'homeland' when 
cultural or political elites construe certain residents and citizens of other States 
as co-nationals, as fellow members of a single transborder nation, and when they 
assert that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, 
not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states 
and possess other citizenships. 
Caught between these two mutually antagonistic nationalisms - those of the 
nationalizing states in which they live and those of the external national 
homelands to which they belong by ethnonational affinity though not by legal 
citizenship - are the national minorities. They have their own nationalism: they too 
make claims on the grounds of their nationality, a political stance that make them 
a minority.  Whilst it is not an ethnodemographic fact, the minority nationalist 
stance characteristically involves a self-understanding in specifically 'national ' 
rather than merely 'ethnic ' terms, a demand for state recognition of their distinct 
ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based 
cultural or political rights.  
Religion	
In Sri Lanka as has been discussed and will be discussed further, religion plays 
an influencing role in navigating the ethnic consciousness and political 
expression.  It is in this regard that the role that religion plays in the development 
of the collective memory and the development of a national identity should be 
explored although classical scholarship on ethnicity and ethno-nationalism 
carefully distinguished religion from ethnicity’ for example, Smith’s definition of 
Ethnie. Whist definitions are contested, there is some consensus that central to 
ethnicity is perceived territorial based descent.  Religion is defined substantively 
as beliefs and practices concerned with the sacred, with particular religions 
identified in terms of institutionally based and bounded sets of such beliefs and 
practices (Ruane and Todd 2011).  Hence “on Smith’s definition of ethnicity, 
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religion may form the common culture that particularly constitutes the ethnie…” 
(Ibid, 68). 
 
Whilst one of the biggest challenges is coming up with an understanding of 
religion that takes into account the diversity of faith based practices around the 
world, another challenges to understand the interaction between religion and 
ethnicity and how the former can inform and perhaps even define the other.  The 
way religion’s role in society and culture is understood varies from culture to 
culture. 
 
Kaufmann (2012) however attempts to develop some workable theories by 
deploying nationalism theory to make better sense of existing frameworks in the 
theory of religion.  In particular, he explores the 'primordialist-constructionist' 
typology, an ideal-typical distinction which structures debates in ethnicity and 
nationalism and allows the constructionists to consider nations to be modern, 
while primordialists assign them a pre-modern or even prehistoric origin.  “This 
classification distinguishes between theories which posit the enduring, rooted and 
emotive nature of ethnicity/nations” (Ibid, 141) as summarised in Table 5  
Table 5: Nationalism and Religion: Two Ideal Types (Kaufmann 2012) 
Theory Ethnic Group, Nation Religion 
Primordialist  
 
Ethnic groups and nations 
have a primordial origin, and 
are deeply rooted in human 
evolutionary psychology. 
Therefore, they are unlikely 


















From the definitions above, there is a relationship between ethnicity, nations and 
religion in the commonality of culture being shared. Whilst most constructionist 
theorists of nationalism take it for granted that religion defined the pre-modern 
order from which nations emerged (Gellner 1983), there is of course a vigorous 
debate about how modernity and the modern nation state has now led to a 
process of secularization  which is the process of moving from a religious to a 
secular order, in other words exemplifying the  durable decline in the power of 
religion in the public or private sphere (Kaufmann 2012).  “The conceptual 
relationship between religion and secularization is vital, and marks an important 
difference from nationalism. Whereas the alternatives to nation and ethnic group 
are various, i.e. empire, lifestyle enclave, city-state or status group, this is not true 
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of religion in relation to secularism. Indeed, religion and secularism are locked in 
an epistemic zero-sum embrace.” (Ibid, 147). 
Whereas constructionism perceives ethnic and religious demand to be human 
creations, primordialism considers them irrepressible psychological constants. 
Yet religions, like nations and ethnic groups, are cultural communities.  Materialist 
accounts privilege economic and political sources of religious decline which arise 
in modernity while symbolists point to self-replicating cultural traditions as the key 
source of social power.  
Primordialists, locate the motivation for religion's persistence in mankind's 
evolutionary psychology, which emerged in the prehistoric past. This religious 
need is held to override the periodic secularizing imperatives emanating from the 
material or cultural realm. Religion springs eternal, though its form may change. 
However, within constructionism, materialist theories consider secularizing 
processes to be modern and terminal for religion, while symbolist theories over 
that period of religiosity give way to those of secularism and vice-versa, in cyclical 
fashion. 
Ruane and Todd (2011) take the discussion on this relationship further by 
investigating empirically the different ways that people construct themselves and 
how groups are formed.    In so doing, they illustrate that the way people construct 
and understand their sense of peoplehood (based on religions and ethnicity) is 
quite complex and needs to be deconstructed.   
The political developments of the 1980s and 1990s in both the post-colonial and 
the western worlds have clashed with the globalisation debate that posits a 
collapse of parochial identities of ethnic and religious groups in favour of loyalty 
with larger communities in the wake of greater political and economic interaction 
among people, coupled with widespread education and mass communication 
networks. Ted Robert Gurr (1993) maintains that ethno-religious movements 
throughout the world in recent decades provide strong networks that form the 
basis for political mobilization.  He clearly identifies modernization as a 
threatening source of ethno-political and religious mobilization, as ethnic tensions 
are raised due to dominant groups wanting to build nations on their own cultural 
values, triggering a minority reaction for increased autonomy and separate 
development. Research “shows how state institutions and secular political 
movements may be permeated by assumptions deriving from religion” (Ruane 
and Todd 2011, 74) 
2.3.4	Conflict	
It is also important in this study explores conflict given that Sri Lanka experienced 
a 30-year-old conflict.  The term conflict describes a situation in which two or 
more actors pursue incompatible yet from their individual perspectives, entirely 
just goals, of which ethnic conflicts are a subset (Wolff 2006).  Whatever the 
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concrete issues over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will 
explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms.  
 
Conflict and in particular ethnic conflict remains one of the prevailing challenges 
to international security (Cordell and Wolff 2011).  Social scientists need to study 
the concept of ethnic conflict in order to understand better what its causes are, 
how it can be prevented, managed and resolved.  It is a subject of 
multidisciplinary study from political science to psychology (Cordell and Wolff 
2011) 
 
Ethnicity (and other markers of identity such as religion and so on) generates 
conflicts in a number of different ways.  A sense of insecurity emerges among the 
members of a group when they feel that they are deliberately and systematically 
beleaguered by the dominant group of the society. This group that is methodically 
targeted by the dominant group due to its ideas, beliefs, lifestyle and/or identity 
tends to mobilize against the oppressors in all available ways, theoretically both 
in non-violence primarily by the moderate democratic leadership and violently by 
radical groups, if it thinks the former’s strategies make no sense to win its rights. 
This punch line theory on mobilization facilitates the understanding of the process 
of group mobilization either against the State or dominant group or both (T. Gurr 
1993). 
 
Analysing conflict through the lens of the schools of thought discussed above, 
highlights the following (Varshney 2009):  
 
1) Essentialism -  Here conflicts are predicated upon the fact that ethnic hatred is 
old and historically rooted – “ancient hatreds”. The primordialism of ethnic groups 
thus remains a stronger bond and a more powerful motivator of human conduct 
than the pull of civic ties of the new states.  However, there are some weaknesses 
to this approach.  If hatred was so rooted, why did ethnic violence rise and fall at 
various times? If the conflict is between a new migrant group and the older 
inhabitants, where does ‘ancient hatred’ lie?  Can ancient ethnic animosities 
which are often on a small scale – local and regional be magnified into national 
issues given the modern construct of the nation state? However, it is still around 
because of the fact that it allows people to tap into the basis of fear, hatred, 
resentment and rage which can be given an ancient framework. 
 
2) Instrumentalism – Here ethnicity is not inherent in human nature or intrinsically 
valuable. It masks a deeper core of interests, which are either economic or 
political. Leaders manipulate ethnicity in order to get political power or state 
resources.  This approach raises interesting questions such as: Why should the 
masses listen/follow the manipulations of the leaders? Why do the leaders think 




3) Constructivism – Here ethnicity and nationality are constructs of the modern 
era as has been discussed above with the concept of the print capitalism and 
colonialism.  However, it does not do a good job of explaining ethnic conflict 
 
4) Institutionalism – here the core idea is that the designs of political institutions 
explain why some multi-ethnic societies have violence, and others, peace. 
Institutionalists believe that ethnic pluralism requires political institutions distinct 
from those that are more homogenous.  Thus there is an ability to move beyond 
national-level institutions and to recognize the need to understand local and 
regional variations.  This approach also understands the fluidity of identities.  
 
Hence what these approaches show is that there is no comprehensive and widely 
accepted theory of the causes and consequences of ethno-political conflict (Gurr 
and Harff 1994). Instead, there are many factors that can lead to tensions 
between groups of people such that “identity doesn’t mobilise individuals as 
primoridalist proponents would argue rather individuals mobilise identity…. the 
pattern of communal conflict is not simply determined by the interaction of 
communal groups like the action-reaction dynamic of billiard balls, it is also 
affected by the constellation of shifting factors within each communal group” 
(Bush 2003, 6).  Thus in any international or regional conflict situation, there is no 
simple explanation for the causes and processes of the conflict – social, 
economic, territorial, political, ethnic and religious factors play important roles in 
any conflict as is evident in Sri Lanka. 
2.4	Relevance	of	the	Literature	for	this	Study	
“National identities are malleable rather than fixed and they can and do conflict” 
(Jackson-Preece 2011, 24) and thus none of the theories of national formation is 
entirely adequate.  Whilst primordialism lacks the ability to explain the emergence 
of new nations; modernism fails to explain the emergence of nationalism at times 
earlier than the industrial revolution and a naked ethno-symbolic approach cannot 
do justice to the complexities of particular national circumstances. It is also limited 
in its power to explain how ethnic conflicts emerge and how nations are mobilised.  
 
In the case of Sri Lanka, the ethnic conflict and in particular the case for the 
Muslim community, the concept of the nation is important as is the concept of 
identity as “identity is about hegemony” (Ismail 1997, 65).  Theorists such as 
Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson who are from the ‘modernist’ position view 
the concept of the ‘nation’ as a recent invention that is linked to the transformation 
of social, economic and political cultures that emerged from Europe in the 18th 
century.  The inadequacy of the theoretical underpinnings outlined above is not 
necessarily a problem for this thesis.  National consciousness formation is so 
diverse so it is perhaps unrealistic to think that any one theory can explain all 
cases.  Different elements of different theories have great explanatory power.   
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Hence what I would need to do is to be aware of the limitations of all the theories 
and try and use a combination of relevant ones, mainly from the ethno-symbolist, 
constructivists and modernist approach.  My justification is that the explanatory 
power justifies the element’s use as long as it doesn’t plainly contradict any other 
element of the explanation. In addition, it is important to stress that my thesis is 
not a theory testing one, instead the theory discussed above is really discussed 
as a way of making sense of the argument of the changing nature of Muslim 
identity in Sri Lanka.  
 
Whilst many  scholars emphasize the pre-colonial roots of the ethno-political 
conflict in Sri Lanka, with the present conflict ‘mirroring’ ancient conflicts between 
the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms to extend their boundaries, others contend 
that the contemporary pattern of ethnic relations in Sri Lanka have been largely 
shaped by its colonial history (A. Imtiyaz 2009). The colonial process created 
borders, which included or divided ethnic groups and defined the demographic 
mixture of the colonies that eventually became countries. Colonialism’s divide-
and-rule policies, census taking, and promotion of ethnic identities all enhanced 
(and sometimes even created) cultural and ethnic distinctions in colonial 
societies, although these processes by themselves can hardly account for the 
nationalistic conflict unleashed in the post-colonial areas.  As has been shown 
before, the modernization theory which further maintains that when colonies 
became independent countries, modern values would spread and indigenous 
inhabitants would be less influenced by traditional ethnic or religious loyalties, 
has largely been over turned.  
 
In Sri Lanka, post-independence ethnic loyalty was strengthened, not weakened, 
by nation building efforts and the modernization of society. Rising competition 
among Sri Lankans to dominate economic and political resources, particularly 
between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, essentially diminished the chance for a 
common national identity to develop, especially as Sinhalese leaders established 
laws that grossly favoured the majority Sinhalese (Ibid), thereby leading to an 
ethnic conflict.  This also led to the development of the distinct Muslim identity.  
 
It is clear that the underpinning rationale for the discussion of ethnic identity in Sri 
Lanka is perhaps more in line with the Constructivist Approach (with some 
elements of the modernist and ethno-symbolist approach) to the formation of an 
ethnic identity and the ethnic conflict.  This is viewed as a product of human 
actions and choices that are constructed, transmitted and not genetically 
inherited from the past (Taras and Ganguly 2002), in keeping  with the Weber 
school of thought which looks at the social origin of ethnic identity based on a 
belief in a common ancestry (Stone 1995), thus not only leading to the formation 
of a community but forming under the right circumstances by appropriate political 
actions (Ibid.). Hence political actors will construct both identity and problems in 
order to gain and hold power.  This forms the underpinning of the thesis,  
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I also propose to use the ‘two level critical juncture’ approach as envisioned by 
Bush (2009).  Namely, the two levels of analysis refer to ‘intra-ethnic’ group 
formation (which refers to the interaction between sub-groups within the same 
ethnic group) and ‘inter-ethnic’ group formation (which refers to the interaction 
between sub-groups across ethnic group boundaries).  Critical junctures, refer to 
“a turning point in which relations within and between groups are altered 
fundamentally” (Ibid, 15).  For the purposes of my thesis, my intra-group analysis 
is within the Muslim community and the inter-group analysis is between the Sri 
Lankan Muslims and the ‘Others’.  Critical junctures for me represent important 
times in Sri Lanka’s history which contributed towards the institutionalisation of 
the Muslim identity.  I pick up four distinct periods:  Pre-Independence to 
Independence 1948 (the ethnic identity formation); Independence (1948) to 1983 
(the social identity formation); 1983 – 2009 (the political identity formation) and 
post 2009 till 2014 (a challenge to current Muslim identity formation)21.  In addition 
to this, underpinning all of these periods is the evolution of religious identity and 
fervour brought about by a renaissance globally of Islam and Islamic thought and 
thus it is important to examine the relationships with religious identity in this period 
as well. Hence my thesis will attempt to understand the concept of Muslim identity 
in this context and will set out to address the following general questions.  These 
questions will be elaborated in more detail in the field work, the interviews and 
focus group discussions as well as in in the research section: 
 
1) Do Muslims understand the history of the development and the 
transformation of their own identity? 
2) What are the critical junctures that drive Muslim identity and history? What 
are the intra and inter group dynamics related to this formation?  How has 
Muslim identity evolved in response to these critical junctures? 
3) How do Muslim Elites (political, civil society, academics) understand the 
development and evolution of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity?  How do 
they understand its formation vis-à-vis others? 
4) How do members from other communities understand the development 
and articulation of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity? How is Muslim identity 
shaped by institutions and how is institutionalization shaped by critical 
junctures? 
5) What are the challenges facing the current narrative of Sri Lankan Muslims 
and how is this tied to their identity and history? 
6) How and what do we need to represent the Muslim identity for the future?   
 
These questions are certainly not exhaustive but can provide a general 
consensus in trying to understand the nature of the thesis.   	






I will now elaborate upon the methodology that was used for my field work and 
research following the literature review.  In this regard it is important to note that 
this thesis is based on a qualitative study rather than a quantitative study primarily 
because of my intent to dig deep into understanding how the development, 
evolution and transformation of the Muslim identity has taken place 
2.5.1	Historical	Analysis	
The thesis is first and foremost a work of historical analysis, relying on a wide 
range of primary and secondary source material as the basis of its research. With 
the project’s time-frame (1889-2014) being so recent, I found that there was also 
great benefit in utilising oral history (also based on my own knowledge and 
personal observation) as an important source of information, analysis and 
perspective. To this end, I conducted interviews with a number of individuals who 
have been involved with the events and developments that I have considered in 
my thesis.  It is primarily a case of following a grounded theory concept (Glasser 
and Strauss, 1967) which really allowed me to study the phenomenon of the 
evolution, institutionalisation and transformation of Muslim identity over the 130-
year period, through collecting and analysing data and verbal reports using a lens 
of positivism and pragmatism. 
Thus my principle research strategy consists of the documentation and analysis 
of primary data gathered from interviews with key figures from the Sri Lankan 
Muslim community as well as those that are intimately involved with the 
community, in addition to indirect surveys22 (particularly in the periods 2011 – 
2015) and focus group discussions with relevant community groups. In addition, 
data consists of participant observation and an insider’s reflective perspective. 
The interviews, surveys, focus groups and observations took place over a 
sustained research period and provide the voluminous and rich data on which 
this research thesis rests. Data accrued from the fieldwork is both original and 
compelling and facilitates research findings which broadly describe the evolution 
of the institutionalisation of Muslim identity in Sri Lanka for the last 130 years and 
how the elites have now gotten disconnected from the grass roots, such that the 
identity of the Muslim community needs to be reimagined, otherwise it runs the 
risk of becoming benign. 
Whilst I fully appreciate that there might have been other methodological options 
for undertaking this research making it more quantitative such as quantitative 
data on public opinion or other demographic data, I took advantage of my 
personal links and accessibility to key informants and felt that this was a 
legitimate way to undertake this research. However, I did take the opportunity to 







do some focus group discussions and a few surveys in order to get an 
understanding of the grass roots to complement the thinking of the elite.  Yet this 
was and is primarily a thesis that is qualitative exploring the development of 
identity from an elitist formation. This was so as to get a first hand appreciation 
of the context and the problem in terms of how it is understood by the community.  
When I first started the thesis, a full census had not taken place since 1981 
because of the conflict.  A full census later took place in 2012 which I used some 
data for the research. 
2.5.2	Grounded	Theory	
Using the grounded theory method, I undertook a constant comparative analysis 
to justify the hypothesis above.  In this sense, in virtue of the interpretive nature 
of the method, this also allowed me to reflect on my subjective engagement in 
the material making note of what is referred to as ‘theoretical memos’ which I then 
used to understand insights that have proven to be grounded.  Through some of 
the analysis of initial interviews and data collection, this resulted in an initial set 
of categories, which in turn guided the selection of new data and so on.  I was 
able to do this concurrent collection and analysis of data until I understood that 
the different data sets and categories were ‘saturated’ and I could bring the study 
to a close. 
While this is not the first research project to posit findings about the Muslim 
community, it is perhaps the first to explore the relationship of identity and 
institutionalisation over time conjecturing the theory that the identity has 
responded to critical junctures in time and is perhaps open to some change.  In 
addition, it is one that has been explored in recent times (especially in the wake 
of the post 2009 rise of anti Muslim rhetoric and violence) and not really looking 
as is normal over the historical formation of the identity. It therefore has the 
advantage of providing a richer recent and holistic picture for what constitutes the 
Muslim identity in Sri Lanka.   
In view of this methodology, qualitative methods were used, which are 
traditionally associated with theory-building approaches to data collection. 
Qualitative methods are also appropriate when ascertaining the subtle and 
complex meanings held by social actors. The study resorted to interviews a few 
questionnaires, both structured and semi-structured, surveys, focus group 
discussions and participant observation, in order to understand the degrees of 
subtlety involved when people formulate their views about Muslim identity, its 
development and institutionalisation and the relation to the other communities.  
To supplement and triangulate the findings from interviews and participant 
observation, the study amassed and analysed a large collection of material – 




From the outset, a series of interviews, surveys and focus group discussions were 
undertaken with key civil society, community, religious, political and academic 
figures on top of conversations with individuals from different parts of the 
community.  This was necessary in order to understand official and explicit views 
as well as to gain deeper insights concerning various issues relevant to the study, 
such as political strategies, deeper understanding regarding participation and 
non-participation in politics, and questions about organisations and operations in 
Sri Lanka. By doing this, the study avoids accusations of inaccuracy and 
misquoting, and does not rely heavily on third-party sources. Finally, meeting key 
figures from the outset helped me to familiarise myself with the atmosphere in 
which some of these organisations operate. On a practical level, it helped 
facilitate access to individuals, once they were made aware that the researcher 
was interested not in political or theological views but greater understanding of 
the identity process.  What was also advantageous was how the researcher 
sought to interview those key individuals who had contributed to articles and 
books and thus in a way was able to corroborate second hand information with 
first hand accounts. 
 
Interviewees were placed into the following categories: prominent Muslim figures 
(politicians, academics, activists); faith leaders and academics from other 
communities; individuals and activists from the Muslim community though not 
prominent but who would represent a more mainstream perspective of the 
community. The first category included Professor Ameer Ali (a prominent Sri 
Lankan academic based in Australia), Mrs Ferial Ashraff (former minster and 
head of the political party NUA and the widow of the founder of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim Congress), the late Mr Izzeth Hussein (a former diplomat and prominent 
writer on Sri Lankan Muslim issues).  The second category includes Rev 
Ebenezer Joseph (the general secretary of the National Christian Council) and 
the late Professor Ken Bush (from Durham University) as well as focus group 
discussions with young activists and business men. For a full list and titles of 
individuals interviewed, see Appendix 1. 
 
The focus on meeting different individuals, community representatives and 
leaders belonging to the Muslim community was deliberate since they feature 
prominently in the politicisation and institutionalisation of Muslims in Sri Lanka.  
Meetings and interviews with leading community figures gave me the opportunity 
to directly hear statements and the stated positions on Muslim identity in the 
country rather than having to rely on second- or third-hand sources. In addition 
to being able to compare feelings on the ground with what was officially said at 
the top, this was also an opportunity to understand the disconnect between the 
two constituents.  The feelings on the ground came from my own observations 
followed by perception studies and surveys carried out for other bits and pieces 
of work that were also relevant to this study.  I have referred to these surveys as 
well towards the final chapters. 
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The style and format of my interviews varied – from extended face-to-face 
interviews, to extended telephone / skype conversations, email conversations 
and more informal discussions. The type of approach I used depended on a 
number of factors, including the availability and preference of the interviewee, the 
level of involvement that the individual had in events that I was covering, and 
therefore the amount and nature of subject matter that I wished to discuss with 
them in an interview. I prepared for interviews beforehand by considering the 
topics that I wished to cover and preparing some central questions. However, I 
maintained a flexible approach to interviews, allowing space for my interviewees 
to speak openly and at length. Most of my interviewees were specifically selected 
on the basis of my background research and knowledge. Nonetheless, I 
occasionally used a ‘snowball’ sampling method, whereby my interviewees 
recommended to me further people that I should approach for interview. When it 
was used, I found this method to be appropriate as it allowed me to hear 
alternative perspectives on issues or events, and to corroborate or verify 
information that I had obtained from other sources.  
2.5.4	Personal	Reflections	
I must mention that I benefited significantly from my own personal position with 
respect to the Sri Lankan Muslim community landscape. Being a Sri Lankan 
Muslim myself, and one who has experienced close interaction and engagement 
with a number of the groups and individuals that I interviewed, I had the important 
advantage of ‘trusted insider’ status, in the sense that I possess extensive 
familiarity with the context and development of the community as well as being 
previously acquainted with some of my interviewees. In some cases, I did find 
this background to be of additional advantage, since a certain level of trust was 
already in place, interviewees did not find it difficult to ‘open up’. In addition, as a 
result of my professional job, the access that I obtained to the communities for 
the surveys helped to build that trust as well as understanding of the context on 
the ground.  This also allowed me to interrogate further my subjects for the benefit 
of the thesis. 
Reflexivity was important to me in the course of my fieldwork, as my familiarity 
with the contexts and subjects that I was studying meant that I had to continually 
reassess my position in the course of my interviews. I took extra care as I framed 
my interviews and questions to search for accuracy and detail, and was acutely 
aware that my findings might be politically skewed if I allowed my own views to 
permeate into my interview style. I therefore made a conscious effort to remain 
unbiased and objective in my approach to interviews and the questions asked, 
allowing space for my interviewees’ views and perspectives to authentically come 
through.  
I took matters of research ethics very seriously and ensured that my fieldwork 
complied with the university’s guidance notes for research ethics. In particular, 
this involved that my interviewees and focus group discussions were not made 
vulnerable in any way as a result in their participation in my research. It included 
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outlining clearly to them the nature and scope of my research, the details of what 
their participation would involve and making clear that they were free to withdraw 
their participation at any point if they so wished. Additionally, I explained to my 
interviewees that their conversations with me were being recorded and that they 
would be treated with confidentiality. Those interviewees who did not wish to be 
identified in the thesis were given the option of anonymity.  
2.6			Scope	and	Limitations	
In short, the approach and strategy employed in this study has been multifaceted, 
and which was aided by the author’s local knowledge of the (Muslim and wider) 
community as well as meetings with key individuals and activists.  
 
Whilst employing qualitative methods to understand the context of the 
community, the study needed to corroborate, test and examine some of the 
understandings from ordinary Muslim as well as relevant activists and academics.   
There was though a challenge with truly getting to the grips of understanding the 
problem.  Not being fluent in the local vernacular at least to be able to conduct 
interviews and surveys, it was not possible to survey a very large section of the 
Muslim community, spanning different cities and languages.  Doing this in English 
thus limited my research largely to give one an idea of the “pulse” of the Muslim 
community.  
 
Although I also had initially wanted to do some specific surveys with a wider group 
of people around identity, I was unable to get much responses from people.  This 
changed when I carried out perception studies of other communities as well as 
surveys related to specific incidents that had taken place in the country.  As for 
the interviews, they proved to be useful in gaining greater insights into the issues, 
as they provided the opportunity to question the interviewees in depth.   
 
Other limitations and problems encountered in the course of this study included 
doing this part time and a delay in submission and writing for personal and family 
reasons. I had intended to do this part time and I moved to Sri Lanka to undertake 
full time research.  In addition, towards the end of my work, I changed jobs in 
2017 which meant a relocation and more travelling.  Thus I was not able to finish 
the writing as I originally intended to do.   Doing this PhD part time whilst working 










“To really understand the complexity of the problem, especially with 
regards the Sri Lankan Muslim identity context, we need to understand in 
history ‘Who was the Muslim?’ This entails properly understanding the 
history of identities in Sri Lanka”23 
3.1			Introduction	
In order to understand the current challenges and scenario facing Sri Lanka, it is 
necessary to start from the beginning.  By tracing the context and history of the 
country, this will enable the understanding of the development of the differences 
within and between the minority communities and the majority community in the 
arena of identity politics and how these have been manipulated and abused for 
political and personal gain contributing not only to the conflict (Bush 2003) but 
also to the current relationships between communities.  This shift in the political 
axes of identity that is reflected in a corresponding shift in the axes of conflict has 
been shown from studies where “the present dynamics of conflict in Sri Lanka 
and the ethnic identities upon which it is based are radically different from earlier 
conflicts and identities” (Ibid, 22).   
 
This manifestation of  identities has blurred ethnic and religious differences 
causing a “repression-reaction pathway” (Henne, Shah and Hudgens 2012, 59), 
perpetuating deeply  delusive and divisive assumptions of single exclusive 
identities.  Such exclusive identities are negative, stressing difference rather than 
belonging and ‘opposition  to’ rather than ‘support for’ something (Commonwealth 
Foundation 2007).  In particular in Sri Lanka, these exclusive identities are as a 
result of the steady growth of political activism on the part of a new generation of 
Buddhist monks post independence which was  aggravated by the conflict but 
has sources in colonial history (Deegalle 2007).  Hence understanding the Sri 
Lankan Muslim identity can not be isolated from understanding how identity in Sri 
Lanka in general was formed particularly in relation to colonial history.  In addition, 
this understanding has to take into account the differences in characterising 
Muslim identity that exist between postcolonial theorists who see Sri Lankan 
Muslim identity being formed  against and in relation to other ethnic identities as 
a result of colonial influences (Q. M. Ismail 1995); and the primordial identity 
theorists who choose to argue through a historical analysis that the Sri Lankan 
Muslim identity is predominantly of Arab origin (Shukri 1989, Deverajah 1994). 
 
                                                
23	Face	to	face	interview	with	Mr.	Naushad	Majeed,	November	2016	
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It is my contention in this thesis that both these factors: the belief held by many 
Sri Lankan Muslims of their ‘Arab’ origin and the efforts to redefine their space 
and position vis-à-vis the other; are not mutually exclusive and hence need to be 
considered in parallel to really understand the challenges that the community has 
faced and continue to face in terms of identity expression. What this chapter aims 
to do is to provide a wider historical conceptual framework for situating the Sri 
Lankan Muslim identity crisis in broad terms that also explores the expression of 
identity within a Sri Lankan context.  The latter identity expression has often been 
used to discuss the Sri Lankan conflict of the eighties as either a terrorist problem 
or an ethnic problem between the majority and the minority (Bandarage 2009) 
that excluded the Muslims, yet it is clear that this binary construct is not helpful to 
understand underlying problems24. 
 
As this chapter will argue, the ‘Sri Lankan’ identity as constructed by the majority 
ethnic community is based on the supposedly close relationship between the 
country’s majority Sinhalese population and their Buddhist religious beliefs, 
thereby sowing the seeds for the later conflict and proving problematic for the 
minorities as it blurred the religious – ethnic lines.  In particular, for the Muslims, 
this identity formation of a religio-ethnic nature became problematic in their own 
search for belonging and in terms of how they relate to this in their own identity 
formation.  The historical narrative of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity formation of 
descending from the Arabs, though serving to reinforce the important role of 
religion in the everyday lives and identity of the Muslim community (not very 
different to other communities) coupled with their position as a second minority, 
has meant that they have been marginalised and excluded from core political 
events, which has led them to search for alternative forms of identity creating 
space for transnational movements of belonging. 
 
It is these seeds that pose a challenge for identify formation and expression in 
Sri Lanka.  This religio-ethno-political identity that has come to define all the 
ethnic communities has to be understood as part of the root causes of the 
problems within and between the various communities.  Thus it is important to 
situate this within a historical context of the country and how the communities 
themselves have developed especially in the wake of colonial pressures. 
3.1.1	The	Mahawansa 
Looking at the colonial influence on Sri Lanka, it is also worth exploring the roots 
of Sinhala Buddhist identity.  The psyche of the identity of  Sinhalese is based on 
a holy land myth (Harris 2007) conditioned by an ancient chronicle called the 
Mahawansa25 which traces  the origin of the Sinhala civilisation from the mythical 
figure of King Vijaya who was said to come from North India.  The Mahawansa 







was supposed to be a court document that addresses the relationships between 
the ruling elite and the Buddhist Monks - Sangha  (Grant 2009), charting the 
account of the arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and its subsequent protection by 
its monarchs.  “The narrative thus claims the whole of Sri Lanka as the 
Dhammadipa, the island of the Dhamma, a holy island dedicated to the Buddha 
and his teachings” (Harris 2007, 152). It therefore consolidates a relationship 
between the monarchy and the Buddhist religious establishment (or the Sangha) 
and by extension a duty upon the ruling elite to offer and maintain protection not 
only for the Sangha but for the concepts it represents.  As was discussed in one 
of my focus groups: 
 
“The Mahawansa is a foundational document for the Sinhala (and by 
extent ‘Sri Lankan’) existence and its formation is based on the ‘other’, 
those who are not part of the ‘Aryan’ race.  Thus we see that any aspects 
of identity difference and conflict in Sri Lanka has to come from 
understanding this very basic foundation of the link between Buddhism 
and being Sinhala”26 
 
This narrative offered by the Mahawansa in terms of Buddhism, the monarchy 
and the Sangha, is important because it lays the foundation that Sri Lanka as a 
nation that cannot be united unless the monarch is Buddhist (R. L. Gunawardana 
1990)27.  In addition, it offers the justification from Buddhism for violence to be 
committed in its name (Harris 2007), in a ‘Just War’ perspective, to bring about 
and maintain political unity through a Buddhist state with the corollary being that 
any threat to the sovereignty of the island like the quest for autonomy and 
separation would come from the minorities (the non Sinhalese ‘Buddhist’ like for 
example as demanded by the LTTE) is “no less a threat to the dhamma, a threat 
to the continuation of ‘pure’ Buddhism in the world”  (Ibid., 152).   By outlining a 
clear connection to North India, the Mahawansa also attempts to define a distinct 
Aryan nature of the Sinhala race as opposed to the Dravidian heritage of the 
Tamil population related to South India (Grant 2009), thereby quickly defining the 
difference between the two communities by stressing the ‘other’ in terms of the 
Tamil community28.   
 
Yet this type of mythology wasn't supposed to deal with group identity nor does 
it map directly onto late 19th and 20th century Sri Lanka29 with the current context-
social mobility, power dynamics, class status as well as the hybridity of the 
population. The significance of the link between the ruling elite, the Sangha (and 
by default a national identity) occurred in the late 19th century / early 20th century, 










when it was used by anti colonialists in the early 20th century, such as Angarika 
Dharmapala, to develop support for their cause. 
 
What Dharmapala did was to re emphasise the  fact that “Sinhalas are specially 
chosen by the Buddha and their political unity guarantees the survival of 
Buddhism in Sri Lanka, just as their political identity is guranteed by their 
espousal of Buddhism”  (Grant 2009, 51).  In so doing, Dharmapala, once again 
linked modern Sinhala identity to religion and ancient chronicle tradition, claiming 
that the colonial period had corrupted the Sinhalese and diluted Buddhism by 
bringing in foreign elements (such as Christianity) and foreign people (a reference 
to Muslims).  By the early 20th century, Dharmapala was using racial 
characteristics to define the Sinhalese by explaining the ‘others’.  For example he 
characterised the Tamils as being “fiercely antagonistic to Buddhism” (Ibid. 74) 
and responsible for acts of vandalism against sacred Buddhist relics.  In another 
place he described Muslims as “alien to the Sinhalese by religion, race and 
language and consequently there will always be bad blood” (Ibid. 73) between 
the two.  In so doing, Dharmapala (and other influential Sinhala buddhists of the 
time) annexed Buddhism with Sri Lankan identity in opposition to colonial 
nationalism combining theories of race, language and religion to describe a 
Sinhala identity empowered by a sense of special religious destiny. 
 
By re reading the ancient chronicle with a specific ethno nationalist agenda and 
projecting it onto modern Sinhala identity, the context of unemployment amongst 
youth; rural and urban disparities; political corruption and so on was missed in 
defining future challenges for the country.  So for example, when the LTTE as 
part of the ethnic conflict (arising out of ethno-political grievances), initially 
attacked Buddhist monks (and subsequently Buddhist places of worship) at the 
start of the conflict, the Sinhalese public were provoked into a response that the 
government of the day manipulated into ethnic and later religious lines in order to 
protect not only Buddhism but also the very unity of the country30.  
 	













Like many post-colonial societies, Sri Lanka drew on pre-colonial culture, 
including religion, to form a national identity after gaining independence, a term 
that I call ‘religously clothed national identity’ in the light of the increasing visible 
involvement of Buddhist monks in political activism (Deegalle 2007).  Despite this 
legacy, it should also be remembered that there are other much more 
complicated factors which have also attributed to these divisions (Bandarage 
2009). 
3.2.1	Debunking	Myths	
Many scholars emphasize the pre-colonial roots citing Tamil and Sinhalese 
kingdoms in Ancient Sri Lanka that existed at a perpetual state of conflict before 
the Portuguese captured the island in 150531 (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).  Thus, 
many Sinhala and Tamil nationalists portray community relations from a 
primordial concept, based on distrust and violence spanning over more than two 
millennia32.  As an interviewee put it 
 
“In fact, there are some who seem to point to this primordial existence of 
the Sinhala-Buddhist nation-state as a way of justifying the Sinhala 
Buddhist consciousness with an ancient civilizational foundation”33 
 
As Fernando (2008) argues, there are many Sri Lanka scholars who claim an 
ethno-religious character that binds the Sangha, kingship and the masses 
together “forming a homogeneous ethno-religious community, namely Sinhala 
Buddhist, with an overarching hegemonic identity and a centralised system of 
state that covers the whole island” (Ibid,114). Fernando (2008,115) calls this a 
“’cultural appropriation’ of primordialism, where despite theorising nationalism 
from a ‘primordialist’ version of nationhood, there has also been an adaptation to 
an essentialist cultural approach to identity formation”.  In other words, for many, 
the Sri Lankan civilisation (the dominant Indo-Aryan Sinhala population) has been 
historically formed and is treated as primordial inputs for the first stages of 
nationhood.  In asserting these ‘essential’ differences among communities, it is 
clear that there is an intent to emphasise the power of Sinhala Buddhist culture 
in the formation of state and national identity ignoring the cultural and political 
impact made by the diverse ethno-nationalist groups in the island. As another 
interviewee put it: 
 
“The danger is that these ‘perennialist’ and ‘primordialist’ approaches have 
transcended from the academic, theoretical assertions to form a political 
and nationalist ideology. We see people like Dharmapala and others being 









part of political organisations defining a national identity as a Sinhala 
Buddhist identity based on these assumptions.  This has repercussions for 
relations in the current day and age, but it is clear that myth has become 
historicised and history has become mythologised.  There is a need to 
debunk this”34 
 
There has thus been a tendency to misread the past (especially the pre-colonial 
era) to talk about ‘two opposed nations’ projecting  the Tamil-Sinhalese 
interaction within the current conflict as a continuity from the past rather than a 
recent upsurge (Bush 2003).  These  ‘identities’ and discussions are very much 
the product of a Nineteenth century35 mind frame  and to see them as conflicts 
between the ‘invading’ Tamils and the ‘resisting’ Sinhalese does not necessarily 
help in understanding the reality of earlier centuries (Feith 2010).  This is because 
the  interpretation of Sri Lankan history is mainly written from a partisan Sinhala 
or Tamil point of view with selective use of literature and archaeological evidence, 
presenting a narrative of opposition through warfare that seems to gloss over 
arguments (especially over events which allegedly occurred between the fourth 
century BC and the tenth century AD).  With this ideological and political bias that 
reflects the respective author’s ethnic or nationalist interest (M. A. Nuhman 2007) 
it is “often difficult to disentangle the historical evidence from the nationalist 
framework imposed upon it” (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, 22).  So a Sinhalese 
nationalist will paint a picture of pre-colonial Sri Lanka prior to the European 
invasion that was “... a mono-ethnic and mono-religious Sinhala Buddhist state 
where the Tamils were migrant aliens” (Bandarage 2009, 18).  In contrast, Tamil 
nationalists will argue that “Tamils were the earliest occupants of the island and 
that the ‘entire island’ of Sri Lanka was ruled by Tamil kinds even before the 
Christian era” (Ibid., 19).  This colonial and partisan interpretation of the past has 
thus not only conditioned the analysis of history and community relations in Sri 
Lanka but cast it as a “bipolar interaction of relatively homogenous groups” (Bush 
2003, 34).  As Gunawardana (1995, 1) points out, in Sri Lanka  
 
“with the intensification of the ethnic conflict and accompanying 
polarisation within the academic community, scholars have been coming 
under increasing pressure to develop representations of the past which 
lend legitimacy to the claims of the ethnic group to which they belong.  
While they have been expected to challenge representations of the past in 
works of writers in rival ethnic groups, it has become difficult,  and in certain 
situations, even risky for them to challenge or to be critical of 
represensations being utilised by their own ethnic groups.  This 
development brought in its wake a notable relaxation in intellectual rigour 
in research.”   
 




This partisan view on history has also been made difficult by the colonial period 
which put forward certain assumptions based on many influences, including the 
types of sources available, the broader trends in European historical writing, and 
the ideological and social positions of the authors and their intended audiences, 
but which were never challenged subsequently (J. D. Rogers 1990).  
 
Despite the fact that Sri Lankan history is written by two different sets of 
communities, each stressing the claim of their own constituency, the pre colonial 
history of Sri Lanka in fact does not conform to this model of two opposing nations 
(Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  There is  Tamil ancestry amongst Sinhalese36 with the 
Sinhalese language showing an influence from Tamil language, and the 
Sinhalese caste system being similar to that of south India, so much so that  “… 
during these centuries the people living in this period would not have necessarily 
identified themselves as Tamil or Sinhalese…” (Feith 2010, 347) .  In fact, “caste, 
not language or religion was the basis of social stratification in pre-colonial 
society” (Bandarage 2009, 5).   “Not only did Tamils and Sinhalese  live together 
peaceably for most of the two millennia, but there was considerable social, 
political and economic commonality between them” (Bush 2003, 34). Thus the 
Sinhalese and Tamils, despite the best claims of extremist nationalists, are not 
two exclusive groups with separate historical pasts and “much of the long pre-
colonial history of Sri Lanka was characterised by ethno-religious pluralism and 
co-existence over antagonism and conflict” (Bandarage 2009, 4) 37. 
3.2.2	The	Portuguese	and	Dutch	Periods	
The early 16th  and 17th  Centuries saw writings from early Europeans in Sri Lanka 
who discovered people in the North and East of the island who spoke Tamil38 and 
were ruled by kings who had rivalries with other rulers in the island yet also 
commonly spoke Sinhalese (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990), whilst Tamil was 
included in the monastic education of Sinhala Buddhist monks (Bandarage 2009).  
Though this explains the dynastic wars that were fought and  the differences 
existing  between the diverse groups of people on the island, it does not explain 
the unique  channelled Sinhala-Tamil communal violence that dated from after 
Independence (Bush 2003), and so “…the point is simply that differences of 
languages, custom and religion were made into something new by the devices of 
the modern state…” (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, 24).  This is emphasized by Bush 
(2003) who further illustrates that even in the height of severe violence in the 
country, there existed pockets and process of inter-group cooperation and 
peaceful coexistence thereby implying that the violence (and group boundaries) 











were not continuous, undifferentiated and impenetrable.  As an interviewee put 
it: 
 
“This notion that there has been a massive historical racial and ethnic 
tension between at least the Sinhalese and the Tamils is disputed and we 
have seen numerous times in ancient and even contemporary times to 
debunk this notion.  Even now where there are tensions between the 
Sinhalese and the Muslims, it is not consistent and is debunked equally by 
the amount of engagement between the communities.  So we need a more 
nuanced understanding of community relations”39  
 
Thus prior to the Nineteenth Century the ideal congruence of race, language, 
religion and political territory assumed in current nationalist discourse was not 
clear-cut and in the pre-modern state of Sri Lanka, there could not have been 
signs of the incipient Sinhala-Tamil conflict as understood today because these 
categories did not bear the nationalist connotations that they now bear (Nissan 
and Stirrat 1990).  There were no political claims to the existence of different 
identities and up to the 1870s “…we  find an awareness of being Tamil, even an 
awareness of a historical tradition that differs slightly from that of the Sinhala, yet 
attached to one political unit, Sri Lanka, and a wider cultural region, India”. 
(Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990, 110). 
 
Hence as the Colonial History theorists contend,  the contemporary pattern of 
ethnic relations and tensions in countries like Sri Lanka is largely due to its 
colonial history, whose process created borders that included or divided ethnic 
groups and defined the demographic mixture of the colonies that eventually 
became countries (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008). Whilst Sri Lanka being an island 
differs slightly, it is definitely true that the differentiation of ethnic identities 
(thereby creating distinction within society) and the selective favouritism of 
colonial rulers towards minorities to help in colonial administration, laid the 
foundations towards the nationalistic conflict that the country faced in the post 
colonial era. 
 
This type of reasoning goes against the notion that Hutchinson (2005) put forward 
around ethno-symbolist continuity in that in spite of the cultural differences being 
exploited by colonial powers it did in fact exist prior to colonisation.  Although he 
also does contradict that with his ‘postmodern’ emphasis on multiplicity and 
interruption.  In other words, that not all national projects have premodern 
blueprints and that intergenerational national consciousness can be broken. To 
some extent, what Nissan and Stirrat (1990), Bush (2003), Bandarage (2004) and 
others have stated though is that there were differences between the 
communities based on caste as equally as there were commonalities.  However, 
the differences that existed between the communities does not match the fervour 
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of the ethnic formation that was created in the nineteenth century especially as a 
result of the British colonial experience. 
	
3.2.3	The	British	Period	
It is the history of modern Sri Lanka from the latter half of the 19th century (i.e. 
during the colonial rule of the British) that there is a conscious development of 
ethnic consciousness (and eventually conflict) among the major ethnic 
communities who hitherto had been ‘living in harmony’ throughout the pre-
modern period (M. A. Nuhman 2007, N. Wickramasinghe 2006).  It is this colonial 
period, especially under the British, that is often blamed by most analysts for 
sowing the seed of ethnic divisions that thrived in the post 1948 Sri Lanka, as it 
fostered and emphasised a new concept of colonial identity40 (Rajasingham-
Senanayake 1999).    
 
British interest in Sri Lanka had first been aroused by its strategic significance in 
the Indian Ocean, but it also later became an important arena for commercial 
interests with the British introducing an independent capitalist sector, improving 
infrastructure like roads and enhancing the coffee and tea estates which resulted 
in large numbers of South Indian Tamil labourers being brought in to tend the 
estates (Nissan and Stirrat 1990). 
Understanding	Local	Contexts	
However when they took control of Sri Lanka in 1796, the British had little 
understanding of the history and customs of the island and began to create a 
body of knowledge that would provide information for both the practical needs of 
government and a general assessment of indigenous civilization on a universal 
scale of progress (J. D. Rogers 1990).  As Wickramasinghe (2006) shows, the 
British, in order to exert control on the native population so they could be 
“counted, objectified and divided into social groups” (Ibid, 45) problematically 
devised categories such as nation, race, religion and caste through which they 
imposed a sense of difference on their subjects. 
 
This was further compounded by the heterogeneous situation, faced by the British 
in coming across people speaking a variety of languages, wearing a number of 
costumes, and following different religions.  Their response to this was simplistic: 
“…different groups in Sri Lanka were, it was argued, different races and different 
races had different customs” (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, 27).  Thus language, 
religion, custom and clothes were taken in various combinations as markers of 
racial variation, and by the end of the nineteenth century a large number of 








distinct ‘races’ were recognized by the authorities in colonial Sri Lanka.   For 
example, in the 1871 census, where 'race' appeared for the first time, there were 
seventy eight 'nationalities' and twenty four 'races' (N. Wickramasinghe 2006)41.  
However by the 1881 census the number of 'races' had reduced to seven: 
Europeans, Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors42, Malays, Veddhas and others (N. 
Wickramasinghe 2006). The Moors, were separately identified based on a 
number of factors including religion, culture and origin (Ibid). According to an 
interviewee: 
 
“This in itself was quite a unique aspect of how the British ruled Sri Lanka 
and divided its inhabitants up as opposed to mainland India which was 
ruled in different way for example, Muslims were not considered as a 
separate ethnicity in the British Raj”43 
 
The identification of ‘Moors’ as a separate category of representation would 
coincide as well with transnational events happening (also as a result of the 
British colonial powers and what was happening in places like Egypt and also 
with the Ottoman Empire) that would affect how this classification of ethnicity 
would engage with the country moving forward.  As an interviewee put it: 
“The British had not really anticipated that providing the ‘Moors’ with an 
opportunity to define their identity also through religion i.e. Islam, would be 
an opportunity to further consolidate relationships with a global 
representation and identity”44 
Consequently  by the uneven and unequal  manner of integration into the polity, 
British colonial policies in particular contributed to new  forms of ethno-religious 
competition and stratification and hence  the “fault lines between the Sinhala and 
Tamil communities that show up in the modern Sri Lankan conflict were drawn 
during the period of British colonization from 1815 to 1948” (Bandarage 2009, 
29).  Nissan and Stirrat (1990, 29) also point out to the paradox at the centre of 
Sri Lanka’s colonial polity which was “subject to one set of rules and one set of 
governors; in terms of citizenship, all should be equal.  Yet...British rule 
substantiated heterogeneity, formalising cultural differences and making it the 
basis of social organisation and political representation”.  For example, the British 
like the Dutch before them promoted separate legal codes for ethnic groups such 
as Islamic personal law for Muslims and the Thesawalami customary law for 
Jaffna Tamils (Bandarage 2009).  Thus these differences were instituted 
differently in the legal system than in the political system in that  more groupings 
were given legal representation at the level of family law (based on cultures and 










customs) than at the political level (Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  All of this 
institutionalisation and dichotomy would eventually have an effect on how the 
different groups thought of themselves and the other45.	
Anti	Colonial	Revival	
The British colonial ideology particularly, also served to influence perceptions of 
the past whereby the images that were developed during this period were 
produced by the use of nineteenth-century Western historical ideas and methods 
undermining the fluidity and inter-mixture that had hitherto prevailed in Ancient 
Sri Lanka (Ibid.).  For the Tamils, their identity and history has been shaped by 
links with South India and the greater amount of assimilation between cultures 
and religions and hence Tamil Christians have been at the forefront of Tamil 
nationalism (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990).  However for the Sinhalese, since 
their history is only available through the Mahawansa, their ideas of history and 
the past were essentially based on the assumption of the decline of a great 
ancient civilization and the presence of different antagonistic groups threatening 
the sanctity of the nation-state (J. D. Rogers 1990). This central idea of a  rise 
and decline of an ancient civilization, was almost universally accepted and 
developed after 1840  by the anti colonial revival movements both because it was 
plausible—it was confirmed by  the Mahawansa and the ruined irrigation tanks 
and cities around Sri Lanka—and because “ it was consistent with the pattern of 
European historiography, which looked to the classical civilization of Greece and 
Rome” (J. D. Rogers 1990, 102).    It was also promoted by people who were not 
professional historians but ‘activists’ from other disciplines such as law, who were 
not only influenced by the circumstances but in some cases were rebelling 
against it (Ibid.) 
 
By developing this idea, the anti colonials from the Sinhala community, 
succeeded in articulating a ‘Sinhalese’ ideology as an essential part of 
contemporary Sri Lankan culture.  Being a majority community and with its 
associations with language, race and religion, this ideology succeeded in 
thoroughly permeating such areas of intellectual activity as creative writing, the 
arts and historical narratives thereby radically transforming and refashioning the 
normative view of Sri Lanka’s past.   This ideology was also helped by the fact 
that from the beginning of the colonial period, the Sinhalese as a group were 
disadvantaged in the colonial system of political representation, for example 
being given “one slot out of a total of six of non governmental members in the 
Legislative Council created in 1832 to function in an advisory capacity” 
(Bandarage 2009, 32)46.  Moreover the situation was made worse by the fact that 
the Sinhala representation was further given to a member of the Sinhala Christian 









community who were from the Govi caste rather than the disparaged Buddhist 
majority47.  Coupled with the fact that as a result of the plethora of Christian 
missionary schools providing the elites in the north with English education, there 
was a ‘structural imbalance’ giving these Tamils favoured status above the 
Sinhalese (and other ethnicities) in the eyes of the colonial rulers.  For example 
“in 1925, the Sinhalese constituted 42.5% of the government medical service and 
43.6% of the civil service, whereas the Sri Lankan Tamils made up 30.8% of the 
medical services and 20.5% of the civil service although their respective 
proportions in the island’s population were 67% and 11%” (Ibid., 31). 48 
 
It is important to remember that these anti colonial revival movements, which 
attempted to define an identity different from the English colonial rulers and also 
to differentiate themselves from the subordinate positions in which the colonial 
administration placed them, was not just concentrated with the Sinhalese. At the 
same time, the Tamil community in their own way, set about rediscovering ancient 
Tamil literature and heritage and as the next section and following chapters will 
show, the Muslim community also used this opportunity to develop a link to their 
unique heritage as well as develop their own distinct identity. In fact, as Nuhman 
(2007, ix) points out “Ethnic consciousness among the Muslims gradually 
developed in relation to the Sinhala and Tamil ethno-nationalisms from the late 
19th century owing to the competition for economic and political opportunities”.  In 
addition, Ismail (1995, 64) is more explicit when he says that the identity 
representation for the Muslim community came from the “elite’s desire to 
safeguard its economic and other interests as well as its fear of the forces of 
Sinhala nationalism and of the hegemonic Sinhala state”. 
Social	Stratification	
In developing this group consciousness, the social classes created by colonial 
rule and influence drew as much on European thought as on their own past 
traditions.  The period during which the modern Sinhala (Tamil and even Muslim) 
consciousness evolved also witnessed the rise into prominence of racialist 
theories in Europe. (R. L. Gunawardana 1990).  The British colonial rulers 
“believed themselves to be involved in a civilizing process”  (Nissan and Stirrat 
1990, 27)  and introduced ideological capitalist imperatives, committed to the  
liberal values of nineteenth-century Britain.  Thus the introduction of ideas about 
the individual, about rights in private property, “and about the various aspects of 
modern society which Weber referred to as bureaucratization and rationalization 
were all parts of this process” (ibid. 27).  From the viewpoint of the British, ancient 
Sri Lanka might be one of the wonders of the world, and its achievements 
celebrated, but further progress depended on the ‘successful introduction of 









European ways’ (J. D. Rogers 1990).  Thus from the mid-nineteenth century, the 
island’s history was judged according to Victorian standards in the context of 
human progress and imposing “modern social categories, such as nationality, on 
the Sri Lankan sources” (Ibid, 90) and consequently from the beginning, political 
representation at national level was instituted by the British on a communal basis.  
For example, the Manning reforms introduced between 1921 and 1924, 
emphasized ‘communal representation’ for those groups recognized as 
‘legitimate interest groups’ by the British.  Thus those eager to secure communal 
representation therefore had to justify this both to themselves and to the 
government (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990). 
 
Whilst these types of representations were contested by those anti colonial 
parties, who maintained that a great civilization had existed in Sri Lanka but had 
become weakened as a product of specific historical circumstances (namely the 
imposition of modern notions of nationality under the influence of nineteenth 
century western thought, including oriental studies), this was done so within an 
ideological framework of human progress and social categories. However  the 
evidence that in ancient Sri Lanka religious, linguistic, and ethnic identities were 
often fluid and not always congruent (and therefore there was commonality 
between mainly the Tamils and Sinhalese) was either denied or portrayed as an 
indication of decay (ibid.) leading to a “particular colonial interpretation of the past 
which has conditioned the analysis of conflict dynamics and the definition of the 
groups in conflict, casting the conflict as the bipolar interaction of relatively 
homogeneous groups” (Bush 2003, 34).   
 
Unfortunately, rather than seek to unify a Sri Lankan identity and history in 
opposition to a British colonial status that could be attributed to specific historical 
circumstances, the obsession with defining the origin and heritage of the different 
social categories in nineteenth-century Sri Lanka, meant that divergent narratives 
of ethnicity (and even religion) were developed (J. D. Rogers 1990) and it was 
the elites of this period who used these narratives to justify their own social and 
political primacy.   For example, it was the elites from both the Sinhala and Tamil 
communities who opposed the constitutional reform brought about by the 
Donoughmore Commission in 1931 that introduced universal franchise based on 
territorial representation making the island one of the earliest British colonies to 
receive the vote for men, women and the working classes (Bandarage 2009).  In 
particular the Tamil elites felt that they would be changed from a majority 
community to a minority community (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990).  
Nevertheless, the elections of 1931 on the basis of these reforms would bring 
about drastic changes to the composition of the new legislature and would signify 
“the beginning of what came to be seen as a ‘re-conquest’ of power by the Sinhala 
Buddhist majority who had been marginalised during 400 years of colonial 
domination and a diminution of the power of minorities especially the Sri Lankan 
Tamils who had ‘benefitted’ from colonial rule” (Ibid., 36).   
 80 
Religion	and	Ethnicity	
Thus ethnicity and religion, two overlapping but distinct forms of identity, would 
become primary markers for a form of Sri Lankan identity shaped by ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’ (Ibid.).  Unfortunately in the years preceding and following 
independence, the prominent movement within the anti colonial parties  for this 
identity were led by Sinhalese elites, who promoted the notion that equated race, 
religion, culture, and language as unchanging components of the Sinhala nation 
throughout the ages (J. D. Rogers 1990) but recognized the advantages that 
capitalism and modern technology had brought them.  Hence Buddhism, which 
was considered the weakest link in the colonial chain, became the channel for 
the Sinhalese elite to voice their opposition not only towards the colonial power 
but also as a way of mobilizing popular support in search of an ‘idyllic’ past (Ibid).    
Eventually the concept of ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ came into use to denote a group of 
people who are distinguished from the Sinhala of the other faiths and also from 
the Buddhists of other ethnic groups (Ibid.). This  portrayal of the ‘Sinhala 
Buddhist’ as a victim of the colonial era and an underprivileged group49, mainly 
by people such as  Dharmapala50, gained traction (especially after universal 
suffrage was introduced to the island in 1931), and the need to struggle for the 
“legitimate rights of the Sinhala Buddhists” (R. L. Gunawardana 1990, 76) 
became an essential part of the Sinhalese-Buddhist ideology.     
 
Consequently, the Sinhala Buddhist construct entered the consciousness of the 
masses, tying together an appreciation of a common culture that underlined 
Sinhala as a linguistic entity and overarching local, regional and caste identities.  
Whilst this construct was predominantly Buddhist in definition, it glossed over the 
Sinhala Christian sections of the community, preferring a “…nationalist 
movement with certain anti-imperialist potentialities” (Ibid.).51  In other words, this 
nationalist movement emphasized the achievements of an ancient past thereby 
offering an anti colonial channel for the Sinhala people to strive to achieve 
‘progress’ (in a colonial sense) whilst maintaining their cultural pride.  By using 
the Mahawansa ideology, it also allowed the elite to once again  set themselves 
above ‘the mass of poor people’ who “needed the élite to help them rediscover 
indigenous culture and meet the challenges of the modern world” (J. D. Rogers 
1990, 103).  
 
Hence by the end of the Nineteenth Century, this Buddhist revival vis-a-vis 
nationalist identity succeeded in placing religion at the forefront of most social 











debates and public activities (Ibid.).  In particular, it also became another indirect 
anti colonial tool especially in the face of Christianity, by many of the ‘upwardly 
mobile’ Buddhist elites to challenge the authority of the British and the power and 
influence of more traditional élite families, many of whom were Christian (and 
often ethnically Tamil).   In this guise, for the Sinhala Buddhist, the Tamils became 
agents of a foreign power and helped on by British perceptions, the Tamil call for 
equal political representation was part of a grand design to deprive the Sinhala 
Buddhist community of what was theirs (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990). 
 
Whilst many define the paradox created by the British as ‘divide-and-rule colonial 
practices’ to consolidate and maintain colonial regimes in the face of  exploitation 
for economic gain (Bandarage 2009), Nissan and Stirrat (1990, 29)  also classify 
this as “of misguided ‘liberal’ sentiments which sought to protect the different 
customs of different ‘races’”, influenced by racial theories developed from the 
relationship between contemporary studies of language, etymological and 
historical, and of evolutionary theory.  Nevertheless, conditions were inevitably 
created for these revival movements to flourish into nationalist movements by the 
turn of the twentieth century and in the lead up to independence.  The concept of 
Tamil and Sinhala nationalism in particular gained strength and the symbolic anti 
colonial rhetoric that promoted one ‘nation’ above the ‘other’ gained momentum, 
developing prominent polarising positions for both the communities which 
hardened in a post independence and a conflict era.  
 
Thus the colonial period under the British in particular fostered and emphasised 
a new concept of colonial identities weakening the process of ethnic assimilation 
that had existed hitherto (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999).  It is in this context 
that the exploration of Sri Lankan Muslims is considered exploring a development 
of a strong ethnic identity based on their religion but one that is vulnerable to 
Sinhala and Tamil ethno nationalisms.	
3.3			The	Case	of	Sri	Lankan	Muslims	
Sri Lankan Muslims constitute about 9.1% of the total population based on the 
2012 census.  This is the first census taken in 11 years (and the first after the end 
of the conflict in 2009) and for the first time did not have approximations for figures 
from in the North and East which were present in 2001, due to the fact that the 
conflict had prevented any proper census from taking place(ICG 2007b)52. 
 
The Muslims are scattered all over the island and they do not account for an 
absolute majority (50% plus one) of the population in any district of Sri Lanka 
(See Figure 2). However, in two districts, with 44% in Ampara and 41% in 






Trincomalee in the Eastern province, they are the largest single ethnic group. In 
two other districts Mannar (North Western Province) and Batticaloa (Eastern 
Province) they account for more than 20% the population of the district.  Thus 
these four districts, which are in the east and northwest of the island, account for 
only about 1/3 of the total Muslim population (D. B. McGilvray 2011). The 
remaining 2/3 are scattered over the island with more conspicuous 
concentrations in the Western coastal districts of Colombo, Kalutara and 
Puttalam53 and in Kandy in the central highlands.  
 
 
Figure 2: Important sites of Muslim population in Sri Lanka (McGilvray and Raheem 2007)54 
 
By virtue of the geographical locus of the conflict and their historical legitimacy 
and also because of their “anomalous position in Sri Lankan ethno-nationalist 
identity politics” due to their definition of a defensive ethnic identity that is neither 
Sinhalese nor Tamil (McGilvray and Raheem 2007, 1), the Muslim community  
found itself not getting involved directly with the 28 year old conflict. This is 
despite the fact that the vast majority of the Muslim community speak Tamil but 
reject their linguistic identity in favour or a religious identity as their ethnic marker 
(M. A. Nuhman 2007).  Yet this approach has had a detrimental effect with the 






Tamil community during the conflict and with the Sinhalese community post 
conflict in 2009.  As an interviewee aptly put it: 
 
“When I was growing up, there used to be this Sinhala folklore: ‘The fox 
sits on the side-lines to watch the tigers and the lions fighting it out, just to 
see who would win, so it could take sides’. The tragedy is that you hear 
that being repeated now again when it comes to the political positions 
taken by the Muslims before, during and after the conflict”55 
 
3.3.1	Early	History	
The history of Islam in Sri Lanka is a story of cultural, economic and geographical 
diversity which has led to the development of a heterogeneous community with 
diverse interests and “plural political adaptations at the local level” (McGilvray 
and Raheem 2007, 2).  Yet, the historical narrative of Sri Lankan Muslims is 
relatively unknown and in fact “there has been a dispute about the precise date 
of the arrival of Muslims in Sri Lanka and the start of their settlements.  Here 
historians have relied upon what they saw as the treasured traditions of the 
community” (K. Asad 1993, 2).  This was further reinforced by a focus group 
discussion which revealed: 
 
“The problem is that we don’t have one fixed narrative of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim component.  People are sketchy about the origins of Islam but 
certain that we, i.e. the ‘Sri Lankan Muslims / Moors’ or at least the majority 
of us are descendent from Arabs.”56 
 
What is generally known, understood and widely accepted is that the history of 
the SL Muslims mirrors that widely of Muslim communities on the coast of South 
India who are mixed race descendants of Arabs and (also Persian sea-faring 
merchants) who traversed the Indian Ocean between the Middle East and south-
east Asia (Ali 1981).  With the advent of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula in the first 
half of the seventh century and the subsequent conquest of Persia thereafter, 
trade became increasingly dominated by Arab Muslim merchants operating from 
the ports on the Red Sea and the Gulf heading towards south-east Asia and using 
the island of Sri Lanka as a stopover.  Thus, this explains why the Islamic impact 
on Muslims in Sri Lanka and south India is similar to that of south east Asia which 
is predominantly Arabic in culture, following the Sunni tradition of the Shafi’57 legal 
school, which is different to the Persian and Turkic invasions of north India, who 
established major states and empires. (McGilvray 2011). 
 
This mercantile motivation enabled the Arab merchants to not only settle and 
marry locally within the medieval Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms of South India 






and Sri Lanka respectively but also to establish dominant economic positions in 
port settlements such as Calicut and Colombo, in return for revenue raised for 
the kingdoms as a result of overseas commerce (McGilvray 2011).  For example, 
in the wake of Vasco da Gama’s 1498 naval crusade against the ‘Moors’ of 
Calicut, the Portuguese encountered Muslim traders in Sri Lanka who were Tamil 
speaking, had links with Muslims in South India and more importantly, had “royal 
permission to collect custom duties and regulate shipping” (McGilvray and 
Raheem 2007) in the major south-western ports under the auspices of local 
Sinhalese kings (Ibid).  Asad (1993) describes how in thirteenth century A.D. a 
mission was sent by Bhavanekabahu 1 of Yappahu to the Sultan of Egypt headed 
by a “Prince of Ceylon” (K. Asad 1993, 6) named ‘Al-Haj, Abu Uthman’.  What is 
particularly striking about this is not that a Muslim ambassador was sent on a 
mission to a Muslim court but the description of him as ‘Prince’ suggests a degree 
of eminence for a member of a ‘recent immigrant’ community (Ibid.) 
 
In addition, as a result of increasing contacts, (commercial and cultural), with the 
Muslims of Malabar, a new identity element, of South Indian composition, was 
added to the composition of the Arab (Muslim) society of Sri Lanka, thereby losing 
its exclusive Arab character (K. Asad 1993).  What is also important to note here 
is that those Arab / Muslim sailors, travellers and traders who came to Sri Lanka 
did not bring with them their families, but often chose to marry from the local 
Sinhalese and Tamil population, converting them to Islam and perhaps even 
justifying the need to talk about ‘Tamil’ Muslims or ‘Sinhala’ Muslims.  This is 
where the discussion about the history then becomes slightly blurred as an 
interviewee said: 
	
“Somehow then this Arab link is superimposed to a Muslim connection and 
things get confused as to who, what, where.  We are descended from 
Arabs who are Muslims and that’s how we became and remained Muslim. 
Yet it is not the full story of how the Sri Lankan Muslim community 
developed and evolved.  Part of the story is connected to the Arabs but 
another part is indigenous”58 
 
The	Arabs	of	Pre-Islam	
It is the type of primordial link to Arabs and Muslims that is mainly espoused by 
community leaders who currently refer to the work by Lorna Devarajah and others 
to justify difference and by extension not belonging to the ‘other’.  In some cases, 
it has even become cited as the ‘official history’ such as for example, a national 
heritage museum that opened in 2015 in the east of Sri Lanka, aiming to 
showcase the heritage of ‘Muslims in Sri Lanka’ (Lonely Planet 2015) that 
highlights the aspect of the Pre-Islamic and Post -Islamic Arab past (See Figures 
3-5)59.   








Figure 3: A Brief Description of the Pre Islamic Arab Settlers at the Muslim Heritage Museum 




Figure 4: Brief description of the interaction of Arabs with Natives in Sri Lanka at the Muslim 





Figure 5: Brief description of Arabs / Muslim in Sri Lanka at the Muslim Heritage Museum 
(picture taken by the author on a visit to the museum in December 2016) 
 
What the figures above show is the narrative of Arabs coming pre-Islam, as 
traders to the island and often settling marrying local women and having children 
who had mixed Arab and local blood60.  Then, with the onset of Islam, Arab 
traders who were now Muslim also came and settled in the country thereby 
introducing Islam to the island and more importantly through marrying the locals.  
Hence at best the Muslim community (like the other communities in the island) 
are a hybrid of the intermarriage of different communities and thus depending on 
where the original Arabs settled, could be mixed Sinhala and Tamil communities 
as well.  As an interviewee said: 
 
“So we have the status of hybridity of the Muslim community which actually 
mirrors a lot of how the other communities historically emerged in Sri 
Lanka.  We had Arabs (and later Arabs who were Muslim in faith) who 
came and intermarried local women (mainly Sinhalese since the Arab 
traders were dealing with the Sinhalese royalty but in many parts of the 
island, like the east, they were dealing with the Tamil community), and 
their progeny who had a mixed Arab and local blood and often took the 
patriarchal faith emerged as what can be called the ‘Muslim’ community”61  
 







This notion challenges the concept of what the Muslim community represents 
about itself in Sri Lanka.  It firstly points out that rather than be different to the 
‘others’, the community could be said to be also descended from Tamils and 
Sinhalese with religion effectively binding them together.  It thus points to a 
heterogeneity of the community in terms of cultural practices and understanding, 
with many of the Eastern Muslims displaying different cultural practices62, to 
those in the Southern parts of the country.  This is something that McGilvray 
(2008,11)63 alludes to when he discusses the ‘matrilineal’ zone on the east coast 
of the island, where matrilineal descent along with embedded cultural patterns 
such as the dowry and ‘matrilocal’ residence are practised by both Tamil and 
Muslim communities (something that Muslim communities from other parts of the 
island do not necessarily practice).64 Yet these nuances all seems to be glossed 
over in a general understanding how the Muslims as per some of my 
interviewees’ understanding: 
	
“Our understanding of history as a community doesn’t really go into details 
of a pre and post Islamic arrival of the Arabs nor of course into the regional 
disparities.  What we are told and generally understand is that Muslims 
came ‘1200’ years go.  The concept of the intermarriage between locals 
and Arabs isn’t really unpacked to distinguish Muslims who could be 
descended from the ‘Tamils’ and those who could be descended from the 
‘Sinhalese’.   A better understanding of the nuances of history especially 
with regards the arrival of Islam to the island could go a long way in helping 
to understand the roots of identity for the Muslim community and the 
subsequent identity crisis many young Muslims face. It will help to 
celebrate the heterogeneity that we apparently have as a community.  Yet 
it also poses some difficult questions for everyone:  you can have the 
possibility of a ‘Sinhalese Muslim’ and a ‘Tamil Muslim’”65 
	
Challenges		
It is this ambiguity that poses a lot of challenges for the Muslim community. The 
first challenge is with the classification and representation of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim as an ethnic identity.  This initial precept is based on a contradictory 
classification, in that most Muslims in Sri Lanka classify themselves as the 















descendants of Arabs or ‘Moors’66, despite it originating as a derogatory term 
from the Portuguese colonial rulers, that was used to refer to people they 
regarded as Arab Muslims, applied solely on the basis of religion and not origin 
(Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011).  In some cases especially during the British time, a 
further distinction was made between ‘Ceylon’ Moors and ‘Coast’ Moors, with the 
latter referring to those who came from South India under the British rule (K. Asad 
1993).  Thus the discussion around the Muslim identity in Sri Lanka is not as 
straightforward as originally thought. As an interviewee said: 
 
“The starting point for the discussion on identity is flawed.  We take a 
derogatory term such as ‘Moors’ and we venerate it and give it a place of 
pride as an identity marker despite not knowing the significance of the term 
throughout history and how that term was used to signify something bad”67	
	
Yet this in itself has undergone a transformation from the concept of a Moor to a 
more general understanding of Muslim which denotes a transition in thinking 
about identity and the role of religion within the psyche of the community. As an 
interviewee said: 
	
“The concept of Muslim becomes problematic and really shows an 
evolution of the thinking of the community that has been influenced from 
outside.  Yet the mere fact that we move between ‘Moor’ and ‘Muslim’ is a 
problem of representation and an identity crisis for the Sri Lankan ‘Muslim’ 
community.  We really mean one thing when we talk about another identity.  
This is hugely problematic because how can ‘Muslim’ refer to an ethnic 
identity?”68	
	
The problem is that the very definition of Muslim does not relate to an ethnic 
representation but to a religious connotation of someone who has “become 
comfortable with the teachings of Islam and following them in every aspect of life” 
(Yakun 1990, 3).  Thus, in Sri Lanka the concept of an ethnic ‘Sri Lankan Muslim’ 
is slightly misleading and confusing as it denotes ethnicity when the concept of a 
‘Muslim’ is essentially an expression of faith.  However, it also goes further than 
that as the Sri Lankan ‘Muslim’ ascribes a type of homogeneity beyond just 
religious practice to cultures, traditions, experiences and language which is made 
difficult by the heterogeneous nature of the geographical location and the lived 
experience of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka.   
	
This homogeneity stems from the concept of being a ‘Moor’ descended from 
Arabs. Over time, this ‘Arabness’ has become fused with being Muslim because 
the Arabs were Muslims and so a racial link has become a religious link. Yet even 







this concept of homogeneity is misleading, because it does not do justice to the 
other ethnic communities that make up the Sri Lankan Muslim community.  For 
example, there are also the presence of Malays who are descendants of people 
from Java who were brought to Sri Lanka by the Dutch; a fair number of Indian 
Muslims who had migrated from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka for the purpose of trade 
and then settled down; and small communities of the Memon69 and Bohra 
Ismailis70, all of which adds to the heterogeneity of the Muslim community ( D. B. 
McGilvray 2011, D. B. McGilvray 2008).  Yet somewhere in the classification of 
the ‘Sri Lankan Muslim’ this heterogeneity isn’t included adding further to the 
confusion.  As one of the interviewees said: 
	
“There is almost a sense of hypocrisy in how the Sri Lankan ‘Muslim’ 
frames their identity question.  Though Muslim is supposed to mean 
homogeneity and affinity, in practice what it means is that it refers to those 
descending from the Arabs or the Moors and not the other ethnicities who 
also happen to be Muslim.  In this sense, the ‘Moors’ are quite racist in 
how they relate to other communities”71 
	
In addition, the homogeneity of a ‘Muslim’ as an identity also has a global 
significance in terms of an affiliation with fellow believers around the world in what 
is known as the Ummah which is essentially a community which developed in the 
process of following Islamic Law (al-Ahsan 1992).   This theme has problematic 
connotations for many Muslim communities who are indigenous (or migrant) and 
who are minorities since the discussion of Ummah is an intellectual predicament 
of the Muslim world that finds itself often at odds with the concept of nationalism 
or the nation-state (Ibid.).  In other words, the concept of the Ummah and the 
homogeneity it presumes poses difficulties for Muslim communities in minorities 
as it is assumed that their ‘loyalty’ is not to the nation that they live in but more 
‘extraterritorial’ to a wider transnational Muslim community (Parekh 2008).   
 
The duality construct of a ‘Muslim’ identity becomes problematic for the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community as they profess their Sri Lankan identity (and sense 
of belonging) and tackle the issue of a religious representation (and a possible 


















transnational affiliation which their protagonists accuse them off).  Whilst Nuhman 
(2007) charts the discussion on this issue, that has concluded that the definition 
and concept of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity has changed from a racial into a 
religious one over the past few decades, he himself (2007, 6) states that “In the 
Sri Lankan context, the term ‘Muslim’ has gained an ethnic sense and denotes a 
distinct ethnic group which consciously differentiates itself from the other major 
ethnic groups, namely, the Sinhalese and the Tamils”.72   This in turn can pose a 
challenge as a couple of interviewees said: 
 
“This development of an ‘ethnic’ classification of the Sri Lankan Muslim 
becomes highly problematic because it tends to justify the thesis of 
primordialists such as Devarajah who imply an en-masse ‘migration’ of a 
race called Muslims to the island”73 
	
“We have a problem with this classification, because many Muslims then 
keep on referring to ‘their’ arrival on the island ‘1200’ years ago as if they 
were migrants or recent arrivals because this is how they understand it.  
This compounds the us and them narrative and almost justifies that we do 
not ‘belong’.  Yet the truth of the matter is that Arabs came as traders in 
the pre Islamic times, they settled and intermarried and later when Islam 
came through the Arab trade, it was spread by affinity or intermarriage.  
Islam was spread through deeds and intermarriage not that there was a 
special race coming to Sri Lanka.  To speak of ‘Muslims arriving here 1200 
years ago’ speaks to a mythology that is not helpful.  Islam came to the 
island NOT Muslims.  Like any islander, our heritage is mixed.  Arabs who 
followed Islam came and intermarried indigenous people and that was how 
Islam was passed down generally.  We have both types of blood.  We also 
end up being racist and exclusivist because we certainly don’t include 
other followers of Islam from other ethnicities within this classification  ”74 
	
This implication by default has wider ramifications because it can be seen to 
justify a primordialist narrative that also implies that the ‘Sri Lankan Muslim’ are 
‘new comers’ to the island tracing their history back to about thousand years 
unlike the Sinhalese and Tamil prehistory that can be traced back to at least the 
first millennium BCE (McGilvray and Raheem 2007). However, “there are plenty 
of archaeological and historical records which have been unearthed in recent 
times, all of which establish the fact that the Muslims of Sri Lanka are as 
indigenous to its soil as the Sinhalese and Tamils” (Ali 1997, 254).  As an 
interviewee said: 
	









“We have lost and continue to lose the grip on the narrative of indigeneity 
from our history somewhat bizarrely choosing to feed into the 
Sinhala/Tamil nationalist discourse.  This adds to an identity crisis for the 
Muslim community”75 
	
This identity crisis compounded by history means that there is a challenge in 
classifying the Muslims simply based on ‘Arab’ heritage which was further made 
worse with the colonial period and encounters and reactions from this period.  It 
also means that the ethnic identification of ‘Muslim’ hitherto justified from a 
primordialist perspective can be misleading and has to be challenged.  
	
3.3.2	The	Portuguese	and	Dutch	Period	
The periods of Portuguese76 and Dutch colonial rule was especially harsh for the 
Muslim community not only due to restrictions being placed upon the practices of 
their faith but also due to the threat they posed to the European monopoly of 
overseas trade, there were limitations placed on the movement of Arab and 
Persian traders especially during the time of the Portuguese in the 15th century 
(McGilvray and Raheem 2007).  As a consequence, there was greater interaction 
between the Muslims of Sri Lanka and the Muslims of South India (who were 
mostly Tamil speaking as well as ethnically Dravidian).  This thus explains why 
the overwhelming majority of Sri Lankan Muslims speak Tamil and not Arabic, 
Persian or Sinhalese as their mother tongue (Ali 1997)77. 
 
Another effect of the Portuguese policies (by the 17th century) was to force 
Muslims living on the West coast of Sri Lanka to migrate inland to the Kandyan 
kingdoms.  Subsequently some of these Muslims were then resettled in Tamil 
speaking Batticaloa in the east by the same kingdom as protection against 
Portuguese attacks.  Ultimately, Muslims settled throughout all of the Sinhala 
regions of the island as well as on the east coast – where they intermarried with 
local Tamils and shared a common matrilineal social structure.  Currently 
although about two thirds of the Muslim population live in the Sinhala regions of 
the island, it is in the east coast where there is the highest concentration of 
Muslims in the local population (McGilvray 2008).  Thus it is safe to say that 
Muslim ethnicity is a ‘historical conundrum’ (Williams 1951) as it seems to be a 
mixture of Arab, Persian, Dravidian and Malay blood of which ‘the Dravidian 
element, because of centuries of heavy Indian injection, has remained the 
dominant one’ (Ali 1997). 












The Dutch sought to control Sri Lanka primarily for trade, and arriving from south 
East Asia, were able to infiltrate both the east and south of the Island.  Again the 
Muslims were initially seen as ‘rivals’ in religion and trade (K. Asad 1993) with 
Muslims being forced out of Colombo to the coastal regions of the south, however 
by the eighteenth century, the initial hostility had declined.  For example, there 
was an attempt to formulate a code for the laws and customs of the Muslim 
community in the island. According to Asad (1993, 11), the reasons for this 
improvement of relationships between the Dutch and the Muslims was that “they 
were seen as fellow outsiders to Sri Lanka, therefore potential allies” and also to 
increase the trade.  According to an interviewee: 
	
“We see the concept of a recognition and institutionalisation of ‘Muslims’ 
in Sri Lanka as a separate entity during the time of the Dutch as political 
pragmatism.  The Dutch and earlier the Portuguese periods served to 
create this mix cocktail of the community and creating this heavy influence 
from South India.  However  by the time of the British occupation, this 





By the start of the British occupation of Sri Lanka, the Muslim community was 
already in a process of a construction (and de-construction) of an identity for what 
constituted a ‘Sri Lankan Muslim’.   There are a number of competing influences 
for how this construction and deconstruction came about. It would be simplistic 
to assume that this whole conversation was solely around political representation, 
although this was a significant catalyst.  There were other competing factors that 
prompted the conversation along these lines.   
Rise	of	Ethnic	Nationalism	
One of the key catalysts for political galvanisation has to be understood in a wider 
context as Muslims (particularly those from the elitist community) were confronted 
with rising Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil Hindu consciousness in response to the 
British occupation. “Ethnic consciousness developed among Muslims also in 
response to the Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 135) which 
was sustained as well because of competition in trade and commerce.  As an 
interviewee said: 
 
“The history of Sri Lanka in the Nineteenth Century is about two things: the 
development of ethnic consciousness which went hand in hand with the 
rise of competition in trade and commerce in the urban areas. Thus the 
rise of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism was supported by commercial 
interests who viewed the Muslim traders as a threat.  Hence it was not a 
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surprise that the pressure on the Muslims from Buddhist nationalists 
centred around trading”79 
 
Drawing heavily on the mythology of the Mahawansa, a Buddhist revivalism 
movement, arose as a resistance to Christianity80.  As an interviewee said: 
 
“The first incidents of Buddhist nationalism really arose out of the famous 
‘Christian-Buddhist’ debate of 1873, where a Buddhist monk and a 
Christian priest went head to head on theological arguments.  Both sides 
declared themselves to be the winner of that debate, but what this did for 
the Buddhists is to embolden them in the face of Christianity and by 
extension the colonial context. This served to rejuvenate the Buddhist 
revival movement.”81 
 
The main proponent of this agitation was Anagarika Dharmapala who became 
the face of the Buddhist revivalist movement and became the ideologue for 
Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. “His conviction was that Sinhala Buddhists were 
the ‘sons of the soil’ and the minorities were ‘alien’ people” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 
101), and none were more hated than the Muslims whom Dharmapala referred 
to as ‘shylocks’ (Ibid.).  For Dharmapala, he saw the struggle as one reflecting 
European nation-states in the lead up to the First World War, with economic 
interests interacting with cultural and religious awareness(J. L. Fernando 2008). 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Dharmapala sought to compare the war 
between British and the Germans with the ‘war’ between the Sinhala Buddhists 
and minorities, which led to “a recycling of pre-existing ethno-religious narratives 
with a racialized perspective” (Ibid,174). This antipathy towards the minorities and 
Muslims in particular was also supported by the Sinhala mercantile class, who 
faced severe competition from the minority communities.82, and who saw the 
movement as a useful opportunity to indirectly resist the colonial powers.   
 
It is with this support of the mercantile class that the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists 
began to agitate against the Muslims which culminated in the first communal riots 
in 1915. 
The	1915	riots	
The 1915 riots remain a bit of a paradox within the Muslim community historical 
narratives.  In basic terms it is often portrayed as a Sinhala- Muslim riots.  To 
some, the 1915 riots reflected a change in the attitude of the Sinhalese towards 
the Muslims especially since during the Portuguese and the Dutch, Muslims had 









been protected by the Sinhalese (K. Asad 1993).  Yet the history is a little bit more 
detailed than that according to an interviewee: 
 
“The ‘Sinhala-Muslim’ riots of 1915 is often cited as the first sign that 
Muslims and the Sinhalese did not get along and there have been 
subsequent riots83 since then, yet the simple matter is that the origin of this 
riot was between the so called ‘coast’ moors (those originating from India) 
and had nothing to do with the ‘Ceylon’ Moors.  In fact some of the ‘Ceylon’ 
Moor community and political leaders initially supported the riots as they 
also saw this as an opportunity to decrease the influence of the ‘coast’ 
moors who they saw as foreigners”84 
 
The immediate cause of the riot was actually a religious controversy that erupted 
in Kandy between the ‘Coast’ Moors and the Buddhists, over an annual religious 
practice which with its loud music and parade was passing by a newly constructed 
mosque (M. A. Nuhman 2007). With this as the foundation, anti Muslim riots 
started and spread across most of the island with many Muslim shops being 
looted and burnt.  It lasted for more than two weeks and the Government had to 
proclaim martial law to suppress the riots. Most of the writing on this incident put 
the blame on the Coast Moors who were seen as exploiters and plunderers of 
the poor Sinhalese village(Ibid.) Yet what is interesting though is that it also 
illustrated an interesting tension for the Muslim community.  As an interviewee 
said: 
 
“There was no doubt in the mind of the natives of Ceylon that the Indian 
‘Coast’ Moor was a bird of passage whose main objective was to maximise 
his economic fortune before leaving back to India.  It was this 
dissatisfaction with his economic exploits of the Sinhalese that was truly 
the cause of the riots.  Yet for the Muslim communities they were split with 
some leaders supporting the riots as they also saw the coast moors as a 
threat to them and other leaders wanting to support the Indians because 
of the common religious bond.  As a consequence, the local Muslims came 
under attack as this was exploited by the Sinhalese merchants supporting 
the nationalists who saw this as an opportunity to rid their trade 
competition”85 
 
It is this image of the Muslim trader that still prevails today in the mind of the 
Sinhalese (Ibid.).  Following the riots and response of key Tamil leaders in 
support of the riots and against the Muslims, it became clear to the Muslim 









community that they were the ‘other’ as compared to the other communities and 
would have to forge a path towards their own identity (M. A. Nuhman 2007)86. 
 
The 1915 riots were a perfect storm of religious, economic, social and political 
developments in the island as a result of centuries of colonial encounters. “To 
interpret the riots of 1915 merely as a reflection of religious tensions is to 
disregard a number of significant economic, social and political developments, 
which influenced the course of events” (K. Asad 1993, 67).  Despite the Coastal 
Moors being initially at the forefront of the problems87, the paradox was that even 
within the Muslim community there was an intra community rivalry based on 
trade.  However due to the nature of the representation of Muslims as a 
homogeneous community it was clear that by the end of the riots, the coast Moors 
were the minority of the victims.  Trade was also seen to be one of the key 
catalysts of the problem as the “Buddhist anti-Muslim campaign was largely 
sponsored by Buddhist businessmen who were commercial rivals of the Muslims” 
(Ibid), and thus the riots spread to the wider Muslim community.  What it 
succeeded in doing was to create a series of doubts between the two 
communities which would prop up from time to time and became prominent in 
2014, when another Sinhala-Muslim communal violence erupted. and trade was 
again seen to be at the forefront of the problem.  The 1915 riots convinced the 
Muslims that they were a separate minority and forced them into “a cocoon 
mentality” (K. Asad 1993, 89). 
Political	Representation	
Suffice to say that by the British colonial period, the Muslim community (led by 
the ‘leaders’ from the elite based mainly in Colombo) were distinct in espousing 
their ‘racial’ Semitic identity comparable to the Aryan (Sinhalese), the Dravidian 
(Tamil) and Burgher (European mixed race) communities in Sri Lanka (McGilvray 
2011).  This put them on a collision course with the Tamil political elite, who 
considered the Tamil speaking Muslims as an extension of their own community.  
In fact a scholarly article written by the leading Tamil statesman in 1888, Sir 
Ponnambalam Ramanathan, used linguistic and ethnographic evidence to claim 
that not only were the Moors ‘Muslim members of the Tamil race’ (Ramanathan 
1888),  but because they shared a great many cultural and linguistic traits 
resulting from conversion and intermarriage over the centuries, they should be 
represented by the Tamil leadership in the communal (racial) system of 
representation that had been instituted by the British colonial power.  This 
argument however neglected to take into account the Muslims settled amongst 
the Sinhalese in the West and South (and the subsequent conversions and 
intermarriage there) and was also subsequently dismissed by Muslim community 
leaders as an academic excuse for the continued political domination of the 







Muslim community by the Tamil leadership.  For the elite Muslim community 
leaders at that time, the term ‘Moor’ put forward by the Portuguese and then 
adopted by the Dutch and subsequently by the British, was not a mistake but 
deliberate because the people they encountered in Sri Lanka “a class of people 
who resembled in religion and other characteristics, the Arabs of Spain” (M. A. 
Nuhman 2007, 128)88. 
 
At that time, Muslim community leaders’ assertion was that Tamil was “not their 
inherently native language but merely a borrowed one and the language test 
cannot be applied to them in determining their racial origin or ethnicity” (Ibid, 131). 
As an interviewee said: 
 
“This rejection of linguistic identity of the Muslims is very interesting 
because it was used to assert a difference based on appearance and of 
course religion. The assertion for many of the proponents of a ‘distinct’ 
identity for the Muslim community was that due to the Portuguese cutting 
off the ties with the Arabs, the Muslim settlers in Sri Lanka thus came into 
contact with Muslims of Malabar (South India) and thus Tamil became the 
vernacular for speaking and also learning about Islam as well as trade with 
India and so on.  What is interesting in this debate though is that there 
were definitely intermarriages89 between the Arabs and Sinhalese and 
also Tamil but Tamil became the medium of language for the Muslim 
community.  So on one hand there is an acceptance of a mixed origin for 
the Muslims but Muslim historians give more importance to the patrilineal 
descent since patriarchy is prevalent among the Arabs.”90	
	
So in the first instance, there is a determined definition of a separate ‘ethnic’ 
identity of the Muslim community which at the outset was linked to religion and 
culture.  As an interviewee said: 
	
“When Ramanathan made his speech in 1888, the outrage of the elite 
Muslims and their political representatives was one of outrage.  It is 
reported that I.L.M Azeez who became the public voice of argument 
against Ramanathan effectively said ‘We can not be called Tamil Muslims.  
We are of a different colour and stature to the Tamils. Our origin is Moors91.  
Our cultural, dress and social practices are also different.  Even though we 













speak Tamil, it is also infused with Arabic’.  In saying this, the assertion 
was quickly made that the Muslim community was different because of the 
fact that the faith it followed inspired a different social and cultural 
practice.”92 
 
Ismail (1995) goes a bit further when he says, that to some extent Azeez followed 
what the Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists had been saying about their Aryan and 
Dravidian (respectively) roots, by invoking the direct link to ‘Arab blood’ as the 
core of being a Moor.  This statement served to represent the Muslim presence 
in Sri Lanka as “originating from a conscious migration to a place of symbolic 
importance to all Muslims” (Ibid, 74).  In doing so, Azeez set the seeds for this 
culture of thinking within the Muslim community that somehow they did not belong 
and had come from outside.  This sense of being ‘foreign’ still pervades much of 
the community’s thinking today as well.  
	
This position by the Muslim community of distinguishing themselves from the 
Tamils93,  would later be justified in the wake of a blood outbreak of anti-Muslim 
violence by Sinhalese mobs in 1915 when Ramanathan conspicuously defended 
the Sinhalese rioters in the Ceylon Supreme court (McGilvray 2011) and made 
representations to the King of England on behalf of the Sinhalese accusing the 
Muslim community of causing the riots.  This action prompted Muslims to consider 
Tamil hypocrisy about ‘Tamil-speaking’ linguistic solidarity (Ameerdeen 2006).  It 
is most likely that this acrimony over the ethnological thesis has been the main 
source of tension between the two communities prompting Tamil chauvinists, 
particularly the LTTE, to think of “Muslim disloyalty to the Tamil nationalist cause” 
(McGilvray and Raheem 2007). 
	
There is also a political context underlying this disagreement with Ramanathan’s 
thesis in the sense of political appointments to the legislative council. The 
legislative council which was set up by the British between 1833 – 1912, to 
engage with all ethnicities within Sri Lanka had previously had a representative 
of the Tamil-speaking community to represent both the Tamils and the Muslims, 
which was Ramanathan himself.  This was later reformed in 1889 when a Muslim 
nominated representative was included in the council (Ameerdeen 2006), which 
has led many analysts to claim that Ramanathan’s opposition was more of a 
political gamble in order to retain representation and power for himself (Ibid, Ali 
1997, McGilvray 2011). 
 
Ali (1997, 259) states, that by arguing the case that “Muslims had no separate 
ethnic identity, that they were in Tamils in origin and that their interests could be 
looked after by Tamils”, Ramanathan’s claim provoked the Muslim elites of that 







time to establish “the claim that the Muslim community had a separate identity 
and that they were neither Tamils nor Sinhalese but Moors of Arab origin”.  
McGilvray and Raheem (2007, 10) elaborate this further by stating that “this 
Moorish racial identity for Sri Lankan Muslims was constructed to emphasise the 
idea that Muslims were peaceful Arab traders who valued the sanctity of the 
island whilst ignoring their maternal connections to Tamil wives and mothers and 
classifying the Moors’ Tamil heritage as a borrowed trade language.”  Ismail 
(1995, 75) puts it more crudely in describing this when he says “it would appear 
that Arab men gave birth, by themselves, to the Sri Lankan Muslim social 
formation”.  To put it plainly, the claims were to enhance a racial distinction to the 
Tamils, assert a religious identity whilst also preserving the emergence of the 
Muslims as a politically conscious minority and also trying to safeguard their 
socio-political interests and forgetting the reality on the ground. 
	
Needless to say the British administration did not go with Ramanathan’s 
assertions and created a seat for the Muslim representative.  Thus by 
“institutionalising Muslim difference, the British, in a crucial sense, helped ‘create’ 
Muslim identity” (Q. M. Ismail 1995, 73).  If not create, certainly this acceptance 
by the British colonial administration provided the Muslim community with agency 
with which it would grow.   
 
From 1920 onwards there were a series of reforms enacted for representation in 
the Legislative Council which provided mixed opportunities for Muslim political 
participation, though the number of Muslim representatives was increased to 
three.  This was then finally changed in 1931 with the formation of a State Council 
consisting of elected and nominated members participating in the actual 
processes of decision-making through a legislative body (Ameerdeen 2006).  
However, one of the failings of the council was the lack of opportunity for 
minorities especially the Muslims to elect representatives based on their ethnic 
ration and thus the council was later amended to provide representation on the 
basis of a certain amount of area. This form of iterating the political representation 
of the minorities would continue to Independence in 1948 as well as much 
afterwards, becoming a catalyst for later communal problems (Ibid). 
 
This also caused intra community challenges as from the 1920 onwards, various 
‘Moor’ and ‘Malay organisations began to emerge to compete for the political 
status of being the Muslim voice on the island (K. Asad 1993).  These divisions 
had not been helped by the 1915 riots where for instance, the Malays had not 
been attacked.  The British also ensured that the differences were extenuated 
when Malays were employed in the police force or in the government clerical 
service.  However, by the end of the 1920s as political reform came in, it was 
clear that there were bitter differences between the ‘Malay’s and the ‘Moors’, 




The concept of political representation and ethnic nationalism can not be 
examined without also looking at the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism which 
occurred during the same time.  Largely led by an elite group representing the 
affluent mercantile class and the emerging middle class mainly centred around 
Colombo and Kandy, this group drew inspiration from the Turkish, Egyptian and 
Indian revivalist and political movements of that time (M. Nuhman 2002).  As an 
interviewee said: 
 
“The development of the identity and consciousness of the Muslim 
community was not done in a vacuum.  Due to internal political and 
economic reasons, the elite within the Muslim community were trying to 
seek another sense of identity and belonging.  In part it is this nostalgia of 
descending from the Arabs and the keenness to seek that transnational 
link with the Muslim community globally that made the elites look outside 
of the country.  This coincided with an Islamic revivalist movement that 
was largely in part an anti colonial process that was beginning to occur at 
the end of the eighteenth century”94 
 
Like their Buddhist and Hindu counterparts that had emerged in an anti colonial 
and anti Christian wave, the Muslim elite seized on the opportunity to create 
awareness of a religious ideology which slowly evolved at the end of the 19th 
century as a religiously oriented ethnic ideology. “Muslim revivalism arose 
basically to consolidate the elitist interest through creating wider community 
awareness in response to Sinhala and Tamil revivalist programmes and 
encouraged by their activities” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 104). 
 
The initial ideological framework for Islamic revival and Muslim ethnicity started 
with the concept of education. Yet the challenge was the fact that the Muslim 
community was not willing to enter the modern education system introduced in 
the 19th century due to a number of reasons including the fear of Christianisation 
(Ibid.) and the fear that education “could contribute materially little towards the 
improvement of the situation of the Muslims” (Ibid, 108).  In other words, there 
was an element of the Muslim elite, who cultivated the notion that Muslims were 
traders having inherited that from the Arabs and that this should be preserved.  
However, this was far from reality as a few interviewees said: 
 
“The Muslim elite during the 18th and 19th century in Sri Lanka it was true 
had ascended to their social position due to trade and the influence that 
this brought.  We have to understand that this did not represent the reality 
of the Muslim community on the ground especially for a large portion of 
the Muslim community in the north and east of the country who were 
employed in agriculture”95 
 




“We almost have a false premise in how the Muslim identity and its 
formation was fashioned.  In claiming the trading identity, the elites of the 
Muslim community did a disservice to those who were not employed in the 
commerce sector and thereby had a different outlook.  In particular we can 
see the ramifications of this when education became a key issue in the 
1960s and how this was dealt with in the community”96 
 
Qadri Ismail (1995, 63) refers to this distinction when he describes Muslims not 
as an ethnic group or community but as a ‘social formation’, which are “not stable 
entities but sites of struggle over which (interest) groups would achieve 
hegemony over the formation and thus determine the nature of its (dominant) 
identity”.  In this case, Ismail points out that social formations refer to fissures and 
cracks and are sites of unceasing struggle and to interrogate class, gender and 
other interests involved.  It is in this regard that Ismail represents the Muslim 
social formation as consisting of two ‘distinct’ groups, Southern and Eastern 
Muslims97.  It is the former that Ismail argues was the dominant and hegemonic 
community, with the elite (of middle and upper class Southern Muslim men), 
representing the entire formation in its own image as a peaceful trading 
community of Arab origin and being an ‘other’ to the other communities. 
 
The catalyst of this change would come in 1883, when the British colonial power 
exiled Arabi Pasha from Egypt to Sri Lanka, bringing with him a new insight into 
a transnational Muslim identity and an intellectual boost to a Muslim identity.  As 
an interviewee said: 
 
“The arrival of Pasha was well received particularly by the elites of the 
community.  In the midst of this struggle against religious revivalist 
movements from the Buddhist and Hindus, and trying to navigate their own 
identity, Pasha gave the local Muslims a sense of agency and 
representation”98 
 
Pasha arrived at what was the culmination of a ‘perfect storm’ for the Muslim 
community.  With an anti colonial movement growing around religious revival, the 
elites within the Muslim community were also looking to emulate a religious 
consciousness (Q. M. Ismail 1995).   
 
The Islamic revivalism had been an effort to unite the Muslims spiritually and 
culturally based on Islamic principles but also to give them a sense of identity and 
purpose.  With the arrival of Pasha who stayed in the island for nearly two 
decades, there was an intellectual inspiration for the Muslims which led to the 







revival of Arab/Muslimness99 as well as a push for political activism, and five 
years after, the Muslims made their first public claims in 1888/1889 about their 
distinct identity and Arab origin in response to Ramanathan’s claims and to stake 
an independent claim on the legislative council. 
 
Pasha himself was interested in English education, seeing this as necessary for 
the development of the community and also  recognising the paucity of modern 
educational provision for Muslims in Sri Lanka (K. Asad 1993).  Coinciding with 
the establishment of the Aligarh university, as the first Muslim higher level 
educational institution in India, as well as engagement with notable Indian Muslim 
scholars such as Sir Seyed Ahmed Khan, this gave the impetus for the Muslim 
community in Sri Lanka to start thinking seriously about education.  By 1891, the 
Muslim educational society was established and a new school opened in 
Colombo in 1892 (M. A. Nuhman 2007).   
 
The irony of Pasha’s influence though is not lost on Sri Lanka, despite being 
responsible for the Islamic revival.  Pasha’s exile from Egypt came about because 
of his concept of patriotism and his thinking that ‘Egypt for the Egyptians’ (K. Asad 
1993).  So to some extent he also propagated love for the mother country and 
striving for freedom from foreign dominance. “He also propagated the idea that 
Sri Lanka should ultimately be administered by Sri Lankans” (Ibid, 50), which 
coincided with the rise of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist elements.  Many of the 
Sinhala elites who were ultimately attracted to supporting these nationalist 
movements would have also come into contact with Pasha (Ibid), so it is an irony 
that if Arabi Pasha was a source of their inspiration, these nationalist elements 
would be later involved in the 1915 communal violence between the Sinhalese 
and the Muslims.  There is also a lost lesson for the Muslim community as an 
interviewee said: 
 
“Although, Pasha thought in the context of an Islamic revival as well as for 
local communities to think of themselves with pride and though education 
prepare for the modernisation of their societies, he was also a nationalist 
and very patriotic.  Somehow this part was lost on the Muslim community 
who used the Islamic revival to bolster their chances of identity and 
recognition but at the expense of the ‘other’ and the nation.  Perhaps this 
says something more about the state of play in Sri Lanka”100	
3.4			Conclusion	
It has been shown in this chapter that it is important to explore the Muslim identity 
formation as part of a wider exploration of the identity dynamics happening in Sri 
Lanka, which is a complex formation and mobilisation process.  On the one hand, 
it can be seen that identity formation in Sri Lanka was largely an elite-centric, 





second-order phenomena reproduced by ruling elites to secure governmental 
office, socio-political mobilisation and legitimacy. In this sense Rampton (2016) 
explores the reproduction of nationalism in Sri Lanka as an elite ideological 
project through which Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was created and stoked by 
political leaders to gain or remain in power.  This is something that Bush (2003) 
takes further in analysing the ascendancy of Sinhala nationalism as primarily a 
result of intra-group “ethnic outbidding” dynamics led by “ethnic entrepreneurs”.  
DeVotta (2004, 1-2) ascribes such an ascendancy to “linguistic nationalism as 
the functional ‘mechanism’ that Sinhalese elites used to achieve their 
preferences, resulting in profound institutional decay and ethnicisation.  Thus 
Sinhala nationalism is largely as construed an elite-led ideology for legitimation 
and, alongside patron-clientelism, for the mobilisation of intra-group political 
alliances (and as a consequence is replicated with other communities). 
 
On the other hand, there is also a historical nature of the consolidation of 
nationalist identities in Sri Lanka, stressing in constructivist fashion, the role of 
colonial authorities and postcolonial elites in the social construction utilization and 
political domination of identity (e.g. Nissan and Stirrat 1990; Jeganathan and 
Ismail 1995).  Key to this emergence is the manner, in which colonial rule 
instrumentalising local nationalist mobilisation, transformed the logic of politics 
and identity, mapping potent governmental dynamics onto pre-existing 
communities with very different pre-colonial and early colonial logics of 
interaction.  In this context precolonial Sri Lanka, had long traditions of 
dhammaraja (righteous Buddhist rule), grounded in a symbiosis between 
Theravada Buddhism and the rulers of the day, in which the latter patronized and 
protected Buddhism, whilst the Buddhist sangha legitimated their rule and 
sanctioned rulers with merit.  Yet, despite this strong symbiosis, the relationship 
between statehood, population and identity remained extremely fluid in the 
precolonial and early colonial periods (Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  This produced 
socio-political patterns, in which there were multiple, overlapping linguistic, social, 
religious and ethnic communities and tributary centres of power revolved around 
a central hub and in which there was little demand for congruence between the 
polity and ethnic, linguistic or religious identity (Feith 2010; Bush 2003: 
Bandarage 2009: Nissan and Stirrat 1990; Tambiah 1986).   
 
Colonialism, in particular British colonialism, disrupted and transformed this state 
of being in a number of often contradictory, tension-ridden ways. First and 
foremost, colonialism sought to tame, isolate and ultimately displace the power 
of ethnicity, religion and patronage as a long-term project towards the 
governmental production of a ‘liberal-secular-civic’ population within a unified 
territorially integrated state. In both contexts, this signified the disassociation of 
state rule and administration from Buddhism and the seeking to replace ethnic 
law and custom within society with liberal practice.  Yet there was an inherent 
contradiction as the colonial state also allowed certain communities to maintain 
their ethnic law and customs whilst also mapping, operating through and 
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ultimately rigidifying the ethnic and religious divisions they encountered in both 
societies, including their reproduction in administration, political representation 
and legislation (Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  Thus the emergence and the 
institutionalisation of the Muslim identity was really helped by this process. 
 
Hence, it could be seen that Hutchinson’s (2005) argument of ethno symbolist 
‘continuity’ holds true.  Local, regional, cultural traditions that existed prior to the 
British were simply opportunistically institutionalised by them.  In other words, the 
differences that emerged during the British colonial period and that were 
exacerbated after independence had existed before and were simply given new 
life and agency by the British, thereby ensuring that identity formation in Sri Lanka 
was not just an elite discursive hegemony that is the cause for identity politics in 
the country but something that was ‘demand’ led.  However, based on the 
interview evidence as well as the research, it doesn't point to this linear 
hypothesis as such.  Though there were these differences within communities 
based on cultural, religious, socio-economic as pointed out by several authors 
(Bush 2003: Bandarage 2009: Nissan and Stirrat 1990), it simply had not the 
formation and thinking strictly set after British colonialism.  There is no doubt that 
the differences as set out by Hutchinson (2005) existed after colonialism and 
were instrumentalised but it is not necessarily as simple as that.  It is a 
combination of colonial power/knowledge structures and local social agency that 
resulted in a nationalist mobilisation that revolved around a Buddhist core rather 
than a wider and more inclusive reimagining and forging of social and political 
order on an all country scale and a response by the minority communities that 
mirrored that but existed in parallel.  Thus in pre-Independence Sri Lanka, an 
elite-level consensus acceding to colonial reformism, constrained the 
hegemonising thrust of anti-colonial movement which was largely Buddhist 
nationalism, limiting these forms of mobilisation to cultural and educational 
regeneration, labour strikes (with ethnicised dynamics) and sporadic events like 
the anti-Muslim riots of 1915 (Jayawardena 1990; Rogers 1990).  
 
In this sense Hutchinson’s (2005) premodernist stance and ethnosymbolist 
stance seem to be at the same time validated showing that there is a mixture of 
ethno-symbolist continuity and a constructivist interpretation with elite led 
discursive hegemony and social-demand, making a complex mix of mobilisation 
and ideational development, a hybrid. The emergence of the identities is thus a 
result of multiple phenomenona and is complex not easily realistically attributed 
to one theory or another. 
 
Hence the Sri Lankan Muslim identity was and is a reactive politico-cultural 
identity that was constructed as a response to late colonial Sri Lankan politics.  It 
was largely ‘constructed’, evolved and transformed in response to the Sinhala 
and Tamil ethno-nationalism that emerged as a result of anti colonial movements 
largely from the late 19th century. In this constructed identity, it became 
instrumentalised by primordial conceptions.  In other words, looking at some of 
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the available narratives around the Sri Lankan Muslim history, one sees a 
primordial conception alluding to this direct link with Arabs that preyed on ethno-
symbolist continuity (Hutchinson 2005) but failed to understand the context of that 
time of political and social mobilisation by the elites and the colonial practice.  In 
some cases, it could be argued that this type of conception in actual fact sees 
colonialism as a good thing because of a little ‘agency’ it was given rather than a 
bad thing. 
  
Yet the irony is that the very political unity that the Muslims sought in 1889 and 
for the next decade would also forge an opportunity for the germination of ethnic, 
social, regional and ideological divisions for the country.  Ultimately this would set 
the scene for how the Muslim community would evolve over the next century. 
 
The construction of an ethnic identity embedded within a religious framework 
poses several challenges for the community.  Despite its heterogeneity of an 
ethnic identity, the growing homogenizing tendency based on a religious outlook 
means that the overarching Muslim identity has evolved within this diversity.  It is 
this tension due to prevailing socio-political conditions of conflict that the other 
chapters will explore and see what the transformation has been and where we 
are in the current context. 
 
It is also important to note the overall country and transnational context in the 
early 20th century as Sri Lanka moved towards independence in the wake of 
independence movements in the Sub Continent.  These contexts have as much 
to do with the pervading discussions around identity and representation as the 





“The entrenchment of the Sri Lankan Muslim community can not be 
confined just to one period but has to be evaluated over a significant period 
to understand its influences and how it was influenced”101 
4.1			Introduction	
Despite Sri Lanka’s ‘conspicuously  un-traumatic’  transition (as compared with 
the decolonisation experience of India) from colony to independent state (Bush 
2003), by the time independence was declared, the pre -Independence tensions 
would corrupt the next 30 years or so for the country.  Post-independence 
euphoria would quickly be turned to despair and a loss of hope as the burden of 
historical memories for the restoration of a pre-colonial past played a role in 
forging ethnic problems.  As an interviewee said: 
 
“The independence from the British colonial period was relatively painless 
compared to the Partition of India. Power was simply ‘handed’ over, yet 
even in this case, with that simple transition, there was a challenge that 
would manifest itself later on.  Part of this problem was that the transition 
did not take into account the dimensions of the ethnic conversations taking 
place in the years from the beginning of the 19th century to 
independence”102 
The climate of the pre-independence years where, “ethnicity seemed to provide 
the strongest and most reliable base for political action” (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011, 
221) for Sri Lankan nationalists as well as the mistrust of Tamil leadership by 
Muslim leaders did not improve after the independence of the country in 1948.  
Post colonial nation building was seen as completing what the majority 
community had initiated from the end of the nineteenth century in terms of 
pushing for greater representation and an exclusivist nationalist ideology (J. L. 
Fernando 2008).  From independence onwards, it was clear that the Sri Lankan 
polity of the day made up largely of the Sinhala Elite, was determined to stamp 
its hegemonic authority, from the cultural symbolism of the national flag, to the 
formation of new cities, to the suppression of the growing left movement and 
rising Tamil national consciousness  as well as abolishing citizenship rights of the 
Indian origin plantation workers103(Ibid).  
 







The first seeds of such ethnic tensions took place within a year of independence 
which was seen as a “puzzle” (Bush 2003, 76) with the rendering of the majority 
of Plantation Tamils as both “stateless” and “vote-less”. Sinhala nationalism 
which had taken shape in the nineteenth century as a counter-colonial movement 
that used Buddhist identity to mobilise popular support against Christian 
missionaries (and unofficial state patronage for Christianity) and later British 
capitalist interests, especially regarding Indian immigrants who came to work on 
the plantations (Moore 1989), was to be exploited even more.  
 
In the years preceding Independence, future Prime Ministers like leaders like 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and D.S. Senanayake of the Ceylon National Congress 
(CNC) would argue that the Indian immigrants were pampered by the colonial 
rulers (International Crisis Group 2007).  This was a problem that had started 
from 1928, made worse by the depression of the late 1920s and 1930s when the 
Indian Tamils were presented as competitors in a tight labour market.  Despite 
negotiations between governments of pre Independence India and Sri Lanka, 
from about 1939, Sri Lanka went into independence with the thorny issue of the 
Indian franchise not only unresolved but with no negotiations on the horizon (De 
Silva 1998).  Thus one of the first acts of the new government was to 
disenfranchise104 800,000 estate (or Indian) Tamils, with the arguments being 
used that “they did not really belong to Sri Lanka, where they were only temporary 
residents, but belonged instead to India” (Nissan and Stirrat 1990, 34).  The 
legislation passed was the Citizenship Act (No.18) in August 1948 which 
stipulated that citizenship was determined by descent or registration105, thus 
implying that “Citizenship was tied not to one’s birth in the country but to the birth 
of one’s ancestors” (Bush 2003, 76).  There was also fear that through the Indian 
minority, there would be undue Indian influence in the affairs of Sri Lanka once 
independence was obtained (De Silva 1998)106.  Despite a second act107 being 
passed in 1949 for those Indian residents who wished to become citizens of Sri 
Lanka, it was clear that what was at stake was the number of people who could 
claim the status of citizenship by descent.  In hindsight it is quite telling in the 
sense of how the Citizenship Act was enacted about the intent of the new 
government and the influence of Sinhala nationalists and more importantly the 
role of the minorities in getting this passed.  As an interviewee said: 
 
“The Citizenship Act should have set off warning signals to the minorities 
because despite it being aimed at the Indian communities, the 











ramifications were wider for the minorities in how ancestry and relationship 
to the country was determined.  In effect, the Act really was to control the 
demography of the minorities.  Ultimately the Sinhala nationalists who had 
played a part in the transition from independence were worried about the 
‘numbers’ of the minorities and how this ‘numbers’ game would play out in 
terms of representations.  By the Citizenship Act, you effectively controlled 
this.  The tragedy though is that this was not just the Sinhala nationalists 
who pushed for this but it was a collective effort from all communities who 
saw the Indian minority as foreign and therefore a threat”108 
 
Whilst it was a case of ‘simple’ electoral politics109 in terms of demographic 
changes to manipulate the electoral balance of ethnic sub groups to enhance the 
relative strength of the Sinhalese electorate (Bush 2003), what is interesting is 
that the native Tamils, like the Sinhalese, saw these estate Tamils as foreigners, 
different from themselves and did little to fight against their disenfranchisement 
(Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  This was reinforced strongly by the formation of a 
government of national unity in August 1948, when the Ceylon Tamil Congress 
entered  a ruling coalition with the Prime Minister, despite the universal franchise 
leaving the minorities in a vulnerable position (Bush 2003).  In addition, there was 
also support from the Muslim community  with one prominent Muslim leader of 
that time saying “We the Ceylon Moors have suffered most in the past for want 
of a Citizenship Bill….Any one in this chamber who opposes this Bill is really a 
traitor to the citizens of Lanka” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 30-31).  In talking about 
Ceylon Moors, the politician was referring to the Indian Muslims who were viewed 
as competitors by the trading class of the Ceylon Moors, and thus there was an 
interest to get rid of them by denying their citizenship rights (Ibid.).  As an 
interviewee said: 
 
“This episode illustrates the tactical and political maneuvering by Jaffna 
Tamil politicians to mobilize political resources for future use in the 
parliamentary arena.  This is classical sub-group self-interest where the 
inter-group collaboration in the disenfranchisement of the Plantation 
Tamils was also facilitated by the shared socialization process of the 
Jaffna Tamil and Sinhalese political elites110.  However, what is also 
interesting in this was the fact that the Muslims also supported this move.  
So in a paradox situation, despite the dangers that the demographic 
moves should have signalled to the minorities about the intentions of the 
Sinhalese, the minorities were also behind this”111 
 












The fact that the minorities were also complicit in this is not only of interest but it 
illustrates really the status and nature of the politics and minority relations in the 
country.  Despite facing challenges in terms of representations by the minorities, 
they chose to act on a piece of legislation that would cause distress to another 
minority group.  In other words, the minorities chose a piece of legislation that 
ultimately benefited the political leadership of the majority because it controlled 
the demography of the minorities, simply because it would disadvantage a certain 
section of the intra minority grouping to the advantage of the others. 
 
Thus even from the outset of Independence the quest for ethnicity, representation 
and nationalism was selective. It therefore paints a cynical picture about ethnic 
representation and politics in Sri Lanka in the sense that the argument never was 
truly about minority rights but more about rights for the elitist representation of a 
particular ethnic group regardless of how other groups fared.  This type of ethnic 
selfishness is characteristic of how ethnic relations have fared in Sri Lanka, 
clearly based on the interests of the ruling elite.  So there is an element of class 
and racism, that groups were willing to sacrifice the landless and those who were 
of the same faith but different ethnicity, purely to push the agenda of the political 
leadership.  For me in particular when one analyses the Muslim community and 
its role in this affair, I am intrigued by the mere fact that a group that was fighting 
for political recognition and right could afford to deny another group (in a similar 
situation) the same rights.  Thus the challenge of political representation as well 
as institutionalization for the Muslim community for example becomes tainted with 
this legacy.  Yet blame can’t just be laid at the feet of the political representatives 
of the minorities, the system of governance inherited which would cause 
minorities to act the way they did also has to be examined. 
4.1.2	Democratic	Models	
The situation was made more complicated as a system of parliamentary 
democracy based on the Westminster model (of first past the post), came into 
operation. Between 1948 and 1956, the government appeared just to be 
continuing the policies developed under colonial rule (Nissan and Stirrat 1990), 
using English as the official language with parliament being controlled by 
western-educated, western-orientated members of the élite112. The rule was not 
only Anglicized but Anglo centric with the manners, symbols and styles of the 
colonial era persisting inside and outside of parliament (Bush 2003).  Instead of 
a comprehensive and justifiable Bill of Rights (which could have allayed the fears 
of minorities with regards their position in post independent Sri Lanka), a 
provision based on section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 prohibiting 
legislation infringing on religious freedom or discriminating against persons of any 






commodity or religion, was adopted to the Westminster constitutional model 113 
(De Silva 1998).  
 
The consequences of this has been a “centralised system of government in which 
there was no formal protection of minority rights and in which the state dispensed 
goods and services on the basis of political expediency to build up electoral 
constituencies has led to the communalization of parliamentary politics” (Bush 
2003, 83).  Thus the aspect of the minority elite appearing to support the majority 
political leadership in political decisions (that would harm the community itself in 
the long run) for short term gains.  As an interviewee said 
 
“With this communalization of parliamentary politics, it was left to the 
minorities to ‘fend’ for themselves often driven by the political elites within 
those communities.  As such you had a scenario as you had in the late 
nineteenth century where minorities only cared as to what their position 
was and how influential they became.  You had the Muslims on one side 
calling for representation because they didn't want to be considered as 
part of the Tamil community and effectively trying to appease the rulers of 
the day in order to gain favour.”114 
 
In post 1949, the Federal Party (led by Tamil elites115 from the northern province 
of Jaffna), took up the cause of Tamils116 as well as Tamil speaking people, a 
passing reference to the inclusion of Muslims.  Ali (1997) states that tensions 
quickly developed though as there emerged ‘ideological inconsistencies’ from the 
party in terms of its public proclamations of a federal political structure and its 
private (to its Tamil constituents) proclamations of a Tamil state, which for many 
Muslims did not include them.  Imtiyaz and Hoole (2011) further assert that these 
tensions were aggravated with the issues of ‘religion, caste and purity of status’ 
which became prime symbols of identity for Tamils, arguing that from 1952 the 
“Hindu resurgence in Tamil politics made it more difficult for all those groups on 
the periphery of Tamil – speaking society to identify themselves fully as Tamil” 
(Ibid, 221).  This ideological inconsistency of the party as well as a parochial 
attitude from its leadership meant that the Muslim community never gained the 
full confidence that they would be treated as equal partners in minority politics 


















especially in the party’s public articulations and gestures (Ibid.).  This lack of 
confidence would not only eventually trickle down to the level of the Muslim 
masses (A. Ali 1997); it would remain historically ingrained between the two 
communities. 
 
Once again there is a repeat of the situation of 1898 with Ramanathan, where 
the Tamils tried to ‘include’ the Muslims because of the similarity in language 
spoken, only for the Muslims to reject this label.  It was clear that in the run up to 
independence that the Muslims, despite their internal differences, kept to the side 
of the Sinhalese leaders whilst disagreeing about the Tamils (K. Asad 1993).  This 
concept of ‘accommodating’ politics whereby sides were kept with the Sinhalese 
politicians would become the singular trait of the Muslim politicians over the years 
as it was seen to be the only way to obtain opportunities and privileges for the 
community whilst ‘supporting’ the party of the day in power which was the majority 
community.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The run up to independence and just afterwards really shows a deliberate 
strategy employed by the Muslim political elites at that time. In effect it was 
a strategy of survival to join the Sinhalese and effectively support the latter 
in whatever political action that was taken provided that their (i.e. the 
Muslim community) demands were met which largely centred around 
freedom to educate their children in the way they wanted, to practise their 
religion wherever they lived and to earn their living through their own 
enterprise and effort.  Of course the caveat of this representation and 
expectations of ‘what the community wanted’ is situated around the fact 
that those speaking for the Muslims were the political elite from Colombo 
who often remained disconnected from the rural masses especially those 
communities in the north and south”117 
 
The earliest signs of this would come even before independence when Muslim 
politicians were divided on how to approach the introduction of a motion at State 
Council to make Sinhalese the national language of Sri Lanka (K. Asad 1993).  
This division is symptomatic of the diversity of thought within the Muslim 
community as to how to represent the community and what the national interests 
are and thus there “was no consensus whether the community should merge into 
the tradition of the larger Sri Lankan society or maintain its separate identity by 
adoption of its own cultural and religious symbols” (Ameerdeen 2006, 73).  Hence 
to many of the Muslim politicians, the concept was clear that they would back the 
Sinhala led national government provided that they were able to leverage that for 
the community benefit (Ibid).  However, this incident is also symbolic of the 
concept of the accommodating politics that has been seen by many in a negative 
light because it pointed to a sense that the Muslim politicians were only engaged 
on issues when it suited them and the community. This would become apparent 
especially in the years post independence with one of the more prominent Muslim 
political leaders called Sir Razeek Fareed, who has also been nicknamed the 
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“somersault leader” (K. Asad 1993, 103), mainly because he spent most of his 
political life moving between the two main political parties during its time in 
government to such an extent that it was said of him “Governments may come 
and Governments may go, but Sir Razik Fareed goes on forever” (Ibid, 104).  
Further it appeared that the “Muslim politicians who got elected became classic 
examples of turncoats and opportunists” (Ameerdeen 2006, 73), thereby losing 
credibility with other communities and as we are to see within their own 
community as well.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The most common criticism that is levelled against Muslim politicians 
which seems to have historical significance is their fickle nature.  They only 
seemed to back the government on issues of interest to them when it 
suited them with a condition of trying the get something back for the 
community.  This is also evident from the fact that despite different parties 
coming to power, you will often find the same Muslim minister there fighting 
for ‘the community’.  So at one stage you ask the question, are the Muslims 
interested in principled national politics or politics that favour their 
community?  Yet what is also an interesting twist is that especially in the 
past decades, these Muslim politicians are also being questioned by their 
own constituency118 who are of the belief that they are ‘selfish’ and are not 
even concerned about the fate of the community”119 
 
This position of ‘accommodation’ in terms of the political strategy adopted by the 
political representatives of the Muslim community who were made up of the elites 
(largely from the south) with regards political patronage at the receipt of benefits 
was and has been tested in the aftermath of independence and especially with 
the rise once again of extreme Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in a post 2009 
context.  In hindsight, it is important to analyse whether the political strategy 
adopted by the political elite of the Muslim community in the wake of this rise, to 
preserve its own identity and for self protection, would be a future detriment for 
the community because it didn't work in the larger interests of the country.  In 
some sense it was not a single vision and strategy that was developed but it grew 
organically as a result of the interests of the Muslim political elite largely from one 
part of the country. As an interviewee of a focus group said   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
“It is really fascinating to see that the minority politicians, particularly the 
Muslims, did not foresee that what happened to the Indian Tamils right 
after independence could happen to them.  Somehow they were blinded 
into thinking that the Sinhalese nationalists would not mete out the same 
treatment to them.  This naivety has somewhat come to bite them.  It has 
been clear that there has been a misunderstanding of how deep and 
rooted the concept of the Buddhist nationalism within Sri Lanka”120 











The concept of a Muslim identity and consciousness was given agency simply in 
opposition to the ethnic discourse and political formation of the other main ethnic 
communities on the island. Thus in understanding the journey of Muslim identity 
discourse in the period post independence, it is important to also explore what 
happened with the Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist discourse after independence. 
Tambiah (1986, 74) describes “Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the ‘gospel’ of 
excluding Tamils from competition”. As an interviewee said 
 
“We can’t underscore enough the fact that the catalyst for the Sinhala 
Buddhist movement was the Christian influence which was seen to be 
supported by the British and which seemed to favour the Tamils who were 
seen to be educated in Christian schools and thus were at an advantage 
with regards resource acquisition.  Hence even the discussions around 
independence was largely driven in this mindset and it was driven by 
people who had been influenced by Buddhist monks at least on the 
Sinhalese side”121 
 
The Sinhala Buddhist nationalist discourse as a primordial understanding of 
nationhood rose in opposition to the colonial influence with a perception that the 
Tamil community in particular was favoured by the British because they were 
educated in Christian schools and spoke English. Consequently, there were more 
Tamils in the Colonial civil service than other communities which led to the 
Sinhalese distrust and opposition.  Though the Tamils in particular were seen as 
continuing the legacy of the British and being impediments to a righteous society 
in which Buddhism was the state religion and Sinhala the official language (Grant 
2009), the Muslims were generally seen as traders also ‘benefitting’ from the 
Colonial rule.  Thus in the wake of lack of and poor employment and education, 
minorities on the whole became a scapegoat for the social deprivation faced by 
the Sinhalese. Fernando (2008) highlights the fact that the political and economic 
conditions of the British Raj were also instrumental in providing a space for the 
Sinhalese to inherit power and ultimately a platform for the nationalists to spring 
from.  The economic strand was largely based on the philosophy of utilitarianism  
which proposed that all the colonies should have the benefits of British liberalism 
characterised by democracy and individual liberty (Wickramasinghe 2006) and a 
shift in the belief of a British Moral State (Fernando 2008).  “In practice, this meant 
removal of any type of state monopoly over the economy with the aim of the 
maximisation of profits” (Ibid, 147) and meant the liberalisation of the economy  
with a view to the maximisation of production.  Whilst this changed the system of 
land ownership, creating a new social strata, the liberalisation of the economy 
allowed a new movement of labour, mainly from South India were brought in to 
work the new plantations, as the Sinhalese rice-farming peasants were unwillling 
to turn to wage labour (Tambiah, 1986).  In this sense the Sri Lankan colonial 
economy was based on British capital, its land, Indian labour and an elite 
Sinhalese land ownership.  Yet as the plantation economy gave rise to a new 
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native bourgeoisie class – who were predominantely Low-country Sinhalese- the 
tension in the social space increased. “Their need for further economic expansion 
was curtailed mainly by Muslim and South Indian traders: their hopes for social 
and political recognition were blocked by local aristocracy who were closer to the 
colonial government” (Fernando 2008, 163).  Thus the only way to break through 
this  was  through a ‘cultural resistance’ as part of a “cultural recycling” (Ibid, 152) 
of a pre-existing ethno-symbolic  system  and cultural tensions between native 
traditions and Christianity which surfaced as a Buddhist revival and which was 
sponsored by this new class (Jayawardena 2003).  The bulk of this new class 
also formed the main material basis of the emerging Sinhala polity.   The most 
critical development in the Buddhist resurgence was a closing of the ranks, a 
growing solidarity and an advocacy of the return of Buddhist monks to 
prominence in the life of the society and the state (Tambiah 1986). 
 
The Sinhala Buddhist nationalist movement rise also coincided with the 
‘independence’ movements of the Sub Continent.  The privileged position of the 
Sinhalese post independence was not by accident but was associated with the 
construction of the unitary political structure in the island by the British, separating 
it from the rest of the Indian sub continent in light of its startegic location as was 
explained in Chapter 3.  The Donoughmore Constitution of the 1930s and 1940s 
which brought about representation in the Legislative Council on the basis of 
territorial and demographic criteria became the dominant electoral principle.  
Territorial representation and universal suffrage (in 1931) gave the advantage to 
the Sinhala community in relation to the minorities (Tambiah 1986).   Thus the 
situation emerged that the “Sinhalese who happen to be religiously different from 
the rest of the others were a ‘minority’ in the sub continent, but the ‘majority’ in 
the island, who were made to believe that they own the island as opposed to the 
Tamils who were a ‘minority’ in the island, but constituted a ‘majority’ in relation 
to Tamil Nadu” (Fernando 2008, 107) and the elections of 1931 helped to signify 
that stance (Hellman-Rajanayagam 1990).  Hence there was a perfect storm 
where those activists who originally had been inspired by the nationalist 
movement found themselves transitioning into a loosely associated element of 
the ‘traditional’ English-educated elite who had common backgrounds that the 
British transferred power at independence (Tambiah 1986), as a fixed notion of 
identities began to form and inform the making of the Sri Lankan unitary ‘nation’-
state post independence.  This was especially as on the eve of independence the 
Soulbury Constitution had confirmed the primacy of territorial and demographic 
criteria for electoral representation and had rejected ‘ethnic’ minority pleas for 
special representation (Ibid).  As an interviewee said 
 
“There was no formal movement for independence such as you had in 
India where different ethnic communities had come together with the sole 
purpose of taking on the colonial master.  Instead you almost had an 
‘accidental’ grouping together of a disparate band of members each 
fighting their own ethnic nationalist corner for representation during the 
colonial period, being ‘forced’ to now come together as a result of the 
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colonial movement.  As such there was perhaps no ‘plan’ or strategy for 
what next”122 
 
Hence those that were at the forefront at independence were those who had 
emerged from agitating with the colonial powers for ‘ethnic’ representation during 
the colonial period and more importantly had been agitating for what they 
perceived as favourable treatment of one ethnic group over the other.  It wasn’t 
helped as well by the fact that at “independence, the constitution of Sri Lanka was 
based on the 1944 Soulbury Commission report which had deliberately avoided 
the contentious issue of defining the criteria for citizenship” (De Silva 1986, 145-
149).  As an interviewee said 
 
“By skirting the issue of citizenship, Britain sidestepped this messy political 
issue in the concluding years of its rule.  However, despite the fact that the 
initial transition into independence was noteworthy for Sri Lanka, given the 
fact that many of those protagonists who were in power after 1948 were 
those who had been active in ethnic nationalist movements pre 
independence, it was clear that it was only a matter of time before the 
concept of ethnic nationalism and what constitutes citizenship would 
become a political agenda.  Inevitably the ‘Citizenship Act’ of 1948 which 
was supported by all groups disenfranchising the Indians was the first sign 
of the Sinhalese ethnic chauvinism that would come to rear its ugly head 
time and time again”123 
 
The situation was compounded in the first few years post independence as the 
transfer of power was made from the British to a group of politicians who were 
deemed the ‘traditional’ English elite.  On the surface, it seemed that the model 
was a good one, where this group (seemingly made up of all ethnicities) would 
take up power and forge a nation for everyone.  However in this constructive 
developments, there were also destructive developments that laid the seed for 
momentous social and political shifts, from the universal franchise, territorial 
electorates and majority politics which worked against the interests of the 
minorities, to the erosion of traditional bases of leadership and power (S. J. 
Tambiah 1986).  The latter in particular produced deep divisions within the 
Sinhalese society itself and was largely caused in the early stages of the post 
independence by the retention of English – the language of elites and the colonial 
regime– as in effect the state language which had the net result of thereby 
excluding most of the population from active involvement in public affairs. As an 
interviewee said 
 
“It was clear that the early years of post independence Sri Lanka did not 
really bring about drastic changes as such.  To many it was simply a 
transfer of power from the British to their representatives, the so called 
‘Brown Sahibs’, who were intent on keeping the status quo.  Although in 
hindsight, we know that this was not necessarily the case”124 






Another catalyst for the division and exclusion was that the new post 
independence administration had also proposed a new constitution which had as 
an integral feature, an emphasis on secularism, defined in terms of the limits to 
the power of the state in religious affairs.  The first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka 
after independence whilst recognizing the state’s special obligation to Buddhism 
emphasized the official policy of neutrality in religious affairs, drawing a distinction 
between “a government of Buddhists and a Buddhist government” (De Silva 
1998, 81).  He “always saw the pluralism of the Sri Lanka polity as a source of 
strength not weakness and identified the establishment of a sense of Sri Lankan 
nationalism through a resolute subordination of ethnic and religious identities as 
one of the principle and most urgent concerns of any transfer of power political 
settlement.” (Ibid. 22)  Thus it is to his credit that “during his time as Prime 
Minister, there was little evidence of the upsurge of religious fervor and linguistic 
nationalism that burst to the surface in the mid-1950s” (Ibid, 84)125.   However, 
this was not understood by the masses who did not connect with the elite 
leadership in terms of language spoken as well as the practice of faith. The lack 
of political will amongst politicians to move away from Anglicised forms of 
government and social relations did not also help matters (Bush 2003).126 
 
Consequently, between the ruling elite and the electoral masses a gap 
developed. In addition, there was little economic progress with little opportunities 
for employment.  The gap increased between the rich and the poor and the 
mistrust between the elite and the grass roots would also escalate mistrust 
between communities127.  The reason for this is that the ruling élite classified as 
the Colombo-based, English-speaking, westernized class from which the MPs 
and the top bureaucrats came were perceived to be favouring the minorities at 
the expense of the ‘rural élite’ or an ‘indigenous élite’ (Ibid.) traditionally known 
as the Sinhala-speaking, non-westernized class of the village teachers, small-
time traders, Ayurvedic (traditional medicine) physicians, monks and students.  
With the inclusion of this group in the mainstream political process, the potential 
power of communal politics was not only realized but used to full advantage by 
the Sinhala political elite 
 
It was in the latter group that Angarika Dharmapala’s rhetoric of Buddhist 
Nationalism would also find resurgent support.  For them, Dharmapala’s ‘dreams’ 
provided a promise of power and status, as Independence had meant little more  











than the replacement of the British by British educated ‘brown sahibs’ (Vittachi 
1962).  Thus  Dharmapala’s  call for Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in the early part 
of the century was revamped to appeal to this group of ‘rural elite’,  especially to 
young Buddhist monks128  who emerged as vocal champions of religion and 
language paving the way for the growth of Sinhala nationalism and its 
entanglement with politics (Edirippulige 2004).  It offered them a sense of identity 
and hope and ultimately by relying on the mythical tales of ‘imagined’ nationalism, 
it gave them a sense of purpose and destiny.  As de Silva (1986, 35) writes the 
“Sinhala language, the words for nation, race and people are practically 
synonymous, and a multiethnic nation or state is incomprehensible to the popular 
mind”.  Thus the rural elite placed an emphasis more on what could be articulated 
as an emotional popular appeal rather than a meaningless abstract129.  This 
further increased the disconnect that had emerged post independence as 
Tambiah (1986,69) says “Overall the most critical development in the Buddhist 
resurgence was a closing of the ranks, a growing solidarity and the engagement 
in a propagandistic activism with political overtones on the part of the Buddhist 
monks…In preaching the restoration of Buddhism to its rightful historical place, 
they were also advocating their own return to prominence in the life of the society 
and the state”. 
 
The revivalists in a bizarre way thought of themselves as recovering to a higher 
pristine form that had been corrupted by the colonial powers.  In their logic, a 
pristine Buddhism represented a higher idealism espousing universal principles 
and a vindication of identity yet what they didn't realize was the seeds of 
discontent being sown (Grant 2009).  Ultimately it was this support that lent itself 
to the social and religious upsurge that climaxed in the 1956 elections and the 
electoral defeat of the governing party, the United National Party - UNP (who had 
ruled from independence).  The defeat came as a result of a coalition that 
included the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (a 
former deputy leader of the UNP), who were able to mobilize local-level rural 
élites by promising not only the restoration of Buddhism to its rightful position in 
Sri Lanka, but that Sinhala would become the official language.     
4.3			The	Perfect	Storm	of	the	1956	Elections		
1956 represents the perfect storm for Sri Lankan politics and a critical juncture in 
its history.  As discontent arose amongst the Sinhala Buddhist public (led by the 
monks) for the government’s apparent disregard for not providing the Buddhist 
religion with an ‘autonomous constitution’ (De Silva 1998),130 the celebration in 









1956 of the 2500th anniversary of the death of the Buddha (the Buddha Jayanthi), 
provided an opportunity for Buddhist revival amidst the general public.  The 
conditions were laid for a multifaceted ‘nationalism’ which conflated three 
elements: language (Sinhala); religion (Buddhism) and heritage (the fact that the 
Sinhalese were descended from the Aryan people) 
 
Bandaranaike successfully exploited these conditions and the discontent 
amongst the masses and his new party (and coalition) sought to provide the 
Sinhala-Buddhist majority with a political party to fulfil their aspirations.  Thus the 
electoral campaign of 1956 was fought in the background of communal identity 
of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism (with an emotional evocation of  the traditional 
values associated with the country’s Buddhist heritage) with a pivotal element of 
the promise of “Sinhala Only”131 – to establish Sinhala as the single official 
language for government business within 24 hours of election (International Crisis 
Group 2007), and to establish once and for all the primacy of the Sinhalese-
Buddhists in Sri Lankan polity. By offering disgruntled groups, a means of 
articulating grievances with a promise of a response once in power and 
manipulating the powerful cultural symbols of language, religion and race, 
Bandaranaike managed to consolidate a wide range of Sinhala Buddhist sub-
groups.    Edirippulige (2004, 36-37) quotes Obesekera (1984) in saying 
  
“The victory of Mr Bandaranaike in 1956 was spearheaded by those who 
were directly or indirectly influenced by Dharmapala.  Thus the post 1956 
era saw the introduction of a new fundamentalist and militant Buddhism 
advocating the takeover of denominational schools to reduce the power of 
Christian missions; the compulsory teaching of (Buddhism) religion in 
schools; the propagation of the intellectualist view of Buddhism as being 
not a religion but a philosphy consonant with the spirit of science and 
above all, the use of Buddhism for political purposes.  As a result 
Buddhism had effectively become the political and civil religion of the 
state”.  
 
What this move effectively did was exclude and alienate the minority groups 
speaking a mother tongue other than Sinhalese and practicing a religion other 
than Buddhism132.  None felt this more than the Tamil community yet the Muslim 










community was also affected as well.  Where hope had at least emerged that in 
a post independence era, there could be a semblance of ‘all being equal’, it was 
clear that with the new phase in 1956, politics had once again become ethnically 
focused.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The 1956 elections were not only a turning point for ethnic minority 
relations, but also politics as well as identity.  Suddenly you had groups 
that were excluded simply because they couldn't speak the same 
language or were of a different faith.  More importantly though and this is 
important to note the ramifications of this, you had the first inclinations of 
what a ‘true’ Sinhalese meant to these nationalists. As Tambiah133 
eloquently writes ‘To be truly Sinhalese was to be born Sinhalese, speak 
Sinhalese and practice the Sinhalese religion, Buddhism’.  You can see 
the implications of such thinking in the years since 1956”134 
 
 
The 1956 election also changed Sri Lankan politics from one based on 
democratic rights to one based on party patronage and ethnic nationalism135.  
This is where the main Sinhala dominated political parties would actively court 
the Sinhala Buddhist vote and any attempt by government coalitions to come to 
an agreement with Tamil political parties was undermined by those in opposition.  
It also represented not only “ the rejection of the concept of a Sri Lankan 
nationalism based on the acceptance of pluralism as an essential feature of a 
democratic political system and its substitution by a more democratic and populist 
nationalism” (De Silva 1998, 24), that was effectively Sinhalese Buddhist in 
nature, but also highlighted the untenable contradiction between and 
consequences of a democratic system in which 70 per cent of voters were 
Sinhala and a state system in which Sinhalese were seriously underrepresented 
(International Crisis Group 2007)136.   
 
In the end the 1956 election serves as a symbol of the chauvinism that existed 
within both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities which could be galvanised and 
rallied by erstwhile politicians seeking to build intra-group support. It illustrates 
“how successful mobilisation of untapped political resources by one actor can 
stimulate competitors to seek to tap those same resources. Those that are unable 
to do so are either politically marginalised or forced to innovate and mobilize still 
other resources.” (Bush 2003, 85).  The political manipulation alienated many 
Tamils from the national political process, encouraging “reactive parochialism” 













(Ibid, 90), but also meant that like the SLFP, the UNP adopted its own ‘Sinhala 
Only’ policy engaging in its own provocative communalist acts as a way to 
‘connect’ with the rural elite.  As Bush (2003) analyses, it was not so much the 
inter-group dynamics between the Tamils and the Sinhalese that was the cause 
of 1956 and subsequent actions (although they were determining factors), it was 
actually the intra-active dynamics within the Sinhalese with competitions amongst 
sub-groups that was the main catalyst for the communalism.  Thus the conflict 
was between “two Westernized elite factions in whom one effectively and 
instrumentally mobilized the support of the traditional, vernacular elite137” (Ibid, 
92). 
 
A similar nature of intra-group conflict was also present in the Muslim political 
elite during this time.  There was a split in the support for the Language act with 
some Muslim members of parliament (mainly from the East of Sri Lanka) voting 
against it and those who were in Colombo and representing the traditional political 
elite voting for it.  As Ismail (1995) writes, this support for the Sinhala policy act 
was principally a construct of the Muslim political elite, who were largely from 
Colombo (and the south) as opposed to the Eastern Muslims who were quite 
close to the Tamil language138. “One can also read in such a move the 
construction of a (Southern) Muslim identity by constitutively excluding Eastern 
sensibilities” (Ibid, 89).  
 
The split support of the Muslims also pitted them against the Tamils.  In so doing, 
there is once again have a scenario reminiscent of the Ramanathan-Azeez 
debates.  As an interviewee said 
 
“We have an appeasement of the Sinhalese by the Muslim polity of the 
day notably Sir Razik Fareed who chose to demonise the Tamils.  In doing 
this, the polity managed to downplay the Sinhala violence against the 
Muslims especially the legacy of 1915.  However, unfortunately, the 
message that was sent was clear that the Muslim elite would ultimately 
accept Sinhala hegemony at whatever cost”139 
 
This was seen with the reactions of the Muslim polity before, during and after the 
whole debate on language policy.  “After the official language policy became law, 
the Muslims reconciled themselves to the new policy” (Ameerdeen 2006, 72), 












helped by the fact that the new government tried to win Muslim’s support by 
setting up a special government training school and by teaching Arabic at the 
primarily level by ‘Moulavis’ (religious teachers trained in madrasas140) all 
appointed by and paid for by the State.  In doing this, the new government played 
on what was seen as the interest of the Muslim political elite in the provision of 
educational opportunities141 and also a safeguard of the practice of religion. “By 
supporting the government, the Muslim community believed that it might gain 
some advantages” (K. Asad 1993, 106).  Thus we see that in 1956, the ‘Muslim 
Mosques Charitable Trusts and Waqf Bill’ was passed in parliament whilst the 
Government declared the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday a public holiday and in 
1957, a concession was granted from the government for government servants 
to attend Friday noon prayers (Ibid.).  As an interviewee said 
 
“This is the first manifestation of a proper ‘accommodationist’ policy of the 
Muslim political elite that would define the strategy moving forward.  They 
were willing to go ahead with whatever was proposed (even at the expense 
of other minorities) if they were looked after despite them being 
disadvantaged by the Sinhala Language policy.  The reasoning given by 
many of the politicians at that time, was that the Tamil language did not 
have any cultural implication for the Muslims as it did for the Tamils”142 
 
It is though clear that this stance not only showed a lack of consensus amongst 
the political elites representing the Muslim community but also showed how far 
they (i.e. the political elites) might be willing to go to preserve the community.  To 
some extent, this stance betrays a sense of hypocrisy in the community for the 
mere fact that language was and still remains the vehicle through which Muslim 
religious distinctiveness has been maintained, which meant that despite 
supporting the language policy, there was no consensus about merging into the 
tradition of the wider Sri Lankan / Sinhalese community. In this case, Tamil 
remains the main language that was and is spoken by the Muslim community and 
is how traditional teachings and interpretations were provided. Ameerdeen (2006, 
39) generously says that “The Sri Lankan Muslims are pragmatic in their 
approach to language without sentimental attachment or antipathy”.  Yet many 
other commentators cite this as the main reason that the Muslim community was 
not able to build trust with both communities. Ismail (1995, 85) also refers to this 
style of politics by the Muslim community coming out of the “fear concerning its 
physical safety”, a legacy of the 1915 Sinhala Muslim violence and a fear coming 
from the fact that it was clear that the Sinhala state was beginning to actively 
pursue a negative policy against the Tamils due to their opposition and thus it 
was one way of avoiding the same treatment that the Tamils were facing.  
However, to the Tamils, the strategy felt like a betrayal that the Muslims had 









largely supported the ‘Sinhala Language’ policy and to the Sinhalese, it still did 
not answer the questions of whether the Muslims truly had integrated.  This is 
because despite supporting the Sinhala language policy, it was seen to be 
conditional with the provision of certain safeguards and in later years, with the 
establishment of Muslim schools (which largely taught in Tamil), it was clear that 
the Muslim community was more intent in maintaining its separate identity 
through its own cultural and religious symbols, without getting involved in the 
national level policies, unless it directly affected the community itself.   In the 
aftermath of the 1956 elections though the accommodation style politics “had an 
unintended consequence: it reinforced Muslim subordination within identitarian 
discourse” (Ibid, 85).  Ismail in my opinion is closer to describing the reality of 
how Muslim polity acted in terms of shifting allegiances to those in power with the 
need to preserve their own identity.  It was a mixture of concern about physical 
safety, preservation of own culture and identity as well as the context that in a 
post independence structure not much was done to generate an expression of 
national identity.  In this sense the Muslim political elite played the 
accommodation style politics game by ensuring that they acquiesced with the 
ruling party of the day in terms of their political advantage whilst seeking out 
guarantees that would meet the needs and aspirations of the community. 
 
Thus 1956 was the catalyst of a pattern with the intensification of “Buddhist 
Sinhala nationalism, leading either to ethnic discrimination or to half-hearted and 
ineffective anti discrimination policies became a key index of the occurrence of 
ethnic violence or of a disposition to resort to it” (Little 1999, 50). 
4.3.1	From	Rhetoric	to	Action	
It is not an understatement to say that “Sinhala Only” was a disastrous policy 
which prompted decades of confrontation between Tamils and Sinhalese and set 
Sri Lanka down the course of politics that it finds itself stuck in. Inevitably “Sinhala 
Only” provoked protests from Tamils, who were now the ones who felt excluded 
by language policy and its effects on the availability of public sector jobs and 
services. However peaceful protests by S.J.V. Chelvanayagam’s143 Federal Party 
(FP) in 1956144 were repressed violently, (after a clash with Sinhala-Buddhist 
extremist mobs) and which led to deadly anti-Tamil riots across the island. 
 
With the election victory came the reality of moving from rhetoric to actual 
policy145, as the Bandaranaike government sought to reconcile its commitment to 












make Sinhala the sole national language with the political and practical necessity 
to make some concessions to the Tamils about the use of their language.  The 
new language policy was not only delayed but when prepared initially in draft form 
appeared to be slightly watered down “combining a strong commitment to Sinhala 
as the sole national language with the protection for the language rights for the 
minorities” (De Silva 1998, 50), in essence a pragmatic concession to political 
realities, which upset the more vociferous defenders of the ‘Sinhala Only’ bill.  
Thus by the time the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956146 came to be 
introduced, whilst it set in train a process in which all dropped support for the 
Tamil language having equal legal status, its implementation was such that it 
could be done on a step-by-step basis over a period of five years, “a period which 
Bandaranaike expected to use to devise or negotiate modifications and 
adjustments to make the change in language policy palatable to the Tamils” (Ibid., 
51) 
 
The FP demanded greater protection of minority rights generally, including 
citizenship for Indian Tamils on plantations, parity of status for Sinhala and Tamil 
as official languages, as well as guarantees for some form of regional autonomy 
for the traditionally Tamil-speaking Northern and Eastern Provinces.  The latter 
was described as “the need of establishing ‘a Tamil linguistic state within a federal 
union of Ceylon’ to preserve Tamil cultural identity” (Edirippulige 2004, 46).  The 
new prime minister began negotiations with the FP on concessions to minority 
interests and (with the approval of leading Buddhist monks) came up with a three-
point proposal: “reasonable use” of the Tamil language; limited devolution of 
power to regional councils and constitutional amendments to guarantee the 
fundamental rights of minorities (International Crisis Group 2007). 
 
Negotiations produced the 1956/57 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact147, 
which gave the status of Tamil as an official language for administrative purposes 
in the north and east and some aspect for regional autonomy, with some devolved 
power to regional councils, including the promise to grant local control overstate 
schemes to settle landless Sinhalese in Tamil areas of the Eastern Province (De 
Silva 1998). Thus the scheme of “regional councils was a precise attempt to 
devolve powers to the local units and to create rather independent regional 
administrative system with the consideration of ethno-territorial divisions of the 
island” (Edirippulige 2004, 117-118). 
 
As Edirippulige (2004, 117) describes, the pact was an important landmark with 
regard ethnic relations in Sri Lanka.  It developed an idea of devolution of powers 
to local authorities and granting some kind of regional autonomy to the Tamils: 
“According to the Regional Councils Bill of 1957, the Northern Province of the 







island was considered as one regional council whereas the Eastern Province was 
supposed to divide into two or more regional councils in accordance with the 
population distribution (the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese of the province).  At the 
same time, the Bill stipulated the amalgamation of the Tamil regional councils in 
the Northern and Eastern Provinces subject to parliamentary ratification”.  
 
In its conceptual stage, the Bill bridged the gap between federalism and a unitary 
government, with elections to the regional councils and these councils having 
power over services such as agriculture, education, health, social services and 
so on .“In short, the Pact was a statesman-like compromise that seemed to 
possess the necessary ingredients for healing the distrust and antagonisms” 
(Bush 2003, 94), which had been built up between the two communities as a 
result of Sinhala power struggles. 
 
However with a political expediency that was to become all too familiar, the main 
opposition party, the UNP (who had previously lost the ‘Sinhala only’ campaign), 
rallied Sinhala Buddhist opinion in protest148 at the pact. In their initial opposition 
to the three point proposal, the UNP would accuse Bandaranaike of fraud and 
being under the influence of a small Tamil anti Sinhalese clique (Bush 2003).  
However, with a touch of irony, they would call upon the same resources which 
had enabled Bandaranaike to come to power to oppose the Pact, i.e. the rural 
elite and the Buddhist monks. 
 
Bandaranaike eventually abrogated the pact in 1958 under severe pressure from 
his own ranks of members of his coalition, leading to a new civil disobedience 
campaign by Tamil parties, which sparked deadly ethnic riots across the island in 
1958149.   Nissan and Stirrat (1990) also note that during these two riots (1956 
and 1958) Indian Tamils were not drawn into the conflict and the conflicts erupted 
over issues of language (the use of Sinhala or Tamil) and access to land. 
 
A further compromise was suggested by the Prime Minister for the approval of a 
‘Tamil Language (Special provisions) Act No. 28 Bill’ which included “the rights 
of Tamils to use their language in correspondence with the government, and in 
local government affairs, to continue educating their children in Tamil and to take  
the competitive examinations for entry into government and local service in Tamil 
with the provision that they would be required to gain proficiency in Sinhala to 
continue in service and to secure promotion” (De Silva 1998, 54).  However this 
was once again opposed and Bandaranaike was assassinated in September 










1959 by a Buddhist monk supposedly angry at his ‘soft stance’ towards the 
Tamils.150  This assassination illustrates that “the wielding of extremist rhetoric 
for short-term advantage inflates the expectations of a support group and invites 
political disaster when these expectations are not seen to be met” (Bush 2003, 
85) 
 
Bandaranaike’s widow, though inexperienced politically, was voted in, out of 
sympathy in 1960 becoming the first women Prime Minister in the world.  Her 
inexperience would show as she drastically continued and implemented the 
Sinhala Only act despite the misgivings of her husband.  Her first (and second) 
terms in power would be disastrous especially on the economic front (Ibid). 
4.4			New	Governments,	Same	Policies	
The political musical chairs of Sri Lankan politics meant that in 1965, the UNP 
came into power.  Once again, with the need for political expediency in gathering 
Tamil support though engagement with the FP, in a reverse to its stance of 1958, 
the Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact was undertaken by the UNP (International 
Crisis Group 2007).  In essence, it was a rehash of the 1957 pact (done between 
Bandaranaike and Chelvanyakam), offering use of the Tamil language in the 
north and east for administrative and court matters and a framework for creating 
district councils, with powers to be allocated after further negotiation, and 
covering issues involving the Land Development Ordinance and colonisation, 
prioritising landless Tamils’ rights to resettlement in parts of the north and east.  
This time however it was the opposition SLFP that would object to the pact 
thereby rendering the Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact, a fading landmark in 
attempts at inter-ethnic accommodation.  This despite the pact having the same 
roots as the one that they had proposed in 1958.   
 
The intransigence of the government, the economic crisis of the 1960s, the 
growing unemployment, constrained by political inertia was made worse in the 
early seventies with an uprising in the south by Sinhalese youth in rural areas 
frustrated by the lack of economic opportunities.  From 1960 – 1977, though Sri 
Lanka had spent nearly 10% of its GNP on programs such as  education, it still 
lagged behind in economic growth, thereby not meeting the needs of the 
educated rural youth (Bandarage 2009) and not bridging the existing divide and 
in particular the gap between the English-speaking elite and the rural Sinhalese.  
Bush (2003) explains this as a politics of exclusion where if you were from the 
wrong family, wrong caste and had no finances, you had no chance to stand for 
political office. 







 In circumstances almost mirroring the rise of Tamil insurgency in the north in the 
early eighties, the Sinhalese in the rural south started to agitate giving rise to the 
first armed insurrection in 1971 led by the People’s Liberation Front (Janatha 
Vimukti Peramuna – JVP).  The 5 lectures given to recruited members of the 
Front were based on Marxism-Leninism as the Front identified perpetuation of a 
dependent economy through neo-colonialism (Fernando 2008).  Whilst the JVP 
played on the undercurrents of Sinhala Buddhist ethno nationalism believing that 
“a revolution can not be won with the support of the ‘minorities’” (Ibid, 198), their 
sole aim was to change the ‘colonial’ economy, in particular its staunchly anti-
Indian posture that manifested itself in the treatment of the Plantation Tamils. 
“The sense of deprivation and disillusionment with the state and the ruling class 
was much greater among the Sinhalese youths than among youths belonging to 
the ethnic minorities because their expectations had been much greater” 
(Bandarage 2009, 54).  With a hardening of social class boundaries, there was 
increasing discontent which resulted in a southern insurrection in 1971 by 
Sinhalese youth, directed solely against the Sinhala State and the ruling class 
and not the ethnic other (Ibid.).  The violence of 1971 reflected the failure of the 
new Sinhalese-Buddhist social order to produce the results expected of it (J. D. 
Rogers 1987) 
 
According to Bush (2003) the agitation of the Sinhalese in the south (leading to 
armed rebelling firstly in 1971 and subsequently in 1987) posed the only threat to 
state authority as opposed to the agitation (and subsequent conflict) in the north 
and east in the eighties and nineties.  The prime reason for this was that the 
violence was predominantly ‘intra-group’ being confined to the Sinhala 
community and limited geographically to Sinhalese-majority areas of the country 
and being against the Sri Lankan government, not against the ethno-religious 
nationalist ideology of the state (Fernando 2008).  However it is important to note 
that the strategy of the leadership of these Sinhalese agitators “intensified and 
harnessed the inter-group fears of the Sinhalese as a means of mobilising 
resources for use in the intra-group arena “ (Bush 2003, 99).   
 
The response of the government was twofold:  one was a violent crackdown 
against the insurrection with a carte blanche given to the armed forces which led 
to widespread intra-ethnic killing among Sinhala Buddhists where it is estimated 
10,000 young men and women were killed (Ibid.)  The second response was to 
initiate a political solution to the insurrection.  Thus the constitutions of 1972 and 
1978 (again as a response to the Southern agitation) were changed to promote 
Sinhala Buddhist hegemony by centralising the state, giving Buddhism ‘foremost’ 
status, making Sinhala the official language and failing to adequately provide for 
the protection of minority rights  (International Crisis Group 2007).  The new 
constitution it seemed institutionalized and legitimized the growing dominance of 
the majority community in the state and polity (Shastri 1990).   
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In addition, the government introduced a ‘standardisation’ procedures related to 
university admissions, which expanded the education opportunity for rural 
Sinhala youth at the expense of students  from the traditional educational elites 
of Jaffna and Colombo (International Crisis Group 2007).  This policy meant a 
preferential system that required higher marks for Tamil language students than 
for Sinhala language students to qualify to enter the university science faculties151 
(Bandarage 2009). Thus the proportion of Tamils in state employment reduced 
as well as in the universities. 
 
Consequently, the JVP would engage in a period of mainstream political activity 
between 1977-1983 with relative ideological moderation before being proscribed 
in 1983 and restarting its conflict in 1987 (Bush 2003). The experience of the JVP 
in the post 1971 era, is useful to be explained through the concept of blocked 
mobility and nationalism as explained by Cormier (2003).  The concept explores 
how young university students see their upward mobility thwarted and as a result 
develop nationalist movements which, they believe, will provide them with an 
independent state and open up career opportunities for them.  In the Sri Lankan 
case, it is perhaps best to see how the aspirations of the young upwardly mobile 
cohort are blocked by the older generation.  The resultant conflict has more to do 
with differences in approach to the everyday running of the state than to anything 
else.  In this sense the blocked mobility thesis acts as a grievance-based 
explanation for the rise of cultural nationalism.  In this case the causal link to 
Sinhala Buddhist nationalism of the JVP and the causal mechanism at work is 
the resentment, and resultant manifestations of grievance, felt when career 
aspirations are not properly satisfied by the realities of the labour market.  The 
resentment felt as a result of this is then channelled into movement activity in an 
attempt to rectify the situation. However, Cormier’s (2003) theory explains the 
need to change the questions we ask about the emergence of cultural nationalism 
which forces us to recognise that there are any number of possible grievances 
motivating any one intellectual.  This then allows us to understand what social 
processes were involved in shaping this particular cultural national movement.  In 
this case, this type of approach helps us not to take binary approach to this aspect 
and also allows us to explore the formation of another social movement based on 
grievances bearing in mind the similar circumstances and context. 
4.5			Formation	of	Tamil	Separatism	
In this case it is important to view the formation of the Tamil separatism based on 
the above concept. “To rise above the bipolar Sinhala vs. Tamil analysis, it is 
necessary to look at the economic grievances that the youth from both the 
Sinhala Buddhist majority and the Sri Lankan Tamil minority had in common.  
Rather than joining in a common cause, however, their grievances gave rise to 




divergent movements given differential responses by elites of the two 
communities” (Bandarage 2009, 53) 
 
Despite tensions between the Sinhala and Tamil groups that would exist post 
1956, there were no major outbreaks of sustained violence between the two 
groups. However societal relations would be tested further in the Seventies with 
the addition of a flailing economy suffering at the hands of the political elites 
anxious to nationalize certain sectors and to control access to all sorts of 
resources, thereby subsuming the state to political alliances and party machines 
(Nissan and Stirrat 1990).   
 
One effect was that the already marginalized Tamils were effectively excluded 
from the channels through which resources were distributed. “Particularistic ties 
between MPs and their followers became of utmost importance, and, in such a 
situation, for any MP representing Sinhala area to allocate resources to a Tamil 
area was madness” (Ibid. 36). 
 
With the changing of the constitutions both in 1972152 and 1978 to favour and 
prolong the governments in power, those Tamils who were beginning to demand 
complete autonomous began to become more vociferous, characterized by sharp 
dissensions, disillusionment and despair (Shastri 1990).  The controversial 
policies for university admissions in particular aimed at improving the 
opportunities for rural Sinhala youth had conversely struck at the very heart of 
Tamil middle class, affecting the economic mobility of Tamils from Jaffna.  
Consequently, this succeeded in alienating and radicalising in particular, the 
Tamil lower middle-class youth arousing in them deep suspicions and cynicisms 
about the Sinhalese (Ibid.) 
 
The Vaddukodai convention in 1976 paved the way for the formation of the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) - a coalition of various Tamil political groups of 
which the FP was the leading component with a demand that moved away from 
regional autonomy to self-determination and the establishment of another state 
(Ibid). Thus in the 1977 elections, the TULF contested on the platform of total 
independence for the Tamil-speaking areas of Sri Lanka, dashing previous Tamil 
demands of some sort of parity with Sinhala, or at least for a system which would 
protect the rights of Tamils in Tamil areas. “With the foundation of the TULF, 
however, it became clear that sizeable numbers of Tamils, particularly in the north 
of the country, had lost all hope that such concessions could be obtained” ( 
(Nissan and Stirrat 1990, 37).  
 






The concept of self-determination was rooted in the Tamil concept of Eelam or 
Homeland intimately linked in both the development and the discrimination 
experienced by the region and its population. (Shastri 1990).  Ironically, the Tamil 
argument for a separate state had been strengthened somewhat by the economic 
policies of the seventies which allowed the rural areas of the north and east to 
emerge as important paddy-producing regions thereby making it a viable 
economic base.  Thus the development of the region had demonstrated to Tamils 
its potential for economic growth and opportunity.  “The manner in which that 
development was being effected, through the instrumentalities of the unitary state 
and majority rule consolidated in ethnic terms, made them acutely aware that they 
would not be shareholders in this development but would be its casualties. 
Although their declining stake in the system explains their alienation from it and 
their acceptance of the separatist option, the region’s perceived potential for 
development provided a strong, intense motivation to struggle for the goal of a 
separate state.” (Ibid, 75). 
 
From 1977, a process of the liberalisation of the economy was introduced inviting 
foreign investors whilst relaxing labour and tax laws.  However, both the 
agricultural and the industrial projects reflected ethno-based measures 
(Fernando 2008).  Industrial development promoted with foreign investments 
were concentrated in the Western Province, whilst the Mahaweli Development 
Project (seen as one of Sri Lanka’s greatest hydraulic and agricultural 
development projects), despite it being in the dry zones bordering Tamil villages 
was accompanied by what was called “state sponsored colonizing schemes of 
Sinhala settlers who were later armed to guard the border” (Ibid, 201).  
 
This liberalization process was made possible by the UNP winning the 1977 
elections and once again changing the constitution in its favour sidelining the 
minorities.  The constitution which brought in the presidential system of 
government, also made the judiciary subservient to it and provided absolute 
powers to the President with no accountability besides declaring Buddhism as 
the state religion. “In short, this constitution reduced the island’s minority 
communities in general and the Muslim community in particular to the position of 
a nonentity” (L. Farook 2009, 48). 
 
The elections which also allowed the TULF to emerge as one of the main 
oppositions is also telling of the support that it received more in the north 
especially in Jaffna than in the east (Shastri 1990).  Unfortunately, with the 
election once again, communal riots flared up in many Sinhala-dominated areas 
where Tamils formed a minority fuelled by rumours that Tamils had killed Sinhala 
in Jaffna. There is some basis to these rumours as by 1975, small groups of Tamil 
insurgents, commonly referred to as the ‘Tigers’, began to appear in the north of 
Sri Lanka (Ibid). They focused their attacks on the representatives of the state in 
the north: police, soldiers, government officials and government property. They 
also attacked those Tamils whom they considered to be collaborators with the 
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Sinhala.  Thus the period of the liberalization and the state colonizing schemes 
juxtaposed the gaining of momentum of the Tamil movement for self-
determination who felt threatened economically and in terms of their existence.   
The government adopted two approaches to counter the Tamil demand for self-
determination: one through the legislature prohibiting demand for separation and 
the other through militarizing the Tamil regions with Emergency Regulations and 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Fernando 2008) 
 
Subsequently the demands of the Sri Lankan Tamil ethno regional movement for 
greater independence from the Sinhalese-dominated centre had evolved not only 
to a call for a separate state in the mid- 1970s but an increase in the use of 
organized violence by both sides in the conflict as more youth joined the militant 
movements.   After a shooting incident, the large numbers of Sinhala police who 
had been deployed to the north, went on a rampage in Jaffna (Nissan and Stirrat 
1990) .  The iconic Jaffna library - the second largest library in Sri Lanka and the 
main library for Tamil material in the country—was burnt; its destruction was 
interpreted by Tamils as a deliberate attack on Tamil learning, culture and history 
(Ganesan 2013). There was also rioting in the east coast, the tea estates and 
Colombo suburbs. In at least one case a government MP was active in organizing 
the anti-Tamil attacks (Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  All of this would pale in 
comparison to the pogrom that took place 2 years later in 1983, of which more 
will be said in the next chapter. 
4.6			Development	of	Muslim	Institutions	
As has been discussed already it is worthy to note that the Muslim community 
had been heavily involved with politics with the aim to preserve and maintain the 
security and identity of the community.  Every cabinet since 1947 has had a 
Muslim representative (De Silva 1998), with the political elite of the Muslim 
community attempting to develop a separate identity from the Tamil community 
by articulating a ‘Muslim’ identity. As an interviewee said 
 
“The number one prerogative for the Muslim political representative from 
the late nineteenth century through to independence and beyond, was the 
preservation of identity for the community and also ensuring safety and 
security in the wake of physical threats (for example from the 1915 
Sinhala-Muslim riots and then in the late seventies and early eighties as 
Sri Lanka faced armed separatist movements).  The preservation of 
identity for the Muslim community was seen through institutions as well as 
through a process of ‘accommodating’ politics”153 
 
The identity that Muslim politicians tried to articulate was through an expression 
and faith which seemingly also appeared to be homogeneous.  Yet despite the 
attempt to maintain a separate identity, the Sri Lankan Muslim community was 
not homogeneous and the sub identities seemed to play off against each other, 
                                                
153		Skype	interview	with	Dr	Imthiyas	Razak,	August	2015	
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with the ‘Moors’, adopting a more superior attitude to the rest of the sub identities, 
“a sign of the conflict between the elitist groups for political power, economic 
benefits and social status” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 40).  As an interviewee said 
 
“We see the true ‘limits’ of the articulation of an identity through a 
‘Muslim/Islam’ lens early on in the Muslim polity.  There was and continues 
to be this struggle with also trying to define one selves as ‘Moor’ or ‘Malay’ 
and all of this boils down to class and political interests.  So from the early 
twentieth century, there is a paradox whereby externally the Muslim polity 
were fighting to find representation for themselves but internally were 
fighting for who or what represented the Muslim polity”154 
 
This dichotomy and tensions within the Muslim community is testimony to the 
challenge of trying to homogenise a faith identity that is not described in isolation 
to other ethnic and faith identities.  This is ultimately the paradox experienced 
with the Muslim community in Sri Lanka and what this thesis is trying to unpack.  
As another interviewee from a focus group said 
 
“To some extent even from the early twentieth century we can see the 
dangers of wanting to use faith as an identity marker.  The ‘Moor’ vs 
‘Muslim’ debate ultimately also began to play out in terms of ideological 
difference amidst social status and political representation.  Regardless of 
this, it was and is clear that a Muslim identity is not homogeneous and was 
certainly not considered an equaliser amongst people.  This is surprising 
because the original intent for Islam was not to provide a divisive identity 
but more to provide a common uniting platform for all identities to find  
common expression and purpose”155 
 
Tensions	
The tensions in the articulation of the Muslim identity as homogeneous as 
protagonists have led to believe is the fact that the Muslim identity was only used 
to described those from Sri Lanka.  In particular the Indian Muslims (like the 
Indian Tamils) were treated with a hostile attitude as an alien people (M. A. 
Nuhman 2007)156, so very much taking to heart the Citizenship Act that was 
enacted just after independence. “The distinction and conflicts between the 
groups were merely a reflection of economic and political interests” (Ibid, 27).  
From the late 19th century onwards, the Indian Muslims were portrayed as 
ruthless exploiters of innocent Sinhalese by the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists 
supported by the emerging low country Sinhala trading class (Ibid) which would 
be the precursor to the 1915 Sinhala – Muslim riots which subsequently also 
deepened divisions between the Muslims and the Tamils on the account of 
Ramanathan’s defence of the Sinhalese.  However, the irony as has been 
discussed above is that in the late nineteenth century, the anti-Indian Muslim 
movement was also tacitly supported by the mercantile class of the Sri Lankan 






Moors as a result of trading rivalry.  This rivalry would play itself out in the 1948 
citizenship debate when Sir Razik Fareed, who emerged as a leading Muslim 
spokesman and politician in the early days after Sri Lankan independence, also 
spoke out against the Indian Muslims by wanting to rid them of their citizenship 
right157.  The question is whether this emerged as part of a colonial divide and 
rule strategy or whether it is a structural / instrumental interpretation of ethno-
nationalism of the Muslim political elites?  In a way it is both as the colonial 
strategy to entrench identities made use of and institutionalised the Muslim 
identity as something that was separate as Ismail (1997) has noted especially 
when it came to the representation on the legislative council. Yet it was also 
instrumentalised by the Muslim political elites of the day as is discussed below 
 
Generally unlike the Tamils, the post-independent “political attitudes and 
behaviour of the Muslim community provided a strong contrast to those of the 
Tamils” (De Silva 1998, 259).  Whilst the Tamils leaders had emphasised a 
distinct and separate identity of their community, which backed by a solid 
territorial and demographic base in the north, referred to regional autonomy 
based on an ethnic identity, the Muslims generally opted for a more 
accommodating stance towards Sinhala nationalism, supporting them (especially 
on some critical issues), in exchange for  socio economic concessions and 
privileges, to maintain the culture and identity of the community (McGilvray and 
Raheem 2007, De Silva 1998).   McGilvray (1998) explains how Sinhalese 
historians and political scientists approvingly view the Muslims’ cultural 
assimilation into Sinhalese society, and their pragmatic accommodationist 
politics, as the mark of a ’good’ minority, implicitly contrasting them with the 
troublesome and uncooperative Tamils.  “There is also the crucially important fact 
that the island’s Muslims never faced the prospect, much less threat, of 
assimilationist policies.  All governments respected the ethnic identity of the 
Muslims and have, in fact, helped to protect and foster this” (De Silva 1998, 259). 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that these pragmatic coalition politics were in 
fact being led by a majority of south-western urban Muslim political elites who 
were close in their relationship to the Sinhalese politicians and removed from the 
realities on the ground especially the interconnectedness of Muslim-Tamil 
political interactions primarily in the north and east of the country. It is these south 
western urban elites that not only downplayed Muslim grievances but supported 
general policies that favoured the business community often at the detriment of 
many in the north and east who were farmers and fishermen and thus felt under 
represented by the mercantile leadership. 
 
Thus with the rise of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism in the 1950s, there 
emerged a real dichotomy for Muslim politicians who were divided on how to 
respond, often being influenced from the region that they represented.  For 




example, Sir Razeek Fareed advocated158 the ‘Sinhala Only’ national language 
policy of 1956 in opposition to discrimination and “political genocide of the Moors 
under the Tamil yoke” (Mcgilvray 1998, 454). However, as Nuhman (2007, 66) 
points out a “close reading of his speech reveals the detachment of the English 
educated Southern Muslim elite from the Tamil language and long standing rivalry 
between the Muslim and the Tamil elitist groups”.  In fact when he was 
sarcastically accused by a Tamil MP of being a Sinhala defector, Fareed 
rhetorically turned the tables asserting that the Muslim community could never be 
considered Tamil Converts, an apparent reference to the ‘ethnological’ argument 
that had taken place in 1885 (Mcgilvray 1998). Fareed’s speeches consistently 
accused the Tamils of discrimination against the Moors in education and in local 
administrative appointments, as well as apathy and indifference wherever 
Moorish voters were politically underrepresented(Ibid). 
 
The	1956	Language	Act	
There were however Muslim politicians who voted against the Bill but it appears 
that they were mainly from the east (with one exception being from the south), 
thereby displaying the rift between the Southern and Eastern Muslim leaders that 
had been there from pre-Independence and that would largely remain until the 
present times.  Thus the language debate in 1956 points precisely to this sense 
of confusion felt by Muslim politicians in terms of ethnic and language identity. 
There was a theory that Muslims spoke ‘Arabic Tamil159, suggesting it as a distinct 
language different from that spoken by the Tamils (M. A. Nuhman 2007).   Whilst 
the Sri Lankan Muslim Tamil language is recognised as a social dialect and 
different to Tamil, the debates added to the discussion led by politicians on the 
need for Muslims to develop a separate ethnic and linguistic identity.   In fact, one 
Muslim MP is credited with saying the “... decision arrived at by certain individuals 
of Muslim faith in Colombo in regard to the specific question of language causes 
much controversy among us...we the followers of the Muslim faith...have no 
language of our own and that the only language that we talk and know is the 
language called ‘Arabic Tamil’ “(as quoted from the Hansard 11 June 1956 in 
Nuhman 2007, 69). 
 
The situation was further not  helped  in 1956 when  several Muslim MPs  who 
despite being elected on  the Tamil Federal Party tickets, ‘crossed the floor’ to sit 
on the government benches, an act that would  forever condemn Tamil opinion 
to caricature the Muslims as ‘untrustworthy turncoats’ (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011).  
This caricature would be reinforced later by the actions of these politicians as 
they would continue to switch tickets to join whichever Sinhala party was in 
power, thus establishing their positions and privileges allegedly putting 







‘community’ interests ahead of anything else160 (McGilvray and Raheem 2007).    
Many Tamils felt betrayed by what they viewed as the narrow self-interest 
frequently demonstrated by the Muslim community, believing that it should 
support the minority Tamil cause more strongly.  This party political patronage 
and outbidding style of populist electoral politics which characterizes Sri Lankan 
democracy, was further exploited over the next 3 – 4 decades by the major 
Sinhalese dominated nationalist parties placating the Muslim politicians who in 
turn were opting for ‘defensive and pragmatic coalition politics’ (Ibid.)  
 
The subsequent political volatility in the years post 1956 thus ensured that the 
Muslim community were offered opportunities for political bargaining which they 
used to the great advantage of their community and really the opportunity to 
develop and deepen Muslim identity consciousness (M. A. Nuhman 2007).  This 
was also supported by   the government’s desire to maintain strong economic ties 
with the Muslim countries of the Middle East.  For example, after the 1970 
elections, an incoming prime minister Bandaranaike, under pressure from the 
Muslim polity, closed the Israeli mission despite the threat to boycott Sri Lankan 
tea (A. Ali 1984; L. Farook 2009). As an interviewee said 
 
“The events around 1956 in particular are seen as a watershed moment 
for the Muslim community in general.  This is where the Muslim polity really 
came into its own with its strategy of accommodating politics which 
resulted in organising separate social institutions in the public sector 
exclusively for Muslims and legitimizing some of the Muslim interests”161 
 
The Muslim elite succeeded in developing sustained Government institutions to 
look after the maintenance of Mosques and charitable institutions (as discussed 
above), but also through the Government owned media. For example in both 
radio and TV, there were exclusive ‘Muslim’ units dedicated to broadcasting 
weekly Muslim programs which especially during times like Ramadan was and is 
used widely (M. Nuhman 2002).   In particular, two items of institution are of 
interest with regards the Muslim identity expression.  The process of this 
institutionalisation was a way of developing a concrete platform for Muslim 
identity expression. 
4.6.1	Educational	Reforms	
The immediate rewards for the support by the Muslim politicians to the 
government, were a series of educational reforms such as the establishment of 
a separate government Muslim school system for instance.  The reasoning 
behind this was that a separate school system would enable the emergence of a 
Muslim professional middle class that could take up technical and civil service 








positions whilst simultaneously preserving their Muslim identity (M. A. Nuhman 
2007).  
 
This call for educational reforms as well as for more engagement of the Muslim 
community within the educational sphere, had been one of the main concerns of 
the Muslim polity.  These concerns had been there since the late nineteenth 
century largely held by the west  coast urban elite as part of an Islamic revival 
catalysed  by the  British-imposed  exile to Sri Lanka  in 1883  of  the charismatic 
Egyptian revolutionary, Orabi Pasha (Mcgilvray 1998).  The Muslim school 
movement was given special impetus in the period post 1956 with the help of a 
key leader, Badi-ud-din Mahmud, within Bandaranaike’s party, the SLFP, who 
“demonstrated the value of a place in the Cabinet as a political base for a national 
leadership role on the affairs of the Muslim community” (De Silva 1998, 260).  
Mahmud is also credited with being one of the first people who wanted Sinhala 
as the official language in Sri Lanka, speaking about it as early as 1938, saying 
that “if the Muslims learn Sinhala, all the misunderstandings between the Muslims 
and the Sinhalese will disappear and peace and goodwill will flourish.  Muslims 
did not get any benefit by accepting Tamil language; on the contrary it has been 
an obstacle for their progress.  Today or tomorrow, we will definitely get 
independence and Sinhala should be the official language” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 
67).  Yet despite this strong support for Sinhala, it is an irony that the measures 
that Mahmud brought in that promoted Muslim schools were in reality protecting 
the use of Tamil as the main vernacular for the Muslim community.   As an 
interviewee said 
 
“By aiming to uplift the place of Muslims within the educational system and 
redress some of the ‘injustices’ done to the community, Mahmud created 
opportunities for Muslim schools.  This was done so that the Muslim 
community could benefit from better educational opportunities whilst 
preserving their Islamic identity.  However, given that the lived experience 
of language for the Muslim community was and is Tamil, the only way that 
they could benefit from these opportunities for education was that their 
schools would largely be in the Tamil language.  So on one hand you have 
Muslim politicians with a public support for the Language policy and on the 
other hand you allow for schools that teach in the Tamil language.”162 
 
In his quest to rectify what was seen as an “injustice”163 done to the Muslims in 
the field of education, Mahmud established schools in predominantly Muslim 
areas and recruited a large number of Muslims into the teaching profession to 
give the Muslims a larger representation in the teaching profession visi a vis their 
national demographic numbers as opposed to the other communities. “As a 







result, a good number of Muslim men and women joined the teaching profession 
and in turn started contributing a great deal in promoting Muslim education” (L. 
Farook 2009, 42).  Apart from standard academic subjects, the curriculum in the 
Muslim schools included Islam and an optional Arabic language, and eventually 
a distinctive Muslim school uniform164 was   introduced with holidays being given 
for Muslim holidays, such as Eid and Ramadan (Mcgilvray 1998). It represented  
a  unique  political  concession165  to  the  Muslim community  which  “vitiates  the  
principle  of  non-sectarian  state  education  which  has been  the  declared  
policy  of  all governments  since 1960” (De Silva 1997, 33).   
 
As an appointed member of parliament166, Mahmud remains a controversial 
figure.  Whilst being credited for the improvement of the education of the Muslim 
community, his measures were deemed to have contributed to the worsening of 
ethnic tensions not only between the Tamils and Muslims but ironically between 
the Muslims and Sinhalese (Ali 1997, McGilvray and Raheem 2007) as ethnic 
tensions were worsened by restricting direct face-to-face contact between 
students and faculty from different ethnic communities. As an interviewee said 
 
“Without pointing fingers, many critics point to the period of Dr Mahmud as 
the one that really institutionalised the tensions between the communities 
especially between the Tamils and the Muslims in the East of the country.  
As an education minister in the early 1960s, he put forth a policy of 
‘equality of opportunity’.  He did so by taking over schools largely run by 
the Church, reorganising schools and the system of education.  However, 
many also fault him with favouring the Muslim community who at that time 
needed more educational opportunities, but through the establishment of 
separate Muslim schools.  At the time this was seen as favouritism by the 
other communities especially the Tamils who had been affected the most 
with the reforms.  There was also a perception that these schools were 
exclusivist unlike many of the other schools at that time.  In addition, the 
proliferation of Muslim schools during his time has meant that you had 
subsequent generations who grew up isolated from other communities as 
you had a process of self selection with the various communities then 
gravitating to faith / ethnic schools of their own (unlike previously where 
people would have studied together despite the denomination of the 
school).  With the conflict, these tensions became more polarised”167 
 
With the Tamils in particular, despite the schools being in Tamil, it became very 
difficult for Tamil teachers to be employed and so on.  For the Sinhalese they 
couldn’t understand this dual nature and it raised concerns of favoritism. 










Eventually this “led to anti-Muslim sentiments which turned into bloody anti-
Muslim attacks in Gampola in 1975 and Puttalam in 1976, where the worst 
communal violence took place since the Sinhalese-Tamil riots of 1958” (L. Farook 
2009, 45).   
 
It is also important to note that the establishment of the Muslims schools was not 
necessarily done in isolation but as part of a government state system that 
“classified a large proportion of the schools in Sri Lanka on a racial, linguistic and 
religious basis such as Sinhalese, Tamil, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Muslim 
schools and also formulated regulations to discriminate the segregate these 
children from the first day in school” (Ibid, 65) 
 
Mahmud’s second term in cabinet office saw the introduction of a change in 
university admissions policy in the early 1970s from open competition to a form 
of affirmative action, of which the beneficiaries were the Muslim community and 
the rural Sinhalese. This would prove equally decisive and reignite tensions with 
the Tamil community who were adversely affected.168  Thus the 
institutionalisation of education for the Muslim community though giving an 
agency also laid foundations for future community disagreements. 
4.6.2	Personal	law	
Another area of important institutionalisation of Muslim identity was the concept 
of Personal Law, which really led to the concept of permanence in society whilst 
also addressing the core root of Muslim identity vis-à-vis marriage and divorce.  
There was a system of laws developed during the colonial periods which defined 
women’s status and autonomy in the private sphere of the family such as the 
General Law, the Kandyan Law and the Muslim Personal Law.  These laws were 
codified during the colonial times and successive post independence 
governments guaranteed their colonial existence (Kodikara and Zackariya 2014).  
From 1806 to the 1920s, the ‘Mohammaden Code of 1806’ was administered in 
the ordinary civil courts, but after reforms in 1929 and 1951, special courts169 
were given exclusive jurisdiction to handle all matters pertaining to marriage and 
divorce (M. Nuhman 2002).  Once again like in the case of education, it was seen 
that the Muslim community was being given special dispensation.  As an 
interviewee said: 
 
“The original intent of the Sri Lankan Muslim polity with regards personal 
law was about preserving identity and religious practices especially in the 
wake of foreign colonial practices. Yet it became clear that the Muslim 
polity using their strategy of ‘accommodation’ politics would derive special 









dispensation with the establishment of Quazi courts.  With the 
establishment of these courts, the jurisdiction of district courts was 
removed totally.  It was also a significant development in the Sri Lankan 
legal system, since all other indigenous or customary laws were applied in 
the civil courts”170 
 
Under this law, Muslim personal law is ruled on through looking primarily at the 
Quran and the Shari’ah, whilst judgments are carried out by specially appointed 
people to the court who normally have a religious qualification.  The Muslim 
personal law has been seen as controversial not only from outside the community 
(as it is seen as the special dispensation given to the Muslim communities), but 
also within the community (especially by women and a select group of men, who 
see this law as discriminatory).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Muslim personal law at the moment, is seen as being discriminatory 
against women in terms of how it is being currently carried out and the 
dispensations towards women.  It has incorporated some traditional and 
patriarchal elements of culture which are not related to Islam but taken as 
coming from the Muslim community practice.  As a consequence, the 
concepts of the law is very muddy.  Not only are Sri Lankan Muslim women 
subject to personal laws that deny us equality in an integral aspect of our 
lives – marriage and family, but there are also no constitutional guarantees 
and safeguards of our fundamental rights of equality and non-
discrimination in these very aspects.  Thus Muslim women feel that they 
are denied fundamental rights as an individual citizen largely as a result of 
belonging to a faith group. Unfortunately any discussion on possible 
reforms gets caught up in a discussion on a challenge to the fundamentals 
of Muslim identity and their primary existence”171 
 
The origin of the law stems from a code of law on marriage and divorce exported 
from Batavia (present day Indonesia) in 1770 during Dutch rule. Between 1806 
and 1951, this code of law went through a process of codification, review and 
modification, led on each of these occasions by a few prominent legal and 
religious individuals at the time. The present-day Muslim Marriage and Divorce 
Act (MMDA) was enacted in 1951 and embodies substantive provisions found in 
the preceding ordinances and codes, but also includes additional provisions 
based on Islamic legal practices and local customs, such as that of kaikuli (dowry) 
followed by Sri Lankan Muslims at the time (Hamin and Issadeen 2016).   
 
As a result of this, there has been a wide call for reform of the laws not only to 
take into account the changing nature of family life, but also to incorporate this 
within a better understood concept of theory of Islamic personal and family law 
especially from other countries, whilst calling for justice and equality.   
 




Sadly, though this has met with little success. In examining these challenges, one 
also understands the challenge of articulating a Muslim identity around cultural 
practices. As an interviewee said 
 
“Currently how gender relations are conducted within the Sri Lankan 
Muslim community display a tension between theory and practice.  On the 
one hand we have what we understand from the Qur’an and Sunnah, 
which constitute the theory on which Islamic theology is based and then 
we have the actual lived experience of Muslims.  There is a difference and 
we see this in Sri Lanka as well.  Sri Lanka after all is a South Asia country 
and like many of its neighbours, there is a conversation and reinforcement 
of patriarchal values.  So in Sri Lanka, religion is not the critical factor that 
determines the women’s socio-legal status but ‘tradition and culture’.  This 
has ramifications where lines of culture and traditions are blurred with 
religion”172  
 
Thus women’s subordination is not just within the Muslim community but has 
been part of the various ethno-nationalist projects of Sri Lanka which has served 
to justify and reinforce the subordination of women (F. Zackariya 2014).  In this, 
the gender identity plays a large part and also illustrates the challenge between 
espousing an Islamic identity based on Islamic theological precepts and what 
happens in practice.  Though it is another research, it is clear that the articulation 
of Muslim women identity for equality, really articulates the challenge and push 
for a community identity.  The aspects of education, employment and finally dress 
sense really illustrate the dichotomies and tension of ‘imagining’ oneself as a 
community that is solely based on faith expression whilst also being influenced 
by contextual traditions and cultures, without understanding the delineation 
between the two.  The debate on the Muslim personal law in particular underscore 
this tensions.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The debate around agency for Muslim women in Sri Lanka especially 
manifesting itself in the Personal Law tensions, but also around dress code 
highlights an underlying tension about what is Sri Lankan Muslim identity.  
By working on institutionalisation of items such as the Muslim Marriage 
Law, there has been a dilution of cultural, theological and social.  Thus any 
attempt to even reform some of the institutions to make them more fit for 
purpose and realistic with the times means that there is a feeling that you 
are tampering with Islam.  This has severe repercussions”173  
 
This dilution and reluctance reform the law has been acutely felt over the last few 
decades where Muslim political leaders have held key government portfolios and 
could have facilitated, expedited and accomplished reforms to the MMDA. Yet 
the Muslim politicians have neither demonstrated the interest nor the ambition 
publically to give their support in addressing these concerns thus far.  As an 
interviewee said 




“There was a lot of talk by the Muslim political elite when establishing the 
Muslim Personal Law, yet when it comes to reform, there is silence. 
Whether this is due to the perceived fear of losing the support of the 
religious leaders and voter constituency, or due to a belief that any 
conversation about reforming the MMDA will diminish the value of Muslim 
political identity in Sri Lanka it is clear that there is a real tension”174 
 
The tension between cultural and religious is apparent, when one way to diffuse 
the tension, is for Muslim politicians to pass off the MMDA reforms as a subject 
that the ulama (Islamic religious scholars) would not accept (Hamin and Issadeen 
2016). Likewise, there is no evidence at this time to suggest that politicians have 
adequately engaged with their own constituencies on concerns that have 
emerged regarding the MMDA, or to gauge opinions on reforms. While not 
demonstrating required political accountability on this issue to the women, they 
have also been very vociferous in guarding the communal boundaries. For 
example, when non-Muslim politicians, raise questions about issues involving 
Muslim women in parliament or public forums, these discussions are not 
positively facilitated by Muslim politicians and Muslim media, but rather attacked 
and silenced (Ibid).  
It is these tensions and how it is and has been dealt with post independence that 
defines the state of the Muslim community and its expression of identity currently. 
4.7			Conclusion	
It is clear that going into the independence and post independence era, the 
Muslim polity adopted pragmatic ways of engaging on a political front, whilst 
getting rights and privileges for the community.  However, with the Citizenship 
Act in the post independence era, new constitutions in 1978 and communal 
tensions all within the first 20 years after independence, it was clear that the 
minorities particularly the Muslims were facing a rough ride and one that would 
define their relationship with the Sinhalese. 
 
What is telling in this period is two fold.  One is of the Government’s response to 
the Sinhala uprising in the early seventies is that despite it mirroring the claims of 
Tamil youth (and also later of the Muslim community), the Government moved to 
try and accommodate the concerns of the Sinhala youth without much opposition.  
However with the Tamil youth, it was clear that both political parties could not 
move on suggesting any form of solution for fear of opposition175, and as for the 
Muslim community, it would become apparent that there was absolutely no room 
for negotiation or understanding about the concerns (L. Farook 2009). It is this 
inability to make concrete decisions due to political losses that has plagued Sri 
Lankan politics and ensured that it is in a continuous whirlpool of negative ethnic 





politics.  Had there been any attempt to take a pragmatic stance, the late 
seventies and early eighties could have seen a different result.  However, with 
the Tamils frustrated into taking up arms, it gave the government the excuse that 
it needed to undertake severe measures. 
 
The tensions between the two major communities would spill over to the Muslim 
community and in 1976, clashes erupted between Sinhala and Muslims in a north 
western part of Sri Lanka (International Crisis Group 2007), apparently provoked 
by disputes over jobs and land.  These clashes and subsequent clashes though 
show a hairline fracture in terms of relationships between the two communities 
that becomes communal even if there are personal differences between 
individuals from the two communities.  It is this hairline fracture which as we will 
explore in subsequent chapters that has been exploited by extreme Buddhist-
nationalist factions (often linked to local business or mafia groups), more recently, 
in the post 2009 tensions, causing a weakening of the relations between the two 
communities (Ibid.) “In most cases of violent confrontation, there are clear signs 
of manipulation of local economic grievances by political extremists. However, 
the resurgence of Sinhalese nationalism in the past few years, coupled with a rise 
in Muslim activism, and in some cases, more radical Islamic ideas, suggests that 
tensions may increase in the future” (Ibid, 5). 
 
It is also clear that until very recently, the level of antagonism between the 
Sinhalese and the Muslim community was not as deep rooted and entrenched as 
that between the Muslims and the Tamils.  For example, the Muslim political elite 
ever conscious of the Muslim-Sinhalese relationship and the need to remain as 
a minority with amenable relations with the Sinhalese community have also acted 
accordingly in politics and business (Ibid). 
 
Secondly, unlike the Tamils, in order to maintain this amenable relationship with 
the majority community, Muslim politicians have always opted for a non-
confrontation approach often remain politically quiet and cautious, “reluctant to 
draw attention to discrimination or ethnic tensions in public” (Ibid, 5).  A casing 
point being the 1976 disturbances between Sinhalese and Muslims (where 
Muslims were killed by police) and no single Muslim politician raising the matter 
in parliament.  Whilst this was often not popular amongst the public, this type of 
approach has also helped to resolve certain difficult situations which arose.  Yet, 
this ‘amenable’ approach has led to accusations that the Muslims are guilty of 
playing party politics to gain concessions for their own communities, without any 
sense of the other.   Thus this period covered by this chapter is very much 
deemed the period for the establishment of the cultural identity of the Muslim by 
solidifying its social constructs through institutions such as schools and the 
codification of the Muslim marriage law176. 





However, there began to emerge a contradiction of relationships between the two 
communities exemplified in the political confrontations among the elites but the 
peaceful coexistence between masses of Tamils and Muslims in the north and 
east (Imtiyaz 2009). These moves by the Muslim politicians mainly made up of 
those from the elite communities of Colombo put them very much at odds not 
only with the Tamil community but ironically also with the Muslim community from 
the north and east of the country.  
 
As the repercussions of the State’s ‘Sinhala-only’ act and its Sinhala-oriented 
development policies led to state sponsored colonization of large parts of the 
north and east by Sinhalese, there was increasing sympathy for the Tamils from 
the Muslims (in these parts of the country) who found demographics altered and 
administrative policies biased against them. The new generation of Tamil leaders 
(who were more militant in strategy, uncompromising in attitude and separatist in 
ideology), anxious to overcome the shortcomings of the neglecting the interests 
of the Muslims by the traditional Tamil leadership, sought to exploit this by arguing 
for minorities as a whole in the face of the dangers of Sinhala Buddhist 
chauvinism (A. Ali 1997).  Despite the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 14 May 1976 
that called forth the constitution of Tamil Eelam as a separate state (Ibid.), which 
pushed the majority of  Muslims into opposing a unified North East Province (or 
an ethnic Tamil state) aspired to by Tamil nationalists, there was still an alliance 
with many north east Muslim community leaders (McGilvray and Raheem 2007), 
with a number of  Muslim youth  becoming convinced of Tamil militant ideology 
and joining  the emerging militant organisations such as the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which had begun to gain strength in the late seventies (A. 
Ali 1997).  As Tamils began to become militarily organised in the Seventies, many 
Muslim youth joined them in the struggle for Tamil rights reflecting common 
concerns over land, language and the failure of the Sinhalese community to 
recognise the grievances of minority communities (International Crisis Group 
2007).  “Arguably these young revolutionaries were protesting as much against 
their own leaders’ conciliatory attitudes as against Sinhalese domination. 
Muslims had been affected by various state-sponsored development schemes in 
the east that had resulted in an influx of Sinhalese settlers and the loss of some 
Muslim lands but these issues had not provoked any real protest from their 
national leadership” (Ibid, 5). 
 
The LTTE in particular supported Muslim concerns over land acquisition by 
Sinhalese settlers whilst many Muslims though not content to engage in a violent 
separatist cause, nevertheless had little alternative channel for their disaffection. 
In the early years of the conflict itself, it was reported that refuge was offered by 
the Eastern Muslims to displaced Tamil civilians (and fighters) after skirmishes 
with the security forces (Ameerdeen 2006). 
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As a result of this, at the initial stage of the Tamil uprising in the mid – late 
seventies, there was considerable support from the Muslims of the east.  This 
situation would have continued with the privileged Muslim political elites in the 
west of Sri Lanka and the socio-economically disaffected Muslim farmers in the 
east had not the education reforms privileging the Muslims began to bear fruit 
with a new nascent eastern Muslim intelligentsia anxious for social mobility with 
greater religious awakening brought about for the Muslim community. This new 
Muslim middle-class began to demand for additional practical socio-economic 
concessions (university admissions and job quotas, for example) and were also 
placated with abroad array of Islamic religious and cultural self-esteem 
programmes, some of them funded by rival Sunni and Shia regimes in the Middle 
East, which cost the government nothing but earned it greater allies.  By the end 
of the seventies and early eighties, this religious and cultural self-esteem 
programs would also set in phase a theological and religious renaissance of the 
Muslim community leading to a religious identity at odds with a cultural and 
ultimately expressed national identity.  
 
The debate around the MMDA reforms in particular illustrates these tensions 
around religious identity.  The MMDA has come to be seen as an identity marker 
for the Muslim community despite its problematic provisions and practical 
consequences. Many individuals are ‘indoctrinated’ with this opinion that should 
the MMDA come under serious review and potentially be abolished, Muslims 
would lose this identity marker (Hamin and Issadeen 2016). As a result, certain 
Muslim political, religious leaders, influential individuals and community members 
have a highly protective attitude towards the MMDA. But the reservations 
expressed around the challenge to identity from the potential reform speaks 
loudly to the tensions and challenges within the expression of an identity 
congruent with the context of the country. Yet the expression of Muslim identity 
and the pursuit to maintain and develop that had and has had repercussions on 
inter community relationship[s]. 
 
This would not be helped with the development of an ethnic conflict in the early 









“Some people criticize the Muslims for their political engagement but we 
have to understand that this was not done in a vacuum and was also part 
of a response to the context of that time.  However there was something 
lost in how the Muslims developed their political identity”177 
5.1			Introduction	
This chapter covers probably one of the most challenging periods of Sri Lankan 
history (especially with regards the ethnic conflict) and in itself requires quite a lot 
of detailed research and study.  However, for the purposes of this study, it will 
provide a slightly superficial glance at this time period choosing to largely focus 
on the Muslim community and their role / involvement in this period.  It thus tends 
to gloss over other major incidents of the conflict and doesn’t do justice to the 
nuances of the discussion.  However, for the purposes of this chapter, it is overly 
simplified and is broken down into significant time periods which are of relevance 
to the Muslim community but not necessarily of importance for considering the 
conflict as such. It also remains a crucial part of the Sri Lankan Muslim discourse 
that is constantly evolving into the current time period. 
 
It however starts with a significant incident in 1983 which is one of the critical 
junctures and fault lines not only for the conflict in the country, but also in terms 
of the relationship between Muslims and the rest of the community.  It is from this 
juncture that the rest of the relationship between the Muslims and the other 
communities changed. 
 
The period of the conflict that evolved from this juncture is examined in crucial 
stages in order to understand the dynamics of relationships and politics. 
5.1.1	Years:	1983	-	1990	
The previous chapter discusses in detail the lead up to the early eighties and the 
fractious relationship that existed not only between the Tamils and the Sinhalese 
but also the sowing of the seeds of tensions between the Tamils and the Muslim 
communities. 




After the turbulence of the sixties and seventies, the eighties saw a downturn into 
more violent incidents.   Coming into the eighties, the relations between the 
communities especially the Sinhalese and Tamils was deteriorating.   In 1981, 
following violence after local government elections in Jaffna, the main library (the 
second largest library in Sri Lanka and the main library for Tamil material in the 
country) was burnt down.  Whatever the reasons for the burning down of the 
library, its destruction (mainly perpetrated by rioting Police), was not only 
interpreted by Tamils as a deliberate attack on Tamil learning, culture and history, 
but as justification of the inability for Sinhalese and Tamils to coexist (Nissan and 
Stirrat 1990).  From that time on Tamil activists and organisations led the civilians 
to believe they could not be guaranteed safety by the government of Sri Lanka; 
and the Sinhalese police and army in the Northern Province were seen as enemy 
occupying forces (Feith 2010).  The tensions (and related violence) would spread 
to other parts of the country as well and take a dramatic turn in 1983. 
 
Following the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna178, there was an outburst of retaliatory 
violence in July 1983 against Tamils in the south, made worse by its politicisation 
by the Government of the day.  When the soldiers’ bodies were returned to 
Colombo, anti-Tamil riots erupted. The armed services, the police and thugs from 
the ruling party were all alleged to be involved in attacks against Tamils and Tamil 
property (Nissan and Stirrat 1990).  Violence exploded in Colombo, where Tamil 
businesses and residential areas were set on fire and looted. The riots lasted for 
about a week, and during that time mobs of Sinhalese systematically attacked 
Tamil homes and businesses, looting, destroying and murdering. The mobs had 
electoral rolls that identified the Tamil properties, provided to them by people 
linked to the government, including government ministers (Feith 2010). 
Compared to previous bouts of violence against the Tamils, the pogrom of 1983 
was different in that Tamils from all sections of society were targeted as they were 
perceived threats against the state. “So where there had once been limited 
violence between Sinhala and Sri Lankan Tamils, there came to be generalized 
violence between Sinhala and all Tamils no matter what their origin” (Nissan and 
Stirrat 1990, 38).  As an interviewee from a focus group said: 
 
“1983 represented a watershed era in Sri Lankan politics and community 
relations.  At that time, it was dismissed as a usual inter community riots.  
Its only years later that we are aware of what took place and not only that 
the fact that it`s very murky.  Because just as it is billed as a Sinhala 
government instigated pogrom against the Tamils, there were Muslims 
who either participated or stood by and did nothing thereby being complicit.  
However, there were equally Sinhalese and Muslims who at the risk to 
their own lives sheltered and protected Tamils.  Either way the pogrom in 
hindsight should have sent warning signals to other minorities about what 
could happen to them”179 






As many as two thousand Tamils were killed (with many neighbourhoods being 
destroyed) and nearly 100,000 Tamils in Colombo itself being displaced180 
(Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).  The pogrom succeeded in sending out a message of 
shocking atrocities committed by the majority Sinhalese community and creating 
an outpouring of sympathy for the Tamil civilians who sought asylum in other 
countries and for those militant Tamil groups who opted to take arms for their 
struggle. 
 
The Sri Lankan government unfortunately also mishandled the political situation 
following Black July thereby not only turning “the island’s crisis into a regional and 
international conflict” (Bandarage 2009, 110)181, but helping to push the extreme 
elements of the Tamil communities out of the political process. There was no 
open condemnation from the Sinhalese ruling elite or state institutions neither 
were any meaningful immediate measures taken to prevent the violence against 
the Tamil civilians from spreading to the other parts of the island from Colombo 
(Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).  The then president of the country, J.R. Jayewardene, 
has in fact been put on record as saying “I am not worried about the opinion of 
the Jaffna (Tamil) people now. Now we cannot think of them. Not about their lives 
or of their opinion about us. The more you put pressure in the north, the happier 
the Sinhala people will be here… really, if I starve the Tamils, Sinhala people will 
be happy” (Ibid, 10) 
Start	of	the	Conflict	
The pogrom against the Tamil community legitimized the claims of militant groups 
like the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) that the Sinhalese majority would not be 
accommodating to the rights and privileges of the Tamil community. Thus the 
financial, moral and physical support for the groups increased from the displaced 
Tamil community. The consequence was an escalation of the Tamil secessionists 
struggle in the north and east and a government attempt to maintain the territorial 
integrity of the country. 
 
Close to a million Tamils fled Sri Lanka to the west and the Tamil guerrilla 
response took an organized shape in the LTTE, who received sympathetic votes 
from Tamils affected by the pogrom. The Tamil demand for a separate state, 
rather than for some degree of lesser autonomy became stronger supported by 














the acts of violence carried out by the LTTE in pushing for this cause and as the 
Sri Lankan government responded in kind. The LTTE claim that they are a 
product of the Sinhala violence and chauvinism, and hold the belief that Tamils 
will not win any justice from the Sinhala polity (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008). 
 
At first the LTTE attacked particular military or state targets. Later they broadened 
their attacks to include Sinhala civilians more widely. In 1985, for example, a 
major attack was launched on Anuradhapura, by then the northernmost Sinhala 
stronghold, in which many Sinhala civilians were killed and the central Buddhist 
temple of the city—a temple closely associated with the history of the Sinhala-
Buddhist nation—was attacked.  The attacks on predominantly Sinhalese 
‘civilian’ targets succeeded in the politicization of ethnic distinctions (ibid) and 
creating further polarizations amongst and between the communities, in particular 
the future of relationships between the minorities and the majority would be 
affected. 
 
Though the pogrom was directly against the Tamil community, it also 
consolidated the position of the Muslim community in terms of their representation 
and reaction.  For many Muslims as well, the pogrom served as a cruel forecast 
for what they could be faced with in the future.  Inevitably this is a position from 
which the state would not recover from in terms of perceptions of its relationships 
and attitudes to minorities often by minorities themselves.   As an interviewee 
said 
 
“I remember being in Colombo during the `83 riots.  The people were 
coming house to house looking for Tamils and when they would find them, 
they would take them outside and kill them.  They came to our house and 
I remember my father opening the door.  We were scared.  The people 
came in and then they saw my mother with her head cover and said `You 
are not Tamils.  We will leave you but we know where you live.  Don’t 
worry, we will be coming for you very soon`. That still haunts me today 
especially as we later saw and learnt that there was state complicity in the 
whole affair often with government ministers leading the attacks on the 
Tamils. When I see some of the anti-Muslim rhetoric and what happened 
in 2014182 to the Muslims, again with a similar lacklustre reaction from the 
State, I am reminded of what was said in 1983.  We will be coming for you! 
”183 
 
The net effect was that not only many Tamils but “during the mid-1980s a large 
number of Muslims joined the ranks of the Tamil from Eravur (a town in the East 
of Sri Lanka) to fight the Sri Lanka state” (Imtiyaz 2009).  The joining of the 
Eastern Muslims with the Tamil militant groups despite the Muslim political 
leadership in the South seemingly being supportive of the government and 






mainstream Sinhala political parties, once again shows a sense of disconnect 
between the grassroots Muslim community in the East and the political leadership 
(of elites) based in Colombo.  The latter were not only seen to be ‘untrustworthy’ 
especially in their co-operation with the Sinhala ruling political class but also in 
their complicity and involvement in the pogrom itself (Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011).  
As an interviewee said 
 
“The 1983 riots ennobled Tamil militancy against the Sinhala state but also 
showed a public difference between the Muslims in the east of the country 
and the Muslims in Colombo and the South who represented the political 
elite.  This difference speaks volumes for the disconnect between the two 
constituencies, with the Muslims of the East saying they didn’t feel 
represented by the Muslim political leaders in Colombo. In the wake of this 
gap of leadership and in a spirit of solidarity and also because there was 
sympathy with the Tamils at that time, the Muslims of the East joined the 
Tamil militants.  This caused a lot of concern for the Muslim political 
leaders of the East who could see that Muslims joining the Tamil militancy 
could have severe repercussions for the future and who were frustrated 




This sense of unity in cause felt between the two communities in the east after 
1983, would be short lived as tensions started to rise as a result of the cycle of 
violence (including extortion, robbery, political marginalization and killings) 
created by the Tamil militants harassing the Muslim community for ‘mandatory 
contributions’ to their cause (McGilvray and Raheem 2007).  These tensions were 
consequently seized upon, exploited and aggravated by a deliberate government 
strategy to increase divisions between the two communities thereby preventing 
the formation of a united front (ICG 2007, Imtiyaz and Hoole 2011).  The security 
forces in particular have been implicated in instigating and supporting violent  
confrontations between Muslims and Tamils such as the attack on the (Tamil) 
village of Karaitivu (Eastern Sri Lanka) in April 1985 when  Muslim youths went 
on a rampage killing several people and burning hundreds of houses (ICG 2007), 
which was subsequently followed by another incident in the north west town of 
Mannar where three Muslim worshippers were said to have been gunned down 
by Tamil militants inside a mosque (A. Imtiyaz 2009).  After the incidents in 1985, 
the LTTE appears to have lost its patience with the Muslims (Ali 1997), changing 
their compromising approaches towards them and increasing the number of 
violent attacks on the Muslim communities in the north east and east of the 
country. Some Muslims were subsequently armed by the government for their 
own protection but this provoked the situation as they were also involved in 
vigilante action against neighbouring Tamil villages, inciting more reprisals from 
the LTTE (ICG 2007).   
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With the intensifying territorial struggles, the Muslims were inevitably caught up.  
The Tamil separatists led largely by the LTTE through their focus on the north 
and east of the country, started to lay claim to Muslim-held lands (especially in 
the east), thereby worsening differences and increasing hostilities between the 
Tamils and the Muslims (Bandarage 2009).   
 
In addition, there was an outpouring of sympathy from Tamil Nadu in 
neighbouring India and over the next few years support and training was provided 
to Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups in India by the Tamil Nadu government and 
the intelligence wing of the Indian Government (Feith 2010).  As a result, the 
numbers of Tamil militant groups proliferated and became increasingly severe 
with their response to the pogrom.  At first the groups attacked particular military 
or state targets but they broadened their attacks to include civilians.  Whilst this 
started off with Sinhalese civilians in mainly the western part of the country, by 
the end of the eighties, the attacks had spread to the east and north to include 
the Muslim civilians. 
 
The Indian Government, largely concerned about the spill over effects of the Sri 
Lankan conflict on their shores, tried to unsuccessfully mediate between the 
Tamils and the Sri Lankan government after the 1983 violence until the signing 
of the Indo-Lanka Peace accord in 1987185 and the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Sri Lankan constitution. 
The	‘Indo	Lanka’	Accord		
The ‘Indo-Lanka’ accord was completed after a period of 2 years of negotiations 
between the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil militants mediated by India 
amidst growing violence.  At these series of meetings, the Government had not 
engaged the Muslim community which had important implications for the latter 
(Lewer and Ismail 2011).  In particular, the proposals put forward by the Tamil 
militants which eventually ended up with the Accord proposed for the formation 
of a new administrative Regional Council made up of a merged Northern and 
Eastern Provinces (effectively a proxy ‘Tamil Homeland’ as demanded by the 
Tamil militants) called the 13th Amendment.  This would effectively place the 
Muslim majority areas in the East under Tamil governance which to some meant, 
under the LTTE control.  In the light of this and the growing violence between the 
Muslims and the Tamils in the east, it had become clear to the Muslim politicos 
that the survival of the community could not be guaranteed under an LTTE/Tamil 
administration.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The ‘Indo Lanka’ accord too all intents of purpose was a milestone for the 
country in terms of hardening Sinhala nationalist sentiment as there was 







a fear of a loss of the sovereignty of the country with the intervention of 
India.  For Muslims (especially those from the East of the country), the fact 
that the Muslim politicians had not been consulted in any talks on the 
merger of the north-east province which would affect the Muslims in the 
east showed the weakness of the `accommodation` politics that had been 
in operation especially after independence.  The accord not only showed 
(in the eyes of the Eastern Muslims) the weakness to stand up the 
government but also in some eyes reinforced the idea that the Muslim 
politicians did not really care about what was happening in the east and to 
the Eastern Muslims.  In this context, calls from the Eastern Muslims for 
their own political representation grew louder and became more 
justified”186 
 
The calls for separate political representation for the Eastern Muslims would 
strengthen the formation of Sri Lanka’s first Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC), which imbibed both religious and ethnic language, in 
its attempt to represent the Muslims (see below for for details).  The talk of this 
type of political representation and the concerns expressed by the Muslims about 
the accord brought a different dimension to the conflict.  As Sivathamby 
(1987:193) states, the violence between the communities in the east “highlighted 
an aspect of Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis that had up to then escaped attention”.  In 
other words, hitherto up to now, the conflict had been considered ‘Sinhala-Tamil’ 
(Lewer and Ismail 2011). 
 
With the signing of the Accord in 1987 and despite repeated assurances that 
emphasised that “Muslims were a Tamil speaking group living in the Tamil 
homeland as a separate ethnic group, with their own separate ethnic identity and 
that the Northeast Province was the motherland of Tamils and Muslims alike” 
(Tharmakulasingam 2000, 330), it was clear that the accord did not articulate 
Muslim grievances nor acknowledge them to be separate from the Tamils (Lewer 
and Ismail 2011).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Accord did not really acknowledge and address the violence between 
the Muslim and Tamil communities and as well the violence perpetrated 
against Muslims by the LTTE.  The Muslims’ security concerns and 
perceptions of threats were generally ignored, and this was an issue of 
great concern to the Muslims. The Accord  which also brought about the 
controversial 13th amendment to the constitution that introduced provincial 
councils as a way of sharing power failed to provide sufficient attention to 
the effect on Muslims. Notwithstanding this, the effect of the Accord for the 
first time was also to show the influence of the Muslim politicians present 
in the mainstream political parties”187 
For the 13th Amendment to be confirmed, the Accord called for a referendum.  In 
the context at that time, it was seen that the Tamils were generally for the merger 




and the Sinhalese were against it, thus any referendum (and subsequent 
election) would be lost or won on the basis of the Muslim vote (Haniffa 2011).  
Thus the potential backlash from both the Sinhalese and Tamils over the merger 
vote influenced Muslim political thinking during the next decades.  It was seen 
that Muslims would hold a key bargaining power, yet it also showed that Muslim 
politicians were unable to successfully counter threats to the community from 
within the national parties.  As an interviewee said: 
“Muslim parliamentarians’ response to the accord was far from uniform 
and clearly party-based. It was remarked at that time that Muslim 
politicians ‘only try to persuade the Muslim community towards their party 
point of view and never try persuading their party or their government ... 
towards the Muslim point of view’. The accord and the response remain 
an indication of the need for a different type of Muslim political 
representation, and the SLMC emerged in its aftermath as a successful 
political force. The party won a significant number of seats in the provincial 
council elections of 1988 and then again in the general elections of 1989 
and 1994”188 
The story of the Accord shows that the complexity of politics and security 
concerns within the Sri Lankan context were not reducible to the protagonists with 
arms alone. By 1990, the Indo-Lanka accord would fail and the Indian 
government pulled out of any direct engagement in Sri Lanka.  This would lead 
the Tamils to believe that there were no genuine political discussions on power-
sharing possible emanating from ‘southern’ Sri Lanka (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).   
In addition to this, partly as a result of the accord, the response of the government 
to the Tamil crisis also succeeded in helping to push the extreme elements of the 
Sinhala community as well out of the political process.   The government’s 
response to ban parties such as  the JVP189 (and the TULF), thereby ensured 
that the vacuum of leadership would be filled by armed militants within both the 
communities.   
With the failure of the Accord, the violence that ensued proceeded along the lines 
of mutuality, in the sense that the LTTE violence against the Sinhalese gave 
justifications for the Sri Lankan polity to continue perpetrating state military action 
against the Tamils (Imtiyaz and Stavris 2008).  It also signalled to the Muslim 
community of a need to rethink their previous engagement in terms of an 
accommodation politics within existing government parties and perhaps the need 
to engage more widely and independently. 
 






Hence by the end of the Eighties and leading into Nineties in particular proved to 
be the most violent episodes in Sri Lanka’s young history but also complex in 
terms of political engagement190.  
The	Sinhalese	Insurrection	
It would be remiss not to mention the parallel conflict that took place during this 
period as well.   Though this insurrection were essentially ‘intra-group’ conflicts 
between state actors and a wide range of disgruntled Sinhalese sub-groups 
(Bush 2003) and confined to the ‘Sinhalese-majority’ areas of the island, it is clear 
that there were correlations with the wider community.  As an interviewee said 
 
“Conflicts in Sri Lanka have to be considered as much from the inter-group 
dynamics as with intra-group dynamics.  Both mutually reinforce each 
other.  The Sinhala insurrection was the culmination of how inter-group 
fears of the Sinhalese (namely against the Tamils and later the Muslims) 
were central points of reference in intra-group mobilisation.  Put in other 
words, the Sinhala insurrection was the excessive culmination of how the 
fear of the Tamils could be mobilised to counter apparent policies that were 
not positive towards the Sinhalese.   In this case it was the Indo- Lanka 
agreement of 1987 which was the catalyst as the disgruntled Sinhalese 
(especially unemployed youth) felt that more provisions were being given 
to the Tamils”191 
 
The Sinhala insurrection in the current narrative of conflict in Sri Lanka is not 
really given much headlines, but it still remains the singular threat to state 
authority (Bush 2003).  It also is a period of extreme violence and atrocities which 
the Sinhalese majority state perpetrated on its own communities.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“As much Sinhalese were killed during this time by the State as were killed 
during the 28-year-old conflict with the Tamil Tigers.  Thus the narrative of 
the ethnic conflict has to be tempered with the question of power, inter and 
intra group dimensions.  The key lesson from this episode is really the role 
of the State.  So in one sense, its responses to how it engaged with the 
minorities should be seen in the light of how it engaged with the rural 
Sinhalese.  Both categories were treated badly which illustrates the elite – 
rural class divide and also when it was suitable was co-opted into political 
rhetoric”192 















it is unclear how the Sinhalese insurrections affected the other communities, 
apart from the obvious implications for security due to attacks in Sinhala 
dominated areas. However, what is notable is the lack of rhetoric around this 
conflict that was apparent in the parallel conflict with the Tamils.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“With regards the Sinhala insurrection, there was a deafening silence from 
Muslim politicians and civil society of the day on this.  It was as if since the 
insurrection did not drastically affect the Muslims and their political 
representations, there was a feeling that this was not something to be 
involved in.  Again it points to this real dichotomy of community relations.  
The Sinhalese insurrection was seen as a ‘Sinhalese’ problem and so 
other communities didn't respond.  The Tamils were in any case involved 
in their own conflict.  The Muslims were concerned about what was 
happening in the north and east.  All of this points to the isolation and 
polarisation of the communities”193 
 
So heading into 1990, Sri Lanka in the middle of two conflicts was also on the 
brink of both inter and intra group conflict.  The Sinhala insurrection serves as a 
reminder that mobilising ethno nationalism for an inter ethnic conflict and to 
challenge the ‘other’, if left unchecked and unfulfilled could be disastrous for intra 
ethnic relations, especially when this mobilisation is seen as a way of glossing 
over intra-group conflict.   As an interviewee said 
 
“What we learn from the Sinhalese insurrection is the fact that it was the 
result of frustration from Sinhalese youth who felt unfulfilled following their 
mobilisation on a Sinhalese chauvinistic agenda against the Tamils, from 
the 1956 era.  By implication, a focus on the elimination of chauvinism as 
a means of managing ethnic relations, must consider both its intra-group 
origins, inter-group consequences and the interaction between the two”194 
 
This to some extent can also be seen in the light of the Tamil insurrection which 
itself became as much of an intra-group conflict as it was an inter-group conflict.   
The implications for the Muslim community were and still remain whether this 
would also follow a similar trajectory or how this could be tempered. 
5.1.2	Years:	1990	–	2002	
By 1990, the LTTE had emerged as one of the world’s most ruthless terrorist 
organizations, as they perfected the use of suicide bombers and recruitment of 
child soldiers and through their record for overpowering the Indian Peacekeeping 
Force195, the mass displacement of Muslim’s from the north in 1990196, and the 









assassination of key Sri Lankan political and military leaders, the Sri Lankan 
president, Ranasinghe Premadasa  and  former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Ghandi. 
Attacks	on	Muslims	
The two incidents that would finally damage community relations (between 
Muslims and Tamils) beyond any repair took place in 1990. Capping off a couple 
of months of massacres on the Muslim community in the east (A. Imtiyaz 2009), 
there seemed to be a premeditated counter strike by the LTTE in the north and 
east of the country against the Muslim community. On 3 August 1990 2 mosques 
in Kattankudi, a densely populated Muslim town on the eastern seaboard were 
attacked.  In similar fashion, LTTE gunmen drove up to the mosques, locked the 
doors to prevent escape and began firing into the crowd inside with automatic 
weapons. More than 100 men and boys were killed and remains one of the most 
traumatic incidents of that town (See figures 6-7)197.    
 
 
Figure 6: The bullet holes are still present in the mosque and maintained as a reminder (picture taken by the 
author on a visit to the mosque in March 2006) 
 







Figure 7: The mosque is still used for normal prayers but serves as a reminder of that day (picture taken by 
the author during a visit in March 2006) 
 
The Kattankudi massacre was only the most graphic incident in two months of 
LTTE attacks on Muslims in the East that may have killed as many as 1,000 (ICG 
2007) and was followed by reprisals against the Tamils. “Most Muslims who had 
been part of the LTTE and other groups were expelled or left forthwith. Some 
were beaten or killed by young Muslims outraged by the Tamil militants’ actions” 
(ibid, 27). There is little to ascertain the reason for why this incident took place 
when largely the Muslim community had remained ‘neutral’ in the tensions, but 
some speculate that it was to do with the fact that revenge was taken on the 
Muslim community.  This was after some of the Muslims who had joined the LTTE 
and later deserted were then subsequently executed, which was then exploited 
by the government, who aggravated the situation by introducing ‘Muslim’ home 
guards that were accused of collaborating with the government forces and 
promoting anti-Tamil violence (L. Farook 2009).  The shock on the Muslim 
community was profound with broader ramifications of Muslims fleeing areas of 
predominantly Tamil populations to more secure Muslim towns and villages along 
the eastern coast. Others  abandoned paddy lands they owned in rural Tamil 
areas,  fearing for their safety if they went out to cultivate rice  fields, with figures 
of 63,000 acres being quoted as the land lost due to these events (ibid)198.   As 
an interviewee said 
 
“The incidents of Kathankudi remain a very sore issue between the 
Muslims and Tamils of the East.  In a sense it gave the first ideas that the 
two communities would be incompatible with each other.  However, what 
it also confirmed was what many of the Muslim political leaders from the 




east had been saying that they were not safe living under the Tamils and 
that they needed safety and security for themselves.  In order to get this, 
the political leaders affirmed that they needed separate political 
representation because the government was not providing it and of course 
it was felt that the Muslims in government who were not from the East were 
not sensitive to these predicaments”199 
 
Subsequently, this was followed by the expulsion of the Muslim community from 
Jaffna and towns in the Northern Province despite there being good relations 
between the two communities (A. Imtiyaz 2011). The expulsion of the Muslim 
community from cities in the north is especially shocking not only in its scale but 
also in its nature.  Without any warning in the third week of October 1990, LTTE 
cadres went from village to village in the Northern Province, announcing over 
loudspeakers that Muslims had 48 hours to leave LTTE-held territory with just the 
clothes on their backs (and little money) or face reprisals (A. Imtiyaz 2011).  In 
Jaffna, Muslims were given only two hours to leave and permitted to take just 150 
rupees ($1.40) with them (Ali 1997).  There are of course varying accounts of 
what exactly happened that fateful day, but it has been reported that the displaced 
Muslims left behind as much as 5,000 million rupees ($46 million) worth of 
property and valuables (ICG 2007).  As an interviewee said 
 
“If the massacres in kathankudi was a sign of the potential rift between 
Muslims and Tamils, the exodus from Jaffna and the north pointed to the 
reality that the Tamils fighting for a separate homeland did not consider 
the Muslims as allies.  This single event remains at the heart of the distrust 
between both communities to this day. It signalled that the Muslims were 
not trusted by the Tamils, yet what was even more sad was that there was 
a muted response from the government on these expulsions, which some 
have argued showed that the ‘Sinhalese’ were also not that bothered by 
the expulsions because it wasn't Sinhalese who had been expelled.”200 
 
The irony of this incident is that despite this being the “single most drastic, and 
yet most tragically ‘successful’ act of ethnic cleansing in the Sri Lankan conflict” 
(McGilvray and Raheem 2007, 22), there was very little support (or even outcry) 
from the government forces and international humanitarian agencies.  “A scholar 
claims that: ‘International humanitarian agencies, some of which were working in 
the Northern Province, made no effort to give international pressure to prevent 
the forcible expulsion of the Muslims’” (ICG 2007, 8).  This lack of support 
(subsequently followed by similar stances in later incidents) from international 
agencies (and the government) would strengthen the belief amongst the Muslim 
community and its leadership (Ameerdeen 2006),  that the international 
humanitarian community was solely biased towards the Tamils (and in fact 
supported the LTTE) and that the government  had isolated them and did not 
consider them as real citizens of the country (a fact that would become more 
apparent as Muslim parties sought to establish themselves as another key 




stakeholder within the peace talks that would take place a decade later).  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“If the `Indo Lanka` Accord was a sign that Muslims were not seriously 
thought of within the makeup of the country and serious discussions about 
federalism, the muted reaction to the expulsions for the first time cast 
doubt in the minds of many especially those from the east, that the politics 
of ‘accommodation’ were in fact working.  The calls for separate Muslim 
political representation which had emerged in the mid eighties from the 
east of the country, become louder after 1987, finally had a justification 
and national political support after the expulsions.  1990 perhaps was the 
turning point in which many felt that separate Muslim political 
representation was justified”201 
 
Though the number of those expelled is not known exactly and is disputed, it is 
estimated that about 75,000 people (ICG 2007) were caught up in the process of 
‘ethnic cleansing’. Most of those chased away ended up in refugee camps (with 
makeshift housing) in a town called Puttalam (3 hours drive north from Colombo), 
where they still survive or in the case of the rich business community, in Colombo 
(Ibid.)202  A few did return after the 2002 ceasefire only to find their houses 
destroyed and lands overgrown by the encroaching jungle or their properties 
occupied by Tamils. 
Plight	of	the	Displaced	
Any eventual return of these displaced poses significant problems.  Under Sri 
Lankan law, property owners lose rights to property occupied by others for more 
than ten years, a legal issue that also affects many other displaced people (ibid).  
Rebuilding Muslim villages in areas where they have been abandoned also would 
be very costly and hence some of those expelled have lost hope and have sold 
their land in the north at low prices.  Having worked in this region and with this 
community since 2004, I can also testify from personal experience about the lack 
of interest to move or the high expectation for people to move back into a fully 
developed place without the need to once again inhabit refugee camps. 
 
Successive governments have singularly failed to provide adequate reprieve and 
support for the displaced who find themselves in a political wilderness without 
much of a voice despite having representation in the government.  This itself 
became a trump card for many as an interviewee from a focus group said 
 
“The displaced from Jaffna have always been seen as a political weapon.  
They are wielded out to justify the fact that separate Muslim political 
representation as well as civil society engagement is needed because one 
can’t trust the Tamils or the Sinhalese.  Yet even with this representation, 
nothing has really happened and where there has been some progress for 






resettlement and rebuilding, it has been used by the Muslim political 
leaders only for the benefit of the Muslim community in their electorates 
and to shore up their votes.  Hence you have a perpetual cycle of ethno-
nationalism feeding into this quagmire of conflict and tensions”203 
 
Problems with education, proper shelter and sanitation plague the refugee camps 
and so the displaced people are dependent on menial jobs or hand-outs from 
philanthropists, the government or humanitarian organisations. Studies claim a 
correlation between the rise of poverty in this particular region and the arrival of 
the displaced people, although there is still insufficient evidence to validate this 
completely (Poverty and Conflict (PAC) Programme 2008).  However, it is true 
that unemployment is a massive problem for the majority of them who rely largely 
on seasonal demand for labour such as work in the salterns and various other 
odd jobs (Saleem 2011). There is also a competition for resources in this 
particular part of the country exacerbating a tense situation between the 
displaced and the host community which is also linked to issues of identity  (for 
example, between host community / displaced community, between displaced 
communities and between host communities); ownership and user rights of land; 
issues related to service provision (for example, health); access to livelihood (for 
example undercutting of the wage market) and so on (Poverty and Conflict (PAC) 
Programme 2008). 
Fault	line	between	Tamils	and	Muslims	
There is very little information on the thinking behind the LTTE’s anti-Muslim 
pogroms and expulsions of 1990.  One surmise is that this was the ‘collateral’ 
damage of a brutal war where hundreds of Tamils died at the hands of the security 
forces in the east204.  Yet the sheer brutality of the attacks shows a well planned 
strategy to eradicate Muslims.  This justifies arguments made by mainly Muslim 
Scholars (Ameerdeen 2006 Imtiyaz 2011; Ali, 1997; McGilvray,2008,2007,2011), 
that there was concern from the LTTE leaders that Muslims would act as a fifth 
column against the insurgency in the north and east at best or at worst that the 
Muslims as a substantial Tamil speaking, non-Tamil minority would pose a 
political threat in the north and east.  This latter reason becomes even more 
clearer with the emergence of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC), the first 
Muslim political party, in the late eighties that seriously undermined the LTTE 
campaign for political control whilst also advocating a Muslim autonomous region 
as a result of the Indo-Lanka accord (ICG 2007). It is felt that the emergence of 
the Muslims as a separate political entity was seen by both communities as a 
threat.  “The inference is that the LTTE had to resort to this forcible eviction in the 
view of the new developments that had emerged in ethnic relations in the Eastern 









Province between the Tamils and the Muslims” (Hasbullah 2001, 46),  such as 
the Muslims claiming to be an different ethnic group and the exploitation by the 
Government of this difference.  As an interviewee said 
 
“There are several reasons for the LTTE turning against the Muslims in the 
nineties, but we can’t deny that they were unsettled by the emergence of 
a separate Muslim political party that not only challenged their legitimacy 
but did it from ‘outside the government’ which was a departure from Muslim 
politics.  In doing so, the Muslims were asserting their separate identity.  
What we didn't realise as a community was that this was exactly the same 
reaction being felt on the Sinhalese side that has come to fruition over the 
last few years”205 
 
This presents a paradox, because one can argue that had there been no separate 
Muslim political leadership, the expulsions and the massacres may not have 
occurred but there are those that argue especially from the Muslim community 
that these incidents would have happened and that the separate Muslim political 
identity would keep the focus on them rather than have it diluted.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“The 1990 incidents were of significant concern for the Muslim political 
leaders from the East of the country that there were calls for the 
recognition of right for self protection and the creation of a Muslim unit in 
the Sri Lanka Armed Forces and the arming of Muslim Youth.  In calling 
for this, the message understood by the LTTE was that the Muslims were 
not only a political threat but could be an armed threat: to the Sinhalese 
(and the Government), the message was that Muslims could potentially 
form a new threat especially as there had also been talk of an 
administrative unit following the 1987 Indo Lanka accord; to the Muslims, 
what this meant was that they would have to defend themselves and not 
be dependent on the government.  Unfortunately, the circumstances of 
that time meant that Muslim political leaders from the east had lost 
confidence in the government to protect them and also had lost confidence 
in the important leverage that Muslim politicians in government were 
having.  It is these misconceptions and misunderstandings formed by the 
events of that time that have contributed to some of the challenges being 
faced today”206 
 
Suffice to say though that the 1990 expulsions were and is a significant trauma 
experienced by the Northern Muslims and remains a fault line between the Tamils 
and Muslims, much as how 1983 remains one between the Sinhalese and Tamils.  
Recognising and addressing the problems faced by those expelled in 1990 
beyond just political expediency, would have (and still could) go a long way in 
addressing the concerns of the Muslim community vis-à-vis their relationship with 
the majority community as well as recognition (and eventually compensation) for 




their involvement in the conflict which to date had been assumed to be mainly 
between the Tamils and Sinhalese.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The expulsions of the Muslims from the north and how this has been dealt 
with since then, provides clear evidence of the serious failure of 
representatives to assert forcibly a solution to the case.  In the case of the 
government, there was a failure to really deal adequately with the 
expulsion and also to hold the LTTE to account.  For the Muslim politicians, 
it has been felt that they haven’t really dealt adequately with the issue”207 
 
Intransigence	of	the	Muslim	Polity	
After the incidents of 1990 for the next decade or so, there would be an impasse 
regarding the conflict as both sides would make advances and lose positions 
against each other, yet what was clear was that the Muslim community had 
effectively became caught in the middle, with little chance of their voices being 
heard within the conflict.  For example, as peace talks in the late nineties took 
place, the Muslim community were effectively side-lined to a consultative role at 
best, “with the net effect of minimizing Muslim participation, denying them parity 
of status and marginalizing Muslim constitutional concerns” (McGilvray and 
Raheem 2007).  It thus became clear to the Muslim polity that they would have 
to take measures into their own hands in order to seek representation something 
that had not really happened previously.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Muslims had become invisible.  This was largely due to the 
intransigence of their political representatives to say anything to upset the 
majority government for fear that whatever ‘privileges’ that the Muslim 
community were getting would be removed.  As a consequence, the 
government suffered from ‘ethno-lunacy’ which is a term I developed to 
describe what has happened in Sri Lanka since at least the Seventies if 
not the Fifties.  In the sense that it means that those afflicted by this 
‘disease’ believe in an irrational manner towards other ethnic or religious 
groups, by stereotyping them and apply essentialist primordial 
descriptions.  The Sinhala majority government were guilty of this in 1983 
and not learning from this, chose to maintain this with their treatment of 
the Muslim community during the periods of the conflict (and even in a 
2009 post conflict era).  The Muslim community were effectively side-lined 
during the incidents of 1990, as well as the peace talks in 2002.  The 
impression that was given was that the Muslims especially those in the 
north and east (and at threat from the conflict) were ‘on their own’ and the 
government (and extension the country) was not looking after their 
interest”208 
 
 This insecurity of understanding of where they stood would come to prominence 
during 2002, at talks surrounding the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), despite being 
initially in the government delegation, Muslim politicians sought to bring an 
independent position and a separate delegation to the talks, though eventually 




when the agreement was signed, Muslims were not a signatory as they were 
deemed “not directly involved in the fighting” (ICG 2007, 9). What this displayed 
was effectively the reality on the ground that “neither the government nor the 
LTTE really supported Muslim demands” (Ibid.) and thus preferred to deal with 
them separately.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The CFA period really highlights the extent of the isolation of the Muslims.  
Despite being in the Government delegation for the negotiations, the 
Muslims once again found that like in 1997, certain strategic discussions 
were being held that had implications for the community especially in the 
East, but it was being done without taking the views of the Muslim 
community into consideration.  In other words, the Muslim politicians 
despite being part of the government delegation weren’t taken into 
confidence.  The impression was that should the Muslims wish to have any 
discussions regarding their safety and security, they would have to do this 
bilaterally”209 
 
It could be argued though, that the Government of Sri Lanka viewed the Muslims 
as citizens of the country falling within the remits of democratic norms of the 
country which ensures rights, security and protection for all citizens, and not as a 
separate military entity external to the nation state (McGilvray and Raheem 
2007).  However, it still does not explain the unwillingness by the Government to 
address key issues of concern to the Muslims (especially in the North and East) 
such as security and livelihood during the CFA negotiations.  It is most likely that 
the Government themselves were slightly uncomfortable and unsure about the 
presence and role of the Muslim community in the bigger picture and it shows 
how they were viewing the whole process and relationship with the two main 
minority communities. Of course from the LTTE’s perspectives the Muslims were 
at best “ethnic rivals and potential demographic competitors for territorial control 
of Tamil Eelam” (Ibid.33) and at worst were traitors to their cause after they had 
‘sided with the Government’.   The LTTE would later offer regret and a willingness 
to address the consequences and repercussions of their actions in 1990, without 
making an explicit apology (Ibid.), yet the fundamental issue was that there was 
a distrust of the Muslim community by the LTTE as well as a lack of clarity from 
the government.  As an interviewee said 
 
“2002 represented to the Muslims a reckoning of where they stood in the 
eyes of the government and it is fair to say that it was not very much.  Much 
to the frustration of the Muslims, it was clear that the Government were not 
really that ‘sympathetic’ towards them.  So the Muslims can’t be blamed if 
they felt that they had to fend for themselves.  In time to come, this would 
also mean that the Muslims would turn to an external dimension to ensure 
that their concerns were addressed.  It does though throw into question, 
the validity of the ‘accommodation’ politics employed by the Muslims.  The 
question that was asked at that time and perhaps continues to be asked 
                                                
209			Skype	interview	with	Prof	Ameer	Ali,	March	2016	
 161 
is ‘Why should we go along with the Government if at the crucial moments 
of need for our community, we are not able to leverage that influence?’”210 
 
This is also my contention that in view of what was being done by the Government 
and the LTTE, the position taken during the 2002 CFA negotiations by the Muslim 
politicians in fact betray their lack of confidence in both parties which stems not 
only from the way that they were treated by both parties during the 1990 ethnic 
cleansing in the north, but also by the sense of disillusionment felt by the 
community in terms of where they stood vis-à-vis the other.   As such this reveals 
a much wider cleavage between the communities which also exposes the 
weakness of the strategy of accommodation as well as future relationships. As 
McGilvray and Raheem (2007, 32) state, “Muslim efforts during this period to 
achieve high-level participation reveals the political obstacles and binary ethno 
nationalist thinking that will continue to hamper any future thoughts for 
reconciliation” 211.   
 
In other words, the 2002 experience show for the first time, the fact that the 
accommodation politics employed hitherto by the Muslim politicians was coming 
to the end of its shelf life.  Previously the Muslim politicians had felt that by going 
along with the Sinhalese politicians, they could extract rights and privileges for 
the community, except when it came down to the final crucial elements such as 
the sanctity of the country and the nature of security, the considerations of the 
Muslims were not taken into account.  Thus for the first time, a challenge was 
being experienced whereby the fact that minority politics could not really exert the 
influence that it thought that it could.  Hence my contention is that by 2002, a 
flashpoint paradox had been developed whereby there was an evolution in the 
nature of the relationships between the Muslim politicians and the government.   
 
It was clear that it was no longer given that with Muslim support for the 
government their (i.e. the Muslim) community would no longer benefit from rights 
and privileges.  In other words, despite the Muslim politicians patronising the 
government and supporting them since independence, and to some extent even 
against the Tamils, when it came to key issues and challenges to the Muslim 
community, they were not able to leverage that influence.  Hence the government 
was content to provide certain superficial privileges but would not budget from 
exerting the Sinhalese supremacy on the minorities.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Sinhala supremacy of the government became apparent to the 
Muslim community in 2002.  The Muslim politicians were forced to find 
alternatives when it became evident that valid reasons for the safety and 
security of the community would not be considered.  The political quietism 
of the Muslim political community became redundant and this had / has 
implications for how the community relates itself to the government. 2002 




in itself opened up serious questions of legitimacy for the community’s 
political affiliations”212 
 
Consequently, separate agreements were signed between Muslim politicians and 
the LTTE in 2002 that seemed to allow for Muslim participation in the ceasefire 
agreement talks and though the agreements would address a right of return for 
Muslims to LTTE controlled areas, this was never really followed on and it was 
announced that the “LTTE were unwilling to deliver on their promise” (McGilvray 
and Raheem 2007, 34).  Again these agreements and failure to address the right 
of return show the impotency of the Muslim politicians and also the way that they 
were perceived by the other communities.  This would be seen in the periods 
2002 – 2009.  
 
5.1.3	2002	–	2009	
As already discussed, a realisation of the implications of the CFA in 2002 marked 
another milestone in the evolution of Muslim political thought.  After its signing, it 
is the Muslims who appeared to be the biggest victims and losers of the 
agreement as they became subject to increasing taxes on businesses by the 
LTTE and victims once again of increasing violence as the LTTE attempted to 
consolidate its control in the east (ICG 2007).  Between 2002 and 2004, there 
were a series of incidents of violence reported against Muslims in the east (Ibid.) 
which were largely overlooked by Norwegian facilitators of the CFA and the 
Government anxious to keep the process going. The CFA had failed to 
adequately address the unhealed wounds from the 1990 episodes or be sensitive 
to the deep levels of distrust between the two communities in the East. These 
had repercussions for the relationships moving forward. 
Isolation	of	the	Muslims	
In the words of one commentator, the “CFA turned out to be a disaster for the 
Muslims, especially to the Muslims in the East but no one, including the 
Government, took notice of it.  Despite all assurances on paper, Muslim interests 
were shelved when the CFA was negotiated, finalised and signed” (L. Farook 
2009, 185).   As McGilvray and Raheem (2007, 34) state, “such efforts to keep 
the LTTE on board by catering to their narrowly focused negotiating preferences 
had negative repercussions for the Muslim community” contributing to “a rapid 
crystallisation of Muslim national identity” (ICG 2007, 10), from 2002 – 2004.   
 
The message that was once again being confirmed to the community was that, 
as Muslims, you do not have a stake in the future of the country and so you would 
have to fend for yourself.  As an interviewee said 
 
“In the wake of the CFA, the alternatives for the Muslim community was to 
seek their own path in the peace agreements.  What this meant was that 
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at some point you had a negotiation process whereby the LTTE were 
talking to the Government and the Muslims at the same time”213 
 
An example of this was the creation of a Muslim Peace Secretariat similar to 
those being developed by the Government and the LTTE, which not only got 
involved in negotiations but also “played an active role in developing political 
ideas among community activists and providing much needed infrastructure for 
Muslim approaches to the conflict” (Ibid.).214  Yet the Secretariat has come in for 
much criticism namely because of its failure to move beyond internal fractures 
whilst also failing to really articulate a role in the peace process  (L. Farook 2009).  
In particular, the internal fractures namely led by political party patronage bears 
testimony to the deep lack of cohesiveness and sense of vision for the Muslim 
political leadership.  It shows not only a disconnect between the urban elite of 
Colombo and the rest of the country, but it also shows an evolution of political 
thought to not only institutions for the preservation of identity but towards 
representation. 
 
An additional request that came out by the Muslim community during this time 
and symbolic of the polarisation and institutionalisation was the request by the 
community for the government to recruit Muslims into the police force to protect 
them (Ibid.).  What this indicates is the lack of trust and confidence in the 
government and state apparatus to provide support unless it as institutionalised 
within the Muslim community.  In other words, the trend of asking the government 
to provide alternative and parallel structures for the Muslim rights and privileges 
to be met continued with regards the security forces.  A further suggestion of a 
separate Muslim administration in the Eastern Province was mooted, in the wake 
of any discussion of the LTTE being granted some sort of devolved power within 
the central government amidst a merger of the North and East Province.  This 
suggestion in particular was seen by many within the Sinhalese community (as 
well as the Tamil community) as a ’betrayal’ signalling the Muslim community’s 
intent to ‘separate’ from the country, which at this particular time was highly 
sensitive.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The move by the Muslim community to suggest a ‘separate’ administrative 
unit in the wake of the merger discussions stemming from the Indo-Lanka 
accord and security forces was not received very well by the Sinhala 
government.  It smelt a little like a stealthy approach by the Muslims to ask 
for something that the Tamils were fighting for.  For the Muslims, they had 
resorted to ask for this because of the lack of trust that they had in the 
government and the other communities in terms of their aspirations being 
met”215 
 







This dual track negotiation seems illogical now in hindsight as it calls into question 
the role and place of the Muslim community and pits them as a ‘third force’ within 
the conflict.  It also paints a light on how they were really considered within the 
government.  What it does also show is that the whole argument from the late 
nineteenth century between Ramanathan and Azeez, still existed within the 
echelons of the community where the community wanted to be recognised 
distinctly as opposed to being part of a wider conversation and that the other 
communities implicitly also acceded to that.  A reinforcement of the way Sri 
Lankan nationalist politics had really evolved and been sustained.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“The Muslims were caught in this bind in the sense that there was distrust 
and frustration that the Government would not represent their interests.  
This had been the case in previous times, and the Muslims had resorted 
to asking for their own representations.  However, (and perhaps rightly so), 
the Government and international mediators decided that the conflict was 
between the state and the LTTE and thereby chose to ‘ignore’ the Muslims.  
Of course, in one sense there was a legitimate reason for this, but they 
failed to acknowledge that the conflict had affected all three major 
communities and that a comprehensive  peace can not be achieved 
without taking into consideration, the view points for all stakeholders 
especially the Muslims”216 
 
Of course, an argument can be made that the alternative that was proposed by 
the Muslims was not really an alternative but to perpetrate what had been the 
status quo so far, which is for the Muslims to seek their own representation and 
stance as opposed to the ‘others’.  This is what had been reflected to date with 
examples from the education process where you would seek for own 
representation by developing a parallel structure for the community.   So the 
question that arises is ‘Should the Muslim interests particularly in this context of 
the north and east as a result of the conflict be treated as separately or not?’  As 
an interviewee said 
 
“The Muslim identity politics was always split between those who were in 
Colombo and those outside.  During the conflict era, it became pronounced 
in the differences with the east of the country.  The political and community 
leaders from the East felt that they were not getting the support from 
Colombo especially during the conflict.  As a result, during the signing of 
the CFA, the Muslims from the east were frustrated that their interests 
were not only being overlooked but being marginalised by those in 
Colombo.  Thus internally though the Muslims became split on how to 
respond it was clear that they couldn't rely on the government for their 
protection and safety”217 
 
 Thus this study shows this vicious cycle developing for the Muslim community 
whereby identity representation had created an impression that the community 




had to deal with their own problems whereby they were left outside of any 
discussions thereby forcing them to set up their own channel for communication.  
An alternative would have been to seek an alliance with other political parties 
(and other groups) who also felt that the CFA did not represent them and come 
to some sort of consensus of the willing.  However, fault can not perhaps be 
placed on the Muslim community response during this time as being faced with 
this scenario and the context, it was perhaps the best response that could be 
given.     
Homogeneity	or	Heterogeneity?	
Despite what was discussed above, it was clear that there was a surprise when 
the Muslim response to the CFA was not homogeneous in terms of how the 
politicians responded.  What was not understood at that time and perhaps also 
now is that the Muslim community could not be homogeneous.  Although 
overshadowed by the conflict, the “increase in different groups and sub-groups 
within the Muslim community since the 1950s has resulted in the splintering of 
the Muslim community, whereby Muslims have become their own ‘other’” (Faslan 
and Vanniasinkam 2015, 3)218. There was a difference in how the Muslims in the 
east viewed the CFA vs the Muslims largely in Colombo.  Whilst Muslims in 
Colombo called for a special status in the east and special recognition during the 
CFA discussions, a large portion of community leaders in the east demanded 
equal rights not special rights and were adamant that they could not be governed 
in an administrative unit run by the Tamils (Bush 2003).  However, this nuanced 
discussion seemed to get lost in the discussions within the Muslim community.  
What was observed in Colombo was that despite the SLMC trying to prove its 
credentials as being the ‘sole political representative’ of the Muslims, it was being 
challenged to this219 both internally and externally.  As an interviewee said 
“The CFA brought to light the superficial homogeneity that the Muslim 
community for a large part of the nineties had been under the illusion of 
unity in the face of the Tamil danger.  Yet the CFA showed the opposite.  
It showed that when the chips were down the Muslim politicians could not 
hold onto a unified approach”220 
 
This pretty much sums up the whole challenge of the Muslim community in the 
sense that there is no homogeneous position that can be developed because of 
the various diversities and geographical spread.  As interviewees said 
 
“The 2002 CFA period was symbolic for a variety of reasons but in 
particular for the Muslim community, its political dynamics were finally 
exposed as an Achilles heel.  Whilst this in itself would not have been the 









issue, what it did mean was that it did hamper the overall CFA discussions 
or so it was also made to seem by elements of the Sinhalese press”221 
 
 “The Muslim differences were compounded during this period and 
became very ugly.  Not only were the weaknesses of the Muslim political 
thought exposed but it had negative consequences on the community and 
also some repercussions on the overall process”222 
 
It must also be stated that underlying this factionalism was the desire for power 
resulting in power struggles within the community. On one hand, there was the 
dichotomy of the urban elite versus the (lower) middle class intelligentsia, and on 
the other there was the difference between the urban elite of Colombo versus the 
rest of the country (Faslan and Vanniasinkam 2015). The intra-group conflict and 
the lack of homogeneity within the Muslim community was exposed with the CFA 
and to some extent also exploited. The intra group dimensions had been 
suspended over the inter group conflict but this came to the fore at the crucial 
moment of inter-group discussions.  Like the others, the Muslim community also 
had substantial internal fractures, which in the case of 2002 was expressed within 
a political dimension and not through a conflict to express their grievances223.  
Once again this made it clear that “the dynamics of conflict within groups appears 
to be tied to those between groups” (Bush 2003, 174) as an interviewee said 
“Despite the political fractures which exposed a certain weakness of the 
community, it can also be argued that this political intransigence was able 
to deflect and channel the frustrations of the youth instead of pushing them 
towards violence.  This was the message that was meant to be conveyed 
to the government.  In the context of the Global War on terror in a post 
9/11 environment, the Muslim politicians did do well to contain this threat.  
However, this threat remained and still remains a viability in the face of 
perceived injustice being meted out to the community.  It is also viable 
given the historical trajectory of the country”224 
 
Tsunami	Effects	
In 2005, the Muslim community would feel aggrieved at being at the receiving 
end of perceived ‘biases’ on the part of the Government, the LTTE and the 
international community.   The 2004 Asian tsunami that affected the south and 
east of the country meant that Muslims accounted for about a third of the total 
victims (McGilvray and Raheem 2007).    Once again the cleavages within the 
Muslim community were put on public display as one of the worst hit parts of the 
country, the east of Sri Lanka, remained virtually neglected whilst the south 
(which was also badly hit) got the bulk of the international and government 








focus225.  Having worked in this region during that time, I was able to witness first 
hand how the east was neglected in this initial response to such an extent that 
even many Muslims in Colombo who hailed from the south were fundraising for 
the southern areas that were hit and not the east226.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The 2004 Asian tsunami affected disproportionately the Muslim 
communities in Sri Lanka especially those from the east in terms of sheer 
loss of life and damage to private property.  As the tsunami-recovery 
process shifted from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, 
the Muslims of the Eastern Province became increasingly disgruntled as 
to how they were treated. They found the pace of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction to be too slow, and felt discriminated against in relation to 
the South. In addition, there was anger towards the failure of Muslim 
politicians especially from the east to provide an effective response”227 
 
The incident of the tsunami once again showed that the ‘accommodation’ policies 
pursued by Muslim politicians had its inherent weaknesses.  When it came to 
issues of key significance to the Muslim community, the politicians (especially 
those with the government) were unable to extract sufficient measures to meet 
the needs of the community.  Thus the message was clear that on certain 
privileges, the government was prepared to engage with the community but when 
it came to key strategic issues of importance, the government was not prepared 
to engage.  This really puts into perspective the impotence of the political 
strategies of the Muslims which exposed a gap in leadership for the community.  
In this vacuum, it was clear that there would be others who could step in to fill 
that gap.  This was reiterated by another interviewee who said 
 
“The intransigence of the Muslim MPs from the east showed the general 
lack of influence of the MPs and their inadequate use of leverage within 
the government, especially those serving as cabinet ministers. In addition 
to the inability of Muslim MPs to provide for their constituencies, the 
divisiveness of the Muslim political leadership and its attempts at gaining 
short term political mileage were cited as key obstacles to the development 
of clear direction in dealing with the tsunami disaster such as ensuring vote 
banks were not broken at the expense of not resettling tsunami affected 
people”228 
 
The situation was made worse with the pollicisation of the aid process (Frerks 
and Klem 2011) especially with a structural mechanism proposed for post 
tsunami relief that raised significant political and social implications. For a short 
period of time, the tsunami seemed to have appositive effect on the peace 











process.  Responding to the humanitarian challenges, the Government and the 
LTTE with advice from the international community took immediate measures to 
negotiate an aid-sharing mechanism called the P-TOMS (Post Tsunami 
Operational Managing Structure)229.   However, it became clear that “the tsunami 
produced merely a temporary halt in the dynamics of the re-escalating war” 
(Frerks and Klem 2011, 179), with the response aggravating underlying conflicts 
and strengthening conflict structures.  Although this was signed in early 2005 
promising greater inclusivity, the P-TOMS compounded Muslim fears of a 
Government-LTTE deal that would ignore their political and economic interests 
(ICG 2007), especially as it appeared to overlook the enormous destruction in 
Muslim areas and gave too much control of resources to the LTTE230. This is 
despite it on paper acknowledging the weaknesses of the CFA with regards the 
engagement with the Muslim community.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The P-TOMS was one of the first institutional recognition of Muslims’ 
stakeholder status as it allowed representation at the high level committee 
and regional committees from Muslim political parties.  Yet there was a 
sense of paternalism about this as the representation was decided without 
consulting Muslim political actors and they were refused signatory status.  
Essentially the government and the LTTE were saying to the Muslims—
we will take care of you, there is no necessity for you to be a party to the 
negotiations.  So really in that sense there was no departure from the CFA 
time”231 
 
To the Muslim community, the PTOMs glossed over the fact that they were the 
community most affected by the tsunami and whilst some space was available 
for articulating grievances to the State, the priority from the Government was to 
keep channels of communication with the LTTE open (Haniffa 2011). The 
inclusion of Muslims was a salutary move on the part of the government and was 
recognised as such. However, in its enthusiasm to seem inclusive according to 
prevalent peacebuilding norms, the government lost sight of Muslims’ own ideas 
regarding their participation and representation (Ibid). Unfortunately, the Muslim 
seemed ill-prepared to exploit the occasion productively. They articulated their 
dissatisfaction by stridently insisting that they had been the ‘most affected’ by the 
tsunami and overemphasised the rhetoric of victimisation which did not go down 
well with the other communities.  This was especially so when they once again 
proposed a separate secretariat to help the Muslims recover from the tsunami, to 
mirror the government (and LTTE) established entities (L. Farook 2009).  The 
suggestion once again shows the polarisation of the communities and the lack of 
confidence in government institutions whereby the impulse of the Muslim 
community was to seek a separate institution to meet its needs without trying to 









engage in the existing national entities, thereby illustrating where they feel that 
they were a part of the conversation. 
If anything the PTOMS illustrated the need for Muslims to develop a common 
position (Ibid) that would rise above political agendas.  Yet the reality was that 
there was not only distrust with and from other communities232 but also within the 
community that made it difficult for any clarity on a way forward.  As an 
interviewee said 
“The significant lesson from this was the sounding of a wake up call to the 
Muslim community as to their stance with regards the future peace 
negotiation process.  It was clear that the Government’s priorities would 
be not to jeopardise discussions with the LTTE and thus the concerns of 
Muslims would only be accommodated up to a certain level.  This was of 
utmost urgency that prevailed during 2005 and 2006”233 
From the perspective of the Muslim community there was a need for a concerted 
effort even though Muslim political parties claimed that they have long agitated 
for parity of status.  However what this meant concretely has not been argued in 
any systematic way, something that the government also maintained that the 
Muslims have not developed a clear position on the issue not helped by the 
wounded posturing (Haniffa 2005)234.  This in particular was felt with regards in 
the post CFA era where there were disturbances between the Tamils and the 
Muslims but was not articulated well enough (Ibid.).   In particular, there was the 
fear that the Muslim villages in Mutur and Kinniya close to Trincomalee harbour 
(in the east of Sri Lanka) would be subject to ethnic cleansing in the LTTE bid to 
take over the harbour and its surroundings but was not acted upon.  Sadly, in 
2006, these fears would become a reality and once again the government and 
Muslim leadership and civil society was left unprepared. 
Resurgence	of	the	Conflict	
In 2006 once again the fear that the Muslim community had expressed about 
being on the front lines of the conflict between the Government and the LTTE 
was exposed as the 2002 CFA started to weaken and a return to conflict became 
inevitable.  In April 2006, the LTTE seized control of the water supply to the Mavil 
Aru Anicut, a densely-populated watershed to the south of Muttur, a remote 
coastal town in Sri Lanka’s Eastern province see Figure 8) .  Muttur lies in the 
Trincomalee district, a district characterised by a relatively equal split between 
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims and long associated with inter- communal 
tension. Muttur’s 57,000 population, however, is predominantly Muslim and since 
1984, the town had come under repeated threat or attack from the LTTE, its 









physical isolation exacerbated by a pervasive sense of insecurity235.  In response 
to the taking of the sluice, the government mounted an offensive to take control 
of the gate in late July.  By the 2nd of August, roughly 150 LTTE fighters occupied 
the centre of Muttur. According to ICG (2007), the LTTE occupied Muttur to divert 
Sri Lankan government forces from the Mavil Aru Anicut, to kill pro-government 
armed groups and to relieve pressure on LTTE guerrillas in the area. “The LTTE 
wanted to drive out Muslims from the East as they purged off the Muslims from 
the North to achieve their dream of Tamil Eeelam, exclusively for the Tamils in 
the North and East with Trincomlaee as the dream capital of Prabhakaran” (L. 
Farook 2009, 289)236 
 
 
Figure 8: Map of Muttur and surrounding areas (Clarke 2008)237 
 
After an initial attempt to reoccupy Muttur failed, the Sri Lankan military began to 
shell the town early on 3 August, forcing residents to flee their homes. 
Significantly, it was among faith institutions that people sought sanctuary (Clarke 
2010).  For example, thousands of people converged on the main Islamic 
Colleges and the three mosques within the town. The evacuation of Muttur began 
after morning prayers on Friday, 4 August, hours before the LTTE guerrillas 
began to abandon the town to government special forces, with residents walking 
to Kiliveddi where they were picked up by vehicles mobilised by local muslim 
organizations and taken to camps in Kanthale, at least 60 miles from Muttur 
(WSWS 2006)238. 














Once again it was notable that many international humanitarian organisations 
(and indeed the government239) failed to respond immediately to the crisis with 
many expressing scepticism on the morning of the evacuation that such an 
incident would take place240.  Thus little preparation was made, and it was left to 
the local Muslim community organisations241 and a few international humanitarian 
organisations to respond (Hovey and Saleem 2008).242  When the government 
did eventually respond, it did so by pushing all its Muslim politicians to react, 
thereby turning this into a largely localised ethnic problem as opposed to a 
national humanitarian disaster that it was.  This once again displayed the lack of 
clarity shown by the Government in terms of its dealings with the Muslim 
community.  The Muslim community response (especially from the politicians) 
was not to challenge the government in terms of its dealings but to acquiesce to 
it.   
 
Having been on the field during that time, it was clear to me that this was dealt 
with as a crisis within the Muslim community.  Rather than waiting for the 
government (and the international community) to respond to this humanitarian 
crisis, the Muslim community through civil society and religious leadership 
responded immediately to provide relief whilst also appealing to the Muslim 
political leadership to intervene.  As a consequence the governments response 
was to shift the burden of responsibility to Muslim politicians to respond243.  Like 
in 1990, the evacuation of Muttur also was reminiscent of what had happened in 
Jaffna, and again displayed to the Muslim community, their position in the eyes 
of the LTTE as well as their standing within the government and the international 
community. “Judging from all what had happened, the Muslims concluded that 
the Mavil Aru water crisis was deliberately engineered by the LTTE to drive out 
Muslims from Muttur and Thoppur.  They meticulously planned the ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims in these two areas in a manner which would avoid the 
negative publicity that they had faced when they drove out Muslims from the north 
at gun point” (L. Farook 2009, 311) 
 
















Nevertheless, 2006 signalled the start of what was deemed ‘low-intensity conflict’ 
but the war would escalate over the next three years before coming to an end in 
2009.  As the war started to escalate, those Muslims who had returned to the 
north after the 2002 CFA gradually fled LTTE areas back to the Government 
controlled areas.  In addition, there were signs that there was a process of 
‘Sinhalisation’ in the east through the appointment of numerous government 
officials in the Eastern provincial council; the declaration of certain areas in the 
east as ancient Buddhist and archaeological sites and so on (L. Farook 2009).  
As an interviewee said 
 
“There is no doubt that since independence, through the result of state 
aided colonisation schemes, the demography of certain areas in the east 
were skewed in favour of the Sinhalese.  This has played into the whole 
problem. The failure of successive governments to understand the delicate 
ethnic balance in the east has been its detriment.  This has compounded 




The periods of 2006 – 2009 were the bloodiest as the conflict came to a dramatic 
and sudden end with the capture of and death of LTTE leaders.  Whilst the end 
of the war is still a sensitive and controversial discussion point, the end of the 
conflict opens up doors for future reconciliation with a number of challenges.  Yet 
the subsequent triumphalism of the government-orchestrated victory 
celebrations, the continuation of a militarised approach and the strong resistance 
to any political solution to the grievances of the Tamils (and the Muslims) all 
indicate that an inclusive and just political settlement remains distant (Goodhand 
and Korf 2011). 
 
What is significant is that 2006-2009 showed that the “liberal peace experiment 
failed in Sri Lanka” (Ibid, 13) and this can be seen in the events post 2009.   
Despite the ending of the war in 2009, there was still some fear and security 
concerns expressed among the Muslims, particularly in the east. These concerns 
have emerged due to reports of planned efforts to change demography in Muslim 
majority areas, discrimination and state imposed hurdles in receiving post-
tsunami assistance, state efforts to take lands belonging to Muslims in the names 
of archaeological sites and new conservation areas.  Moreover, the seemingly 
protracted methodology to deal with the plight of the northern Muslims in terms 
of returning to their areas of origin, compensation and the need for restorative 
justice in terms of the injustice and atrocities they faced makes it currently difficult 
for Muslims to actively participate in a comprehensive post conflict reconciliation.   
The fear is that the conflict in Sri Lanka was used by successive governments to 
legitimise power against the minorities. “Sri Lanka’s conflict is essentially a state 
formation conflict, in which the adversaries continue to give priority to war making 
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as the most effective and productive path to state making.  For the Sinhalese 
political class, war is the most useful policy option to re-establish the hegemony 
of the unitary state with minor alterations.” (Uyangoda 2011, 37).  It is in this light 
that the post 2009 scenario is worth exploring in terms of the souring of ethnic 
relations especially with the Muslims as will be discussed in the next chapter.  As 
an interviewee said 
 
“It is the post 2009 scenario that really shows much isolated and polarised 
the Muslim community had become in terms of how they were treated and 
with the rise of Islamophobia.  Post 2009 for me is significant as it shows 
the results of the political accommodation that Muslims had chosen to 
follow”245 
 
A post script is that many Muslim organisations (both international and local) were 
involved in the post conflict rehabilitation and humanitarian response working in 
the camps (Clarke 2010).  This is quite telling especially in some of the northern 
areas and Muslims working with communities they were supposed to be against.  	
5.2			The	Formation	of	the	Sri	Lankan	Muslim	Congress	(SLMC)	
It is clear from what has been discussed, that by the mid Eighties, the Muslim 
community (especially those in the East) were quite apprehensive in terms of the 
future of their security and the sense of threat that they were facing. This period 
of history is also important for yet another transformation of Muslim identity in 
terms of the development of its political identity with the establishment of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC).  The SLMC occupies a unique position not 
only in Sri Lanka246, as  an interviewee said 
 
“The SLMC represented a break from the normal party political patronage 
and really wanted to make a mark in providing an alternative voice for the 
Muslims (especially from the east of Sri Lanka).”247 
 
5.2.1	Growing	Frustration	
As a result of the first two decades of independence of a quietist and 
‘accommodation’ approach to politics characteristic of the Muslim business and 
political elite (mainly from Colombo and the South), a growing frustration from the 
north and East Muslims (ICG 2007) would mean a change in tactics.  This was 
especially so in the late seventies with the changes in constitution which many 
felt would have detrimental effects on the community (Ali 1997).  “From the outset, 
the SLMC attempted to highlight the adverse impact on the Muslim community 
for not having their own political party” (Ameerdeen 2006, 129). As an interviewee 
said 
 






“What we see as the genesis of the SLMC is the political context at that 
time. As a result of changing the constitution in 1978 which had detrimental 
effects for the minorities, it is interesting to see that the Tamils frustrated 
by this started their road into militancy and the Muslims opted for political 
engagement.  Although the political reasoning for the Muslims was also 
based on the Pakistan example.  The ideologues behind the SLMC 
formation, thought that if the Sri Lankan Muslims could unite under one 
political leadership as most sub-continent Muslims did under the Muslim 
League in the sub-continent, then they could rise to greater heights in all 
national fields. By the mid eighties as Tamil – Muslim relations grew worse, 
this added additional imperatives to the formation of this party”248.  
 
This tension between the ‘North/East’ and ‘West/South’ Muslims of Sri Lanka is 
a historical phenomenon as Muslims in the east had lagged behind Southern Co-
religionists in education and representation in government service.   As a 
consequence of this under representation, with the need to ensure amenable 
relations with the Sinhalese community, the southern Muslim political elite often 
remained politically quiet and cautious reluctant to draw attention to 
discrimination or ethnic tensions in public249.  “The Muslim-Sinhalese relationship 
has had a direct impact on political consciousness among southern Muslims. 
Muslims in Sinhalese areas have always had a sense of being very much a 
minority and have acted accordingly in politics and business” (ICG 2007, 5). 
Whilst this also has helped to resolve difficult situations with the majority 
community through negotiation rather than confrontation, a lack of a clear 
strategy and plan for engagement with the majority community has also meant a 
“popular dissatisfaction with community political leaders, who have attempted to 
calm tensions rather than demand redress” (Ibid.) This is one of the challenges 
also currently being faced by community and political leaders currently.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“The genesis of the idea for a separate Muslim political representation 
largely came down to the frustration that was felt that the Muslim political 
representatives at that time who were part of the two main political parties, 
were largely from the south.  To some extent they did not understand the 
concerns of the Muslims form the east (who were in a different context) 
especially during the rise of the Tamil militancy which required a different 
reaction than the acquiescence that had so far been displayed.  So you 
really see that to some extent the concept of a homogeneous Muslim polity 
was not really possible”250 
 
However, it is this dissatisfaction and a frustration perpetuated by the inaction of 
the southern Muslim polity over concern of land acquisition by Sinhalese settlers 
in the east and a general downplaying of grievances from the north and east 








Muslim community, that along with the standardization policies of education from 
the sixties onwards providing greater educational opportunities, that began to 
produce “a nascent eastern Muslim intelligentsia” (ICG 2007, 5). As an 
interviewee said 
 
“Part of the agenda for the Southern Muslim polity was to increase the 
presence of Muslims in education and through the standardization policies 
of the sixties, they succeeded.  However, what also happened is that we 
had a burgeoning intelligentsia in the east as a result of this from people 
who were traditionally considered to be rural farmers.  This new group 
started to challenge the urban / Colombo elite / intelligentsia as a result of 
this. An irony so to speak”251 
 
5.2.2	Political	Experiments	
Initially this ‘intelligentsia’ found a home (largely as an experiment) within Tamil 
politics and militancy which also built upon the close relationships between the 
communities in terms of cultural and linguistic ties and the interdependency of the 
communities in economic affairs252.  The Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF) 
was established which partnered with the Tamil Federal Party reaching its peak 
in the 1977 elections.   The Tamil militant groups especially the LTTE also overtly 
supported Muslim concerns during this period particularly over land acquisitions 
by Sinhalese settlers, in the hope of getting support for their separatist notions 
(Ibid).  This support would extend into the early eighties and also reciprocated by 
the Muslim community, especially in the support of the LTTE by young Muslims 
entering the cadre force.   
 
Despite this, the “coalition with the Tamils proved to have been short-lived and a 
failure in the long run” (Ameerdeen 2006, 90).  The increasing activities of the 
Tamil militants from the mid-1980s onwards, particularly their attempts at 
extortion from Muslim businesses provoked more serious inter-ethnic tension. 
“This seems to have been accentuated by a deliberate attempt to increase 
divisions between the two communities, as part of a government strategy to 
prevent formation of a united front” (ICG 2007, 24). 
 
M.H M Ashraff, a young lawyer from the East, who had initially been involved with 
MULF and had entered into an active membership of the Federal Party, later had 
differences in terms of candidates to be chosen to a district development council.  
Whilst Ashraff had wanted a Muslim, the Federal Party thought otherwise, leading 
the former to advocate this “as a sign of Muslims being let down by another 
numerically significant minority” (Ibid). Thus, Ashraff and other Muslim leaders 
especially in the East began to see that their interest would not be achieved 








through a violent separatist cause253 and did not believe that the Tamil struggle 
for an independent state was an issue for Muslims” (Johansson 2007, 35).  As 
Johansson (2007,5) states, the current leader of the SLMC has come on record 
saying “one important thing is that the Muslim community has never taken up 
arms in our political struggle and we have always had a moderate model for our 
party and this should be a model for Muslims all over the world”.   
 
Thus drawing inspiration from an ethnically motivated political movement that 
could provide an alternative channel for their disaffection with the mainstream 
political process, the SLMC which started off as a social movement, transformed 
into a political party by 1988 eventually transforming Muslim politics in the 
country.   
 
To some extent, the SLMC evolution exemplifies the trajectory of social 
movement formation that is about a deep revision of the sense and experience 
of spatial belonging and integration.  In this they have to take note of 
transformations both from material conditions but also people’s definitions of 
selfhood and identity. (Hamel, et al. 2001), and this is to some extent how the 
SLMC responded to the context of the time.	
5.2.3	Effects	of	the	Conflict	
With the effects of the intensifying conflict in the north and east of the country 
towards the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties, this would 
provide a justification for the SLMC to advocate for greater and increased security 
for the Muslims of the East which along with the espousal of Muslim grievances 
and refusal to follow the accommodating politics of the community’s traditional 
leaders, gave them a notable following.  “The manner in which the LTTE cadres 
were committing crimes against Muslims was the main driving force for the 
creation of a political party.  When the SLMC raised the slogan of Muslims’ 
security, the community in the North and eastern province” (Ameerdeen 2006, 
108)   As an interviewee said 
 
“As the conflict intensified in the north and east, it was clear to the Muslim 
polity especially those from the east, that their security was compromised.  
The confidence they had in the existing community leadership who were 
part of the mainstream political parties had waned.  The feeling was that 
the security of the Muslims in the east could only be guaranteed if they 
had representation from the east”254 
 
 It is this Eastern drive that would form the basis of the SLMC support thereby 
causing some to accuse it of being “a Muslim party for the east” (Johansson 2007, 
9). To many these accusations were unfounded as the SLMC was seen as 
meeting the specific contextual needs of the community in the east.  Yet to others, 
it was clear that the SLMC was actually a ‘regional’ party based mostly on the 





support of the Muslims from the Eastern Province (Ali 1997).  Ultimately with the 
signing of the Indo-Lanka accord in 1987, the mosque massacres in 1990 and 
the expulsion of Muslims from the north in 1990255, the SLMC’s claim to be 
representing the security interests of the Muslims at a national level were justified 
and there emerged national support.   Ashraff had been vindicated in his fears 
and through his rhetoric had really emerged as a genuine alternative Muslim 
politician. However according to Knoezer (1998), though whilst the SLMC 
organized and amplified the Muslim voice, it still remained largely a Muslim party 
for the east, speaking vociferously on their issues such as education, employment 
and security.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The story of the SLMC is in itself a story of the complexity of the Muslim 
community in Sri Lanka.  It used Islam as a basis to unite the community 
on a homogeneous basis but failed to account for the heterogeneity of the 
community based on geographical location.  This is the crux of the problem 
in Sri Lanka that as much as Muslims are united by Islam, there is a 
contextual difference in them which needs to be understood and accepted.  
This is an irony in itself, because it was formed largely because the feeling 
was that Muslims from the east were being neglected yet after coming into 
prominence it tried to speak for everyone which was impossible.  Muslims 
are as much heterogeneous as they are homogeneous”256 
 
What is interesting and unique about the space occupied by the SLMC is the fact 
that unlike the Tamil parties, despite taking a clear stance in their ethnic agenda, 
the party did not distance itself from the major Sinhalese parties. Like other 
Muslim politicians, the SLMC instead chose to collaborate with the major parties 
and over the last twenty years has succeeded in being part of the government in 
power whatever the party with some influence as well.   In hindsight, the 
emergence of the SLMC has been perceived as an attempt by the Muslim 
community to assert their political and ethnic identity, often in a negative sense, 
claimed to be isolationist.  As a respondent from a focus group said 
 
“Previously we as Sinhalese knew that the Muslim politicians belonged to 
the 2 main political parties and chose their battles along party lines whilst 
striving to get some privileges for the community.  The SLMC changed that 
as we suddenly had a political party that was attempting to ‘blackmail’ the 
government of the day into giving into demands of the Muslim community 
or fear losing the majority in government.  As a consequence, it was felt 
that the SLMC were only interested in the affairs of the Muslim community 
and were only in the government for that reason, which means that 
whatever government that was in power, the SLMC were there regardless 
of the effects of the said party in power for the country”257 
 
Whether or not, this was the case, the SLMC challenged and changed the 
conventional leadership shifting the centre of Muslim politics from Colombo and 






the south to the rural east, which lead to a dramatic change in balance for Muslim 
politics (Ameerdeen 2006).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The SLMC put on notice the Muslim politicians from the main stream 
political parties.  For the first time they asserted in the national discourse 
that Muslims were a community as well to be engaged with.  Of course the 
context at the time demanded it”258 
 
5.2.4	Challenges	of	Muslim	‘Nationalism’	
The SLMC in choosing ‘Muslim’ nationalism had another challenge in defining a 
space and role for themselves that kept an ethnic difference, a language bias of 
Tamil, and a religious identity.  “The emergence of the SLMC was initially 
perceived as an attempt by the Muslims to assert their identity” (Ameerdeen 
2006, 129). Hence SLMC is one of the first twentieth century manifestations of 
an ‘Islamist’ party (i.e. using the concept of political Islam as tool to engage in the 
political process) in today’s contemporary discourse.  Yet in contrast to other 
forms of ‘Islamist’ parties (around the world within a majority setting such as 
Turkey or Egypt), the SLMC as a minority party initially developed a dual identity 
of a ‘Muslim nationalism’. In other words, whilst the SLMC used religion to 
articulate their political rhetoric259, they situated their politics within a  nationalist 
discourse and view of the nation-state of Sri Lanka as evident from the  discourse 
of its leaders. “The Muslim party SLMC’s identity is built on nationalism of a non-
Islamic state” (Johansson 2007, 12).  This statement and many others like it show 
that the SLMC did not fight for a new Muslim state within Sri Lanka or necessarily 
had the focus of a Muslim Ummah, but considered it their duty to safeguard the 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.  Despite this, the party also 
became adept at moving from ‘Muslim’ issues to ‘national’ issues whenever it was 
suitable, which became more apparent in the late eighties when the SLMC would 
demand a separate administrative provincial council for the Muslims in the south 
eastern province in response to proposals to set up a Tamil council as part of the 
Indian-Sri Lankan peace negotiations.  This manifestation was mainly as a result 
of the failure of the ‘Indo-Lanka’ accord to address Muslim concerns (Faaiz 2009) 
and was not based on any theological or religious demand for an Islamic 
homeland but something identified as “an outcome of the manifestation of Muslim 
nationalism in Sri Lanka” (Johansson 2007, 11).   
 
In other words, it was evident that the party’s decisions were made on ethnic and 
community lines and not necessarily because faith played a perspective.  Yet to 
many critics, there were many contradictions with how the SLMC used religious 
identity on the one hand to mobilise people whilst approaching political problems 
with a certain level of finesse (Ameerdeen 2006).  This though raised some 
confusion in the minds of many people including the Muslims as well (during that 





time and since then).  Were party decisions made on ethnic and community lines 
or did faith play a perspective in them?  How could one balance faith decisions 
(that by virtue of being Islamic have a transnational link) with ethnic concerns?  
These concerns underpin a lot of the challenges facing the identity question of 
the Muslim community.  “The ethno-political environment of the country facilitated 
its assertion of identity” (Ameerdeen 2006, 134).  As an interviewee said 
 
“For the first time, identity politics took a different turn with the SLMC.  By 
espousing a religious line but also basing a narrative on ethnic lines, the 
lines were blurred for the Muslim community identity.  On the one hand, 
there was the sense that this was a community who thrived and used a 
religious identity, but on the other hand, it also played the ethnic card well.  
To some extent this worked during the times of the conflict but became 
more confusing in eras post conflict”260 
 
 
The ‘Indo-Lanka Accord’ in particular afforded an opportunity for the SLMC to 
seize the moment to ‘unite’ the community and provide some political leadership 
to the Muslims in the wake of what was felt to be a snub. The SLMC raised 
concerns that the accord did not acknowledge the Muslims to be a distinct 
community (as described above) and in fact changed the political power of the 
Muslims in this new ‘merged’ Northeast province.  In essence, “it meant that the 
percentage of Muslim votes had dropped from 33% to an overall of 17% (Lewer 
and Ismail 2011).  Thus the SLMC stance was that subject to a permanent merger 
of the North and East (as advocated by the accord subject to a future 
referendum), a separate Muslim administrative unit within the region should also 
be created based on a perception amongst Muslims that they would be 
discriminated against in terms of resource allocation and employment 
opportunities (Lewer and Ismail 2011).  Effectively the accord and subsequent 
amendment had the effect of pitting the Muslims of the Eastern Province against 
the Tamils with whom they had been coexisting for centuries (Faaiz 2009).  
However, in providing that voice, the SLMC succeeded in channelling the 
frustrations felt by Muslims in the East against the Tamil leadership, into realising 
political aspirations in a more peaceful manner. “It is widely acknowledged that if 
not for a political force such as the SLMC, the Muslims would have naturally been 
drawn to the path of violence and presumably radicalism” (Ibid, 111).  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“The SLMC really emerged out of an idea to channel the frustrations and 
fears that Muslims in the east had about central rule from Colombo.  There 
was this feeling that despite have ‘Muslim’ representation in government, 
those in the east were disadvantaged. So when the LTTE first emerged 
fighting for ‘minority’ rights against the Sinhalese, there were a lot of 
Muslim youth from the north and east who sympathized with them and in 
fact joined them.  The founder and leader of the SLMC, Ashraff wanted to 
provide an alternative for Muslim youth to take to arms and join the LTTE.  
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He talked abut an alternative ‘jihad’ for the Muslims.  The SLMC was seen 
as this channel, because he foresaw that the LTTE were only interested in 




In taking the stance as described above, followed by subsequent electoral 
victories in provincial council elections the following years, the SLMC emerged 
by the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties as “an important actor 
in the competitive electoral politics of Sri Lanka, proving the democratic character, 
vibrancy and resilience of the Muslim community” (Ibid, 112). 
 
By 1990, in the eyes of the LTTE, the SLMC providing an assertive leadership 
role to the Muslim community had also become an ‘obstacle’ and a clear political 
threat to the LTTE domination of the region (ICG 2007).  For the SLMC, its fear 
of the security of Muslims was heighted by the withdrawal of the IPKF thereby 
creating a security vacuum for the Muslims in the east and north of the country.   
These fears would become realised with the subsequent expulsion of the Muslims 
from Jaffna in 1990, Muslims being killed at prayer time in their mosques in the 
east and the confiscation of Muslim agricultural land by the LTTE.  It is this theft 
of land that was and still is a crucial element contributing to the environment of 
mistrust and tension between Muslims and Tamils especially in the east (Lewer 
and Ismail 2011).  As has already been discussed, there is nothing to say what 
prompted the LTTE action in 1990, but needless to say that the stance of the 
SLMC somewhat helped to accelerate the action.   
 
With Muslim ethno-religious nationalism being further aggrieved by these 
expulsions the SLMC managed to convert these grievances to electoral gains (A. 
Imtiyaz 2012).  The general election victories of 1994, 2000, and 2004 and the 
provincial council elections in 1993 proved that the SLMC’s election campaigns 
employing ethno-religious Muslim nationalism coupled with anti-Tamil/Tamil 
Tiger rhetoric over and over again engendered the support of the Muslims. The 
SLMC managed also to bridge the gap between the Northern/Eastern Muslims 
and the traditional southern Muslim polity. The rise of the SLMC brought the 
Muslim factor to the frontline of any permanent solution to the ethnic crisis (Ali 
2004) however this was not necessarily welcomed.  As an interviewee said 
 
“the rise of the SLMC created a major challenge firstly to the national 
Muslim leadership which traditionally came from Colombo and its 
suburban areas and which did not favour the formation of any independent 
political party for the Muslims, let alone the SLMC. Throughout the 
parliamentary history of Sri Lanka, the Muslims were able to steer their 
political destiny quite creditably without the necessity of a political party of 
their own. By dividing their support between the two major national parties, 
the UNP and the SLFP, they were able to avoid the ethnic party politics of 
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the Tamils which, given the inevitable logic of such politics, had driven the 
country to its current state of political tragedy. In the views of the traditional 
Muslim leadership, Ashraf s strategy appeared to be damaging that 
healthy trend.  Yet from Ashraff’s perspective this had not worked 
especially in the case of the Eastern Muslims”262 
	
With this political capital that the SLMC earned from the Muslim voters, it was 
clear that the SLMC was in a position to negotiate with the Southern Sinhalese 
polity to secure jobs and other non-territorial concessions for Muslims (A. Imtiyaz 
2012).  It had emerged as a political force using its parliamentary seats to form 
alliances that lent it political influence beyond its limited vote base.  For instance, 
whilst the parliament during 1989-1992 was dominated by the UNP with a 
majority of over 50% the SLMC and its leader Ashraff supported the UNP and 
Ashraff received the Portfolio of Minister of Port development, Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction (Johansson 2007).  In spite of the changes introduced by the 
1978 constitution to reduce the political clout of the minorities, Muslim support 
became crucial when the SLFP won the general elections of 1993 but with a 
slender majority. Without the support of the SLMC the coalition government under 
the leadership of Chandrika Kumaranatunga could not have emerged (Ali 2004) 
and it would not enter the government thereby further increasing Muslim 
opportunities in public service.  As an interviewee said 
 
“In return for his support in 1993/1994, Ashraf was appointed as the 
Minister of Shipping and Rehabilitation Affairs by the new government. 
This appointment in- creased the number of Muslim ministers in the 
cabinet to three; the other two being members of the SLFP. This was 
something which the Sinhala Buddhist supporters of the SLFP could not 
digest. To them, although the emergence of the SLMC was a welcoming 
factor in the fight against the Tamils, the position of Ashraf, as a minister 
in the present government in addition to two other Muslim ministers and 
Ashraff’s flamboyant braggadocio that it was he and his party which were 
responsible for the formation of this government, was totally 
intolerable263.”264 
 
Ashraff would hold many different significant portfolios under different 
governments along with his party colleagues (who also got government and 
diplomatic appointments) till his untimely death in 2000.  With his death, his 
dream of unity was shattered with personal feuds and political infighting which 
led to several Muslim leaders breaking away from the SLMC and forming their 
own small Muslim political parties.  This was also exploited by the nationalist 
government who offered carrots to various Muslim representations resulting in 









the general weakening of the bargaining power (Ameerdeen 2006).  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“With the death of the founder, the SLMC was exposed to its Achilles heel 
in that it was difficult to articulate a clear political strategy for the Muslim 
community due to its heterogeneity. The Eastern Muslims had clearly 
different challenges and aspirations than those from the South.  The SLMC 
was relevant to the population landscape of the Eastern Province but in 
the other provinces where each Muslim politician has his own bailiwick, a 
centralized Muslim political party is bound to be fragile. It begs the question 
as to whether there can be a whole strategy for the community or whether 
something else is needed? This nuance was somewhat lost on those who 
took on the mantle of leadership from Ashraff and this led to the infighting 
that we see now.”265 
 
5.2.6	New	Leadership	&	New	Challenges	
The new leadership, led by Mr Rauf Hakeem, severely weakened of its bargaining 
power, though decided to follow in the footsteps of the late Mr Ashraff in terms of 
cohabiting with the Sinhalese polity and its leading political parties yet 
increasingly found itself at odds with a changing context.  The changing context 
is indicative of the fact that the Muslim politicians were increasingly becoming 
considered irrelevant as per their demands for the community. This became 
apparent during the 2002 and also during the tsunami response, but it would 
become more clear in the post conflict experience.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The SLMC effectively did what Muslim politicians had done in the past but 
with a difference.  In response to getting privileges for the community, they 
negotiated based on the concept of a ‘block vote’ of the Muslim community 
for the party in power.  However, it was clear a lot of this also had to do 
with the leadership of the time and after the death of its founder, the SLMC 
were unable to garner the same support from the community as well as 
from the mainstream polity.  This was evident not only from the post 2002 
experiences, but also from how the community responded after the death 
of its founder”266 
 
This disunity continues to plague Muslim politics and in fact is symbolic of the 
challenge facing the community in terms of articulating a political identity. The 
divisions within the Muslim political elite were due partly to personalities but also 
to the lack of an overall political strategy.  As a result of the heterogeneous nature 
of the community with competing priorities, and a difference between the 
‘southern’, ‘northern’ and ‘eastern’ Muslims, there were no cohesive policies on 
the whole with regards the community. Consequently, the main political parties 
between them have succeeded in dividing the Muslim politicians based on 
personal motivations as opposed to community interests (ICG 2007).  “The 
Muslim political elite’s inability to make the right choices and policies to win 




Muslim interests largely frustrated the eastern Muslims” (A. Imtiyaz 2012, 57), 
with the SLMC in particular being accused of being “preoccupied with the 
leadership problem” (Ibid). 
 
A real test how much ‘clout’ the SLMC would have with the Sinhalese polity would 
be around the signing of the CFA in 2002.  Whilst this milestone within the history 
of the conflict should have proved an ideal opportunity to test the solidity of the 
relationship between the Muslim and Sinhalese polity and prove the value of the 
Muslim community to the nation, as discussed in previous sections, it turned out 
to be otherwise.  The CFA agreement showed the Muslim polity that if they 
wanted security for the Muslims in the north and east, they would have to do it 
themselves.  This is what happened with the signing of the memorandum of 
understanding being signed in 2002 by Rauf Hakeem (leader of the SLMC) and 
Pirabakaran (leader of the LTTE).  Despite this as discussed above, violence 
against the Muslims increased after the CFA.  Muslims would be further ignored 
during the discussions of the establishment of the Post-Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure (P-TOMS).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The emergence of the SLMC created problems during the CFA.  Its 
stance and positions were not understood by both sides and thus an 
impasse was created.  This lack of clarity very much haunts it today as 
well”267 
 
As the conflict restarted under a new president following the abrogation of the 
CFA in 2006, namely the Muttur conflict as discussed above, it was clear that the 
Muslims had lost the edge that their polity had once held. “The Muslim leaders 
were impotent witnesses to the devastation that followed and the displacement 
of the Muslims of Muttur and the deaths of many” (Ibid, 57). Moreover, the Muslim 
leaders of the east and those of the south found themselves completely ignored 
in matters relating to the military offensives against the Tamils268. By the end of 
the conflict in 2009 and the follow up years, it became clear that the SLMC (and 
other Muslim polity) despite being part of the government were not able to apply 
the leverage on Government. With the subsequent military defeat of the LTTE in 
May 2009, the minorities in general and the Muslims in particular found 
themselves more and more marginalized.  
 
The scenario also brings into question whether the validity of having a separate 
Muslim political party was working as it can (and has been argued by many) that 
the SLMC has lost relevance as a political party. “Without a coherent political 
message, the Muslim political parties risk being regarded as irrelevant” (Lewer 








and Ismail 2011, 130) 
5.2.7	Changing	Priorities	
It is also argued that Ashraff in the final year before his death also realised the 
shelf life of the concept of the SLMC and set about creating a new more inclusive 
political party called the National Unity Alliance (NUA), which was made of more 
main stream and other minority groups.  As an interviewee said 
 
“Ashraff began to realise the fact that the SLMC was a limiting entity as 
regards fulfilling the entirety of the agenda for Muslim rights.  He realised 
that the SLMC should have remained a geographical party in other words 
one focussed on the eastern province Muslims.  His realisation that the 
heterogeneity of the Muslims meant that a wider coalition of actors was 
needed to articulate their rights.  Hence he floated the idea of NUA as 
exactly this coalition for a broader perspective whilst he tried to align the 
SLMC with the eastern province Muslims and their concerns on security 
issues.  To some extent I think he foresaw what would happen if he were 
to leave the SLMC and he wanted to avoid this.  Unfortunately, his death 
meant that this was not fulfilled and in his death he attained a sort of 
martyrdom and those who acquired the leadership of the SLMC capitalised 
on his name and legacy for the preservation.  Who knows what would have 
happened had he lived?  Perhaps Muslim politics would have been 
different as he would have realised that the context for communal politics 
was changing”269 
 
The vision for NUA at that time remained a long term one with the “establishment 
of a new democracy without Opposition” (Salman 2015) with the concept of the 
freedom of the individual, abolition of the Westminster type of adversarial politics, 
constitution of committee system where every Member of Parliament shares 
executive power, accountability of the Head of State and the strengthening of the 
rule of law and the independence of the Judiciary.  It is ironic that fifteen years 
after his untimely death there was a unique situation in Parliament where the 
majority of the Sri Lanka Parliament are members of one coalition of which the 
President Maithripala Sirisena is the Chairman of the biggest constituent party, 
the SLFP.  Yet a section of the SLFP MPs supports President Sirisena and the 
Prime Minister of the UNP from the government ranks and the rest support him 
whilst remaining in the Opposition.   As an interviewee said 
 
“Perhaps this what Ashraff meant where he saw this period of cohabitation 
between the main Sinhala political parties as well as a Tamil national 
opposition leader as a process of reconciliation.  No one would ever know, 
but it was clear that he was keen on this concept of ‘One Sri Lanka’”270 
 
 
This is an irony in the sense that the SLMC was formed on the basis of a dis 
satisfaction that Muslim politicians embedded within the mainstream political 





parties were largely ineffective and hence a separate party was needed.  By 
insisting on the NUA, it was clear that Ashraff realised that the evolution of politics 
meant that the context determined the nature of the politics and that a unified 
approach was needed. 
5.3			The	Evolution	of	the	Political	Thought		
The Sri Lankan conflict has been understood internationally as a two-party affair, 
between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. This logic excludes other 
stakeholders, like the Muslims, who have been affected by the conflict in different 
ways. Efforts to resolve the conflict overlooked or only minimally accommodated 
Muslim interests.  Regardless of the constant threats to their security and their 
perception of conspiracies against them, Muslim ideologues and political leaders 
have never actively proposed armed struggle. Community groups and politicians 
depended on their status as citizens of a putatively ethnically neutral state and 
called on the government to fulfil the community’s security needs.  Yet what we 
have seen in this chapter is that several national milestones associated with this 
security concern impacted the development of the Muslim political community 
and the emergence of a Muslim nationalism in response to a growing Tamil 
dominance. This evolution is synchronised with the emergence of an educated 
middle class, empowered from the sixties and seventies educational reforms 
(Ismail 1997), also supported by a parallel rise in religious understanding and 
practice (O'Sullian 1999).  All of this coinciding with the political and security 
context of the 1980s meant that there emerged demands for Muslim ‘rights’ and 
Muslim ‘development’, promoting the political interests of the community (Lewer 
and Ismail 2011).  In the context of the changed systems of political 
representation and altered security situation in the north and east in the late 
1980s, the emergence of a political party was inevitable. 
 
The Muslim dissatisfaction articulated on a variety of different registers can be 
summed up as stemming from two main grievances (Haniffa 2011). First is the 
consequence for Muslim participation within the conflict and the peace process. 
The manner in which the agreement was entered into, with Muslim members of 
the government and the Muslim Peace Secretariat consulted rather late in the 
process and allowed only very minimal input, with no place in the discussions and 
no possibility of having signatory status, were seen as a betrayal of the Muslims 
by the government.  Their being deprived of any ownership in the process was 
resented. Secondly a mechanism framed as Tsunami relief was seen to pay little 
heed to the losses suffered by the Muslim areas that it sought to address.   The 
Muslims felt that there was little acknowledgement of the loss suffered by them 
as a community and they felt that the memory of their dead and the suffering of 
the living was not sufficiently given credence by this action of the state.  
 
The complexity of politics and security concerns within the Sri Lankan context 
can not be reduced to the protagonists with arms alone and required a wider 
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conversation and this was the discussion around the politicisation of the Muslim 
identity. However, this politicisation has only brought about minimal 
improvements for the Muslim community as a whole, and as the tsunami 
highlighted, there was a political impotence of the Muslim politicians who were 
unable to mobilise support and resources for the post tsunami reconstruction.  As 
an interviewee said 
 
“The inability for any effectual change to be done by the Muslim politicians 
is only partly the fault of the politicians concerned. There is culpability from 
the governments of the day who faced with the prospect of coalition 
governments meant the manipulation of elected officials as well as the 
splintering of smaller political parties such as the SLMC.  This policy of co-
option of minority parties especially in the post conflict period of 2009 had 
the effect of neutralising any influence of the minority parties as well as 
ensuring that minority and concerns are put to the back burner.”271 
 
Thus moving forward, questions are raised around the relationship separately 
between the Tamils and the Muslims, the Muslims and the Sinhalese and also 
between the Muslims and the Sinhalese and Tamils in the context of the national 
politics (Ali 1997).  It is clear that there can be nothing taken for granted with 
regards community engagement and there are many considerations. The North 
and East of Sri Lanka is as much the traditional homeland of the Muslims as of 
the Tamils. The Muslims of this region are an integral part of the Tamil milieu. 
Even outside this region the Muslims play the role of a Tamil missionary in the 
spread of Tamil language and culture. Their contribution in this field is unique and 
massive in many respects (Ibid). For example, if not for the Muslims there may 
not be any Tamil schools in the Sinhalese districts. The Tamil daily Thinakaran is 
almost totally patronized by the Muslims and has the largest Tamil newspaper 
circulation in the country. The Muslim cultural programs in the national 
broadcasting services is an additional vehicle through which Muslims have 
enriched and spread the Tamil language and traditions on a national level. Tamil 
literary conferences, seminars and orations which are conducted in the Sinhalese 
districts are organised and patronised almost totally by the Muslim community. 
The little communication that there exists between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
literary persons in Sri Lanka, is solely through the Muslims. In fact, Tamil culture 
cannot exist in Sri Lanka without the cross-fertilization of the Muslims.  
 
Already, because of the decision made by the Muslim leadership in the fifties to 
support the Sinhalese Language Bill and encourage Muslim children to opt for 
Sinhalese as the medium of education, a generation of Muslims have grown in 
the Sinhalese areas without any ability to understand Tamil. 
 
On the other hand, the Sinhalese can not underestimate the link between the 
Muslim community across the island that has been made stronger through politics 
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but also through the spiritual awakening among the Muslims since the seventies.  
The international implications of outright injustice to even a section of the Muslims 
will be costly to the government, and the presence of hundreds of thousands of 
Sri Lankan Muslims in the Middle East as expatriate employees adds even more 
weight to this argument.  
 
5.4			Conclusion	
The transformation of the institutionalisation of Muslim identity took a new form 
with the concept of a formal Sri Lankan Muslim political identity which took shape 
and was institutionalized in the mid eighties with the development of a Muslim 
political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).  It has been argued that 
the development of the SLMC was inevitable within a country whose politics is 
dominated by communal parties (Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam 1999). 
However, it is hard not to argue against the existential threat that Muslims faced 
with the rise of the conflict in the country which seemed to trump the grievances 
of the politics which had somehow been ‘contained’ through the accommodation 
politics practiced since the country’s independence.  The foundation of the SLMC 
based from the east of the Sri Lanka and away from the traditional Muslim political 
elites (based in Colombo hailing from the south and being part of the main political 
parties) is also illustrative of the divided social formation where political and 
economic considerations were more important for the eastern Muslims than 
simply religious unity (Ismail 1997).  In other words, “the SLMC transformed and 
Islamicised Muslim politics in Sri Lanka…” (Lewer and Ismail 2011, 122), and 
there was the beginning of a Muslim ethno-nationalist political movement with 
national politics impact. 
 
Yet it was clear that the geographical dispersal of Muslims would always make 
any common political position very difficult on top of personality differences and 
party politics aside.  The SLMC’s attempt to be a ‘sole representative’ for its co-
religionists proved in the long run to be untenable.  In particular, after Ashraff’s 
death, the SLMC increasingly were not accepted by all Muslims as their political 
representatives (ICG 2007) and do not necessarily represent their interests.  This 
is also not helped by the age old problem in Sri Lankan politics of party patronage 
which means that there is inadequate democracy in Muslim politics at the lower 
levels. 
 
The constant search by politicians for a reliable vote bank and the willingness of 
many Muslim voters to be directed towards one or another candidate by local 
leaders, businessmen or religious leaders has skewed policies towards winning 
elections rather than achieving inter-ethnic harmony or developing proper public 
services for all.  Unfortunately, even the Tamil community felt this even more 
keenly complaining that Muslim representatives ignored them and were primarily 
interested in their own community (ICG 2007).  
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However, it is clear that this was not just a problem with Muslim politicians, but 
with everyone including the international community.  As for example, the whole 
period of the peace process in Sri Lanka exemplified, Muslim politicians were 
marginal in the 2002 (and subsequent negotiations) and their issues were not 
prioritized by the government. (Lewer and Ismail 2011).   
 
The political institutionalization of the Muslim community in response to this and 
as a result of this and also not helped by the lack of a united political front have 
not only weakened the Muslims’ case for more political negotiation, but also the 
case for representation.  Its institutionalization was altogether weakened by the 
political infighting. 
 
The Muslim community can not receive redress to their grievances by playing 
ethnic politics.  Ethnic based political parties and ethno – nationalisms have 
ruined the peace and prosperity of the country.  There has to be a return to 
inclusive politics and to that they should first build the intellectual and independent 
forces to create that channel. 
 
However, in the absence of any credible Muslim political leadership, the question 
that is posed is what happens when the political influence is lost and who takes 
up the slack? This question is important on the whole because of the new 
pressures facing the Muslim community particualrly after the end of the conflict 
(as the next chapter will explore). It was clear that the influence of the Muslim 
politicians had waned and where they had previously been able to have some 
influence this was no longer the case.  In the gap that emerged in terms of 
leadership, Muslim civil society stepped in, which would later be taken over by 
religious leaders. 
 
Within such a context Muslims need to find a new way of articulating their 
grievances that will not be routinely dismissed. As we have seen and will see, 
greater organisation and commitment from Muslim civil society groups has been 
required to articulate Muslim concerns to the government, concerned 
international actors and local civil society. Articulating the specific effects of the 
problems – political marginalisation, rising hate speech and needed development 
initiatives – remains a challenge for Muslim community groups.   This is 
particularly important mainly because it is important to realise that the Muslim 
community have not only had to face challenges for survivial from the Tamils in 
the North and East, but also in the Sinhala dominated South and West (Nuhman 
2007) 
 
Thus at a moment when both Muslims and Tamils fear the growing Sinhalising 
imperative of the state, it is essential that some collective mobilising for 
addressing community concerns is undertaken.   It is perhaps in this context that 
the idea of the formation of the NUA should be considered.  In fact, as intimated, 
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we can see that there was a thinking that this type of political engagement was 
no longer the way forward for the Muslim community. Lewer and Ismail (2011) 
allude to this when they talk about the next steps for the Muslim community in the 
east.  Elaborating on this, there is perhaps a need for  three pronged approach 
of Muslim political thought: one that is really regional and context specific so for 
example, how in the East the Muslim polity engages with their Tamil counterparts; 
how these regional politics renogitiates a position with the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the central perspective; and a politics that stands for a more 
nationalistic solution.  This is perhaps what the NUA was aiming towards. 
 
Ultimately what the formation of the NUA posits is that fifty years of post 
independent politics could not bring in unity among various communities and the 
country was facing one of the greatest challenges. Inter community relations were 
strained irreparably and one of the causes was the inability of the people to 





“After 2009, we see the true relationship between the Muslim community 
and the ‘others’ coming to a head and it is not that favourable in terms of 
the tensions between all”272 
6.1			Introduction273	
On June 15 2014, the southern town of Aluthgama became a focal point for ethnic 
clashes between Sinhala and Muslims (Tegal 2014).  For a couple of days, 
violence ensued in an eerie comparison to the 1983 pogrom that had taken place 
against the Tamils and referred to in Chapter 5.  Whilst reports as to what sparked 
the violence are sketchy and there is still a debate as to ‘who threw the first 
stone?’, it is clear that the backdrop for the violence had been a greater increase 
of underlying tensions between the Sinhalese and the Muslims especially since 
the end of the conflict in 2009, but that has been there since at least 1915.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“The ‘Muslim’ problem did not arise after 2009.  Since 1915, there have 
been anti Muslim problems (or problems between the Sinhalese and 
Muslims) since 1915 and especially in earnest since 1976, where every 
couple of years there has been a flash of issues.  What has been symbolic 
here has been the inaction of the Government to do anything to quell or 
stop these from happening”274 
 
The question that was asked then and to some extent that is being asked now is 
why should something like this have happened? This question in particular is also 
related to how this violence was/is linked to the evolution of Muslim identity as 
discussed in the previous chapters especially in the backdrop of the infamous 
1915 Sinhala-Muslim riots? These questions are pertinent, given the relationship 
that has existed between the Muslim minority and the majority Sinhala (mainly 
Buddhist) community, any lessons learnt and the state and an apparent 
deterioration of relations between the two communities.  The question is also 
pertinent to address issues of nation building 










The violence in Aluthgama came on the back of a larger coordinated hate 
campaign orchestrated by an extreme Sinhala Buddhist organization called 
Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) against the Muslim community.  It is not entirely clear as 
to what  the origins of the organization are but it is clear that it was behind a 
systemic campaign inciting hatred that came to a head between 2012-2014 
(Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015).  “The BBS unleashed a cancer”275 in terms 
of relationships between the Sinhala and the Muslim communities. The tensions 
emerge in one aspect out of the end of the 28 year old conflict, which extenuated 
fragile cracks between different ethnic groups, along faith lines (Mohamed-
Saleem 2013).  As an interviewee said 
 
“From 1976 to 2002, there have been a series of anti Muslim ructions, 
often of a minor order but sometimes extremely serious.  What has been 
clear has been how they have been depicted.  These make it seen that 
there has been anti Muslim racism for a while”276 
 
Identity was further exacerbated not only by an insecurity of religious affiliation 
but a religious affiliation that is borne from a sense of the ‘other’ who is not only 
someone of a different ethnicity but someone of a different religion. Calhoun 
(2016,66) identifies this as part of a wider problem of the era we are living in at 
the moment, where it is hard “to articulate a shared identity that is strong enough 
to really bind us to each other and at the same time capacious enough to 
recognise differences among us”. 
 
In Sri Lanka, whilst this insecurity of identity has been felt on all sides, it is the 
Sinhala Buddhist, who form the majority of the population, that exhibited the most 
extreme of strains. As Tambiah (1991, 92-93) said “[t]he Sinhalese manifest the 
features of a ‘majority with a minority complex’ that is partly the product of Sri 
Lanka’s miniscule size, both territorially and demographically, and the nature of 
the exchanges with India, especially South India, that have been interpreted in 
certain (tendentious) ways…”.   An interviewee also reflected 
 
“Tambiah’s description of the Sinhalese as a ‘majority with a minority 
complex’ has best been understood in the current context of the post 2009 
era.  During the war, it was assumed that the conflict was what spurred 
this rise of nationalism rhetoric, but with the war ending and a new threat 
being found from the minority Muslims who for all intents and purposes are 
more visible in their identity, it has been clear that the insecurities of the 
Sinhalese go more deep.  Their insecurities with the Muslims now go to 
the transnational link with the rest of the Muslim world that they accuse 






Muslims of having and thus the fear that Sri Lanka will be taken over by 
Muslims”277  
 
This can be seen in the current context with the absence of conflict, they are 
beginning to exert this religious based ethnic identity thereby posing the greatest 
threat to religious freedoms in Sri Lanka (Mohamed-Saleem 2013). In particular, 
the ideological strand of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka has undergone a 
massive change and reinterpretation of its doctrines as a result of the conflict (M. 
Deegalle 2007), becoming more militant, violent and ultimately intolerant towards 
other ethnicities and religions largely led by the clergy (K. Noble 2013).   
 
Post conflict, the concept of ‘Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalism’ has emerged 
as a potent force (Zuhair 2016).  This has manifested itself especially between 
2012-2013 in a rise of violence against religious sites and members of religious 
minorities characterized as ‘chronic’278 and ‘acute’279 violence (Gunatilleke 2015).  
Of the accounted reports, most have been mob attacks on places of worship; 
robberies and vandalism; the killing of clergy; protests against communities and 
the proliferation of hate speech on social media, the internet and via the audio – 
visual media (CPA 2013).  Whilst the majority of cases have been from the 
Christian community280 (mostly against the non-traditional evangelical churches 
accused of forced conversion); Buddhist temples from the non-Theravada sect 
and Hindu places of worship, the more visibly aggressive incidents has been the 
rising anti-Muslim rhetoric and acts of violence such as the high profile case of 
the attack on a mosque in Dambulla in the north east of Sri Lanka in 2012 (BBC 
News 2012) and the attacks in Aluthgama in the south of the Country in 2014, as 
part of coordinated hate campaign by the BBS, targeting the Muslim community 
in particular from a commercial, social and religious perspective (BBC News Asia 
2013a) and specifically targeting attacks on Muslim businesses.  For example, 
on 28th March 2013, Fashion Bug, a popular Muslim owned garment chain store 
was attacked (BBC News Asia 2013b).  Footage shows Buddhist monks leading 
a crowd of people and then throwing stones at the warehouse in Pepiliyana, while 
the police stood by and failed to stop the events from unfolding (ibid). Prior to the 
incident, BBS had circulated a text urging people to boycott Muslim shops and  
another Buddhist political party the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) had issued a 
statement saying: "Sinhalese Buddhists should be determined to teach such 
Muslim extremists a lesson that they will never forget" (Bangkok Post 2013)281.  
In particular the Secretariat For Muslims (SFM)  itself has  recorded 284 incidents 
of threats, attempted attacks, harassment, incitements and provocations directed 











at Muslims in 2013 (Secretariat for Muslims 2013) and continued to do so well 
into 2015 (Secretariat for Muslims 2015) even after there was a  government 
change which brought about a hope that there could be a better respite for the 
Muslims.  As an interviewee said 
 
“In 2015 following the presidential elections, a new government of ‘good 
governance’ was brought in largely with the votes of the Minorities (Tamils 
and Muslims).  The perception especially from the Muslims was that the 
government that had been removed from power were complicit in the anti 
Muslim pogrom that had happened in Aluthgama in 2014.  However, what 
the SFM has showed that even into 2015 these incidents continued which 
points to a deeper structural problem within the government that goes 
beyond party politics.  These deep fractures deserve to be understood and 
addressed as these incidents have continued and will continue to take 
place”282 283 
 
The emergence of such rhetoric and violence has also to be seen in the backdrop 
of what is being seen as the ‘Sinhalisation’ of areas, particularly in the North and 
East that had little or no Sinhala Buddhist population previously with state 
complicity and with the direct involvement or assistance the military (CPA 2013, 
Zuhair 2016).  This state complicity has also paved the way for Sinhala-Buddhist 
groups such as the Bodhu Bala Sena (BBS) to emerge and launch campaigns 
aimed at soliciting a reaction particularly from the Muslim community (Imtiyaz and 
Mohamed-Saleem 2015). As an interviewee said  
 
“the complicity of the state (regardless of the party in power at that time) 
in these incidents whether it is the troubles in the seventies, the 1983 riots 
or the 2014 troubles in the south point to a structural problem in the Sinhala 
– Minority (Muslim) relationships.  In particular, the 2014 disturbances 
really showed that the inter community fractures went deeper than just 
political grievances.  These were exploited by the extremist groups and 
given air by the state”284 
 
6.2.1	The	Rise	of	the	Bodhu	Bala	Sena	(BBS)	
In the discussions of post 2009, it is also important to understand the rise and 
influence of the BBS.  The BBS was launched on 07 May 2012 and its 
membership is made up exclusively of Buddhist monks (J. Fernando 2015). In its 
first national convention, there were five resolutions that were passed related to 
protecting Buddhism in the country whilst strengthening the State in supporting 
this (Haniffa, Amarasuriya, et al. 2014).  As an interviewee from a focus group 
said  
“The initial call of the BBS to the mainstream Buddhist were not 







threatening.  Sri Lanka has been traditionally considered as a land of 
Buddhism and the rulers being obliged to protect the call for Buddhism.  A 
lot of the concerns that the BBS raised re the minorities especially the 
Muslims were ‘valid’ in the sense that these were concerns that many of 
the Sinhalese masses felt.  However there is a difference between how 
these concerns were articulated and then carried out”285 
In addition, there have been those who take issue with the BBS articulation of the 
grievances against Muslims.  As an interviewee said: 
“The BBS raised several concerns about the Muslim community in terms 
of their identity, dress code and so on.  A lot of Sinhalese Buddhist 
moderates appeared to agree with these concerns even though dismissing 
the methodology of how the BBS carried it out.  This is where the 
conundrum lies and also where the issue of challenging the BBS”286 
Though  the BBS resolutions themselves are not threatening, what has been clear 
is that the BBS have marked differences in how they attempt to interpret the 
implementation of the resolutions and how they related their grievances on which 
these resolutions were based, with the other religious communities287.  The 
intentions and angle became very clear by the end of 2012, when the BBS 
‘identified itself as an unofficial police force’288 and in 2013, they raised the claim 
that “Sri Lanka is not a multi-racial or multi-religious country but a ‘Sinhala 
Buddhist’ country and that people should be prepared to ‘rally against Christian 
and Muslim extremist groups operating in the country’” (Colombo Gazette 2013).  
There are of course many from the Sinhala Buddhist majority community who 
were against the BBS with some in fact going as far as speculating that “the main 
force behind the BBS was the Tamil diaspora, mainly because it appeared that 
the BBS were trying to disrupt the unity of the country and thus it was ‘logical’ that  
the main force behind the BBS consisted of those who are not reconciled to the 
unity of Sri Lanka” (I. Hussein 2014b).  Yet it was clear that the BBS threat to 
‘rally’ against minority extremist forces also extended in part to Buddhists who 
attempted to show solidarity with the affected minorities as well.  For example, on  
19th April 2013, BBS disrupted a peaceful candle light vigil which was organized 
by the Facebook group calling themselves ‘Buddhist Questioning Bodu Bala 
Sena’ (Sunday Leader 2013).  “This incident sent a powerful message to many 
Sinhala Buddhists opposed to the acts of the BBS not to ‘interfere’ and really 
created a conundrum for many of the minority communities”289.  This conundrum 
being how do you counter the extremist narrative of the BBS whilst attempting to 
build bridges with the majority Sinhala community.  For the Muslims in particular, 










this became a challenge in determining what was the best course of response.  
As members of the key informant group discussion noted 
 
“The BBS demands posed real problems for how the Muslim community 
should respond. Do you address some of the concerns raised by BBS no 
matter how preposterous they may be knowing that they would never be 
satisfied?  Do you seek to define a response?  What is the appropriate 
level of response?  In any case, the BBS questions really caused a mini 
existential crisis within the Muslim community as it caused them to start 
questioning their own identity”290 
 
Whilst to most commentators, “the BBS represents the worst of the Sinhala 
Buddhist Nationalist expressions based on their social conduct”291, what has 
been interesting to note has been the public support or at least silence from the 
majority community in the wake of such provocations (Saleem 2013). This is 
despite many of the allegations292 argued by the BBS to generate public 
sympathy being unfounded293. Notwithstanding the support from outside Sri 
Lanka294 for BBS, its public success has been attributed to several factors (I. 
Hussein 2014a). First, they were able to be successful because they launched 
effective campaigns across the country where the Sinhalese were not only a 
majority but where there was a small Muslim community living thereby capitalizing 
on existing local problems whether it be economic or social. The BBS also 
received tacit support from the government of that time, namely the defence 
secretary295 which explained  its exceptionally privileged position in breaking the 
law with near total impunity. Third, the BBS was able to win support both from 
local and state media to their campaign as well as capitalize on social media, 
attracting support from outside the country. “For a lot of people who support them, 
they make sense especially in terms of some of the concerns raised”296, largely 
based on Muslim visibility and perceptions about the community.  





















This therefore just adds to the complications of tensions between the 
communities and it is important to explore how these tensions have manifested 
themselves especially if “the perception is that Muslims in Sri Lanka are becoming 
radicalized and causing upheaval in the country”297. 
6.3			Reasons	for	Misperceptions.	
The tensions between the communities manifest themselves largely based on 
perceptions of each other. As part of a series of focus group discussions around 
this topic for some work I was undertaking for my job (which has some relevance 
with this research), with a group of faith leaders, civil society activists and Muslim 
professionals, the perceptions of one community about / from the others were 
examined. In these exercises, participants representing different communities 
(Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and Christians) were requested to form exclusive 
groups of the respective community. Each group was tasked to come up with its 
impressions about the other three communities in this country. They were not to 
discuss religious precepts, and instead, they discussed socio-cultural 
manifestations as practitioners of a religion. Although these perceptions may not 
be factual or they may even differ under different circumstances they represent 
an interesting snapshot into perceptions of other communities at that time.  
 
With regards this particular research, it is interesting to look at the case of the 
perceptions about the Muslim community from the others. Amongst some of the 
main misperceptions about the Muslim community, the issue of Muslims being 
prejudiced of other cultures and intolerant of other religions was brought up298.  
The evidence of this was cited through the apparent lack of social engagement 
between Muslims and other communities especially with regards social 
interaction between males and females; lack of inter faith / ethnic marriages 
between Muslims and other ethnicities/faith and so on.  This lack of social 
engagement was also stated towards the perceptions that Muslims were 
intolerant of other religions and not giving space for the freedom of the choice of 
faith.  Interestingly, through the discussions, the other communities highlighted 
the feeling that they felt that they were barred from establishing businesses or 
doing any form of economic activity or taking residence in Muslim dominated 
areas299.  Politically, it was felt through the discussions that Muslims were ready 
to compromise their political principles.  Examples were stated of how for 
example politicians such as those representing the SLMC had compromised their 
politics and principals by shifting allegiances from government to government in 
order to secure ministerial positions. The Muslim politicians it was felt could not 
be trusted to adhere to policies and principles and were more focused on their 
interests.  The last bit of feedback from the community discussions reflected 
concerns about the public display of religiosity by the Muslims especially with 





regards the concept of halal certification and dress code300.  This resonates with 
other studies that have looked at the negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims. 
“Slaughtering of animals, the way Islam spread, business dealings of Muslim, the 
ways Muslims demand their rights, the rights of the women in Islam, and the 
isolated nature of the Muslim community are some of key issues on which 
Buddhists have negative opinions”. (Razick, Long and Salleh 2015, 65). 
 
What these sets of different community perceptions show about the Muslim 
community is what could happen with a lack of engagement with the ‘other’ 
especially in the wake of conflict which polarises communities.  This is also 
confirmed through studies such as (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015, Razick, 
Long and Salleh 2015 and so on).  As a consequence, misperceptions have been 
formed with regards the Muslim community.  The dichotomy between religious 
and cultural identity and the failure by the Muslim community to delineate 
between religious and cultural practices has meant that there is a real 
misunderstanding about the two in terms of where the lines were drawn vis-à-vis 
both.  For instance, the display of head scarves and halal certification though a 
religious practice emerged as a cultural and social expression for the community 
anxious to delineate it from the ‘other’. The concept of Muslim schools, Muslim 
personal law and even Muslim political parties meant that the political expression 
of the community also meant that the religious and cultural framework were 
viewed with suspicion as it became conflated with the thorny issue of politics.  As 
a consequence, the community has become viewed with suspicion.   
 
In addition, the issue of religious expression, cultural declaration and political 
identity for others perceiving the Muslim community, has become blurred as 
mosques are suspected of not only being used for religious propagations but for 
other purposes as well such as politics, business and so on. A point301 was made 
that most demonstrations begin from the mosques after the mid-day special 
prayer on Fridays giving the impression that the mosques are the dissent-
breeding places for which there is also sanction from the Mosque (religious) 
authorities.   Hence there seemed to be an impression that unlike other 
communities, Islam was a politicised faith that could be used to mobilise 
communities. As an interviewee said 
 
“The existential fears of the Sinhalese Buddhist were realised after the 
conflict especially with regards the visible identity of Muslims.  In particular 
the population growth of the Muslims seems to have ignited a fear that Sri 
Lanka (like many other countries) could lose its Buddhist 
consciousness”302 
 






In 2013/2014 in another piece of work303  the opinions of Muslims were solicited 
with regards the BBS.  As such, a questionnaire related to the growth of BBS was 
distributed living in the North-Western Province (commonly known as Wayamba), 
located in the Matale District, Central province of Sri Lanka, localities in 
Anuradhapura, located in the Anuradhapura District, North Central Province, 
Colombo and Kalutara districts, which are two major districts in Western Province 
of Sri Lanka to Muslims. Two hundred and fifty Muslims who are 23–60 years of 
age from both genders were randomly selected to answer the questionnaire 
which was later also used in a paper that was written on this subject (Imtiyaz and 
Mohamed-Saleem 2015). The findings, from this, though limited can be 
extrapolated to consider the feelings of the Muslim community living in Sri Lanka 
especially those living in areas with the Sinhala communities.   
 
A large portion of the Muslims surveyed (about 72%) drew an economic  link  
associated with the rise of the Sinhala-Buddhist forces and Sinhala-Buddhist 
traders in the areas where Sinhalese are majority, but Muslim traders pose 
serious trade rivalry against the Sinhalese traders (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-
Saleem 2015).  Hence the problem as its roots in an economic dispute over 
territory which has manifested itself within religious and ethnic communal lines304.  
This reason was also attributed to the inability of the government to take any solid 
action305 when there were attacks on Muslim businesses306 as well as the issue 
of the halal certification, which in turn affected consumption, export and trade. 
The inaction of the government to respond to these tensions further weakened 
confidence in the state structures and state law enforcement officials307 especially 
as the focus of the Buddhist nationalists shifted to fundamental markers of Muslim 
identity308 being particularly targeted in the form of attacks on mosques, the Halal 
certification issue (which was also an economic issue) and the challenge on 
women’s clothing. Thus, it became apparent that people felt that their very 
existence was being called into question with state complicity.  Two important 
parts of the survey show that about 75% of the Muslims questioned said that they 
would be the next target in the absence of the LTTE and that 25% of respondents 
strongly believed that there would be a repeat of the 1983 pogrom against the 
Tamils. 
  















Reflecting on my consultations with Buddhist monks309 looking specifically at their 
perspectives on the Muslim community.  Generally, it was felt that there were 
certain elements within the Muslim community that had an extremist ideological 
thinking and there was interest to know how these groups were seen within the 
community as well.  There was also concern raised about the role of external 
forces such as Saudi Arabia with regards these extreme groups but also in 
helping to shift attitudes and ideas in terms of socio cultural practices.  Questions 
were also raised as to how the Muslim community had seemingly evolved from 
an older generation in terms of appearance and practice.  This was not 
necessarily understood by the Buddhist community. The question of politicisation 
of faith was once again raised as there was a misunderstanding between the role 
of the political leaders vis-à-vis community and religious leaders. 
The community discussions have been reinforced by yet another perception 
survey310 done in the wake of the Aluthgama incidents which highlighted some 
interesting aspects vis-à-vis the Muslim community.  Muslims were seen to be 
different as the ‘outsider’ mainly because they did not necessarily speak the same 
language, nor follow the same religion, or be a neighbour, not being the same 
ethnicity, caste or not dressing in the same way. One of the responses from the 
survey is worth highlighting here: “The difference of Muslims to the Sinhalese 
cannot be put into words; you have to feel it” – Sinhala (Galle)”311.  Though, whilst 
the Tamils shared the same differences as Muslims, they were somehow 
perceived to be closer to the Sinhalese with the main difference being language 
and politics. The Muslims were somehow seen to be more ‘de-linked’ than the 
Tamils with the differences being more structural.  
Much of these surveys and perceptions also tally with what the Asia Foundation 
conducted in its ‘National Values in Sri Lanka’ Survey in late 2011 to gain a more 
grounded understanding of people’s perceptions of religious beliefs and 
practices, influence of religious leaders, inter-religious relations, and tolerance for 
religious expression. The survey revealed some interesting results showing that 
religious minorities were less positive about the country than Buddhists especially 
in the feeling that the conclusion of the conflict in 2009 had not brought an end to 
ethnic conflict (The Asia Foundation 2011).  In particular, the survey found that 
religious minorities were more likely than Buddhists to perceive discrimination by 
the government with Buddhists themselves believing the improvement of the 
rights of minorities had been much more substantial than minorities themselves 
who were more likely to feel only minor or no change has taken place. 90% of the 
Buddhists surveyed believed that people of all religions were treated equally in 
the government job market, compared to the 66% of Muslims and 45% of Hindus. 
Roughly twice as many Muslims (41%), Hindus (50%), and Catholics (41%) than 








Buddhists (21%) strongly believed that government should enact special 
initiatives to protect the land and assets of minorities. The survey also identified 
that Sri Lankans overwhelmingly perceived their society as becoming significantly 
more religious as well as adherence to core religious practices amongst people 
of all faiths. More Buddhists (70%) and Muslims (53%) surveyed said they were 
“much more religious than other either Hindus (39%) or Catholics (44%)”. Local 
religious leaders were also identified as highly influential and by far the most 
respected leaders for Sri Lankans of all faiths. Interestingly while the majority of 
Sri Lankans (66%) believed religious leaders should not be involved in politics, 
Muslims were relatively split on the issue, with just under half (42%) believing 
religious leaders should have some role to play in politics despite the fact that 
among Muslims the rate of involvement is quite low (17%). In addition, the survey 
found that religious leaders needed greater involvement in community level 
development with 84% saying that religious leaders should be involved in the 
development of neighbourhood amenities and a further 81% believing that if 
religious leaders are not consulted on the problems facing an area, political 
leaders will make mistakes.  
What is interesting from the Muslim community survey is the expectation for a 
greater involvement of the religious leaders in issues of politics and community 
affairs beyond their religious duties.  “Therein lies the problem in how our 
community is not only constituted but also perceived. There has been a blurring 
of the lines between religious leaders, political and civil society leaders.  This 
blurring means that those outside of the community remain sceptical as to the 
‘true’ intentions of the Muslim leaders”312 
6.3.1	The	Trends	of	Violence	and	Intimidation.	
In another landmark study conducted, importantly the problem of religious 
violence that has been reinforced by the perception studies was unravelled.  It 
showed an important trend emerging when geographic data on religious attacks 
is compared with demographic data (Gunatilleke 2015). Areas with low or 
medium levels of religious diversity and relatively low concentrations of religious 
minorities appear to be more likely to witness chronic violence against religious 
minorities. It is thus possible to hypothesise as to why such areas might display 
greater tendencies towards chronic violence. On the one hand, the relatively low 
number of persons belonging to the targeted minority community exposes them 
to the risk of being perceived as defenceless. Perpetrators from the majority 
community in the area may not fear retaliation, and may therefore be somewhat 
emboldened. On the other hand, low diversity may produce a ‘host-guest’ 
dynamic, where the majority community view themselves as the ‘hosts’ of the 
area, and the minority community as the ‘guests’ (Ibid). As an interviewee said 
 
“It is this understanding of the relationships between the majority and 
minority that creates a power differential between the two. When the 
minority community oversteps the perceived limits of this arrangement, i.e.  
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it oversteps the duties and privileges of the ‘guest”, then these attacks 
serve to remind everyone of their rightful role in society”313 
 
However highly diverse areas appear to be confronted with relatively fewer 
instances of chronic violence, but they encounter acute violence where certain 
communal fault lines exist as a result of a particular local context.  What the 
perception studies described in the section above do is they validate the 
suggestion by Gunatilleka (2015) that communal fault lines allow for a situation 
to arise such that a trigger event together with incitement by organised groups 
could create the necessary conditions for acute violence to erupt. In this case, 
violence takes place when certain contextual factors (such as socio-cultural, 
economic and political) converge to exacerbate the communal tensions.  Thus as 
seen in numerous examples of religious violence in 2013 and 2014, a particular 
local context may explain the eruption of violence in far more accurate terms than 
broad contextual factors. 
 
For example, the violence reported  in Sri Lanka between 2012 and 2014 against 
the Muslims Grandpass and Aluthgama certainly demonstrates the manner in 
which particular local tensions might erupt into acute violence owing to certain 
trigger events alongside instigation by hate groups314. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that there was an estimated (Secretariat for Muslims 2013) 241 anti Muslim 
attacks in 2013 of which 166  were location-specific (for example, an attack on a 
specific place of worship) and a further 75 incidents were not location-specific (for 
example, hate campaigns in the media)315 and more related to contextual factors.  
In addition, data collected from 2012 – 2014 (Ibid.)  by the Secretariat for Muslims 
reveal two trends in terms of attacks on Muslims. First, more than 50% of the 
attacks were non-physical and related to hate speech and propaganda. Second, 
political actors or political or social movements perpetrated more than 50% of the 
attacks. More than a quarter of all attacks were in fact attributed to a single 
perpetrator—the BBS. Hence the increase in attacks against Muslims during 
2013 and 2014 corresponded with the rise in the prominence and influence of 
particular organisations which according to the surveys also received political 
patronage (Ibid.). The contextual factors that underpin the violence can not be 
ignored. As an interviewee said 
 
“The BBS campaign is about resources; it is about Sinhala businesses 
challenging the ‘perceived’ monopoly by Muslim businessmen and using 
monks as the scapegoats”316. 
 
This clearly was seen in the ‘Ban Halal’ campaign conducted by the BBS in 2013 
which was aimed at imposing a ban on halal certified foods (Karunasena and 







Rupasinghe 2013). As an interviewee said “The ‘Ban Halal’ campaign was clearly 
seen as an attempt to cripple Muslim businesses and those supplying the Muslim 
community”317, yet it appeared for many to be more than that. 
 
For many in the Muslim community, the concept of Halal very much speaks to a 
recognition of identity within the mainstream and an expression of being Muslim.  
Though there is a warped understanding of what halal truly means with “some 
exaggerating the extent of halal certification”318, it was clear to many Muslims that 
the BBS campaign was designed to attack the very identity and nature of the 
Muslim community.  In other words, “by focusing on halal, the message was clear 
to the Muslims: we don't necessarily want you here dictating to us what is ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ and enforcing your identity on us”319. 
 
There was a resolution of this campaign when  the clergy of both Buddhist and 
Islamic faith in collaboration with the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce met and 
announced that the controversial Halal logo would no longer need to be 
compulsorily displayed on the packaging of consumer products (Bastian 2013). 
However this was also met with concern from many in the Muslim community, 
who felt that a “compromise on identity had been reached and that this would be 
the start of a more vicious campaign of intimidation and incitement to violence”.320 
 
The fears of the Muslim community about physical violence would be realised in 
June 2014, when ethnic riots erupted in Aluthgama, Dharga Town, Valipanna and 
Beruwela—towns located in the South of Sri Lanka. The area has a large Muslim 
population that lived alongside a larger Sinhalese community. Despite there 
being previous tensions this particular riot has to be evaluated especially in the 
wake of the current discussions of causal and contextual factors. Following an 
alleged altercation in between a Buddhist monk and three Muslims from the area, 
the BBS organised a rally to condemn the alleged attack on the Buddhist monk 
where racist and inflammatory remarks were made against Muslims at the rally 
(Haniffa, Amarasuriya, et al. 2014).  At the rally, the leader of the BBS incited the 
Sinhalese to finish off the Muslims (derogatory referred to as ‘Marakkalayas’) 
telling the rousing crowd, “If one Marakkalaya lays a hand on a Sinhalese that 
will be the end of all of them” (Young 2016, 78).  As an interviewee said 
“The manner in which Muslim property was targeted in Aluthgama leaves 
several unanswered questions especially in this element which seems to 
be a phenomenon of the anti Muslim riots. Many anti Muslim violence in 
1915/ 1976 / 1981 / 1992 / 2001 and 2006 all show this destruction of 
property as the pattern of anti minority anti-Muslim violence.  However, 
these incidents have not become part of the narrative of the history of the 






Muslim community at least in English.  This gap is part of the problem, 
because we forget every time it happens that it has happened before”321. 
 
Whilst it is not the intention of this chapter to go into the details of the actual 
violence and so on, what is eerie about the riot was its similarities to the 1915 
Sinhala – Muslim riots when after the rally, the crowd led by BBS marched into 
Muslim areas chanting anti-Muslim slogans, despite there being some ‘damage 
control’ being done after the alleged altercation between the monk and the three 
Muslim men322.  What is unclear is what happened next but in the confusion, 
stones were thrown and violence erupted323.  However, for many Muslims in 
general, they are less interested in the ‘who-started-it’ narrative given the 
recorded eyewitness reports of the organized nature of the looting and violence. 
The situation was made worse by the inaction of law enforcement officials to 
contain the violence and with witnesses claiming that many of the attackers wore 
boots and helmets324, suspicions were raised of the strong suspicions of state 
involvement in the riots. As an interviewee from a focus group said  
“It was clear that this was a planned attempt to incite the Muslims into a 
violent response akin to 1983 and as well as a reminder of the 1915 
incidents.”325. 
Indeed, these sentiments underpin the analysis of the ‘Aluthgama’ riots, because, 
though amity between the two communities has remained somewhat fragile, as 
communal violence had erupted previously, almost a decade earlier, it was clear 
that it was different this time.  The Aluthgama campaign was seen as the ‘testing 
ground’ for future anti Muslim campaigns and was directly correlated to the hate 
campaign carried out by the BBS in the preceding months326.  The mere fact that 
there were evident signs of organization and orchestration implying state 
complicity did nothing to quell the fear from the Muslim community that “not only 
was their existence at threat, but they were going to be subjected to the same 
type of harassment that the Tamils had faced from 1983 onwards”327. 



















So how do we explain and understand the anti-Muslim campaign?  After all, the 
Muslims were described as the ‘model minority’328 by the Sinhalese because they 
are perceived to have remained largely loyal to the state during the 30-years of 
ethnic conflict and civil war and even thereafter,  and also in terms of the fact that 
they have hitherto been submissive, have consistently sided with the Sinhalese 
against the Tamils ignoring all ethical norms329; and the wider Islamic world has 
been immensely beneficial to Sri Lanka economically, militarily, and politically. 
Yet they are now expressing the fear of religious marginalization which increased 
uncertainty of their co-existence and long-term cordial relationship with other 
major ethno-religious groups, especially with the Sinhalese (Yehiya 2013) 
 
It is clear from the perception studies especially those carried out by the Asia 
Foundation, that the emergence of Buddhist-Muslim religious confrontation in Sri 
Lanka in the post-2009 period is a phenomenon driven by the convergence of 
multiple factors: a sense of beleagurement within the Buddhist (and Sinhala) 
community, despite the defeat of the LTTE; a sense that Buddhists and Sinhalese 
do not occupy the proper place within the Sri Lankan nation as a majority; rapid 
commercialization of society and a fear that religion and religious institutions are 
becoming irrelevant, which is a narrative that cuts across both the Sinhala and 
Muslim communities; the fear of Muslim expansionism and public displays of 
religiosity and what is perceived as the increasing isolationism within the Muslim 
community i.e. that there is a concern about the growing visibility of the Muslim 
community has displayed by their religiosity which then has implications on social 
/ cultural and political expressions; the tendency by both Muslims and Buddhists 
to see each other as homogenous blocs; and inadequate sensitivity to the internal 
conflicts and contradictions within both communities. In addition, it is important to 
consider other contextual factors including socio economic and local political 
priorities, especially the role that the macro political environment in the country 
can also play a significant role in shaping ethno-religious relations. The 
increasingly vociferous presence of extremist Buddhist groups happened in a 
context where the post-war government until January 2015, deliberately 
propagated and sustained a discourse of Sinhala triumphalism and at the same 
time used the media extensively to keep alive the possibility of an LTTE-like threat 
remerging (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015). Such a government sanctioned 
discourse obviously has/had implications for majority-minority relations in the 
country. Notwithstanding a global Islamophobia process as well as “the sinister 
machinations of foreign devils who want to keep the Sri Lankans divided” (I. 
Hussein 2014) , the campaign has sought to play on the fear psychosis among 
the Muslims (from the 1915 riots) which endures to this day. 
 






The campaign has also been grounded in the aspect of social mobility in the wake 
of an expanding modern economy.   There is the competing economic interests 
which is the other narrative that underpins misperceptions about the Muslim 
community and that characterizes perceived Muslim ascendency through the 
visible success of certain Muslim enterprises, though there is little evidence to 
suggest that the Muslim community as a whole is economically better off than 
any other community in the country (Herath and Rambukwalla 2015). The 
campaign which manifested in both online and on the ground is symptomatic of 
one major common denominator.  It is about opposing signs of visible Muslim 
identity that also has an economic dimension; ranging from calls to boycott 
Muslim companies and Halal products, Halal certification, women’s clothing, to 
protests outside Muslim-owned retail outlets (Mohamed-Saleem 2013). 
Interestingly, a significant portion of the members and supporters for BBS not 
only hail from middle and upper class backgrounds in urban areas that have 
decent education and affiliated to good money-making professional jobs, but 
there is also a lot of support from Sri Lankan expatriates living abroad (Ibid). The 
growing disenchantment in the Sinhala-Buddhist community on many fronts, their 
economic and cultural insecurity in particular, at least in part has made it easier 
for nationalistic political posturing to re-capture its lost appeal. Thus there is a 
heavy interest of Sinhala business involved in these campaigns330, which has 
been capitalised on by certain nationalist political parties for their own gain (I. 
Hussein 2014). As an interviewee from a focus group said  
 
“a large part of the initial campaigns by the BBS were seen as targeting 
certain Muslim businesses within the community.  Not the high range elite 
companies but those that had daily dealings with the Sinhala majority 
community and were a good opportunity for Sinhala businesses to get into.  
So what better way than to see the success of certain Muslims 
entrepreneurs as representative of the disproportional success of the 
Muslim community as a whole. And then to use that as a cause of envy 
and motivation for violence?”331 
In the calculations of the Sinhala nationalists, the Muslim community is alleged to 
be posing a demographic, religious, security and economic threat to Buddhist 
supremacy in the island332. The demographic threat is manufactured from a 
simplistic comparison of statistics provided in the census reports of 1981 and 
2011. They show that while the Sinhalese population has increased from 73.9% 
to 74.9% and that of Tamils have declined from 12.7% to 11.2% Muslim 
population has increased from 7% to 9% and hence the danger of Sri Lanka 
becoming a Muslim country (A. Ali 2014).  Yet this simplistic calculation ignores 
the phenomenon of migration (as a result of the conflict) which has caused 
hundreds of thousands of Sinhalese and Tamils have left the country permanently 






in search of greener pastures while the Muslims, for various reasons, have found 
themselves unable to do so, between the two censuses333. 
 
Thus, what we have seen is that these discourses are successful because they 
can tap into fears and prejudices that are already present in the collective 
consciousness of these religious communities.  The incidents so far described 
have created a suspicious and tense situation and the feeling of marginalization 
among the Muslims, especially those who are living in the Sinhalese majority 
areas in the country. Further, these incidents have contributed to the clashes of 
opinions and misunderstanding, thus widening the gap of healthy relationship 
between the Sinhalese and the Muslims in Sri Lanka.   All these incidents pose a 
question that to which extent the new re-emergence of the religious- based 
hegemonic nationalism and extreme anti-Muslims sentiments have impacted on 
the relationship between the Sinhalese and the Muslims who have been 
maintaining ‘historic cordial’ relations in Sri Lanka? 
6.4			Conclusion	
Yet it is also clear that the majority of Sinhalese Buddhists do not subscribe to 
these extremist views as evident from views on the ground where most of the 
local Sinhala Buddhist residents of areas where these demonstrations have been 
taking place, clearly disapprove of the demonstration and do not in any way 
participate or encourage it (Imtiyaz and Mohamed-Saleem 2015). However, 
these incidents have thrived and the discourses are successful because they can 
tap into fears and prejudices that are already present in the collective 
consciousness of these religious communities. 
 
It is, however, important to note that the macro political environment in the country 
can also play a significant role in shaping ethno-religious relations. The 
increasingly vociferous presence of extremist Buddhist groups happened in a 
context where the post-war government until January 2015, deliberately 
propagated and sustained a discourse of Sinhala triumphalism and at the same 
time used the media extensively to keep alive the possibility of an LTTE-like threat 
remerging. Such a government-sanctioned discourse obviously has/had 
implications for majority-minority relations in the country (Herath and 
Rambukwalla 2015).  
We must also take into account the fact that the Sinhalese power elite has shown 
a fierce hierarchical drive – for cultural reasons that cannot be explored here – 
which leads to a resistance to giving fair and equal treatment even to the 
Sinhalese. It is not accidental that for the greater part of the period since 1977 Sri 
Lankan democracy has been deeply flawed, and everyone has suffered from this. 
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All these incidents pose a question that to which extent the new re-emergence of 
the religious- based hegemonic nationalism and extreme anti-Muslims 
sentiments have impacted on the relationship between the Sinhalese and the 
Muslims.  The question that is being asked is “What should the Muslims do to 
secure and promote their legitimate interests?” 334  It is not difficult to work out 
the answer to that question. Obviously all the irritants that have been be-deviling 
Sinhalese-Muslim relations for decades should be addressed by both sides and 
removed as far as might be possible. But if that is obvious, why on earth has that 
not been done over several decades? As an interviewee said 
 
“As long as there is no drive to build a multi-ethnic nation, we can expect 
the Sri Lankan Muslim problem to continue”335 
 
It is perhaps, best seen as a dialectical process where pre-existent discourses 
become reconfigured and circulated when public and political discourse in society 
at large support and nurture such discourses.  What is at stake is how the Muslims 
identify themselves. To a large extent the shape this discourse takes will depend 
on the macro political environment but a reimagining of the Muslim identity will 
also have an important role to play in shaping the future of these discourses. 
 
  





Chapter	 7:	 Deconstructing	 the	
Narrative		
“Who is the Muslim?  Ultimately the Muslim identity has come out of 
wanting to be different in the light of the Sinhala & Tamil identity.  As a 
consequence there is a confusion within the Muslim community in terms 
of their identity, how they relate to the other communities and where they 
are within the history and the narrative of the country ”336 
7.1			Introduction	
This statement indicates the conundrum currently faced by the Sri Lankan Muslim 
community as it navigates being caught in between trying to find an ethnic identity 
and remaining true to religious values.  This conundrum faced by the Muslim 
community pretty much speaks to what Barth (1969, 10) wrote about when he 
referred to not only how “ethnic groups are categories of ascription and 
identification by the actors themselves”, but how the formation and continuation 
of the ethnic groups are dependent upon interaction with ‘others’ and how ethnic 
boundaries entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby 
discrete categories are maintained, despite changing participation and 
membership in the course of individual life histories.  Thus the question for the 
Muslim community is ‘how does one navigate religious expression in an ethnic 
identity discourse that is also challenged on a political basis?’ 
 
In addition to this, whilst the overwhelming literature about the conflict in Sri Lanka 
has talked about ‘ethnic’ divisions, it is clear from its cultural diversity that there 
is more to the Sri Lankan identity including “how religious identity is connected to  
the outbreak of ‘ethnic’ conflict”  (Hoole, Senanayake and Perera 2013, 96).  This 
to some extent explains why there is not much in terms of discussions around 
religious identity and ethnicity.   
 
This gap also extends to much of the scholarly work on Sri Lanka which does not 
adequately discuss the conundrum of the Muslim community identity. This is as 
much a problem that is internal within the Muslim community as well as outside 
the Muslim community.  In the course of doing the research for this piece and in 
my formal and informal conversations with people (particularly from the Muslim 
community), I have been struck by the ignorance of the history about the Muslim 
community as well as a superficial understanding about the Muslim community 
narrative.  Statements such as ‘The Muslim community has been in Sri Lanka 
over the last 1000 years and have coexisted with the Sinhalese’ display an 
ignorance not only about the history but how the Muslim community interacts with 
history as well as the relationships with the rest of the communities.  To say that 
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the Muslim community has been in Sri Lanka over the last 1000 years, indicates 
that en masse, there was a migration of an entity of a race called ‘Muslims’ who 
came to Sri Lanka, settled down and populated it.  At best this is a disingenuous 
process which reinforces the ‘us’ and ‘them’ perspective.  This is farther from the 
truth because as we have seen, Islam through the Arabs came to the island and 
through inter marriage spread to the inhabitants here.  To indicate otherwise is 
not representative of the situation.  Unfortunately, the Muslim community is as 
guilty of this as others (such as the Sinhala Nationalist Buddhists) as it reinforces 
the narratives that predicate the relationships currently.  This does not help to 
ground the narrative of the community within the country and being from the 
country. It also means that the basis of a conversation around identity becomes 
even more problematic moving forward because of a misunderstanding of history.  
 
This is also a gap that essentially also does a disservice to the Sri Lankan context 
as Sri Lanka is a country of the 4 major world religions that have interacted in a 
dialogical manner and where faith plays a major role in shaping peoples lives and 
identity337.  Furthermore not understanding this particular element means that you 
ignore the process of polarisation between ethno-nationalist communities as well 
as religious communities that is manifesting itself, particularly in the post 2009 
era with a growing Buddhist Christian tension and the emergence of an anti 
Muslim campaign338.  As Fernando (2008,7) writes “A careful study of the 
complex situation shows that the conflict in Sri Lanka which revolves around a 
dogmatic belief in a nation state reflects the complicity between the dominant 
Sinhala Buddhism nationalism and western imperialism.  The cultural nexus of 
this complicity lies in the representation of the other in the projects of colonial 
practice and postcolonial nation building. It operates with an Orientalist-
Occidentalist interpretation of each other within a network of asymmetrical local 
and global power relationships initiated by colonialism and continued by 
postcolonial nation-building and the present phase of globalisation.  This belief is 
mainly supported by dominant interpretations of ethical and religious traditions 
where the particular cultures and religions have been interpreted and continue to 
be interpreted in unchangeable homogenous categories.  Its main characteristic 
is the essentialist perception of ethnicity, religion and nationhood, through which 
ethno-religious myths have been transformed into political myths of exclusivist 
types of nationalism and national identity.”  
 
Thus it is in this light, that the discussions of Muslim identity need to be framed, 
understood and discussed. This identity has occupied a perilous position, being 
compressed between two dominant identity groups, the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils, whilst also being subject to a context of Sri Lanka of “cultural and religious 
beliefs that imbricate with economic and political factors in forming the dominant 





power structures such as nation-states in a network of local and global powers” 
(Ibid, 8). 
 
This ‘politics of interpretation (within and without the Muslim community) has 
undoubtedly created a tension in the institutionalisation of the Muslim identity as 
it wrestles between the distinction of faith as a theological marker, i.e. a religious 
motivator, and faith as an identity marker, i.e. a communal galvanizer.   This 
tension for the Muslim community in Sri Lanka centres around the nexus of 
political and ethnic identity vs religious expression which the latter incorporates 
personal (and social) capital for whilst the former incorporates social capital.  In 
this regard, Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ thesis is transformed into 
an ‘imagined Muslim community’ with a schizophrenia of being split between the 
local and the universal, i.e. the local community vs the global transnational Islamic 
community or the ‘Ummah’.  As such there is always a dynamic tension between 
the relatively local focus and the civilizational focus, and the concept of moral 
patriotism and how it may inform notions of giving and conceptions of belonging 
to a larger collective such as the Islamic community. In this perspective the 
tension and challenge for the Muslim community is how it interprets its 
relationship on a transnational scale and within the local context.  For example, it 
is interesting to see how Muslims in Sri Lanka mobilise on the issue of Palestine 
versus issues in Sri Lanka whilst reflecting on issues in Sri Lanka.  As a member 
of a focus group stated 
 
“There is a concern that the Muslims in Sri Lanka mobilise greater when 
there is an issue of Muslims in places like Palestine or Myanmar, but are 
less likely to mobilise on issues of social concern in Sri Lanka”339 
 
This sentence illustrates the challenge that the Muslim community faces with 
regards the perceptions from the others.  For many the representations and 
feelings towards Palestine for example, are because of the affinity of the 
transnational concept of the Muslim based on the theory of the Ummah and yet 
this seems to be at odds with feelings of affinity with similar causes within the 
country.  As an interviewee said 
 
“In this perspective from a theological perspective, every Muslim is 
supposed to feel the pain of other Muslims.  There is even a saying from 
the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) to this effect.  This is the concept of the 
Muslim nation, the Ummah, and has been used and abused by the 
community.  Hence the impression given is that Muslims care more for 
other Muslims and not really concerned about their own country because 
they are not able to respond to internal crises unless if affects them 
directly.  The impression then is one of apathy and not caring about the 
country which is seized on by nationalists. ”340 
 




Thus this is a real confusion and challenge for the community yet must not be 
seen in isolation to the context of Sri Lanka at the time it also emerged.  This has 
been a trend that has been replicated in other communities, within the context of 
an emerging religious identity connected to ethnic expression, particularly in the 
late 19th century and earlier 20th century as a result of colonial activity341.   
7.2			Fear	of	Small	Numbers	
Appadurai (2006) writes that for extreme violence to occur against ethnically 
different but nonetheless neighbouring groups, there must be a confused mixture 
of high certainty and grave uncertainty within the in-group about the intentions of 
their neighbours.   This in all intents and purposes exactly defines the approach 
of the Sinhalese to the rest of the minorities in Sri Lanka. 
 
This type of confused mixture of certainty and uncertainty is caused by a couple 
of factors (Ibid): 1) the empiricisation of minorities via census data and other 
forms of survey.  This creates an empirical count of the “other”; 2) Minorities 
remind the majority of the failure to collectivize a national unity; 3) minorities end 
up being the site that nationalisms find an outlet for their own anxieties about 
global insignificance. In other words, minorities blur the idea of nationhood 
because they aren’t the majority; therefore, the majority often maps the globalized 
ephemeral onto their reality in the social imaginary.  “The worry this produces is 
that the ordinary faces of every day life (with names, practices and faiths different 
from one’s own) are in fact masks of everydayness behind which lurk the real 
identities not of ethnic others but of traitors to the nation conceived as an ethnos” 
(Ibid, 91).   
 
So as has been seen on the ground, the Sinhalese have displayed all of the above 
in terms of their engagement especially with the Muslim community.  From the 
fear of the increasing visibility and numbers of the Muslim community, to a 
narrative that Muslims are not part of the nation, one can see that this confusion 
has been built up over time and fed into a narrative of an ‘ethnocide momentum’ 
(Appadurai 2006) where Sri Lanka’s idea of national ethos has been shaped 
especially in the last 30 years, from the rhetoric of war, sacrifice and the 
subordination of local traditions.  With the end of the war, the concept of sacrifice 
was brought even more to the fore with the ‘anxiety of incompleteness’ (Ibid) 
based on the fear of small numbers. Thus the Muslim minority threatens the 
nationalist majority of the Sinhalese because they remind the majority that the 
unsullied and complete national whole doesn’t exist.  There is thus a ‘fault’ with 
Muslims and to fix this, they either must be “assimilated”, integrated or there must 
be extreme and spectacular violence that can be mobilised to overcome the 
volatile deficit of that ‘incompleteness’.  
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The dominant tale of this kind of fearful symmetry between the fear and power of 
small numbers is further not helped by a minority is on its own trajectory for its 
identity expression.  The Muslims were pushed to respond in one way and in so 
doing reinforced the polarisations. So to some extent the fault comes from the 
majority community in how they perceive engagement with the minorities but 
equally there is fault from the Muslims in how they responded to this situation.  
By pushing for the ‘other’ identity in the face of hegemonic aspects and as part of 
a colonial process, the Muslims chose religion and then sought agency by the 
institutionalisation of social, ethnic, religious and political identity.  It is the last 
aspect which they relied on over the last 30 plus years in the wake of the conflict 
and a way of legitimising their interest.  However, what they couldn’t and didn’t 
realise is that identity is multiple and it is difficult to unite a group no matter how 
much the image is of homogeneity, actually into something else.  It is even more 
difficult to do that under religion and then to combine that religion with ethnic and 
political entities 
7.3			Nationalising	Religious	Identity	
Though there is no durable link between religion, language and ethnicity when it 
comes to the Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist expression, it is clear that this first 
emerged and then changed as a result of colonial encounters.  With 
Independence, a fixed notion of identities began to inform the making of the Sri 
Lankan unitary ‘nation’ state with a Sinhala Buddhist majority-dominated ideology 
and a movement leading to the polarisation of diverse communities (J. L. 
Fernando 2008). 
 
As Stanley Tambiah (1992) writes, the Buddhist establishment went through a 
religious revival in the 1880s not only as a counter to the colonial missionary 
influence but influenced by salient political and economic dimensions. Through 
the likes of people like Anagarika Dharmapala (as previously discussed in chapter 
4), this new revival also took place in a period when local capitalism was linked 
to the nationalist stirrings of Buddhist sections of the emergent bourgeoisie.   As 
Jayawerdena (2003) shows, the growing relationship between the Sinhalese 
Buddhist politics and the commercial and middle classes during the colonial and 
post colonial phases was accompanied by an essentialist perception of culture.   
 
On the one hand, religion, ethnicity and race were depicted as inseparable, 
serving to infuse a new nationalist identity.  However, on the other hand, 
Dharmapala’s brand of Sinhala Buddhist revivalism was supported by and served 
the interests of the rising Sinhala Buddhist middle class going through their own 
changing phase of social class structures, thereby enabling them to identify with 
the concept of a ‘Sinhala Buddhist Nation State’.  It is thus no surprise then that 
some of these Buddhist middle class were later implicated in the 1915 ‘Sinhala-
Muslim’ riots (Jayawerdena 2003) as economically there were growing tensions 
between the new Sinhala Buddhist rich and the other ethno-nationalist groups 
who engaged in trade.  
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Hence this growing relationship between Sinhalese Buddhist politics and the 
business minded middle classes helped to inform an essentialist perception of 
cultures in terms of how Buddhism related to Sinhala nationalism.  These 
perceptions reflected a selective reading of the pre-colonial ethno-religious 
narratives within the colonial and post colonial politics of control, domination and 
manipulation. An essentialist representation of nationhood and the centrality of 
the nation state defined in terms of developing from primordial categories gained 
predominance, within the context of economic tensions between the groups, 
thereby blurring out collectivities, both global and local.  Put simply, the narrative 
held “the minorities responsible for limitations that the Sinhala Buddhists faced 
within the colonial economy ignoring the fact that these limitations were the very 
result of the colonial economy of the Empire” (J. L. Fernando 2008, 173).   
 
As Appadurai (2006) writes, the lines between the majority and minority have 
been blurred at the boundaries as nations lose national economic sovereignty. 
Hence minorities become the site for displacing the anxieties of the majority about 
their own marginality in a world of unruly economic flows and can be the flash 
point for a series of uncertainties and other collectivities have become blurred.  
“Majorities can always be mobilised to think that they are in danger of becoming 
minor and to fear that minorities can easily become major” (Ibid, 83).  Thus in Sri 
Lanka, there emerged a concept of ‘political Buddhism’, a Sinhala-Buddhist 
ethno-nationalism with its manufactured ‘mythohistory’ (Thambiah 1986), turning 
into an ‘anti-minority’ movement,  envisaging Sinhala-Buddhist nationhood as an 
ideology of national identity in which all non-Sinhalese and non-Buddhists are  
the distant ‘other’342.  What this meant in practice was the emergence of a 
narrative that being Buddhist in Sri Lanka became intimately tied to Sinhala 
cultural and political identity and representation. The normative assumption was 
that if one is Buddhist, that he or she is Sinhala, though not vice-versa because 
there is a significant minority of Sinhala Christians.  The converse of that was that 
non Buddhists were largely non Sinhalese and thus did not ‘belong’ to the country 
and had less rights.  In this regard the Sinhalese Christians occupied an 
interesting and often dangerous space as well. 
 
However, it is clear that this narrative didn't really have too much of an implication 
in the country despite the pre independence symbolism until the post conflict 
scenario in 2009.  It is really in the period of post 2009, that we saw a real 
articulation of this symbolism, with the rise of the BBS and in particular against 
the Muslim community, a reminder of the 1915 tensions, with theological causes 
being an additional impetus, leading to a ‘1915 V 2.0’, so to speak. As an 
interviewee said 





“The end of the conflict which so far had distracted the Sinhala nationalists, 
now empowered them (with tacit support from the government of the day) 
to try and articulate this utopian vision of the nation and to assert the rights 
of the majority and the minority”343. 
 
In this sense, Buddhism has evolved from a transcendent category to something 
that is fashioned out of the everyday socially embedded practices of Buddhists – 
either lay people or monks.  With a growing involvement of the latter in politics, a 
sharper emphasis began to emerge on Buddhism and violence (S. Tambiah 
1992), which has also been supported by Deegalle (2007) who talks about this 
massive change and reinterpretation of doctrines in Sri Lanka largely as a result 
of the conflict.  
 
In this trajectory one can see the trend of ethno-religious nationalism as nothing 
new within Sri Lankan history. However, the result of such ethno-religious 
nationalist fervour has been the politicisation of religion where all religions have  
a political element to them and people are aware of different communities also 
having religious and political identities (Flanigan 2008).  Thus the Sinhalese had 
been effectively mobilised through Buddhism, whilst Hinduism was also used to 
express ‘pure’ Tamil roots, although the conflict served to split the Christian 
community between Sinhalese and Tamils, with Tamil Christians expressing 
some sympathy with the LTTE and Sinhalese Christians largely siding with the 
government.  This has also left Muslims with a unique position.  As an interviewee 
said 
 
“The Christian community has not had the same challenges as the Muslim 
community as ethnicity plays an important role in community identity, but 
this certainly had an effect on the Sinhala – Tamil relationship in terms of 
the church.  However the Muslims were very good at keeping to their own 
political and religious points of view.”344 
 
In “fearing that their particular socio-political and economic interests would be 
marginalised in a broader Tamil-speaking coalition” (Hoole, Senanayake and 
Perera 2013, 97), the assertion of a Muslim identity has also become a 
conundrum for the Muslim community caught in between transnational questions 
of religiosity, national questions of identity and local challenges of polity. As an 
interviewee said 
 
“The Muslim community at best remains confused as to how it expresses 
itself and this dichotomy lends itself to the challenges being faced”345. 
 
However, in this perspective it is also worth noting that this religious political 
representation is one sided.  Whilst Buddhist monks are seen as an influential 





force behind the Sinhalese politicians, they somehow are given a special status 
than other religious leaders, who are shown in a negative light if they are seen to 
be influencing political leaders.  As a number of interviewees have said 
 
“There is a classic example of there being a difference in how the religious 
leaders are treated.  When the national anthem is played, it is customary 
for everyone to stand and pay respect to this, religious leaders included 
except for Buddhist monks.  The latter are allowed to sit down during this 
time.  If any other religious leaders were to do the same, they would be 
accused of treason and being against the country.  This hypocrisy 
becomes more apparent when some of the Sinhalese majority and 
politicians tend to refer to the Buddhist monks but make a fuss when other 
minority politicians refer to religious leaders”346 
 
“Buddhist monks are seen to exert undue influence on the Sinhalese 
politicians and even though there are some who oppose this, the fact of 
the matter is that the Buddhist monks are and have been present in the 
politics of the country.   For example, we have had a number of occasions 
where the monks have changed country legislation through their protests.  
In fact, the first head of state to be assassinated in Sri Lanka was killed by 
a Buddhist monk but people do not see this as a religious influence.  
However when members of other faiths do it, this is seen as negative”347 
 
The evolution and institutionalisation of Muslim identity intertwined with religious 
expressions of piety has proven to be a dilemma for the community. Being Muslim 
in Sri Lanka is both an ethnic category as well as a religious one and the two are 
used interchangeably. In Sri Lanka being a follower of the Islamic faith means 
automatically that the assumption is that one is of the Muslim ethnicity – though 
there are other ethnicities that have converted to Islam, their ethnicity is not 
something that is discussed in much detail or given much credence to348. Hence 
there technically can be ‘non-Muslim’ (in the ethnic sense) followers of Islam in 
Sri Lanka unlike in many other parts of the world, where one’s ethnic identity can 
be distinct from one’s identity, but in Sri Lanka it becomes difficult to discern the 
differences. Fernando (2008) calls it ‘cultural recycling’ in that all ethnic 
communities developed a sense of ‘cultural nationalism’ in response to the 
colonial experiment.  Yet instead of uniting and articulating an alternative vision 
of a post colonial independent state, these racialized perceptions of ‘nationalism’ 
and ‘nationhood’ remained within the realm of competing for cultural space. 
 









The Muslim identity in Sri Lanka has emerged from a constructivist perspective, 
constructing an ethnic identity for political reasons but also instrumentalising 
religion for the same reason to achieve that political end.   In this sense they are 
unique in that they have become an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) with 
an ‘imagined geography’ (Said 2000).   I have deliberately chosen both concepts 
because I think they are particularly pertinent to the discussion about the Sri 
Lankan Muslims and their identity formation and in fact influence.  It also 
illustrates the particular predicament that the Muslim community is in, which I will 
explain below. 
 
Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities is useful to anchor the 
Muslim community, since, despite not actually knowing all other members of the 
community – or even having face to face contact at the time of discussion, the 
community was ‘imagined’ by political elites in the sense of horizontal 
comradeship and shared history; despite the actual inequalities and hierarchies 
that existed in reality; and the limitations because of an understanding of a 
‘boundary’ (Anderson 1983). This boundary is better explained clearly through 
the imagined geography narrative, that Edward Said (2000) has used to evolve 
this thinking as a form of social constructionism from the imagined community 
narrative. In this term, "imagined" is used not to mean "false" or "made-up", but 
rather "perceived".  In Culture & Imperialism, said (1993) pointed to how none of 
us are completely free from the struggle over geography, over territory, over 
space, and over place.   
 
In this sense, the formation of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity is one of perception 
– a perceived link to history, time and space; to define oneself against the ‘other’.  
This imagined geography for the processes of cultural intervention of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim narrative has been shaped by a long tradition of efforts to forge 
effective political formations in times of global crisis, in other words, efforts with 
transnational ambitions that have profoundly shaped the history of the 20th 
century— including, in particular, the legacies of anti-colonial movements and 
other internationalist thought. According to Said (1993,2000), imaginative 
geography is a form of invention used by practitioners of empire to re-interpret 
the meaning of certain territories and create discourses justifying the need for 
control over such re-imagined places.  This exercise in imagination begins by 
reconstructing the history of those places coveted by empire builders. This 
practice of constructing alternative representations of places and people is what 
Edward Said refers to as the crafting of “imaginative geographies.” (Ibid.)349.  
Thus “institutionalising Muslim difference, the British, in a crucial sense, helped 
‘create’ Muslim identity” (Q. Ismail 1997, 73). 
 





Thus it is worth referring to how Barth (1969) explores that discussions around 
‘ethnic boundaries’ canalizes social life entailing a frequently quite complex 
organisation of behaviour and social relations whilst recognising a limitation of 
shared understandings and differences in criteria for judgement of value.  In this 
sense, the argument is that ethnic groups persist as significant units if they imply 
marked differences in behaviour and allow the persistence of cultural differences.  
What this means is that ethnic divisions in Sri Lanka have been formed and 
reinforced as a result of the boundaries placed by them and the interaction 
between them. 
 
It is in this vein that we see how the Muslim identity developed and evolved 
depending on the context of the time. The Muslim identity in Sri Lanka has 
become perceived and imagined and determined  vis-a-vis the identity of the Sri 
Lankan nation and has been formed based on (Guibernau 2007): 
1. The construction and dissemination of a certain image of the ‘nation’ 
2. The creation and spread of a set of symbols and rituals 
3. The creation of common enemies 
 
In doing this, the Muslim community led by the political elites, institutionalised 
their identity founded on an imagined assumption. In this sense, identities have 
been imagined where global, regional, national and local spaces have entered 
into relationships of replication, consequences and repercussion.  Appadurai 
(2006) calls this phenomenon, ‘geography of anger’, stating that this “is one way 
to examine how the fear of small numbers and their power shape the mutual 
relationships of different spatial scales and sites” (Ibid, 93).  Thus the concept of 
imagined communities and geographies lead to this concept of the geography of 
anger, where global concerns and tensions can produce complex replicas of the 
larger struggles and that creates “a freshly charged relationship between 
uncertainty in ordinary life and insecurity in the affairs of states” (Ibid, 101).   
 
In other words, this imagination which has led to a blurring of certainty and 
identities has become a flash point for insecurities, and the minorities 
subsequently evolve to face those circumstances.  This is indeed the predicament 
that is faced by the Muslim community in Sri Lanka.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Muslim community is at a cross roads in how it forms its identity and 
there needs to be serious thinking about what and how they move 
forward”350 
 
In so doing, we need to understand how the identity and institutionalisation of the 
Muslim community has evolved in Sri Lanka in different phases as a 
consequence of the ‘othering’. 





As I have come to understand, believe and have used the earlier chapters of this 
thesis to argue, there are 5 significant phases for the evolution and the 
institutionalisation of Muslim identity in Sri Lanka, all influenced by ‘critical 
junctures’ of the country’s history. “A critical juncture is a turning point in which 
relations within and between groups are altered fundamentally” (Bush 2003, 15).  
This is evident for example in how intra-group and inter-group relations have been 
constituted leading to polarisation, fragmentation, tensions and so on351. It is also 
clear that these junctures are not mutually exclusive and there is a fair amount of 
overlap in terms of time frames and events that could ensure that different 
junctures leading to an evolution of the Muslim identity, could have also happened 
simultaneously.  It is this that forms the basis of the discussion not only of the 
evolution but also in terms of navigating complex political transitions. 
 
It is obvious from the previous chapters that this discussion on Muslim identity is 
implicitly linked to inter and intra group dynamics and can’t be treated in isolation.  
As an interviewee said 
 
“The narrative of the concept of the Muslim identity has its origins in trying 
to define themselves against the `other`. This has implications for 
community relations (both inter and intra) overall”352. 
 
In understanding these dynamics, it can then help us to understand the conditions 
for improving relations between the communities.  These critical junctures have 
led to specific representations of the Muslim community identity. 
Critical	Juncture	1	–	Framing	the	Ethnic	Identity	
The framing of the ethnic identity remains the by-product of as well as the first 
critical juncture for Muslim community representation and identity.  The incidents 
leading up to the framing of the ethnic identity, has been already discussed, as 
the framing of the identity began really in response to other nationalist and anti 
colonialist currents that were affecting the country.   
 
In examining the national identity of Sri Lanka that has evolved to its current 
circumstance as a result of these movements, we can see that the  image of the 
‘nation’  is based very much on constructing  a  Sinhala Buddhist image which is 
best represented through the symbol of the national flag as represented by Figure 
9.  It is also the symbol that visually illustrates the country's underlying problem 
of ethnic rivalry and compartmentalisation (D. B. McGilvray 2011), where the 
Muslims are represented by a vertical green ( Islamic) stripe, and the Tamils by 
a parallel orange (Hindu) stripe, while the Sinhalese majority (the “people of the 





lion”) are represented by a regal sword-wielding lion and four leaves from the 
sacred Bo tree under which the Buddha is reputed to have attained 





Figure 9: The Sri Lankan Flag353 
 
It is clear that there is no unifying Pan-Lankan symbols of national identity or 
citizenship, with the flag said to be the royal red and gold panel spanning two 
thirds of the flag portraying the legendary lion ancestor (Sinha) of the Sinhalese 
people, their distinctive religion (Theravada Buddhism) and their sword-wielding 
pre-colonial political sovereignty over many parts of the island. The smaller, 
separate bloc of space on the left side of the flag that represents the minority 
Muslims and Tamils towards whom the Sinhalese lion brandishes his royal sword, 
in an interpretation of the ‘awareness of the danger’ posed by the minorities to 
the majority (Ibid). What in fact, the national flag represents, is a virtual schematic 
of the island's ethnic divisions and a clear proclamation of Sinhalese Buddhist 
(ethnically specific) domination of the Sri Lankan state with two 
compartmentalised ethnic totems, which are small and religiously generic. Hence 
the conflict in Sri Lanka has been and actually remains354 predicated on the 
continuous legitimacy over time not only  of ethnic uniqueness but its 
differentiation from  the ‘other’. As an interviewee said 
 
“Identity is Sri Lanka is primarily essentialist, based on perceptions of 
ethnicity, religion and nationhood which have allowed ethno-religious 
myths to be transformed into political myths.  The predominant feature for 
Sri Lankan identity as represented by the flag underscores the centrality 
of the Buddhist symbol and the mythology of the Lion, and the minorities 
are reminded of their place in the country under the watchful eye of this 









lion with a sword.  Consequently, the Tamils relied on their symbol of the 
Tiger to counter the Lion symbol.  The Muslims were caught in the middle 
and relied on the crescent.  However the issue is that there is no one 
symbol uniting communities and each one has relied on their own 
understandings to be able to articulate agency and representation”355 
 
Thus it is no surprise that the Sri Lankan Muslims  also constructed their identity 
as a ‘differentiation from the other’ as it was based on the socio-political condition 
facing them at that time (M. A. Nuhman 2007).  Despite Tamil being the major 
mother tongue of the Muslims (and the vernacular of Islamic scholarship from 
South India), in order to differentiate themselves and to safeguard their political 
and economic interests, they chose religion as their primary ethnic marker. 
Nuhman (2002, 15) calls this “disowning linguistic identity” and refers to this as a 
total differentiation from the Tamils due to the safeguarding of socio-political 
interests. This is in sharp contrast to Muslims in South India who never hesitated 
to call themselves ‘Islamic Tamils’ using both religious and linguistic identities 
(Ibid.) As an interviewee said 
 
“In this sense religion was associated with a cultural expression as 
opposed to a theological discussion which poses its own challenges to 
identity formation”356. 
 
Yet there is a paradox to this representation.  Even though a religious 
interpretation of Islam is supposed to transcend ethnic and cultural identities, the 
Sri Lankan Muslim identity is only representative of one ‘racial’ element of the 
diverse Muslim community based in Sri Lanka.  It is a name that  is used to define 
ethnically those Muslims that claim that they descended from the Arabs357 , so 
called ‘Moors’, as opposed to the other ethnicities described in the earlier 
chapters.  As a key informant from a focus group discussion revealed 
 
“Therein lies the paradox of the Muslim identity which from a ‘religious’ 
perspective was supposed to be inclusive encompassing a heterogeneous 
diversity with religious similarity, but has boiled down to who you were 
descended from.  So the Muslim in Sri Lanka becomes synonymous with 
being ‘Moor’ ie descended from the Arabs, and thus this becomes a 
symbol of status”358. 
 
It is this paradox which continues to provide challenges for the community since 
the religious identity is of course used by all Muslim ethnicities but there are still 
cultural differences, in other words, between the Moors, Malays, Memons and so 











on.  However, the religious identity has also proved problematic in terms of the 
developing visible homogenizing tendencies amongst the Muslims of Sri Lanka 
as a result of religious awakening. 
 
The claim for identity from Moor to Muslim in Sri Lanka is also a  tale of  politics 
at the basic element: the rivalry of two families, “conflict  between elitist groups 
for ‘political power, economic benefits and social status’” (M. A. Nuhman 2002, 
40) which resulted in the establishment of the  All-Ceylon Muslim League and the 
All Ceylon Moors Association.  This rivalry continued  for decades  that “at one  
point in 1945, the leaders of the Muslim League threatened to pronounce a fatwa 
expelling anyone who calls himself a ‘Moor’ from the Muslim faith” (Mcgilvray 
1998, 452). 
 
This rationale for  the discussion of ethnic identity in Sri Lanka is in line with the 
Constructivist  Approach to the formation of an ethnic identity which is viewed as 
a product of human actions and choices that are constructed, transmitted and not 
genetically inherited from the past (Taras and Ganguly 2002).  In keeping  with 
the Weber school of thought which looks at the social origin of ethnic identity 
based on a belief in a common ancestry (Stone 1995), the Muslim identity has 
not only been formed as a community but has been formed under the right 
circumstances by appropriate political actions (Ibid.) The development of the 
Muslim identity thus has been political from its inception as political actors have 
and continue to construct both identity and solutions to problems in order to gain 
and hold power. 
 
In doing this though, a sense of insecurity can emerge among members of a 
group when they feel that they are not only deliberately and systematically 
undermined by the dominant group in society but methodically targeted by the 
dominant group due to its ideas, beliefs, lifestyle and/or identity (A. Imtiyaz 2009).  
Thus there arises a mobilisation against the ‘oppressors’ in all available ways, 
theoretically both in non-violence primarily by the moderate democratic 
leadership and violently by radical groups, if it thinks the former’s strategies make 
no sense to win its rights (T. Gurr 1993), a scenario that has played itself out in 
Sri Lanka time and time again and that will continue to be a problem 
 
This Constructivist Approach aptly describes how because of Sri Lanka’s ethno-
nationalist identity politics, the Muslim community, led by the political elites, have  
also been forced to define themselves as an ‘other’ that is neither Sinhala nor 
Tamil and one that is largely based on Islam as a  faith to maintain this distinct 
group identity mainly from the Tamil community (Q. Ismail 1997).  This has led to 
some controversy in determining whether the Sri Lankan Muslim identity is ethnic 
or religious (M. A. Nuhman 2007).   Qadri Ismail (1997) in fact argues that the Sri 
Lankan Muslim identity has changed from a racial one into a religious one over 
the past few decades, stating that “the Sri Lankan Muslim social formation ‘lost’ 
 222 
its ethnicity in the post colonial period or to be precise ‘lost’ its racial / ethnic 
identity” (Ibid, 59)  
 
However, as Nuhman (2002, 2 ) states, “the Muslim identity is a reactive politico-
cultural ideology that has been constructed and developed in relation to and as a 
response to Sinhala and Tamil ethno-nationalistic ideologies”.  This reaction that 
was born at the start of the 20th century became more mature as a consequence 
of the ethnic strife.  The ‘composite Islamic identity’ that has been developed not 
only promotes and promotes Muslim cultural and religious life but also envelopes 
a passion for socio economic advancement and social recognition (O'Sullian 
1999).   
 
What this means is that the situation today is that the Muslims are the only Sri 
Lankan ethnic group bearing a religious rather than a linguistic, ethnic or racial 
name, i.e. faith is not only a theological marker (a religious motivator) but also an 
identity marker (a communal galvaniser), which means there remain tensions and 
fault lines along racial and religious lines.  In defining themselves as such, their 
identity has been developed not only based on ethno-nationalist tendencies but 
also from a theological and spiritual basis.  This has caused some tensions of 
manifestation and representation especially in trying to navigate the 
heterogeneity that naturally exists within the Muslim community in Sri Lanka on 
an ethnic  and demographic basis (McGilvray and Raheem 2007), with the 
homogeneity that is being developed as a discourse on Pan-Islamic basis which 
seeks to discuss the concept of the global Islamic community or Ummah.   
 
It is this homogeneous element that is being seized upon as a negative trend in 
the sense that the ‘Islamization’ of Sri Lanka is perceived as opening the door for 
extremist tendencies (McGilvray 2011).   This is also being echoed by extreme 
elements within the Sinhalese (and Tamil) communities who have used the global 
language against increasing Islamic extremism to criticize and justify a potential 
suppression of the Muslim community359.   It is this fear of the Muslims tainted 
with an Islamophobic discourse that seems to cause the greatest threat to 
community relations. 
 
Yet as we have seen this homogenising quality has not necessarily been an 
advantage to the community as at different times in history, as they have been in 
conflict with both Tamils and Sinhalese which has also not been helped by the 
political naivety and expediency (on the part of the Muslims). As an interviewee 
said 
 







“The seemingly duplicitous nature of the Muslim politicians (and by 
extension, the Muslim community) has meant that both the Sinhalese and 
Tamil leadership view them as highly suspicious and opportunistic”360. 
 
Critical	Juncture	2:	Consolidating	Social	and	Cultural	Identity	
It is in the second period, which I have classified as the formation of the social / 
cultural identity phase for the Muslims where most of the institutionalisation took 
place. As an interviewee said 
 
“Institutionalisation is about developing a separate identity and organising 
separate social institutions in the public sector. So for the Muslim 
community the legitimacy of its ethnic identity around the end of the 
nineteenth century was about getting it ingrained within society through 
representative institutions.  Hence there was a need to develop 
institutional representation to further the agency and expression of that 
ethnic identity“361 
 
Thus here in Sri Lanka we are talking about separate social institutions in the 
public sector exclusively for Muslims and legitimising some of the Muslim 
interests (M. A. Nuhman 2002) based on this understanding of a separate identity 
for Muslims. Though a large part of the discussion of institutionalisation started in 
the late 19th century and early 20th century in part due to the influence of 
transnational elements, it is only really after independence that the issue of 
identity, ethnicity and said institutionalisation had much more poignant 
ramifications with political leaders taking great strides to deepen 
institutionalisation.   It is this juncture that has been described as  the period when 
“…a culturally conscious religious community gradually transformed itself into a 
strong politically motivated ethnic community in Sri Lanka” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 
92). 
 
Largely brought about by the arrival of Ahmad Orabi Pasha362 in exile from Egypt, 
the Muslims in Sri Lanka, at the peak of their economic prosperity were receptive 
to new influences, namely the concept of a transnational Muslim identity with the 
concept of a ‘revival’ of Islamic thinking (M. K. Asad 1993)363.  Pasha in particular 
spoke to the sensitivities of an elitist (and affluent) group of Muslims mainly in 
Colombo who were seeking a sense of political expression and representation 
against the ‘other’364, whose own identity spoke to the religious revivalism 
common amongst all the communities in Sri Lanka as an anti colonial struggle 












and a way of seeking an ethnic consciousness based on a separate ethnic 
identity, cultural ideology and traditional mythology365.  For the Muslim elite, they 
found that identity within what Pasha represented, a link with a grander and 
transnational identity represented in Islamic nationalism (against colonialism)366 
and the Ottoman empire and a glorious Islamic history.  This thinking of a more 
expressive identity received support from Pasha who recognised the paucity of 
modern educational367 provision for Muslims in Sri Lanka, especially in response 
to the rise of Christian missionary schools.   
 
Up to that point, the Muslim community had not really entered the modern 
educational system introduced in the 19th century, one reason being the fear of 
Christianisation. Yet there is another theory which was postulated that Muslims 
were perceived as a trading community whose social mobility would be assured 
through wealth and not necessarily through education. As an interviewee said 
 
“This is a colonial construct of the Muslim community which gives the false 
impression even today that Muslims are a wealthy community despite  the 
fact that there is widespread poverty amongst the Muslims whilst a large 
portion of them were not traders but often farmers”368. 
 
However this construct was also accepted by the Muslim elites as it served their 
‘hegemonic interests’ (Q. Ismail 1997) and who were keen to trace their origin to 
Arab traders of the medieval period in order to ensure the legitimation of 
difference from the ‘other’, the Sinhalese and the Tamil369.  Nevertheless, in 
recognition of the changing times, with external influences such as Pasha, from 
India, and a realisation of the need to maintain influence, the concept of opening 
separate schools for the Muslims was developed. “‘Giving modern education in a 
religious environment’ was the common feature of their ideology and this was a 
kind of mixture of tradition and modernity” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 110).   For the 
Muslim community, the issue of separate schools became problematic because 
unlike the Sinhalese/Tamil (where the major differentiation was based on 
language and secondly faith and culture despite following similar curriculums), 
here it was based on ethnic makeup.   The problem of the Muslim schools in a 
way became representative of the larger problem that the Muslim community 
faced and faces in terms of how it represents itself.  Muslims schools largely had 















/have Tamil as the language of instruction but follow a separate calendar to 
accommodate religious holidays like Ramadan (M. A. Nuhman 2007).  It is this 
‘difference’ that is seen as the fundamental aspect of the isolation of the different 
communities. The schools issue is thus seen as important because it is also one 
of the key political leverages used to justify support by politicians. As a key 
informant from a focus group discussion said 
 
“It is this segregation of different communities in their schools that is seen 
as the start of the breakdown of relationships between communities.  For 
the Muslim community because they chose a different medium of 
education it meant that they were isolated from both communities thereby 
leading to a misperception about them from the others and also a 
misperception of the others by the Muslim community”370. 
 
Another  area of institutionalisation for the Muslim community was in personal law 
with the establishment of the ‘Mohammaden Code’ of 1806371 which had a 
complementary and integral system of legislation and which later emerged as the 
1951 Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act - MMDA (M. A. Nuhman 2007). “The 
introduction of special Quazi Courts was a unique development in the Sri Lankan 
legal system, since all other indigenous or customary laws are applied in the 
ordinary courts” (Savitri Goonesekere as quoted in Nuhman 2007, 149).  
Currently it is the current discussions around the reform of the MMDA that has 
created a space for an examination of the cultural and religious identity of 
Muslims and where the two blur lines.  Activists have been calling for the reform 
of the MMDA claiming that it is unfair to women and also that it boasts certain 
cultural practices not found in the practice of the religion (Hamin and Isadeen 
2016), yet those opposed to the reform largely led by the council of Imams have 
argued that to demand a reform of the act is to delve into religious jurisprudence 
and by extension, to question Muslim identity and existence in general (Daily 
News 2017).  This argument represents the crux of the matter with regards ‘who 
or what is the Sri Lankan Muslim?’  With the arguments between faith and cultural 
practices taking place, it is clear that the MMDA and any other discussions around 
institutionalisation goes deeper to the heart of the question beyond just a law. It 
raises the main concerns about how to deal with the challenges between the 
ethnic, political and religious representation of the Muslim community.  As a key 
informant from a focus group said 
 
“The discussions on the MMDA reform to me symbolise the existential 
crisis that the Muslim community faces.  The initial introduction of Muslim 
Personal Law was done to appease the Muslim community and allow them 
to feel some religious agency in marriage which was seen as something 
sacrosanct.  Accordingly, to the time when it was first brought in, it 
incorporated certain cultural and traditional norms which have now 







evolved over time and perhaps are seen as out of place and out of date. 
The MMDA reforms have been really about ensuring that justice is 
maintained which is the original precept of the faith, yet there are those 
opposing it saying that this is challenging jurisprudence itself and should 
not be allowed.  This has wider ramifications for how the Muslim 
community views itself and any changes.  The danger is that any call for 
reform within the Muslim community against patriarchal cultures or 
institutional evolutions can be misinterpreted as a call for the evolution of 
faith and a challenge to jurisprudence.  Hence any real discussion is 
forgotten and everything else becomes cosmetic”372 
 
In order to preserve  a religious identity, government  institutions were established 
to look after the maintenance of mosques and charitable trusts, with the 
development of the Muslim Mosques and Charitable Trusts or Wakfs Act of 1956 
(M. A. Nuhman 2007). “Under this Act, a separate government department with 
an executive Wakfs board was established” (Ibid, 149).   These effectively had 
the effect of ensuring a solidity to the identity formation of the Muslim community 
which very much focuses centrally around the practice of faith and the primary 
place to worship.  As an interviewee said 
 
“To the average Muslim, freedom to worship especially with the ability to 
go to the mosque is key.  Thus for the Muslim community, the fact that the 
government established separate mechanisms to look after this was an 
achievement towards helping to recognise that identity and accept it.  Of 
course, it was achieved due to the ‘accomodationist’ stance of Muslim 
politicians post independence and then it was used to cement a separate 
identity.  In other words, although freedom of worship entailed mosques 
and so on, the fact is that these institutions with a separate governance 
structure became key indicators for the expression of the Muslim ethno-
religious identity.  To challenge them was tantamount to challenging the 
existence of the Muslims which is interesting, because traditionally the 
Mosque was simply a place where people could gather to say their 
prayers.  It hadn’t really developed that institutional aspect”373 
 
Muslim identity was also institutionally recognised in government owned media.  
A separate Muslim unit was set up in the Sri Lankan Broadcasting Corporation, 
broadcasting a separate Muslim service exclusively for Muslim affairs (M. A. 
Nuhman 2007).  Mirrored in the national television service as well, the media 
access “promotes ethnic and religious awareness among Sri Lankan Muslims” 
(Ibid. 149)374.   
 
With all of these moves, the social and cultural identities of the Muslim community 
were well and truly developed and ingrained as key non negotiable determinants. 








Though the political identity of the Muslim was formed on the “anvil of Portuguese 
religious persecution of them as ‘Moors’” (D. B. McGilvray 2008, 10), it was only 
under the British colonial regime in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, in response to the prevailing British colonial model for categorising and 
representing indigenous Ceylonese by ‘race’ in the census and on the appointed 
Legislative Council, that  the Sri Lankan Muslim elites energetically constructed 
their ‘racial’ identity as Arab descendants.   It can be said that the central 
innovation in the period leading up to independence in 1948 was not the 
bifurcation of Sinhala vs. Tamil political identities but the development of ‘the 
political separation of the Ceylon Moors as a distinct ethnic group from the larger 
Tamil-speaking community’ to ultimately distance the Muslim community from the 
characteristic Dravidian linguistic chauvinism but also to “safeguard their socio-
political and economic interests” (M. A. Nuhman 2007, 13) As an interviewee said 
 
“The mere fact that post independence, the Muslim community managed 
to institutionalise their social and cultural identity speaks to the 
accomodationist stance of the Muslim politicians of the day who were 
largely political elites from Colombo and the South.  By emphasising their 
differences as articulated towards the end of the nineteenth century, they 
were able to use these as ‘bargaining chips’ to ensure that the interests of 
the community were met”375 
 
What history shows is that the Muslim political elites of the South used this 
development to cooperate with the  Sinhalese political parties, which formed the  
successive governments since independence to win and consolidate their 
interests (A. Imtiyaz 2009).   Whilst the Sri Lankan Government’s enthusiasm to 
accommodate Muslim demands helped them in their quest for a separate identity 
(A. Imtiyaz 2012); it is no surprise that the continuous Tamil indifference towards 
the Muslims and the strained political relationship between the two communities 
since the end of the 19th century, was the real catalyst for why sections of the 
Muslim political leadership opposed the Tamil nationalist struggle for political 
autonomy and developed the full expression of political identity as an 
independent community (A. Ali 1997). 
 
This political expression of Muslim identity where faith is an identity and 
community galvaniser has also meant a blurring of the boundaries with a Muslim 
identity based on a theological construction where faith is a theological marker 
(A. Imtiyaz 2012) in the sense of identifying the level of ones piety and practice 
of the religion.  This blurring of the boundaries has also meant that being identified 
as Muslims, rather than Moors, has placed them in a religious category beyond 
the Sinhala–Tamil ethnic and linguistic binary leading to other underlying 
challenges facing the identity politics of the Muslim community in particular the 
relationship with the other religions in Sri Lanka.   This is not about saying whether 
the label of Moor or Muslim is better or worse, but certainly this blurring of 
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boundaries has meant that people from other communities are left confused as 
to where Muslims are and also sceptical about their ‘true’ belonging to the 
country.  For example, the celebrated Sri Lankan Buddhist revivalist of that time, 
Anagarika Dharmapala, was a leading campaigner against Muslim presence in 
the country. To him Muslims were “‘aliens' and 'foreigners' and deserved to be 
expatriated to Arabia” (A. Ali 1997, 260), as it was felt that there was a threat to 
the existence of Buddhism in the country and that Muslims were never part of the 
country and ‘belonged’ elsewhere.  Thus, the Muslim identity became and still 
remains a challenge as two thirds of all Muslims live and work in Sinhala-majority 
parts of the island, where Muslim business people and professionals are aware 
of the potential for Sinhala animosity (D. B. McGilvray 2008). One can not 
underestimate this antipathy towards the Muslim community on the part of the 
majority Sinhalese Buddhist community, as incidents in 1915 and others 
throughout the twentieth century have not only displayed  the outright hostility, 
but also have been manifested  in the formation of a political party formed by 
Buddhist clergy called  the Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU, or National Heritage Party) 
that represent the most xenophobic wing of the Sri Lankan Buddhist monkhood 
(ICG 2007). 
 
O’Sullivan (1999) states that in the context of ethnic competition, the composite 
Muslim identity developed into a political force with demands for ‘Muslim Rights 
and Muslim development’.  Thus the situation would become even more 
complicated with the founding in 1981 of a direct Muslim political party, Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC), in direct response to Muslims in the North and East 
feeling vulnerable to and seeking protection from Tamil Tiger violence and 
extortion (D. B. McGilvray 2011), an issue which it had been felt was largely 
ignored by Southern Muslim politicians who were practising the politics of 
accommodation with the main Sinhalese political parties.   The emergence of the 
SLMC centred in the Eastern province provided an anomaly  in Muslim political 
representation, by challenging the strategies of the Colombo-based Muslim 
political elite through explicitly promoting the interests of the Muslim community 
as a whole,  attempting to cohabit with the Sinhalese polity  (A. Imtiyaz 2012), 
developing the concept of a separate ‘other’ and eventually posing a “Muslim 
nationalist threat to the Sinhalese and the Tamils” (ICG 2007).  The SLMC also 
prided themselves on invoking a religious identity on top of the evolution of an 
ethnic identity (Johansson 2007), which meant that this shifted the centre of 
Muslim leadership to the east (Ameerdeen 2006).  As several interviewees said  
 
“The underlying premise for the formation of the SLMC was the fear that 
many in the east felt about their security especially in the wake of the rise 
of the LTTE.  In addition, with the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord, it was 
felt that the safety and security of the Muslims had been compromised with 
very little push back from the Muslim political elite at that time.  Since it 
was felt that the elite were largely from the south, they would not have 
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much interest or knowledge about the east.  Hence it was felt that the east 
needed their own representation”376 
 
“The SLMC represented a game changer within Muslim political circles 
because it challenged the status quo of the elite.  It emphasized the need 
for a separate representation outside of the mainstream political parties, 
largely because it was felt that the security of the Eastern Muslims was 
being compromised and not being addressed.  Thus the message was 
clear to the Muslim political elite of the day  that they no longer spoke for 
the eastern Muslims”377 
 
“With the frustration of the Eastern Muslims being felt as a result of the 
‘inaction’ of the political elite from the south, the SLMC not only capitalized 
on this but also on the Islamic awakening that was sweeping the country 
in the late seventies and early eighties resulting in a rediscovery of Islamic 
piety.  What this meant is that the SLMC noticed a gap whereby they saw 
the ability to capitalize on Islamic awakening, become more ‘religious’ than 
other politicians and push forward their agenda for the eastern Muslims.  
This is why a lot of their initial formations was colored with religious 
language which appealed to a wider community of Muslims than the 
eastern Muslims”378 
 
Though initially, the key policy issues for the SLMC were to do with security and 
peace in the north and east of the country, especially in guaranteeing the 
livelihood and security concerns of Muslim farmers and fishermen in the north-
eastern war zone (ICG 2007), it also attempted to address the needs of Muslims 
living in close proximity to their Sinhalese majority neighbours in the dense urban 
areas of the island's south-west. Thus the difference from other communities was 
that the SLMC effectively encouraged Muslim nationalism through religion, while 
other ethnic communities did it by language (O'Sullian 1999) thereby 
emphasising the difference of ‘others’.  As an interviewee said 
 
“There is a paradox in the thinking of the SLMC.  The original premise was 
that the southern Muslim political elite couldn't understand the problems 
being faced by the eastern Muslims, which indicates that the SLMC 
indirectly felt that a homogeneous representation of the Muslims beyond 
a religious aspect was not possible.  Yet the SLMC forgot this as they 
sought to move beyond the east to the rest of the country.  The issue is 
that the Muslims of Sri Lanka are not necessarily homogeneous as they 
have different priorities and it is a fallacy to think that only faith linkages 
can be enough of a uniting factor.  This was a move that ultimately 
backfired especially in the eyes of the majority community”379 
 
By articulating a vivid religious identity fused with geo-political interests, it was 
not long before the Muslim urban elites of the south west (who had previously 
controlled the political representation of the Muslim community) were expressing 






concern about the potential of antagonising relationships with the Sinhala 
majority community, especially when the SLMC started to put forward  in 1990, a 
proposal for a Muslim Self-Governing Region (MSGR) as a means of 
guaranteeing the safety and rights of Muslims in the north east (McGilvray and 
Raheem 2007)380.   It was this proposal for a separate Muslim ‘homeland’ in 
particular that prompted the southern Muslims to oppose the SLMC for fear that 
there would be a Sinhala backlash (A. Ali 2004).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The concept of the MSGR was ill thought and ill timed.  Though it spoke 
to the fears of the Muslim community following the Indo – Lanka accord, 
to the Sinhalese it raised concerns that like the Tamils, the Muslims 
(another minority) would be asking for ‘independence’ and a homeland.  
Thus the suspicion was roused about the intent of the Muslim community.  
To the Southern Muslims, this was out of the question yet people could not 
distinguish between the eastern and southern Muslims as both sides had 
used the transnational link of the Muslim community to their advantage, 
and hence the Sinhalese would view the southern Muslims with suspicion. 
It is this backlash that the southern Muslims still blame the SLMC for even 
today”381 
 
By developing this counter narrative of a separate and distinct Muslim nationalist 
identity, it is also thought that this put the Muslim community on a collision course 
with the LTTE, which could explain their changing attitudes towards the end of 
the eighties (A. Ali 1997), especially in the increasing attacks in the east as well 
as the expulsion of Muslims from the north. Though very little information has 
emerged on the thinking behind the LTTE’s anti-Muslim pogroms and expulsions 
in 1990, it was obvious that these incidents did not happen in a political vacuum.  
 
Although many scholars (McGilvray 2011, Ali 1997, Imtiyaz 2009, ICG 2007 and 
so on) believe that the LTTE’s anti-Muslim violence in 1990 was a natural 
consequence of the exclusivist politics of Tamil militancy and an expression of 
deep seated Tamil ethnic chauvinism unleashing collective punishment for 
Muslim collusion with the state, it is clear that the emergence of the SLMC 
seriously undermined the LTTE campaign for exclusive political control in the 
region. “There seems to have been a concern on the part of LTTE leaders that 
Muslims would act as a fifth column against the insurgency in the north and east” 
(ICG 2007, 9). 
 
It does appear that the increasing  militant threat as the LTTE  strengthened their 
hand amidst a weakening influence from Muslim politicians in the mainstream 
political parties, meant that the SLMC emerged as a party providing a “political 
voice and leadership” (Ameerdeen 2006, 109) to Sri Lanka’s Muslim community. 








At this stage, one needs to explore the position of the SLMC when it comes to 
the concept of nationalism and Muslim issues in the country.  The constitution of 
the SLMC includes references to the fact that the “Holy Qur’an and the traditions 
of the Holy Prophet shall be the supreme guidelines of the Party” (Johansson 
2007, 36), but also talks about upholding and honouring the principles of 
democracy, the fundamental human rights of the people of Sri Lanka and 
recognising and respecting the distinct linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious 
identities of the communities of Sri Lanka (Ibid.).  This to some extent really 
underlines the paradox that the SLMC faced but also that faced by the Muslim 
community on the whole.  It also highlighted the confusion faced by members of 
the other community when dealing with the Muslim community. As an interviewee 
said 
 
“The SLMC largely employed the Islamic religious and ethnic symbols for 
the electoral purposes and used mosques as its base. They participated 
for the first time in the December 1988 Provincial Council elections. This 
combination of religion and ethno politics created an emotional appeal for 
Muslims of the region but also created issues for other communities since 
they did not understand the intertwining nature of religion and ethnicity.”382 
 
However, these perceptions of the other communities vis-à-vis the Muslim 
community which in particular came out during the post 2009 incidents with the 
BBS has to be placed within a caveat.  This is because to some extent the SLMC 
mirrored how the Sinhalese community mixed religion and ethnicity.  For 
example, since 1956 the Buddhist monks had played a large role in influencing 
the Sinhalese politicians and national politics.  However, it seems unthinkable for 
the minorities to do something similar.  As an interviewee said 
 
“What the SLMC did was to articulate in a clear manner the relationship 
between religion and politics which was very similar to how the Buddhist 
monks engaged with the Sinhalese politicians in an indirect manner.  
However, the mere fact that this was done caused outrage to the 
Sinhalese as this was seen as a problem vis-à-vis the Muslim community 
and by the extremists as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation and a 
betrayal of the Muslims of the country.  This is where the challenge 
arises”383  
 
However, it is clear the SLMC as an Islamic political party was not initially seeking 
to create a new Muslim state within Sri Lanka or with the wider Muslim Ummah 
in focus. Although the party manifesto pledged a platform based on ‘Islamic 
principles’, it was more to do with conveying honesty and incorruptibility than 
anything more detailed like an Islamic state (D. B. McGilvray 2011).Thus the 
SLMC is unique in the sense that though they wore the badge of Islam on their 
sleeves and claimed to be influenced by the Qur’an and the traditions of the 
Prophet, they were in fact another ethnic nationalist party fighting for the rights of 




their constituents within the confines of the State. Its stand was mainly to create 
their politics from a nationalist point of view within the framework of the nation-
state of Sri Lanka, and within the context of the ethnic confabulation of the conflict 
between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The SLMC connection with Islamic theology was not to push forward an 
‘Islamist’ or theological political thought.  In a way it was to articulate and 
convince the constituents of the integrity and credibility as it sought to fight 
for the basic political rights of the eastern Muslims which included safety 
and security.  The idea was to fight for these rights within the national 
system without trying to call for something ‘different’ but using a language 
that was in some sense acceptable to the Muslim voters”384 
 
This is in fact a very unusual scenario in terms of a Muslim political party, formed 
very much in the same guise as other well known Islamist parties, supported by 
religious foundations yet calling for nationalism and accommodation within a non 
Muslim state.  This goes against the thinking of many who feel that Islamist or 
Muslim political parties are a threat because of the fact that their ultimate motive 
is to create the Islamic state or reunite the Ummah under a caliph385 whilst 
upholding Islamic religious issues.  As an interviewee said 
 
“When one thinks of a Muslim political party, the immediate thought 
process is to associate those with the party of Erbekan in Turkey or even 
the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt which was seen as Islamists with 
an ulterior motive in terms of their politics and religions, all set to establish 
an Islamic state or caliphate.  This is what the prevailing discourse is 
about.  However, to this extent, the SLMC bucked this trend and whilst 
maintaining a charter of Islam, they were really pushing ahead with a 
national agenda.  To this extent they can be compared to the Christian 
Democrats in Germany”386 
 
In the case of the SLMC, in terms of religious issues, their position would typically 
seek to preserve the status quo without demanding the radical changes that 
would appeal to ultra-conservative or ultra-progressive Muslims (D. B. McGilvray 
2011).  Having said this, there are however some anomalies concerning the 
SLMC and their makeup.   
Whilst they cultivated ties with local mosques to increase voter mobilisation, 
during election campaigns Muslim ritual invocations and prayers were intensified, 
they also involved themselves with aspects of Sri Lanka’s Muslim personal law 
(Zackariya and Shangmugaratnam 1997).  Whilst respecting the distinctiveness 
of the diversity of Sri Lanka’s communities within a united Sri Lanka, they also 
promoted the preservation of Shari’a law and the adoption by members and 
general Muslims of the entire code of Shari’a law in their private and community 







life (Johansson 2007).  Another anomaly is that though the SLMC called for 
national unity, keeping the nation intact and developing a national identity 
(Ameerdeen 2006) and not  about  a separate state, their calls almost 
simultaneously for an autonomous administrative state for the Muslims in the east 
was a stark contrast.  This confusion also extended to its discourse on issues to 
do with jurisprudence and laws where they talk about adopting the laws of the 
country but also preserving the entire law of Shari’a (Ibid).  
It is this confusing shift between religious and political rhetoric that is not only 
problematic for Muslim identity within Sri Lanka but has also led to confusion from 
the other communities.  However by stressing on Islamic principles and focussing 
on the minority politics of the Muslim community especially the security of the 
community in the east, the SLMC had a lot of success in the first 20 years of its 
existence (Ameerdeen 2006).  By the start of the 21st century, with the death of 
its charismatic founding leader, the SLMC found itself splintered with internal 
disputes on its national agenda and the organisation would fail to exert its level 
of influence that it had previously.  As an interviewee said 
 
“Essentially, the death of Mr Ashraff undermined the unity of the SLMC. 
Several factions emerged within the party ranks. Many believed that 
Muslim political representations lost the common program to win the 
security and rights and they failed to articulate coercive policies to win 
Muslim interests.  Once again the Eastern Muslims were left frustrated by 
a political leadership who was not  largely delivering”387. 
 
For example, following the ceasefire agreement of 2002 (when the SLMC tried to 
secure an official Muslim seat for the party at the ensuing peace talks) and the 
Indian Ocean tsunami that struck in 2004 (when the SLMC sought to intervene 
on behalf of the devastated Muslim communities along the eastern and southern 
coasts), in both instances, the Sinhalese and Tamil ethno-nationalists largely 
ignored their demands (McGilvray and Raheem 2007).   
 
To some extent there are some who felt that the founding leader of the SLMC 
before his death was aware of the potential shortcomings of the SLMC and was 
striving for an alternative.  As an interviewee said 
 
“Before his death, the SLMC leader had put together an idea for something 
called a National Unity Alliance (NUA) as a way of an evolution of the 
SLMC.  He had begun to realise that the SLMC was limiting to achieving 
the aspirations of the Muslim community and he started to articulate a 
political vision that encompassed other communities and that really 
challenged the two party political system of Sri Lanka” 388 
 




Challenges	 for	 Muslim	 Political	 Leadership	 –	 a	 skewed	 model	 for	 Muslim	
Democracy	
So where does this leave the challenges for Muslim political leadership and 
representation? How does one explain the behaviour of Sri Lankan Muslim 
politics? 
 
Whilst it might be easy to dismiss the behaviour of the politicians especially the 
SLMC as purely self interest, it is clear that there is more to the conversation.  In 
the wake of the Muslim politicians to extract benefits or commercial opportunities 
(not only for the community but also personally in the form of ministerial 
appointments), it is safe to say that the moves of the Muslim politicians including 
the SLMC were just pure political moves by Muslims as a path of least resistance 
(Ali 1997, Ali 2004, McGilvray 2011) in the context of the Sinhala-Tamil schism 
and the prospect of ‘otherness’  in the country. 
 
However, it became apparent from the early eighties onwards that this system of 
accommodative politics was proving to be a detriment especially for the east and 
north Muslim communities.  The circumstances of community safety and security 
prompted a rethink of the Muslim engagement vis-à-vis politics especially with 
the emergence of the SLMC promoting the interests of the Muslim community as 
a whole but also focussing on the security and well being of the Muslim 
community in the north and east.  This rethink has not only meant a further 
division in political aims and motives but has meant that a single ‘Muslim agenda’ 
that can unify the entire Muslim electorate in the island has proved impossible for 
the SLMC (or any other breakaway Muslim political parties or politicians) to forge.  
As an interviewee said 
“There was great anxiety amongst Southern Muslim politicians that the 
Eastern Muslim parties were usurping their role as the leaders of the 
greater Muslim community.  There was also uneasiness as to what 
repercussions Eastern Muslim ethnic politics would have on the Southern 
Muslims who live amongst the Sinhalese. While the problems of the 
Southern Muslims are clearly not as immediate as those of the East or the 
North the insecurity with which many Southern Muslims live in Sinhala 
majority areas, the incipient violence that flares up at various moments – 
the incidents of Aluthgama for example is the most recent—must also be 
kept in mind when discussing the consequences of Muslim political 
decisions in the east”389 
The SLMC experience could be interpreted as one of the early models of ‘Muslim 
Democracy’ (Nasr 2012), which is the phenomenon of political traditions that 
integrate Muslim religious values – drawn from Islamic teachings on ethics, 
morality, family, rights, social relations and so on – into political platforms 
designed to win regular democratic elections.   This concept of Muslim Democrats 
has particular relevance to the SLMC whereby Muslim Democrats view political 
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life with a pragmatic eye with the aim of crafting viable electoral platforms and 
stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests within a 
democratic arena whose bounds they respect, win or lose (Ibid). In this sense 
“Muslim Democrats do not seek to enshrine Islam in politics, although they do 
wish to harness its potential to help them win votes” (Nasr 2005, 14)  The 
integration of the values should not also be thought of in absence of the prevailing 
context of that time which was that it happened at the same time as a steady 
increase of religious consciousness within the Sri Lankan Muslim society.  As an 
interviewee said 
“We can not look at the rise of the SLMC without also looking at the context 
of that time.  From the late seventies after the Iranian revolution as well as 
the rise of the Gulf petrodollars, we see that there was a reawakening of 
Islamic religious consciousness.  The quest for more piety and adherence 
to the faith meant that the community was more sensitive to this.  With the 
need for security and safety of the community, the SLMC were able to 
capitalise on drawing the need for safety and security with spiritual 
wellbeing.  Suffice to say if it wasn't for the rise in Islamic consciousness, 
then the rise of the SLMC perhaps would not have been so strong. So we 
have to look at both circumstances”390  
In addition, the SLMC succeeded also in gathering support from the Muslim 
private sector especially the middle class who felt isolated from the traditional 
political elites of the south.  In this sense, it again speaks to the emergence of 
Muslim Democrats with the bourgeoisie, as it combines the religious values of the 
middle and lower middle classes with policies that serve their economic interests 
(Nasr 2005).   
Certainly the early pronouncements and agenda of the SLMC points to this 
model, however this is where the comparison with the Muslim Democrats that 
Nasr (2005,2012) talks about then ends. The concept of ‘Muslim Democracy’ is 
sounder for Muslim-majority countries where the concepts of Islam and 
democracy need to interact and there is no discrepancy about the identity (either 
ethnic or faith) of the constituent members. 
It therefore doesn’t fully give justice to the whole predicament facing the Muslim 
community in Sri Lankan politics.  I feel that to understand this, one has to go 
deeper into the roots.  By identifying themselves as Muslims, the Muslim political 
elites (from the south and subsequently from SLMC) played on blurring the 
distinctions between faith as a theological marker (ie a religious motivator) and 
faith as an identity marker (ie communal galvaniser).  By deliberately blurring 
these lines, they were able to utilise it to serve their own interests to the detriment 
of their community.  For example, it is the concept of the homogeneity of the 
Muslim community, through the concept of the Ummah or the religious motivator, 
that Muslim political elites played on when they pushed for Muslim schools or 
rights for the community, but they failed (especially those from the south) in 
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realising the heterogeneous nature of the community, or the communal 
galvaniser, with regards the threats to security and livelihood facing the Muslims 
in the north and east.  As several interviewees said 
 
“Based on the experiences of the SLMC, certain civil society organizations 
in the East articulated a position that was becoming clear for some time 
now; they claimed that the Muslims of the North, the East and the South 
were three distinct groupings with distinct problems and interests with the 
conflict affecting Muslims differently in the different regions. Their 
problems, therefore, were regionally specific and required specific redress. 
For instance, the interests of the concentrated Muslim populations living in 
the Eastern Province are different from those displaced from the North 
contemplating return and those living in Sinhala majority areas in the 
South. Recognizing this specificity of interests is a perspective from which 
the most useful kinds of conversations as to what Muslims’ options are 
could be undertaken for the future.”391 
 
“Muslim opinions in the East held that the disunity and factionalism among 
the Muslim politicians undermined the Muslim interests both at the peace 
talks and beyond. Such frustrations could de-legitimize political 
alternatives and weaken the trust of the Eastern Muslims in the Muslim 
political establishment if the Muslim political representation continuously 
dissatisfies the Muslim masses. Also, it may lead frustrated Muslims to 
seek violent means as their only choice in conditions that are beyond their 
control when their moderate political representation was weakened. Such 
a scenario had ensued in relation to the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka against 
the State and its institutions”392 
 
As such there has been a lack of clear articulation and policy from the Muslim 
political leadership instead choosing to move between both notions as and when 
circumstances provided.  This I feel is a mistake because had they understood 
their religious motivation properly and looked within Islamic teachings to provide 
solutions, they would have been able to provide alternatives for communal 
galvanisation as well as helping to bridge the schism within Sri Lankan society.  
Fed with the theological motivation for justice and peace, they could have used 
their heterogeneous diversity to ensure that a bridge between the communities 
could have been built.  Instead of focussing on this strength of their theological 
construct to articulate issues of deep meaning, they instead chose to focus on 
theological issues of a superficial nature such as issues of worship or law whilst 
choosing to develop a separate political identity.   As an interviewee said 
 
“There should also be an appreciation of a past where coexistence 
amongst ethnic groups was the norm—especially in the case of Muslims 
and Tamils in the east. However, it is essential that such a step is matched 
by an understanding of the interests of the larger Muslim community, their 




mixed settlement patterns and the consequences to all Muslims from a 
settlement that involves the east” 393 
 
In the wake of rising religious consciousness by the Muslim community and by 
neglecting the necessary theological discussions necessary for developing 
identities, and contextualising faith and failing to provide leadership in articulating 
this, their sole aim of developing a separate identity has fallen prey to the global 
malaise afflicting Muslims, which is the push for a ‘pure’ Islamic identity based on 
a theological construct but taking the identity  of a global community / race, 
neglecting local contexts and cultures.  This is a new phenomenon within Islamic 
teachings and history because there is no such thing as a pure community 
identity.  There are different manifestations of Islam and Muslim communities 
united with a pure theological marker, of which the latter is mistaken to be the 
identity.  It is this that is now causing global concerns and issues of the rise of 
‘conservative’ Islam.  
 
By pushing for a new political identity, what has happened is that the doors have 
been opened for discussions on a religious identity that is not only foreign to Sri 
Lanka but fails to take into account local contexts and cultures, making any future 
discussion of post conflict reconciliation even more challenging, as people feel 
that the Muslim community is more isolated (linguistically, culturally and socially) 
than before. 
 
Thus the question remains can a Muslim Democratic party exist in the situation 
of a minority where the faith identity also becomes an ethnic identity?  The 
experience from Sri Lanka is that such a scenario is very difficult or at least 
difficult to maintain and sustain as circumstances evolve which should cause 
changes in how identities are represented. 
	
Critical	Juncture	4:	Consolidating	Religious	Identity	
For the Muslims of Sri Lanka, language is not the defining and uniting factor. “Sri 
Lankan Muslims are becoming defined, interpellated exclusively in religious, not 
ethnic terms” (Q. Ismail 2013).  In particular, it is the religious ties or the concept 
of the Ummah (community) that means Muslim representatives refuse to consider 
themselves as a divided community. Thus despite the heterogeneous nature of 
their geographical locations, religion becomes a homogenizing factor. As has 
been discussed above, the rise of the SLMC could not have been possible if 
religious consciousness was also not a factor in Sri Lanka and had contributed to 
this thinking of the SLMC in terms of trying to articulate a national voice for the 
Muslims.  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Muslim social formation was empowered by the Iranian revolution in 
the late seventies as well as the Middle East petro dollars which aided a 
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gradual rise in Islamic religious consciousness.  Empowered by this, 
religious groups started to put another dimension into the Muslim 
consciousness in Sri Lanka.  However given the political and ethnic 
challenges that the early eighties posed for ethnic representations, there 
was a perfect storm in terms of the religious identity finding a channel for 
expression for the Muslim community”394 
 
One should not underestimate the concept of Ummah as understood within Islam. 
It is the very essence of the Muslim personality that the declaration of their faith, 
or their shahadah, which supported by the other pillars of worship395 reinforces 
the community feeling and forms the basis of a common global identity (Ramadan 
1999). Thus the Ummah becomes the community of faith, feeling, brotherhood 
and destiny396 that is subject to the principles of Justice.  “To be Muslim anywhere 
in the world means to experience and develop this feeling of belonging to the 
Ummah as if one were an organ of a great body” (Ibid., 158). 
 
It is this homogenizing tendency tempered with the global context of the Ummah 
that explains the growing religious consciousness and its rise to prominence in 
Sri Lanka especially as a consequence of global trends from the 1970s following  
the revolution in Iran (M. A. Nuhman 2002).  However it should not be 
underestimated that the Sri Lankan Muslim elite who had sought a political / 
ethnic differentiation were also motivated by a religious identity in Islam and a link 
to the ‘glorious’ Islamic historical past (M. A. Nuhman 2007).  In fact, as stated 
before, along with the arrival of Arabi Pasha in Sri Lanka and religious revivalism 
in the late 19th century due to Turkish, Egyptian and Indian Islamic revivalist and 
political movements, the Muslim elites would have also been influenced by this 
(Ibid.)  It was also fortuitous because this revival was seen in response to the 
‘other’ which in this case was a response to a revival of a Buddhist identity (and 
Hindu nationalism) at the same time against Christian domination (and the 
colonial yoke).  As an interviewee said 
 
“It is hard to disassociate the competing externalities during the late 19th 
century and early 20th century which meant that as a process of ‘othering’, 
the concept of identity (often introduced and encouraged by the colonial 
powers) which was formed as an opposition to colonial rule, layered off 
each other.  Religion became intertwined with ethnicity and also took 
oxygen from other competing global factors which were at play.  Hence in 
the case of the Muslim community, as they strove to identify themselves 
separate to the Sinhalese and Tamils, there was a parallel process of a 










revival in Islamic religious thinking (which was also taking place globally) 
which helped with the identity formation”397 
 
Hence the late 19th century saw a first wave of ‘Islamisation’ led by the educated 
Muslim elite of the time, anxious to counter Christian domination but also to 
promote and encourage the social mobility and ethnic consolidation of the 
Muslims.  Through the establishment of Jamiyatul islamiya in 1886, Islamic 
awareness was promoted among Muslims in order to consolidate the Muslim 
identity and to work towards the social and political progress of the Muslims (M. 
A. Nuhman 2007).  Thus Islamisation in the late 19th century was essentially an 
effort to unite the Muslims spiritually and culturally, based on Islamic principles.  
However, this rise of the religious identity has proved to be problematic in relation 
to the political identity especially in a perceived ‘Islamisation’ of the country. The 
Muslim social formation that is deployed to discuss construct as opposed to an 
ontological entity is problematic because unity is a problem (Q. Ismail 1997) and 
there is a need “to examine the construction of that unity, of the stakes and 
antagonisms involved and of the many exclusions required to constitute and 
maintain it; to show that social formations are not stable entities but sites of 
struggle over which (interest) groups would achieve hegemony over the formation 
and thus determine the nature of its (dominant) identity” (Ibid, 63).  In this sense, 
what Ismail (1997) describes is what happened with the Muslim community where 
the interest groups for religious identity got agency and were able to establish 
their dominance.  As an interviewee said 
 
“With the advent of the ‘piety’ movement, religion has come to override all 
other forms of collective identity for Muslims, even those of language and 
region. Any analysis of the success of Muslim piety groups in the country 
cannot be conducted without taking this peculiarity into account.”398 
As a consequence, it was left open to interpretation by the modern educated elite  
and the traditional Ulema (religious clergy) which would lead to controversy and 
conflicts (Ibid.) For example, this development of a pure identity has been 
manifested in a move away from the traditional clothing to one that is more Arab 
in nature399 (D. B. McGilvray 2011).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The expression of the Muslim identity evolved into expressions of 
religiousness and piety.  However, what was quite apparent was the fact 
that expressions of piety soon became acquainted with superficial 
representations of expression namely in the form of clothing.  So to be 
‘Muslim’ was to be ‘seen’ to be Muslim which in many cases meant 
wearing clothes inherited from Saudi Arabia.  Thus the question was ‘are 
we becoming more ‘Islamic’ or more ‘Arab’?’.  Nevertheless this confusion 









of expression has led to an existential crisis of representation for the 
Muslims”400 
 
Organizations like Jamaati Islami401 and Tabligh Jamaat402, which have its 
historical basis from the Indian Sub Continent as a result of Colonial interventions 
(Hirst 2011), in particular have  been ‘blamed’ for the  ‘Islamisation’ of Sri Lanka 
during the last few decades which  has been perceived largely as negative by 
analysts who feel that this has led to a psychological conflict within the community 
(D. B. McGilvray 2011) in terms of a tension between the religious and cultural 
influences of the global Islamic movements and religious ideologies of the local 
context.  However, to blame these two organisations solely for the large scale 
Islamisation of the country is not only naive but doesn’t take into account other 
factors and contexts. Whilst it is true that  both organisations are credited with 
playing positive roles  in uniting Muslims under an Islamic umbrella to give 
political weight to a largely constructed religious identity (A. Imtiyaz 2012), it must 
also be noted that an increased social religiosity and display of religious clothing 
is also as a result of the large numbers of Sri Lankan Muslims – both men and 
women –  who were employed on labour contracts in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and 
the Gulf Emirates, and who when they returned back to the country brought the 
traditions and cultures inherited from the Middle East (D. B. McGilvray 2011).  In 
addition, one should not also discount this ‘existential’ crisis that the Muslim 
community faced with regards the ‘othering’ caused by the ethnic tensions 
between the Sinhalese and the Tamils and the need that the community felt to 
chart its own course separate to these two.  Hence the evolution of the religious 
identity is one of a ‘perfect storm’ when all elements seemed to coalesce together.  
As an interviewee said 
 
“The piety is perceived and propagated among Muslims in Sri Lanka must 
be understood as located within the context of ethnic conflict and the 
polarization between ethnic groups that occurred in its wake”403 
However, it is in the expansion of the global electronic media where the greatest 
influence and casual effect has arisen which has led not only to a heightened 
awareness of ‘Muslim issues’ around the world, and thus a greater sense of 
membership in the global community of all Muslims (the Ummah) but also a 
greater strive to develop a Muslim identity. This global pan-Islamic reformist quest 
for identity is part of a much more complex deeply rooted malaise (Ramadan 
2012).  The quest for this identity has entailed a preoccupation with religion in 












terms of the framework, the structure of ritual, the rights and obligations of 
believers, prohibitions, the moral protection of the faithful and so on, much in 
opposition to the danger of cultural colonialism and alienation exacerbated by 
globalisation404.  Thus contemporary Islamic discourse “has, however too often 
lost its substance, which is that of meaning, of understanding ultimate goals and 
the state of the heart.” (Ibid., 141).  
 
Hence the new pan Islamic reformist quest for identity has lacked spirituality and 
the understanding of value systems, traditions, habits and culture.  What this has 
ultimately meant is the development of an identity that is at odds with a Sri Lankan 
identity and departure from what was seen as a ‘traditional Sri Lankan Muslim 
identity’. “Discrediting traditional ritual practice is a common feature of new 
religious movements” (Haniffa 2008, 366), which  has also meant the concept of 
framing one’s own identity vis-a-vis the ‘other’.  Whilst the religious revival 
amongst Muslims has given them a greater appreciation of their own identity, it 
has also transformed the relations with the ethnic others (Ibid) and has been 
centred around the perception and propagation of piety in terms of their minority 
consciousness and the “cultivated distancing of the religious other and promoting 
a sensibility of community exclusiveness among Muslims” (Ibid, 366).  As a key 
informant of a focus group said 
“What we have seen over the last 30-40 years is a change both from a 
visible as well as a community engagement perspective.  We always saw 
the Muslim community as close with their religious principles and practice, 
but what we saw over these decades a change in the attire of the 
community to become ‘more religious’ which in turn affected their practice 
and their engagement with the Non-Muslims.  For us looking at it from 
outside, we perceive with some sadness that this increased religious 
practice has a change in the behaviour of the community.  We don't 
recognise what and who we saw as the Muslim community.  However to 
some others, they view with suspicion these changes as they seem it as 
an Arabisation of the community and ultimately the country”405 
 
One of the practical products of this new identity mark, globally has been the 
development of the term , kafir or infidel—as it functions today to refer to religious 
others within the everyday language of the newly pious (Ibid)406.  What this means 
















is that it maintains the ethnic exclusivity (through the religious otherness) and 
bolsters uniformity in personal and communal piety which ultimately affects the 
consideration of the Muslim community as part of a pluralistic society that 
includes people or other faiths (and ethnicity).  Hence engagement with the other 
is minimal and often limited to supplying instrumentally the needs of everyday life, 
and does not extend to the qualitative social exchanges of an earlier era.  As an 
interviewee said 
 
“Religious revivalism amongst Muslims gave them a greater appreciation 
of their own identity, but also transformed their relations with ethnic others 
in a way that mirrored the polarization that took place amongst the different 
religious/ethnic groups during the conflict.  To some extent the polarisation 
was extenuated by the practices of religion, which in a way called for the 
cultivated distancing of the religious other.  In the end, it promoted a 
sensibility of community exclusiveness amongst Muslims.”407 
 
This itself is an irony because despite the quest for political identity, there was a 
lot more interaction between Muslims (especially Middle class Muslims) and the 
wider society408.  This is exactly what the Buddhist monk in my focus group said 
when he talked about seeing and feeling a greater sense of isolation from the 
Muslim community.   What it  does make difficult though with this  dehumanizing 
reduction of the ‘other’ that occurs in the midst of Islamic reform  groups, is that 
“it is almost impossible for adherents to consider Muslims’ problems as issues 
which are commonly shared, with themselves understood as part of a common 
‘Sri Lankan community’” (Haniffa 2008, 367).  As an interviewee said 
 
“While the community is then being transformed in many positive ways, 
the piety movement is also affecting Muslims’ place in the Sri Lankan 
polity, by the cultivation of ethnic exclusivity. This phenomenon—entirely 
predictable in the context of intense ethnic polarization—may have 
troubling consequences in the future. A most unfortunate result of piety 
groups’ work to make Muslims informed and appreciative of their religion, 
is the manner in which religious community is being emphasized to the 
detriment of any other sorts of social participation”409 
In the wake of such ritualism and politicisation as well as isolation, the thirst for 
meaning is often solved through mysticism. What this new identity has meant is 
also a resurgence of the traditional popular Muslim Sufi mysticism in many 
different forms from the older traditional and ritualistic groups to newer 
controversial sheikhs (D. B. McGilvray 2011).  One explanation for this trend is 
that the polarising harshness of the new reformist teachings have offered ordinary 
people few answers to their spiritual pursuit of meaning, faith, the heart and 








peace.  Thus the Sufi movements provide a kind of exile from world affairs, in 
contrast to the ritualistic traditionalism and the pan Islamic reformist traditions.  
However, this re-emergence of these mystical circles also seems to be either the 
educated elites / middle class urban sector in search for meaning or the poorer 
who feel a need for reassurance that verges on superstition (although the 
superstition reason is also attributed to the elites as well).  Whilst a majority of 
these diverse groups are respectful of norms, a substantial number of these 
circles also yield to the temptation of the cult of the personality of the sheikh or 
guide or develop a culture of isolation, social and political passivity and loss of 
responsibility of taking action to solve social problems in the world (Ramadan 
2012).   Hence these Sufi renaissance movement represents an expansion and 
diversification of religious expression but have also led to local religious conflicts 
that have arisen between heterodox Sufi groups and zealous orthodox Islamic 
reformers which are another cause for alarm for the community.   As an 
interviewee said  
 
“The blurring of lines between political and religious affiliations has 
surfaced such that Islamic ideological differences such as with the practice 
of Sufism become internal cleavages and conflict between different 
Muslim groups within a certain area that can then take on a political form 
as well” 410 
 
This split of the community within Sri Lanka between trying to maintain a link with 
the historic Sufi movements (often seen as deviant by newer movements) and 
the more well organised ideological movements of Islamic revitalisation is not just 
based on ideological reasons but is also broken into class lines as well with the 
more affluent elites or the poor being affiliated with the Sufi and the middle and 
working class with the reformist movements. This also relates to a difference in 
education as many of the elites and the very poor may not have gone to school 
and would have inherited their status and the middle class going onto have higher 
education.  Hence there is once again a mirroring of the differences that took 
place in determining the political identity of the Muslim community, with the elites 
on one side and the intelligentsia and activists on the other side.  
 
The counter argument to this criticism of the Islamisation process is that it has 
enabled a rediscovery of what Islamic identity, the proper norms for ritualistic 
practice and a benchmark of piety.  However, what is apparent is the majority of 
the middle and working class to whom the new ideologies have appealed, view 
this as a rebellion once again against the elites.  It is this quest for a purer 
understanding of Islam, away from the elite definition that is driving this new 
religiosity and articulation of a new identity which on its own is fine except when 
it is being dominated by one ideology or line of thinking. 
 
                                                
410			Face	to	face	interview	with	Mr.	Izzeth	Hussein,	January	2016	
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In this, there is a cause for concern.  The ‘Islamisation’ of communities has largely 
been influenced and driven by funds and donations from the Middle East mainly 
Saudi Arabia and the other petro-monarchies, which propagate a certain type of 
ideology mainly of the ‘Salafi / Wahabi’ form, thereby leading to a straight-jacket 
of thought and a scaffolding of authority.  As a result of the amount of funding for 
mosques411 and Muslim organisations over the last 30 years or so, there is now 
a greater influence of Saudi Islam on the thinking of people in Sri Lanka. What 
this ideology has done is to devalue classical Islamic tradition  and to narrow 
religious and spiritual sensibilities (Allawi 2009). “The concern with the minutiae 
of religious life, the micro-regulation of daily activity, the smugness that 
accompanies dogmatic certainty, the joylessness of a fastidious religiosity, the 
lack of interest or curiosity in the past or in multivariate aspects of Islam, have all 
crept into the religious culture of Observant Muslims” (Ibid, 121).  Thus the culture 
of Islam becomes drained of vitality by a barren utilitarianism and a perception of 
a purity which divorces the natural diverse state of Islam and isolates it from the 
cultural inputs of the countries that it takes root in.  This is an important issue to 
take serious stock of as culture is intertwined with  religion as complex questions 
of values, meaning, spirituality, traditions and the arts are answered that give 
form to history, memory, nations and identities (Ramadan 2012). “Cultures, along 
with the religions that shape and nurture them, are value systems, sets of 
traditions and habits clustered around one or several languages, producing 
meaning: for the self, for the here, for the community, for life” (Ibid, 140). 
 
As a consequence, the ideology of thought that is emerging currently in Sri Lanka 
is in fact been linked to one of the more conservative forms of Islam that has 
tended to try and articulate a ‘purist’ Islam which doesn’t take into account culture 
and context.  This pure Islam which fits in with what is the ideology from the 
middle east has caused quite a lot of concern in Sri Lanka in its framing of the 
Muslim vis-a-vis the other and as a consequence has meant a lot of antagonism 
as well as isolation from the other.   
 
In addition to this, much has also been made about the potential for radicalisation 
amongst the youth mainly from the eastern province.   The social, political and/or 
economic grievances that could motivate communities to rebel violently against 
the dominant actors (T. Gurr 1993) did exist for the Muslims from the East (in a 
similar vein to the radicalisation of Tamil and Sinhala youth).  However whilst 
discontent has existed, the radicalisation has not taken the violent path412, and 
has in fact been confined to what has already been discussed in the development 
of an Islamic religious identity. 
                                                
411   Another sign of departure from traditional worship and a mark of ‘Pan-Islamic’ influence has been 
the wholesale demolition and reconstruction of historic older-style mosques in accordance with imported 
models of Islamic architecture. For example, the new, brightly painted ‘gingerbread’ mosques with 
multiple minarets and ornate Arabian-inspired rooflines are quite different from the simpler whitewashed 





Having said this, it is also important to note that the search for the ‘purist’ Islamic 
identity has also in a sense been driven by the conflict and the political 
ramifications of the desire to differentiate oneself from the other.  What this means 
is that an outward appearance of ‘piety’ which fits in with the norms of a ‘purer’ 
Islam suddenly also becomes an indicator of a political identity of being part of 
the Muslim community. For example Muslim girls' school uniforms are now 
designed  with a hijab and in some cases to include a face covering (niqab) that 
can be folded down when girls are walking between home and school, while boys' 
Western-style school uniforms include a Muslim cap as a way not of only 
religiously identifying themselves as Muslim (from a spiritual sense)  but  also 
serving as a political statement of identity413.   In particular, the hijab which is the 
most visual form of identity, has become a marker of  cultural difference in the 
sense of displaying to the other one’s Muslimness  in a multi ethnic polity and 
less of a newly and consciously embraced personal piety (Haniffa 2008). 
“Therefore the selfhood embraced is Muslim, but not always radically religious” 
(Ibid, 357). 
 
Whilst the reformist groups make Muslims informed and appreciative of their 
religion, it is the manner in which the religious community is being emphasized to 
the detriment of any other sorts of social participation that is a cause for some 
concern.   As an interviewee said 
 
“The religious self-assertion has given the community self-confidence in 
ways that the idea of a Muslim political community—a distant possibility as 
a geographically dispersed second minority—failed to do or even sustain.  
However the danger is that the preoccupation with religion has left little 
room for the political understanding of Muslimness as part of a 
constellation of different ethnicities and religions within one polity.”414 
Thus a case for Muslims as a minority with its own cultural and social identity has 
not been made in parallel to the political identity.  Hence the end result has been 
a political entity that is not really supported either through culture or heritage.  
Since ethnicity and religion are seemingly inseparable with regards the Sri 
Lankan Muslims, there has always been a challenge  on the development of 
either category as Islam is the primary marker of the ethnic identity of Sri Lankan 
Muslims (M. A. Nuhman 2007).  As an interviewee said 
 
“Muslims are still struggling to find ways of articulating Muslim grievances 
in a manner that can change current misconceptions regarding Muslims’ 
place in the conflict. The lack of fit between the practices through which 
Muslim society is transformed and energized and the practices of society 
at large means that there is as yet no meeting point between the language 






of the piety movement and the demands of activism in the larger Sri 
Lankan context.”415 
These are the challenges that the Muslim community faced moving into the last 
critical juncture and continue to face in their prospects.  If they are unable to 




As the previous chapter showed, post 2009, the Muslim community faced some 
immediate threats from the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist extremists.  However, as 
we have seen, this is not some isolated incident but is built on a precedence.   As 
an interviewee said 
 
“In Sri Lanka, Muslimness is not validated within the dominant national 
culture and will always be difficult to reconcile.  As we have seen since the 
end of the conflict, the only challenge with the Tamils seem to be political 
as there are no issues with the cultural or religious practices.  With the 
Muslims it is entirely different and one is led to believe that the cleavages 
are more deep and almost existential in nature”416 
 
The preceding discussions have demonstrated that in the past seventy years the 
Sri Lanka political parties of various shades have instrumentalised the Buddhist 
religious symbols for political gains; and that a distinct Sinhala-Buddhist political 
agenda has been fostered and nurtured over this period.  
Though the Muslim political elites adopted a policy of accommodation whilst 
ensuring their community interests were maintained which were largely around 
the preservation of religious and cultural identity, it is clear from the post 2009 era 
that this was not enough.  The bottom line is that the Sinhala-political elites and 
politicians have intentionally politicized Buddhism as a means to advance their 
political agenda such that the state has to make disproportionate concessions to 
Buddhism and Sinhala-Buddhists and the ethnic and religious minorities are left 
outside. What must be underscored is that the agenda is not entirely invented by 
the political. In short, the political Buddhism must have been present in the 
society; even if within a small minority of the population. The worldview of an 
influential segment of the Sinhala-Buddhist population, a ‘nationalist’ response to 
the westernization, fear and anxiety of a perceived outside connections of other 
ethnic/religious communities are some of these factors which have played 
significant roles in politicization of Buddhism. 
 
Despite this, the Muslims did undertake a policy of accommodation, yet somehow 
this has also become a challenge to the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists insecure in 
their majority and insecure in the religiosity of their fellow countrymen. 





Coupled with a growing international Islamophobia campaign, the Muslim identity 
and its expression became and still remains a challenge.  This explains the attack 
on the elements that visibly describe the Muslim identity such as the halal 
certification, the issue of mosques and the dress code.  All of these that show a 
visible religiosity of the Muslim community and therefore enables them to be 
visibly seen above the radar screen became a problem for the Sinhala 
nationalists.  Thus the critical juncture becomes a challenged identity as the 
narrative of belonging to the nation was thrust on the Muslim.  Muslims were 
challenged to show that they were part of the system and thus there became a 
lot of emphasis on explaining this.  As a key informant said 
 
“Suddenly, you see a lot more ‘Muslims’ celebrating national occasions 
such as the Independence day or paying respect to senior dead Buddhist 
monks and going out of their way to do it.  Its not like we suddenly accepted 
these national  so called cultural elements  but mainly we have been forced 
into it to show we belong”417 
 
Thus it is a case of the ‘roosters coming home to roost’ as the Muslim mind which 
is often split between the local and the universal, i.e. the local community vs the 
Ummah has to get over this conundrum.  How can they focus on the relatively 
local and whilst focussing on the civilizational?   
 
The post 2009 era should have really been a chance to rethink ethnic based 
politics and explore a return to more inclusive politics given the fact that the 
circumstances had changed.  It also should have represented an opportunity for 
a rethink in terms of how the Muslim community represented itself vis-à-vis the 
others.  However, for the Muslim political elite, they had failed to recognise this 
shift.   The political institutionalisation of the Muslim community not helped by the 
lack of a united political front thus failed to grasp the opportunity brought about 
by a shift in the wind of Sinhala national politics, instead choosing to push for the 
same old status quo of political representation, thereby not only weakening the 
Muslims’ case for more political negotiation, but also the case for wider 
representation and identity.  By failing to really take into account the changing 
nature of the community as a result of other globalising external factors such as 
religious reformation, the rise of Islamophobia, a securitized agenda and also the 
changing nature of the country especially post 2009, the Muslim community can 
not receive redress to their grievances by playing ethnic politics.  This has been 
apparent with the rise of the BBS and the violence in 2014 and other periods, 
where Muslim politicians were not able to gather support or to influence the 
Government of the day to really stop the violence before extreme damage was 
done or able to gather support after these incidents for redress or to prevent 
future incidents from happening. 
 
                                                
417	Key	Informant	Focus	Group	Discussion	with	Muslim	civil	society	activists,	November	2016	
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However, in the absence of any credible Muslim political leadership, the 
questions that was and are posed is what happens when this political influence 
is lost and who takes up the slack?  How can Muslims get the representation for 
their identity?  This question is important on the whole because of the new 
pressures facing the Muslim community particualrly after the end of the conflict. 
It was clear that the influence of the Muslim politicians had waned and where they 
had previously been able to have some influence this was no longer the case.  In 
the gap that emerged in terms of leadership, Muslim civil society stepped in, who 
would then abrogate that role to religious leaders especially as this happened in 
parallel to a global Islamic reformation418.  With faith becoming an identity that 
was much more fixed and almost a refuge from insecurity brought about by the 
conflict and the subsequent identity politics, faith leaders were really expected to 
step up to fill that gap of leadership and representation.  Unfortunately, they were 
not equipped to handle both and succeeded in putting a lot of emphasis on 
religious representation and identity.  The incidents post 2009, exposed the 
weaknesses in this type of leadership who were unable to answer the questions 
being posed on religious identity and expression vis-à-vis political representation.   
 
In addition, the incidents also displayed how entrenched the civil society and 
political leadership were in the past and how dependent they were on the religious 
leaders.  Despite severe criticism of the weakness of the religious leaders, the 
civil society and political leadership were unable to not only provide constructive 
criticism (for fear of criticising religion) but also were not able to fully understand 
the depth and strength of the anti Muslim feeling.  They instead opted to think 
about it in terms of a binary perspective of party political manipulation without 
understanding that the polity of the day were exploiting already deeply held 
insecurities about the Muslim community. The feeling held by many within the 
civil society leadership was to try and keep the accommodation politics going and 
that by changing the government (largely held responsible for the 2014 violence) 
with another political party and then working with the new Government, such 
violence and feelings could be avoided.  Their false premise was that one Sinhala 
political party was better than the other and by bringing one into power over the 
rest, the problems of the Muslim community would be solved.  The violence of 
2018 effectively makes that concept redundant and brings back to the drawing 
board the questions of how and where the Muslim community position 
themselves.  In effect, the serious situation which faces the Muslim community at 
the cross roads in 2018 is the future of Muslim identity and expression of agency.  
 
As a ‘third party’ in the complex ethnic politics of Sri Lanka, the Muslim community 
have been transformed under its influence and forced to define themselves and 
seek their own discourse. However, this has also meant that there has been an 
element of naivety in how they have conducted themselves trying to forge their 





own identity, in particular with the simultaneous combination of balancing the 
combination of external ethno-nationalist rivalries with the internal Islamic 
doctrinal conflict i.e. How does the community defend itself against hegemonic 
actors whilst avoiding a global Islamist agenda?  Muslims have struggled and 
continue to struggle to articulate their grievances from the conflict in a manner 
that is conducive to maintaining confidence with the other two parties and in a 
manner that perhaps changes the current misconceptions regarding Muslims’ 
place in the conflict.  
 
So what is the answer to the question posed as to what the Muslim community 






As I write this conclusion, there has been anti Muslim violence taking place in the 
central province of Sri Lanka, namely in Kandy (See Reuters 2018; Mashal and 
Bastian 2018).  The worst fears predicted in the previous chapters of a recurrence 
of the Sinhala – Muslim riots of 1915, or the 1983 pogrom have been realised.  
What has been clear from the 2018 violence, was that the predictions of the 
Muslims being the targets of Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist in the post 2009 era 
have not only taken place but run the risk of creating an enabling environment for 
future conflict in two ways: the spreading of myths about the community that 
scapegoats the community in terms of representing them as a threat to the 
Sinhala-Buddhist economic dominance and racist population politics (Wettimuny 
2018) and the indifference and silence of the silent majority (Gunasekara 2018).  
Again these are not new issues, but simply a reinforcement of what has been 
discussed and what has happened previously. The violence against the Muslims 
recently in 2018, 2017 and 2014 is nothing new and represents repeated Anti 
Muslim violence that has taken place in Sri Lanka over the past three to four 
decades (Nagaraj and Haniffa 2017).  As an interviewee said 
 
“The Anti – Muslim violence in Sri Lanka was overshadowed by the armed 
conflict and extreme polarization precipitated by Sinhala and Tamil 
nationalisms.  To some extent it was also forgotten within the narrative of 
the Muslim community and we seem to treat every new incident as a new 
phenomenon, without realising that there is a trend that is there that also 
reflects deeper relationships between the two communities which are 
under stress and threat”.419  
8.2	Effects	of	Indifference	
It is clear that this collective indifference, coupled with a fog of misconception of 
the Muslim community and the visibility of the Muslim identity are the fault-lines 
of the problems between the two communities420 in the country.  
 
However, the different periods of violence have shown a deeper issue, in terms 
of examining whether the violence are an “an example of an ingrained Sinhala 
Buddhist mentality, or in fact reflect a history of ideological and political 
reconfiguration” (Gunawardena 2018), or in effect  something more like 
economics.  What is clear though is that the distinct experience of political and 
ethnic violence experienced by the Muslims in the context of Sinhala-Muslim 
tensions requires greater empirical attention and theorizing than it has received. 






Since 1915 there have been repeated incidents of Anti Muslim violence by 
Sinhalese and despite this, there has not been a formal call to arms to date by 
the Muslims421 unlike the 1983 Anti Tamil pogrom which led to the consolidation 
of power by the LTTE.  This in itself reflects a slightly different approach to how 
the Muslim community seeks to solve their issues with the Sinhalese and hails to 
that legacy of ‘accomodationist’ politics, although the Easter Sunday attacks 
could well change that.  There is though a temporal, spatial, political, economic 
and social dynamic to the anti- Muslim violence and to some extent, the violence 
of 2018 represents a ‘perfect storm’ where such different competing factors such 
as economics, inter-ethnic relations, religious sentiments, mythology and so on, 
all consolidated together. So there can not be one cause for the violence but 
multiple causes that need to be understood and worked on and a separate study 
is needed to really understand these dynamics.  
 
Yet, the fact that 103 years on from the first Sinhala-Muslim clashes that took 
place in the country, we had come full circle back to Kandy with the clashes can 
not be under estimated or over emphasised.  As it then pushed the Muslim 
community to realise that they were at a crossroads in their relationship with the 
Sinhala and also as a minority in the community, so to the current wave of 
violence in 2018 represents a symbolic statement of a real cross roads for the 
Muslim community vis-à-vis- their relationship with the Sinhalese community and 
the rest of the country.  Regardless of the single or multiple causes for the 
violence, the mere fact that the violence took place on the scale that it did and 
with the complicity of state actors (Fernando 2018, Wijesinghe 2018) poses 
important questions for the future of the expression of the Muslim identity as well 
as the representation and expression of their identity and identity in general in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
In this sense, the institutionalisation of the Muslim identity proves Barth’s (1969) 
argument that boundaries are also maintained between ethnic units by a limited 
set of cultural features, and that consequently it is possible to specify the nature 
of continuity and persistence of such units. His rich analyses, deep insights and 
acute perceptions advanced understandings of the complex social mechanisms 
that create and shape ethnic communities, as well as the emergence, constitution 
and persistence of ethnic groups (Verdery 1994). As Barth argues, ethnicity is the 
product of specific kinds of inter-group relations. An ethnic group cannot exist in 
isolation, its formation and continuation is dependent upon interaction with 
‘Others’ (Barth, 1969). Thus Barth focused on ethnic boundary maintenance, 
interaction and identity change across the boundaries, stating that: categorical 







ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and 
information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation 
whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and 
membership in the course of individual life histories (1969:9-10).  Barth’s 
theoretical framework sets out the subtle and sinuous frontiers of ethnic 
boundaries, the interconnectedness of ethnic identities and the continuity and 
transformation of ethnic groups.   He elucidates that 1. Ethnicity is not defined by 
culture but by social organisation. 2. Ethnic identifications are based on ascription 
and self-identification. They are situationally dependent and can change. 3. The 
roots of this social organisation are not cultural content but dichotomization, so 
that the ethnic boundary is a social boundary formed through interaction with 
‘Others’.   
 
In this case, the Muslim identity as a religious motivator and communal galvanizer 
really explains what Barth (1969) tried to argue in terms of setting out the subtle 
and sinuous frontiers of ethnic boundaries, the interconnectedness of ethnic 
identities and the continuity and transformation of ethnic groups. However, it 
doesn't fully explain the role of the elite in terms of their instrumentalisation of 
identity and how they balanced their interests vis-à-vis community expectations. 
It is important to note these dynamics in order to understand that identity is also 
dependent on elite dynamics. 
 
It is also worth revisiting the triadic nexus of Brubaker (1996,2009), where in one 
sense the argument can be made that the Sri Lankan Muslim identity formation 
was indeed symptomatic of this triadic nexus.  There is the ‘nationalising 
nationalism’ or the core nation represented by the Sinhala Buddhist, the 
perceived transnational link or ‘homeland’ conceived as the ‘Ummah’ and the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community as an imagined political minority.  However, this is 
where the similarity ends, because the main implication for the Sri Lankan Muslim 
identity formation was for ‘adequate representation’ and a preservation of identity 
versus the ‘other’. Though there is an imagined community and imagined 
geography, in reality there is no ‘external national homeland’ for the Muslims.  
There is no external state like that exists for the Indian Diaspora or the Chinese 
diaspora that would be able to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, assert 
the rights and protect the interests of their ‘ethnonational’ kin.  Although the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community did try and push the envelope of this relationship in 
the wake of anti Muslim violence in 2014 / 2017 / 2018 when they made 
representations to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Muslim 
countries for support and the right for Sri Lanka to be censured by these Muslim 
nations for the treatment of the Muslim community.  Whilst this was the intent of 
the Sri Lankan Muslim political elite, calling on the transnational link with other 
Muslims, in reality, other than eliciting some statements of concern from the OIC, 
it did not necessarily stop the attacks from taking place nor did it elicit the support 
that the community was hoping for.  So in this case, the interests of the Muslim 
community in Sri Lanka are not protected by an external body despite its 
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expectations and perceptions of this and the ‘other’s perception of this422.  Hence 
the concept of this transnational link is challenged and nullified and needs 
rethinking423. 
8.3			Reimagining	Identity	
It is clear from what we have discussed that there is a paradox in the Muslim 
identity and that the Sri Lankan Muslim community is at best a complex mix of 
different ideologies and thoughts processes.  Faith is not only a theological 
marker (a religious motivator) but also an identity marker (a communal 
galvanizer), which means there remain tensions and fault lines along racial and 
religious lines. In defining themselves as such, the identity of the Sri Lankan 
Muslim community has been developed and evolved not only based on ethno-
nationalist tendencies but also from a theological and spiritual basis.   
 
This duality construct of a ‘Muslim’ identity has become a challenge for the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community as they attempt to profess their Sri Lankan identity 
(and sense of belonging). By identifying themselves ethnically as ‘Muslims’, 
politically constructed from the late 19th century, the Muslim political elites played 
on blurring the distinctions between faith as a theological marker (religious 
motivator) and faith as an identity marker (communal galvanizer). This meant that 
the Muslims energetically constructed their ‘racial’ identity as a distinct ethnic 
group that is founded on religious and cultural identity.  They interchanged 
religious motivators and communal galvanisers as and when it suited them.  
Largely helped with a renaissance in Islamic theological movements and thinking 
globally, the concept of Muslim representation in Sri Lanka evolved into 
theological and ideological formations on top of political representations.   
 
It is this that provides a challenge, with respect to the classification and 
representation of the Sri Lankan Muslim as an ethnic identity, whilst the generic 
definition of Muslim does not relate to an ethnic representation but to a religious 
connotation. Thus in Sri Lanka the concept of an ethnic ‘Sri Lankan Muslim’ is 
slightly misleading and confusing as it ascribes a homogeneity beyond just 
religious practice to cultures, traditions, experiences and language which is made 
difficult by the heterogeneous nature of the geographical location of the Muslim 
community in Sri Lanka, religious practices and traditions and often at odds with 













the concept of nationalism or the nation-state. By deliberately blurring the lines 
between theology and identity, the political elites were able to utilize it to serve 
their own interests to the detriment of their community. Ultimately this also caused 
a sense of disengagement and isolation. 
 
Hence this identity has emerged as a double edged sword, with a negative aspect 
being a minority but reifying an identity that is not singular and cohesive but that 
evolved influenced by global politics and a securitised lens.  In that reification of 
a Sri Lankan Muslim identity, this process doesn't recognise the challenges faced 
by and from different communities, both internally and externally.  This means 
that the singular point of identity doesn't negotiate the lived experience and 
challenges of the community and communities.  There is thus a real tension 
between the reified identity (of a singular binary expression) and the lived reality 
of political experiences.   
 
In other words, there has been a transformation, institutionalisation and 
politicisation of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity into a religious / ethnic identity over 
130 years where Islamic became an ethnic boundary marker that was 
instrumentalised politically.   However, this did not take into account the local and 
global lived experiences of the Muslim communities. This left the community with 
a political identity that was also influenced from outside but didn't take into 
account evolving individual identities.  This meant that the identity was not fit for 
purpose and left it open to challenges.  As the simple illustration below explains, 
this is the trajectory of the challenges for the Muslim community in Sri Lanka.  
 
External pressures                                    institutionalisation                                           
internal challenge and responses                                             transformation of 
identity                        identity not fit for purpose 
	
	So	what	does	this	mean?		
There is a lack of clear articulation and policy of identity, instead choosing to 
move between both notions of religious marker and community galvaniser as and 
when circumstances provided.  In the wake of rising religious consciousness by 
the Muslim community and by neglecting the necessary theological discussions 
necessary for developing identities, and contextualizing faith and failing to 
provide leadership in articulating this, the sole aim of developing a separate 
identity for the Muslim community in Sri Lanka has fallen prey to the global 
malaise afflicting Muslims, which is the push for a ‘pure’ Islamic identity based on 
a theological construct but taking the identity of a global community/race, 
neglecting local contexts and cultures. This is a new phenomenon within Islamic 
teachings and history because there is no such thing as a pure community 
identity. There are different manifestations of Islam and Muslim communities 
united with a pure theological marker, of which the latter is mistaken to be the 
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identity. It is this that is now causing global concerns and issues of the rise of 
‘conservative’ Islam.  
 
By pushing for a new political identity without understanding the changing 
dynamics of the context, what has happened is that the doors have been opened 
for discussions on a religious identity that is not only foreign to Sri Lanka but fails 
to take into account local contexts and cultures, making any future discussion of 
post conflict reconciliation even more challenging, as people feel that the Muslim 
community is more isolated (linguistically, culturally and socially) than before.  
So	what	needs	to	be	done?	
It is here where one can start talking about multiple identities as elaborated by 
Sen (2006).  The encouragement and retention of multiple identities means that 
people have several enriching identities: nationality, gender, age and parental 
background, religious or professional affiliation (Sen 2006). It is the recognition 
of this plurality and the searching for commonalities within this pluralism that will 
lead to greater respect and ultimately understanding and acceptance. Thus these 
new solutions will have to challenge people to accept diversity and create equal 
opportunities for diverse communities, ethnicities, traditions, cultures and faiths. 
This is in fact something that echoes what Barth (1969) acknowledged in terms 
of the need to possess and celebrate multiple identities and that is problematic 
and reductive to limit the individual to having one superordinate ethnic identity.  
By reducing these pluralities, we in turn risk reducing the dynamics, potential for 
creativity and future transformation and emergence of ethnic groups and 
identities.  Thus the point is simply that “if identities are always constructed, then 
they can also be deconstructed, perhaps even reconstructed” (Q. Ismail 1997, 
95).   
 
So for the mainstream Sinhalese there needs to be a recognition of the plurality 
of the nation in terms of Non Buddhist and Non Sinhala people.  Equally the 
minorities need to rethink the concept of multiple identities and pluralism.  
 
This is also something that Brubaker (2002) raises when he writes about the need 
to rethink ethnicity, race and nationhood to construe their reality, power and 
significance in a different way, with the reality. In challenging the formation of 
groups Brubaker (2002, 167) calls for a thinking “of ethnicity, race and nation not 
in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, 
cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, 
institutional forms, political projects and contingent events. It means thinking of 
ethnicization, racialization and nationalization as political, social, cultural and 
psychological processes. And it means taking as a basic analytical category not 
the ‘group’ as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual 
variable”.  Hence the implication of this rethink raises the prospect of raising the 
awareness of the interest that ethnic and nationalist leaders may have in “living 
off politics, as well as for politics” (Ibid, 176), and awareness of the possible 
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divergence between the interests of leaders and those of their putative 
constituents.  This is one of the main conclusions that we have identified in this 
thesis as the disconnect between the political elite and the grassroots in terms of 
the experience and expectations for the Sri Lankan Muslim community.  This 
approach also brings into analytical and policy focus the critical importance of 
intra-ethnic mechanisms in generating and sustaining putatively interethnic 
conflict.  This is again something that was raised at the beginning of the thesis 
when discussing Bush (2003) and his two level critical juncture analysis and how 
he maintains that “inter-ethnic group relations may both condition and be 
conditioned by intra-group dynamics” (Ibid, 11) 
Change	of	Narrative	
There thus needs to be a holistic re-imagination of Sri Lankan Muslim identity, 
expression and agency and an approach to the conversation.  This can be done 
in phases as part of an evolution.  The first phase starts from a re-imagining of 
the historical narrative.  The Muslim narrative is and has been the fact that 
‘Muslims have been existing and co-existing with other communities in Sri Lanka 
over the last 1000 years without any problem’.  This in itself is a problematic 
statement.  It presupposes that there is a noble race of people called ‘Muslims’ 
who decided one day to move to Sri Lanka, 1000 years ago, fell in love with the 
country, decided to settle, intermarry with the local people and it is their 
descendants who are living today in Sri Lanka making up the population of Sri 
Lankan Muslims and whose constituents are facing the problems of racism and 
xenophobia.  This reasoning is completely simplistic, assumes homogeneity for 
a religion that thrived on heterogeneity, and simply does not consider the 
complexity of relationships and lived experiences between communities. This 
reasoning also assumes that Muslims are one race which again is not true.  
Muslims are a heterogeneous community from different races, ethnicities, 
languages and countries all bound by the simple, universal principles of Islam 
and its teachings.   
 
The narrative of Muslims has to change in Sri Lanka starting from this simple fact.  
Islam came to Sri Lanka 1000 years and not Muslims.  The latter are made up of 
a number of people who sought to believe in the former including definitely Arab 
traders who came and settled in the country, interacted with the locals and 
married local women (from the Sinhalese and Tamil community); Sinhalese and 
Tamil communities who converted to Islam; Muslim communities who came from 
Malabar in south India; communities who came to Sri Lanka as part of colonial 
migration and slave trade including the Malays, Memons and Gujaratis and other 
forms of migration and trade during the ages.  Thus the Muslim community in Sri 
Lanka is a mosaic of people who are Moor (if they want to claim Arab heritage), 
Memon, Malay, Bhora, Pakistani, Afghani, Tamil and Sinhala.  Even the Moor 
label is slightly disingenuous because it assumes a direct and pure link with Arabs 
instead of acknowledging the intermarriage over centuries between communities.   
This also reinforces what came out from a key informant in one of my focus 
groups 
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“I am not fully Moor, because I have a whole heritage of people descended 
from Malays, Memons, Sinhalese and so on, because of the intermarriage 
that took place over the centuries.  We come from a place in Colombo 
where different communities coexisted and lived together and then 
intermarried.  So the concept of Moor to define a Muslim is a fallacy for 
many.  We don't have that link anymore and we are a cocktail of different 
people.  Muslims in fact epitomise to some extent the pluralistic nature of 
the country” 424 
 
So the narrative has to move away from a label of “Muslims who have come from 
a 1000 years ago” to something that holistically represents in a true form the 
spectrum of Muslim ethnicity.  We can’t continue to have this narrative which then 
presupposes everything else including a need for institutionalisation of identity 
based on race and which becomes confused with a need for religious expression. 
The second phase of this reimagination has to be around the political identity 
and expression of the Muslim community. What we have seen with the 
transformation of identity in Sri Lanka amidst the political and conflict context 
changes is that political elites from the Muslim community have failed to 
understand the change in political context in Sri Lanka.   
 
The experience of the political challenges of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka 
also raises questions about complex political transitions (especially in post 
conflict scenarios), where politically active minorities have to tread a fine line in 
terms of balancing national plus community sentiments.  In politically complex 
transitions, politically active minorities can’t rely on block votes as this only works 
in the short run and depends on dividing the majority.  However, this scenario is 
a narrow window. Thus in order to remain active and viable, ethnic block voting 
has to transition and evolve to produce another narrative of identity.  This new 
narration of identity has to consider multiple identities that also splits the majority 
vote and to some extent this is what Sen (2006) alluded to as well. Identity is 
flexible and changing and minority polity has to be flexible and to evolve to 
respond to this. The process of minority block voting only works if the majority 
community is divided politically which was largely the case during the conflict, in 
Sri Lanka but the moment with the end of the conflict, the Sinhala community was 
largely aligned politically with the state, the Muslim community concept of block 
voting became irrelevant. In other words, block voting has a shelf life and can’t 
be considered a panacea for minority politics.  There has to be a realisation of an 
evolution of politics and thinking which is also affected when politically active 
ethno-religious minorities have a double problem in traversing their ethnic and 
religious duties and principles.   
  




What I show is that the transformation of a constituency at the grassroots in the 
light of changes in political and global contexts could undermine the legitimacy of 
political elites if they fail to understand, appreciate and respond to meet those 
challenges.  What the example of the Sri Lankan Muslim community shows, 
which is useful for elsewhere is that whilst Muslim democrats (a Muslim political 
party) can protect the right of an ethno religious minority in the wake of political 
challenges, religious expression which can lead to a homogenisation of identity 
and the process of the homogenisation of the political identity of the Muslim 
community can lead to their isolation away from key political debates. So a 
Muslim Democratic (political) party can not exist easily in a situation of a minority 
where a faith identity is also part of a conversation of an ethnic identity.  The 
experience from Sri Lanka is that such a scenario is very difficult if it is just 
managed as a binary expression.  It works much better if there is a recognition of 
the multiplicity of identities as well as a changing context at the grass roots and 
at the top. 
 
We see this taking place in Sri Lanka where political elites from the Muslim 
community failed to understand grassroots dynamics and is actually part of a 
cycle that has been experienced before.  This happened in the mid 1980s which 
led to the formation of the SLMC as elites from the South failed to understand the 
security concerns of the eastern Muslims and thus it was felt that the eastern 
Muslims needed their own separate party to look after their secure interests.  It 
then happened again in 2009 after ethnic politics lost legitimacy after the conflict 
and the dynamics of the community changed at the grass roots.   From being 
largely a divided polity during the conflict, the Sinhala majority community 
became ‘united’ at the end of the conflict which emboldened extreme nationalists 
thereby weakening the Muslim polity.  The grassroots also underwent a change 
in context as the political context also changed.  In other words, at the grass roots, 
the Sinhala Muslim relation did not really improve after the conflict and in fact 
exposed all the weaknesses and fractures that had so far been masked by the 
conflict and the focus perhaps on Sinhala Tamil relations.  During the conflict, the 
Sinhalese forgot about their relations with the Muslims and the Muslims were 
naively and blissfully ignorant developing their identity and expression almost in 
a vacuum to the conflict and those dynamics.  This was exposed and exploited 
by the extreme Sinhala nationalists post 2009 leading to the violent incidents of 
2014, 2017 and 2018 but the Muslim political elites did not understand this bottom 
up change in community dynamics and also did not understand the emergent of 
the nationalist mainstream politics.  The Muslim community also being led by 
political and religious dynamics failed to appreciate these dynamics as well.    
Lewer and Ismail (2011) allude to this when they talk about the next steps for the 
Muslim community in the east of Sri Lanka as a three pronged approach of 
Muslim political thought: one that is really regional and context specific so for 
example, how in the East the Muslim polity engages with their Tamil counterparts; 
how these regional politics renogitiates a position with the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the central perspective; and a politics that stands for a more 
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nationalistic solution. So elaborating on this, thinking about a three pronged 
approach of Muslim political thought has to take into account the changing 
context and an evolution of the community in terms of influences and 
externalities.   Although there was some attempt to do away with the ethnic 
nationalist politics by the founder of the SLMC with the formation of another party 
with Sinhala parties to get back the Muslims back to mainstream politics his 
untimely death meant that this legacy was not continued.  And the question still 
remains what is the strategy for a nationalistic solution? Part of this starts from a 
rethinking around collective mobilising for addressing community concerns is 
undertaken.  What we have seen especially in the past decade, is that this type 
of political engagement is no longer the way forward for the Muslim community. 
 
The third phase is about the classification of identity. The concept of piety and 
spirituality has to be divorced from the political reality of identity expression. So 
the premise is that one can be a good political Muslim and a bad spiritual Muslim: 
one can practice the spiritual aspects of Islam, be a ‘practicing’ Muslim but a bad 
political representative; of course, one can also be both.  However, the issue here 
is not to be too prescriptive on linking being Muslim in Sri Lanka to simply being 
about spirituality and piety. 
The fourth phase of the reimagination to be addressed thus is around the 
deconstruction of an ethnic identity embedded within a religious framework, 
which poses several challenges for the community and the relationships with 
others.  Despite a heterogeneity ascribed to an ethnic identity, the concept of a 
Muslim identity label can lend itself to a growing homogenizing tendency based 
on a religious outlook.  This is especially given the global trend of Islamic 
reformation which based on influences from Saudi leads to a certain 
understanding around the concept of a ‘pure’ Islam which can lead to other issues 
around religious identity.  This means that the overarching Muslim identity has 
evolved within this diversity.  It is this tension due to prevailing socio-political 
conditions of conflict that leads us to think of a need for a reimagining of identity, 
agency and expression as a result of this.  There is a need to take into account 
the changing circumstances of the context in Sri Lanka in order to understand 
that things are now different.  It is perhaps, best seen as a dialectical process 
where pre-existent discourses become reconfigured and circulated when public 
and political discourse in society at large support and nurture such discourses.  
What is at stake is how the Muslims identify themselves. To a large extent the 
shape this discourse takes will depend on the macro political environment but a 
reimagining of the Muslim identity will also have an important role to play in 
shaping the future of these discourses. Thus the conversation has to centre 
around traversing a ethno-religious discourse whilst attempting to define a 
political stance.  Thus we have to redefine who the Sri Lankan Muslim is!! 
 
This is the contention of this thesis that the Muslim community have become 
victims of their own doing.  Whilst the Muslim community (like the other two 
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communities in Sri Lanka) have succeeded in becoming an ‘imagined’ 
community, based on an ‘imagined geography’  that has an imagined political 
community that disregards  the majority of the other inhabitants within the nation 
and reproduces their imaginations with cultural roots (Anderson 1983), they have 
underestimated the ethnic confrontation with the  pan – Islamic influences that 
would result and the changing temporal and spatial dynamics of religious 
expression especially Islamic reformism from the late seventies.  Hence there 
was a perfect storm as the global pan Islamic reformism coincided with the search 
for the Muslims in Sri Lanka to articulate a separate identity in the face of the 
conflict and trying to develop an expression for themselves separate from the 
‘other’. This was seized upon by the Muslim elites in Sri Lanka who somehow did 
not understand or comprehend that this would have a life of its own and evolve. 
With pan–Islamic influences, there became a preoccupation with looking 
internally as opposed to considering the external message of reform that is at the 
heart of the original Islamic message: that of changing the society for the better.  
This lack of synergy between the practices through which Muslim society is 
transformed and energized and the practices of society at large, exhibited by 
these reform groups, means that there was and is as yet no meeting point 
between the language of the piety movement and the demands of social 
expression for ethnic representations in the larger Sri Lankan context.  The 
reification of the Sri Lankan Muslim identity assumes the homogeneity of identity 
because of a religious edict without recognising the diversity of individual 
communities and identities.   
Recalibrating	the	Premise	
Thus the premise is that the reimagining of the Muslim identity for Sri Lanka has 
to be one  where  Islamic reformism in piety and theology makes sense, in 
recognising the diversity and homogeneity of the Muslim community; in guiding 
an ethnic and local agency and expression whereby, cultural practices and 
traditions are enhanced not replaced by theology; to  struggle for greater justice 
and against discrimination; defend civil responsibilities and the democratic 
processes and restore the dignity of conscience and human values (Ramadan 
2004).  In this sense Muslim political representatives and a Muslim political party 
(or even a reformist group) who define themselves with guidelines from the 
Qur’an and “Islamic principles”, should have focussed on conveying honesty and 
incorruptibility, and with grassroots support, to have used those same principles 
towards building an identity and relations with other communities by emphasising 
an ethical system and orientation that promotes social justice through equal rights 
and opportunities.   
 
This re-imagination of the community identity has to include rethinking what the 
Muslim community is, represents and ultimately identifies with.  In its evolution it 
has undertaken a number of different forms of identity as it sought to carve a 
place in Sri Lanka, however it is clear that from the the recent anti Muslim 
violence, the community is now at a crossroads.  The role that they carve out for 
themselves is dependent on them being seen as part of the solution and not as 
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an additional problem. This comes back to the fact that they need to articulate a 
comprehensive platform and identity (based on their Islamic principles of ethics) 
that takes into consideration the whole community and country.  The community 
can not shed its religious label, and thus a rethinking of the identity has to start 
from understanding how one approaches Islamic reformation.  
 
In this sense, it is worth exploring how Asad (1986) argues that Islam should be 
understood as a 'discursive tradition' producing doctrine and practice that are 
historically situated.   So what Asad is talking about is a tradition that consists 
essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct 
form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has 
a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was 
instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has 
been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that practice can best be secured 
in the short or long term, or why it should be modified or abandoned), through a 
present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions). An 
Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that 
addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a 
particular Islamic practice in the present. This discursive tradition is constituted 
and reconstituted not only by an ongoing interaction between the present and the 
past, however, but also by the manner in which relations of power and other forms 
of contestation and conflict impinge on any definition of what it is to be a Muslim. 
Such a view of Islam, Asad suggests, helps avoid essentialist constructions that 
strive to judge all facets of Islamic thought, ideals, and practice in terms of how 
they relate to (or, more often than not, fail to relate to) Islam’s foundational texts, 
even as it seeks to steer clear of the temptation to reduce the variety of religious 
and cultural expression to different, local ‘Islams’.   This is perhaps essentially 
how the Muslims of Sri Lanka fashioned their narrative.  While Asad's definition 
helps to challenge and overcome problems of the conceptualisation of change in 
Muslim society, by historically situating the production of doctrine and practice it 
mainly captures the element of time and not space.  This is what we see about 
the limitations of the construct of the narrative currently put out by the Muslim 
community in Sri Lanka.   
 
Thus in order for there to be a reimagining of this, we need to be aware of more 
than the discursive.  We need to be aware of the dialogical process of 
relationships and religions in Sri Lanka, where the discursive is also met with 
interactions and relationships, in demographic and other spaces as much as it is 
affected by the context and situation at the time.   Thus the complexity in Sri 
Lanka of an identity based on the history and heritage of the Muslim / Moor 
community versus the relationship and external facets of what happened when 
the community developed and had external factors.  We also have to discuss the 
'objectification' of Islam (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004) in Sri Lanka, whereby the 
process by which basic questions come to the fore in the consciousness of this 
did not occur specifically as a result of a disillusionment with secularisation, 
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modernisation, democracy or the nation-state. It came about as a significant push 
to define oneself against the ‘other’.  Hence any discussions around religion and 
theology has to take these considerations into context 
 
There needs to be a rethink about the identity for the Muslim community (and 
beyond).  We need to come back to the concept that we are not just Muslims but 
Moors, Malays, and so on as well as Sinhalese and Tamil.  We are not 
homogenous but heterogeneous and made up of multiple identities.  We are no 
longer one entity. We also need to more away from the concept of Muslims being 
in Sri Lanka for 1000 years. We have emerged and evolved and although linked 
with religion, we are different to regions and need to work on that to ensure some 
better relationships.  So it is vital for the Muslims of the east that the Muslims in 
the south and central are in good relationship with the Sinhalese but equally it is 
important to the Muslims of the south and central to realise that there are cultural 
and other differences that they need to understand especially with Muslims out 
of those regions. 
 
The gist is that the Muslim community cannot be ignored nor marginalised (by 
either the Tamil or the Sinhala polity) when considering the future of Sri Lanka in 
a post conflict scenario.  However, the role that they carve out for themselves is 
dependent on them seeing themselves as part of the solution not an additional 
problem.  This comes back to the fact that they need to articulate a 
comprehensive platform and identity (based on their Islamic principles of ethics) 
that takes into consideration the whole community and country. Their part in 
reconciliation and forgiveness (based from their Islamic references) is vital.   
 
However, they cannot afford to be politically naive and need to develop a 
sophisticated argument and agenda.   Because of global concerns about the rise 
of conservative Islam it is easy to conflate terminology and ideology with 
radicalisation, violent extremism and potential conflicts.  In this case, Muslims 
especially those living in areas where Sinhalese are the majority and who have 
legitimate grievances, need to pay attention. While Muslims are aware of the 
challenges they are facing, they have to be able to understand where they have 
gone wrong. There needs to be a realization that exclusive social practices and 
values practice among Muslims themselves have to be curtailed. This allows the 
beginning of a potential conversation in ensuring that tensions can be alleviated.  
8.4			Final	Reflections 
In Sri Lanka attempts at redefining politics and religion are not useful and in a 
practical context can be seen as meaningless mainly because of the 
interconnectedness between the two entities.  My argument has been that Islam, 
ethnic and politics religion are intertwined and constitute a different perspective 
that creates a political / ethno / religious representation.   This is definitely different 
to how we traditionally approach this classification where religion, ethnic and 
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politics through the state are understood as fixed and separate. Instead we need 
to look at how a hybrid of these representations are done with the process of how 
the boundaries between these concepts move, what factors cause these 
movements and its implications. The process of shifting, breaking and remaking 
the boundaries of religion whilst ensuring institutionalisation can indeed be 
described as the evolution of the institutionalisation of religious identity. 
As a ‘third party’ in the complex ethnic politics of Sri Lanka, the Muslim community 
have been transformed under its influence and forced to define themselves and 
seek their own discourse. However, this has also meant that there has been an 
element of naivety in how they have conducted themselves trying to forge their 
own identity, in particular with the simultaneous combination of balancing the 
combination of external ethno-nationalist rivalries with the internal Islamic 
doctrinal conflict.  
 
So what is the answer to the question posed as to what the Muslim community 
should do now?   
 
The way forward has to be about a re-imagination of what the Muslim community 
is, represents and ultimately identifies with.  It has to include thinking about how 
well the community manage the formation of attitude towards ‘other’ ethnicities 
and practices adopted to mitigate negative attitudes. In this regard much work is 
needed by the Muslim community to work towards possible behaviour change in 
order to experience ‘other’ communities. 
 
Muslims have struggled and still continue to struggle to articulate Muslim 
grievances from the conflict in a manner that brings confidence to the other two 
parties of a sincerity of goals for the benefit of the whole country and in a manner 
that perhaps changes the current misconceptions regarding Muslims’ place in the 
conflict.  
However, the role that they carve out for themselves is dependent on them being 
seen as part of the solution and not as an additional problem. This comes back 
to the fact that they need to articulate a comprehensive platform and identity 
(based on their Islamic principles of ethics) that takes into consideration the whole 
community and country. This is one of the antidotes that can neutralize the 
advances of a minority of Sinhala Buddhist extremists.  
The Muslim community has found itself caught between a rock and a hard place. 
Undoubtedly, their future prospects could be based on their past, but the past 
should not become a ball and chain for the future. Muslim politicians have made 
mistakes in reacting and developing a separate identity. Their naivety and quest 
for political representation obscured the gains that could have been made for the 
country. Coupled with the now rising religious consciousness of the community, 
which confuses religious and ethnic identity, there are real challenges for 
representation and identification.  
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Any movement forward needs to articulate a common space for all of these 
representations to take place.   
However, the Muslim community will now have to advance this thinking and this 
re-imagination. As discussed earlier on in the chapter, whilst undertaking this 
revision, Sri Lanka suffered its worst suicide bombing attack with the Easter 
Sunday attacks on churches and hospitals.  Carried out by locals belonging to a 
Muslim terror group aligned with the Islamic State, the scale of the attacks not 
only shocked the global community but in its aftermath have thrust a lot of scrutiny 
on the Muslim community.  Though the latter have been quick to respond and 
distance themselves from the acts of violence, they are now under scrutiny in 
terms of their identity and action.  Early indications are that that the Muslim 
community is under pressure to ‘respond’ and ‘reform’ according to concerns 
others might have of their conservative religious practices and identity, 
particularly as the likes of organisations such as the BBS and others (who were 
active in the post 2009 period pushing against a visible conservative Muslim 
identity and presence) have now been emboldened to come out and be strong in 
their push to ‘regulate’ the community.  Already there have been public calls for 
the banning of the Burqa and Madrassahs and so on.  In the emotional fervour of 
the attacks whilst this is expected, what is unknown at this moment at is what the 
future will hold.  There is a lot to be observed and discussed in the coming months 
and years around this which at this early stage can not be speculated on.   
My immediate analysis though is that I think that the relationship that the Muslim 
community had with both the Tamils and the Sinhalese (and with the Christians) 
has been changed and will take a long time to rebuild (if at all)425. The 
accommodation politics that the Muslim polity had hitherto been employing has 
probably now disappeared and they will have to employ if not forced to go through 
a different type of relationship.  As scrutiny becomes securitised the Muslim 
community will be expected to change their visible identity and their expressions 
of religious practices and how they define themselves vis-à-vis the other 
communities and the country.  How this manifests itself depends on how 
proactive the community and polity are versus how much they react to situations.  
The four phases described above could serve as a starting point for that 
conversation as the nation seeks a way of healing.  It is clear though that in this 
vacuum created, the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist narrative will become more 
prominent and minorities will now need to acquiesce even more.  This has to be 
understood and followed through. 
 
 





It is hoped that this research will fill a gap that exists around contemporary Sri 
Lankan Muslim identity especially in moving forward after the Easter Sunday 
attacks, where there will be more public scrutiny and calls for Muslims to 
assimilate and accommodate the ‘Sri Lankan’ identity.  As I tried to do my work 
in this basis, I was struck by the lack of credible and volume of work in this aspect 
of Muslim identity in Sri Lanka especially in the contemporary times.  This 
research thus stands out from much of the contemporary work primarily because 
in Sri Lanka a lot of work has been done around the conflict and the relations 
between the Sinhalese and Tamils, with very little being done on the Muslim 
community. This research also adds to the conversation around politically active 
minorities and how evolving circumstances and contexts need to be 
comprehended to ensure relevance and coherence.  
There is also something to be said about the transnational similarities between 
Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar that this study will go to some lengths to 
unpick.  Like Sri Lanka, Myanmar has a similar trajectory of identity politics that 
are largely elite-centric to secure governmental office, socio-political mobilisation 
and legitimacy. Some of these approaches are explicitly instrumental looking at 
intra-group ethnic outbidding led by ethnic entrepreneurs, with a stress on 
“linguistic nationalism” as the functional mechanism thoroughly infused with the 
logic of majoritarian Buddhist nationalist and ethnic hierarchies.  Both have 
parallel histories where the territorial integrity of the state and the protection of 
the majority populations’ core values, culture and the Buddhist religion have 
become inextricably interconnected, to the extent that citizenship and 
development policies either explicitly or implicitly privilege the Burman or Sinhala 
identities, a dynamic that marginalizes minorities who do not remain faithfully 
subordinate, peripheral or assimilate within this overarching hierarchy.  Thus 
such an instrumentalist approach demarcates distinct socio- political spaces and 
dynamics within Burma and Sri Lanka, of state and society, authoritarianism and 
democracy, elites and ‘people’, with nationalism and ethnicity residing in the elite 
and state spheres and obscures the socially diffuse hegemony of these identity 
practices. In this sense it will become interesting for the future to understand how 
such hegemonisation leads to contestation amongst and between the elites over 
the high ground of nationalist authenticity. 
Taken in this vein there is also much to learn from the Sri Lankan experience to 
a wider regional perspective especially around the ethno-politics of market 
dominant or trading communities.  As Chua (2003) hypothesised, 
democratization and globalization lead to ethnic violence in the presence of a 
market-dominant minority. As these minorities live by and benefit from ‘the 
market’, Chua aptly labels them ‘market-dominant minorities’ (MDMs). MDMs 
typically control large parts of the economy so that globalizing markets favour 
them disproportionally. In turn, growing inequalities lead to resentment among 
the majority which, in democratic settings, cannot be contained by repression - 
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or is even stimulated by office-seeking politicians. Chua’s main argument is that 
such resentment causes a violent backlash against the MDM, against markets 
and against democracy.  The case of Sri Lanka contradicts and validates that 
thesis.  On the one hand it does show that the Muslims as a perceived MDM were 
under threat of resentment but it shows that the accommodation politics hitherto 
utilised had allowed it a safe space to operate whilst allowing them to maintain 
their exclusive identity. Yet there is a threshold that once past can prove fatal to 
the fact that these identity narratives need to be changed. 
The experience of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka can speak to the situation 
of politically indigenous active Muslim minorities in non Muslim countries who 
have a challenge with faith as an identity expression whilst trying to develop a 
community identity and how they need to constantly balance both in order to 
create safe dynamics.  In the Sri Lankan case you have this constant tension in 
maintaining the elite interest of representation with the grass roots expectation 
for privileges and rights.  It is a hybrid approach that then challenges the normal 
integration of constructivist /ethno-symbolist theories. 
This thesis challenges the common narrative about the conflict in Sri Lanka (and 
post conflict reconciliation) that there are two stakeholders in the conflict.  What 
we see is that the Muslims are also a significant stakeholder in and victim of the 
conflict and need to be figured in any post conflict reconciliation conversation.  In 
addition, it also challenges the Muslim community to really rethink its identity 
formation and narrative both internally and also lead an external conversation.  
This can be controversial but is definitely a needed conversation.  There has to 
be a reimagining of how the Muslim community really identify themselves and 
also how they want to be associated with faith. 
This research has shown that for minority politics there is nothing such as binary 
or a homogenous identity formation and minority political representation and 
identity expression that insist on this, is disconnected from the reality.  As we 
have seen the Muslim political and ethnic identity which also depended on 
religious agency, manifested in monumental changes to Muslims and Islam. We 
can not explore the politicisation of Islam just as an ever changing process, 
without analysing and understanding the lived experience of Muslims during such 
a process.  
In Sri Lanka political Islam was intrinsically linked to Muslims' position, not just as 
a minority group but as a 'second minority'. Their need for separation, to be 
identified and exist separate from the ethnic/religious other, came as a 
consequence of being compressed between two dominant groups who were 
engaged in a conflict with each other, a conflict that was itself primarily about 
identity and existence. The Sri Lankan case illustrates how being a minority 
population can be a critical contributing factor to nationalist majority politics during 
times of crisis, but how this can become irrelevant once a tipping point has been 
reached and there needs to be a rethink of that engagement, which takes into 
account changing grass roots dynamics.  It is about understanding the complex 
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relationship of faith as a community galvaniser and a moral marker which when 
politicised manifests itself in a minority context but also how that very factor, of 
being a minority, causes the politicisation process. Also we have to consider the 
effect and influence of other groups on the development of the politicisation of 
Islam.  As we have seen in Sri Lanka, the formation of the Muslim identity was 
largely in response to the formations of the identity of the ‘Other’ and has 
challenged theories around identity formation as this is really a hybrid argument. 
What we see is that the discussion of the Muslim identity in Sri Lanka weakens 
an essentialist perception which is often utlised to create a binary representation 
of Muslims.  Other groups in Sri Lanka also underwent religious reformation and 
also emerged with similar conservative religious interpretations which affected 
their co-existence with others.   The lived experience at the grass roots and the 
relations between communities is important to really understand how identities of 
communities and ultimately society needs to be developed. 
This thesis also never was intended to be a theory testing piece of work.  Instead 
theory has been used to make sense of the argument in the very least or to 
understand how the theory itself can be challenged as is clearly the case 
described above with regards Brubaker where it is clear that elements of his 
notion of ‘triadic nexus’ has been challenged because it shows that the lived 
experience of ethno-politics makes it very difficult to have binary representations 
of identity, their formation, relationships and engagement. Yet the thesis does 
show what Brubaker (2002) describes as the need to rethink classification of 
ethnicity preferably without groups, precisely because of the possible divergence 
between the interests of leaders and those of their constituents, which can keep 
us from accepting at face value leaders’ claims about the beliefs, desires and 
interests of their constituents.  We have seen this in the experience of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community and thus the challenges being placed on theories of 
ethno politics. 
I want to finally discuss some limitations with my work in terms of analysing my 
findings and in my discussions with key informants and others for this thesis.  I 
found that there is definitely a binary approach to how people look at this identity 
and were not willing to think beyond that.  For example, there is still a prevailing 
concept that Muslims came to Sri Lanka 1000 years ago and to think and say 
otherwise is considered wrong.  This is from both the Muslims and the non Muslim 
community.  No one wants to question the fallacy of an ethnic identity called 
Muslims.  There is no starting point on this.  We accept this as given.  Hence if 
we really want to have a true in-depth conversation we need to start from there, 
otherwise anything else is a window dressing.  Hence in doing my research, it 
was frustrating to find that no one even considered this or was willing to talk about 
it in detail. In addition, I am conscious that this was more of a qualitative study 
than a quantitative study.  This was deliberate from my end to enable an initial 
discussion around this topic and felt that this was a legitimate way to start the 
conversation.  Thus this was not a complete study but the beginning of the study 
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which needs to be continued.  Hence the next phase after this thesis has to be 
more quantitative than qualitative to really add weight to the theory.  It has to 
complement the elite approach taken in this thesis by being a more bottom up 
approach with more grass roots engagement. 
Being a Sri Lankan Muslim myself, I felt able to bridge language, cultural, religious 
and other similar barriers that can affect research findings. I also understand and 
acknowledge that there can always be gaps in interpretation. However, I was 
unable to bridge the gap between the core beliefs of my subjects and my 
epistemological grounding. I found it quite problematic that the analysis of the 
phenomenon I have been studying was being conducted in an opposing 
paradigm to the phenomenon itself: two paradigms based on conflicting 
ideologies and world views.  
In order to make progress on this thinking for Sri Lankan Muslims, we need to 
resolve this fundamental aspect of who are the Sri Lankan Muslims and where 
they came from. 
Scholarly work across disciplines has begun a process of challenging Western 
academia to better understand the developments in Muslim societies and within 
Islam. This thesis contributes to this work and opens up new areas for further 
analysis. In addition to what has already been identified in this conclusion there 
are other areas which warrant further research.  
As has been pointed out by other research and also this thesis, we need a better 
understanding of the causes of the anti Muslim violence especially by the 
Sinhalese as this has been happening over the last century.  In addition, we need 
to understand the relations of trans-national elements of Buddhist-Muslim 
tensions as evidenced by what is happening in Myanmar and Thailand, as these 
are very similar in nature and rhetoric. 
Further research on the lines of that conducted in this thesis, in the same areas, 
could provide an understanding of how the politicisation of Islam and the 
expression of identity continue to be affected by targeted attacks on Muslims.   It 
should also explore the challenge to ethno-politics theory in terms of the binary 
representation on identity formation and relationships between minority and 
majority which are affected by the lived experience.  It should also be used to 
explore how the community can move forward to face the pressures that are there 
and will come after the Easter Sunday attacks. 
There is substantial literature on the spread of Wahhabism and that influence on 
a theological expression of Muslim identity.  This can not be explained in isolation 
to the other factors for Muslim identity but there certainly needs to be more 
research done around Islamic reformations in Sri Lanka as well as religious 
movements.  Again the Easter Sunday attacks will prompt this to be undertaken 
sooner rather than later. 
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Finally, the biggest contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how Islam can be 
politicised in a Muslim minority situation, and how minority status can itself cause 
this politicisation as well as how it can become disconnected from the lived 
experiences of the heterogeneity of the Muslim community. I end my work with 
this call that there needs to be more research not only into this phenomenon as 
it challenges our understanding of contemporary Islam and lived experiences of 
Muslim communities, but also we need more research into Sri Lankan Muslims, 






Interviews were carried out in three forms: face to face interviews; skype 
interviews and focus group discussions. 
Face to face interviews: 
• Mrs Ferial Ashraff (August 2015) – former Member of Parliament and 
Minister, head of the National Unity Alliance.  She is also the widow of 
the late M.H.M Ashraff the founder of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
and was able to provide first hand accounts   
• Rev Ebenezer Joseph (October 2015) – General Secretary of the 
National Christian Council of Sri Lanka and former president of the 
Methodist Church of Sri Lanka.  He is someone that I have engaged in 
conversations with in the past really to understand Buddhist / Christian 
relations which mirrors some of the challenges being faced between 
Muslims and Buddhists. 
• The late Professor Ken Bush (November 2015) – An academic with 
Durham University who had done substantial work on Sri Lanka 
especially during the conflict with his work on Critical Junctures but sadly 
passed away unexpectedly in 2016.  I have also referred to his work 
extensively in this research as highlighted in the bibliography 
• The late Mr Izzeth Hussein (January 2016) – former diplomat and 
prominent commentator on Sri Lankan Muslim communities especially in 
the print media.  I have also referred to many of his articles in my 
research.  He sadly passed away in 2017 
• Mrs Jezima Ismail (July 2016) – chairperson of Muslim Women Research 
Action Front.  Well respected former educationalist and civil society 
leader known for her leadership on community issues especially around 
the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA).  She is also recognised 
for her leadership in Muslim community affairs 
• Dr Farzana Haniffa (July 2016) – academic at the University of Colombo 
and chair of the Secretariat of Muslims.  She is also a well known writer 
and commentator on Muslim community affairs 
• Mr Naushad Majeed (November 2016) – former Member of Parliament 
and local government politician from the east of Sri Lanka.  Closely 
associated with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress in the past and being 
from the east of the country, he is a commentator on community issues 
Skype interviews: 
• Dr Imthiaz Razak (August 2015) – academic from Temple University in 
the USA.  He has written extensively around Muslim social and political 
issues and I have also collaborated with him on several papers together.  
I have also used him extensively as a reference for my thesis 
• Prof Ameer Ali (March 2016) – academic from the University of Western 
Australia and former president of the Australian Federation of Islamic 
Councils.  He also writes extensively around Muslim social and political 
issues.  I have used him extensively as a reference for my thesis. 
Focus Group Discussions: As part of my research on top of individual 
interviews, I carried out some focus group discussions with different 
constituencies, that enabled me to get a wider perspective of issues 
• Muslim Business Men (May 2015) – a group of Muslim business men 
who I discussed many issues with around the halal certification, 
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pressures on economics from Sinhala nationalists and also to get an idea 
from them on their take around Muslim community issues 
• Muslim professionals (May 2016) – this was a mixed group (gender and 
age) of professionals within the Muslim community all involved at 
different levels as well as having different approaches to how they 
understand the community 
• Buddhist monks (June 2016) – this was specifically done to get a sense 
of the Buddhist understanding of the issues of identity and also the 
relations and current tensions between the Sinhalese Buddhist and 
Muslim communities   
• Muslim Civil Society Activists (November 2016) -  I conducted this focus 
group discussion with young (average age 22) civil society activists all 
involved in one way or another with the Muslim community.  This was an 
interesting discussion to see how they perceive these issues. 
Field Visits: In addition, I conducted some informal field visits to meet and 
discuss with people on the ground.  Though these discussions were not formally 
recorded I still hold these interactions as valuable field research to get an 
understanding of the thinking on the ground.  Field visits were conducted to the 
following places: 
• Amparai district (September 2014) – this is in the Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka and the birthplace of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC).  It 
was important to ascertain how people understood the birth of the SLMC, 
the politics of the conflict and the current issues facing the Muslim 
community.  It was also important to understand how they viewed the 
history of the community and the conflict 
• Kandy (December 2015) – this is in the central province and before the 
ethnic riots in 2018 was a place of close relationship between the 
Sinhalese and the Muslims.  It was interesting to see here how the 1915 
riots did not figure in most people’s radar screens 
• Kathankudy (December 2016) –  this is in the eastern province of Sri 
Lanka and was the site of the conflict in 1990 and also of discussions 
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